The author traces the historical evolution of the distinction between international humanitarian law and international human rights law. He demonstrates that the structures of the two regimes follow from the fact that while humanitarian law was designed to apply in periods of war, human rights law was to apply in periods of peace. The difference between the two are not matters of abstract logic. Rather, they have important consequences for the functioning of these important branches of international law.

L'autodétermination des peuples autochtones suscite la controverse en droit international contemporain depuis que le processus de décolonisation s'est achevé, à la fin des années 1960. Parce qu’ils craignaient avant tout des désordres nationaux, de nombreux pays ont refusé de reconnaître que les peuples autochtones ont le droit de se séparer du territoire national et d'obtenir leur indépendance. Cependant, même la reconnaissance d'un droit moins vaste, soit un droit de recevoir un statut spécial et d'obtenir l'autonomie politique dans le cadre des frontières étatiques existantes, demeure une question litigieuse, car aucune définition claire des bénéficiaires et de la substance de ces droits ne peut être établie. De toute façon, la disparité des conditions politiques, économiques, sociales et climatiques dans lesquelles vivent les peuples autochtones du monde entier rend futile la création d'un seul et unique concept d'autodétermination qui s'appliquerait au monde entier. Pour sortir de cette impasse, on propose d'adopter une approche procédurale, au lieu d'essayer de fixer ces questions dans des termes juridiques stricts.

Le fait de qualifier le concept d'autodétermination de processus, au lieu de le décrire comme étant une série de règles exactes et préétablies, a pour avantage d'apporter un élément de flexibilité, car il permet aux deux parties, c'est-à-dire les États et les peuples autochtones, de trouver des appuis pour défendre leurs intérêts et d'imaginer une solution viable qui tienne compte des circonstances particulières de chaque cas. Mais toutes les parties concernées devraient tout d'abord accepter trois conditions préalables:

(1) Le droit de sécession immédiate et d'indépendance complète, en tant qu'aspect du droit à l'autodétermination, devrait être réservé aux peuples autochtones des territoires d'outre-mer.

(2) Les États ont le devoir de favoriser l'autonomie de leurs peuples autochtones et le fardeau de prouver qu 'ih offrent la plus grande autonomie possible aux peuples autochtones vivant sur leurs territoires.

(3) Une fois que des ententes relatives à l'autonomie ont été conclues, les États ne peuvent pas les révoquer, les abréger ou les modifier unilatéralement.

L'auteur de cette note examine ensuite le régime d'autonomie du Groenland et conclut que ce régime semble satisfaire aux critères énoncés, bien que la question du statut actuel du Groenland (et des îles Faroe) au sein du royaume danois demeure incertaine sur le plan constitutionnel. Le régime d'autonomie implique un transfert irrévocable des pouvoirs législatifs et administratifs des autorités danoùes aux autorités du Groenland, ce qui a pour effet de créer un régime juridique indépendant au Groenland. Par ailleurs, il est entendu que le régime d'autonomie du Groenland permet d'établir un système judiciaire indépendant, si les tribunaux danois du Groenland ne reconnaissent pas la validité de la Loi d'autonomie du Groenland.

Although a number of learned articles and even books have appeared recently on the subject of state succession, relatively little has been written about the practical problems faced by a new state seeking to establish the scope of its treaty obligations. An examination of these practical, even mundane, problems indicates that some of the current theoretical arguments are unreal, and that a shift of emphasis in discussion would be desirable.

The practical problems in defining a new state’s treaty obligations are illustrated well by the cases of new Commonwealth countries.

Since mid-1961, a research project at Queen’s University at Kingston, Ontario, has sought to determine which of the old British treaties continue to apply to Canada. Surprisingly enough, even an older Commonwealth country like Canada has not yet been able to reach a firm decision on this question. Thus, Professor (now Dean) Maxwell Cohen of McGill University was obliged to tell the Duke Conference on Canadian-American Treaty Relations in 1961 that existing Canadian publications were inadequate, and to urge that Canada's treaties be collected and published.

The canadian plan suggested to the 21st session of the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1966 for re-allocating China's seat in the world Organization was designed to bring about a breakthrough in resolving a question of great complexity that has beset that Organization for some 17 years. It has attracted world-wide attention and evoked various comments by both practitioners and students of international politics.

Before analyzing the contents and denoting the legal and political implications of the plan, it is necessary to review briefly the background and the discussions of the question of China's representation at the 21st General Assembly.

On July 20, 1962, the International Court of Justice handed down its Advisory Opinion concerning the expenditures of the United Nations for peace-keeping operations in the Middle East and in the Congo. This Opinion is of the utmost importance, since it deals with a question affecting the very survival of the World Organization. The Court was asked to pronounce on the financial obligations of members in the fulfilment of the first purpose of the United Nations: the maintenance of international peace and security. The Opinion also involves the constitutional question of the division of powers between the General Assembly and the Security Council in the attainment of this basic purpose.

Les marchés publics sont essentiellement régulés ou réglementés, au niveau mondial, par l’Accord plurilatéral sur les marchés publics de l’OMC (AMP). Cet Accord est aujourd’hui sur le point de prendre un nouvel envol, car les négociations dont il faisait l’objet ont abouti à la fin de l’année 2011 et l’AMP révisé est entré en vigueur le 6 avril 2014. Bien que l’entrée en vigueur de l’AMP révisé insuffle un élan vigoureux à l’ouverture des marchés, elle ne constitue toutefois pas la fin du processus visant à libéraliser les marchés publics. Afin de comprendre la nécessité de négocier de façon quasi permanente une libéralisation accrue des marchés publics et d’apprécier pleinement l’importance de l’AMP révisé pour l’économie mondiale, cet article décrit succinctement les événements marquants de l’histoire des négociations internationales visant à libéraliser les marchés publics et présente ensuite, d’une façon générale, les principaux éléments du texte de l’AMP révisé. De plus, cet article contient une analyse approfondie des listes d’engagements des Parties à l’AMP révisé (les annexes à l’Appendice I) car, malgré une certaine simplification résultant de la conclusion des négociations, cette partie de l’AMP révisé demeure particulièrement technique et complexe. Ces renseignements et observations connexes pourraient, d’une part, apporter une aide aux décideurs confrontés à des choix dans ce domaine et, d’autre part, aider à identifier les débouchés à l’exportation qui sont susceptibles d’intéresser les fournisseurs des Parties à l’AMP et des autres Membres de l’OMC désirant accéder à l’Accord.

The executive directors of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), having formulated a Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, approved on March 18, 1965 the submission of the text of the Convention to member governments of the Bank. This action represents a milestone in the efforts of several international organizations to achieve some sort of harmony in an area of international economic development where there has been manifest disunity. The arbitration of private investment disputes has strong legal and political undertones, for it is set against a background of friction between capital-exporting countries that always seek to protect the interests of their nationals abroad, and capital-importing countries that normally recognize a need for foreign private capital to bolster their economic development, yet are wary of allowing external mechanisms to encroach on their sovereign jurisdiction within their own territory.

A first reading of the majority opinion in the South West Africa Cases, Second Phase, may leave the Common Law reader with the feeling of having waded through the marshes of a pre-Judicature Act search for a form of action in which to frame this case; the plaintiff having failed to find the proper writ, the defendant's demurrer is thereby upheld. The extremely technical, indeed artificial, nature of the International Court of Justice's judgment of 1966 has already stirred controversy, but one suspects that the heat of debate will cool rapidly out of sheer frustration with this judgment. Many writers will assume the attitude of Judge Wellington Koo who said in his dissenting opinion that “There is a Chinese proverb put in the form of a question: Why write a long and big essay on such a small subject?” In labouring to bring forth its largest judgment yet (500 pages), the International Court of Justice has engaged in what Judge Jessup, in his excellent dissenting opinion, called a “procedure of utter futility.”

In its August 1998 reference, Reference Re Secession ofQuébec, the Supreme Court of Canada discussed thetopic of the international recognition of Québec.The authors argue that the Court is incorrect in itssuggestion that recognition is a precondition forstatehood, confusing legal and political factors. Inthe authors’ view, the introduction of the conceptof international recognition by the Court is anattempt to provide a sanction against unilateralsecession and to back up the Court’s view that thereis an obligation to negotiate any departure byQuébec. The result, the authors consider, isunsatisfying for it leads the Court into legal errorand political conjecture.

The Philip G. Jessup International Law Moot Court Competition is now well established as an annual event on the calendar of Canadian legal education. It may seem trite, therefore, to assert that the competition is a worthy pursuit for law students, that it should be preserved, and that a greater number of law schools should be encouraged to participate in it. The Jessup has great potential both as a teaching tool and as a basis for meaningful interaction among students from across the country and an attempt should be made to realize this potential. In this note, some suggestions are made for doing so.

In Geological Time a quarter of a century does not rate high on the scale of perspectives. But for law and lawyers, for ongoing politics and policies, twenty-five years in an age of electronic communications, ballistic missile speeds, and space activities can include a planetary march of revolutionary proportions. Indeed, the rise and fall of empires now may be counted in years or decades rather than in centuries. The paradox of our age is that the future marks a constant acceleration of political processes, with conservative forces such as law and other social controls hard put to keep up with escaping events. The compression of time at the end of the twentieth century is its dominant feature.

For twenty years, both Canada and the United States were non-parties to the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS Convention). In 2003, Canada finally ratified the LOS Convention, leaving the United States as the only industrialized state that was not a party to the “constitution of the oceans.” Canada's perspective on the US non-party status involves an equal measure of frustration/disappointment, appreciation/understanding, and ambivalence.

From 1872 until 1913 legal education in Manitoba was dependent almost entirely on apprenticeship, supplemented by private study. In 1913 the Law Society of Manitoba organized an improved programme of lectures for intending members of the bar and in 1914 the society entered into an agreement with the University of Manitoba to create and operate jointly the Manitoba Law School. The school's expenses were to be shared equally by the two parent bodies and its operations were to be supervised by a board of trustees consisting of two appointees chosen by each body and a chairman elected by the appointees. The school was modelled on the Osgoode Hall Law School in Toronto and offered a three-year lecture course leading to both the LL.B. degree and admission to practice. As at Osgoode Hall, enrolment at the law school was not regarded as a substitute for service under articles. Classes were held in the morning and late afternoon and students were expected to carry out office duties during the remainder of the day.

La Question de l’immunité de juridiction des Etats étrangers est particulièrement liée au rôle joué pas les Etats tant dans le domaine interne qu’international. Il est devenu banal de dire que les activités étatiques ont envahi, depuis le début de ce siècle, des domaines considérés jusqu’alors comme étant réservés a l’initiative de personnes ou institutions strictement privées. Les conséquences de ce changement sont importantes. A ce point même que sur le plan interne beaucoup d’Etats ont eu à faire face à des problèmes de réaménagement de leurs structures qui, conçues dans une autre époque, n’avaient pas prévu le montée extraordinaire de l'Exécutif au détriment du Pouvoir législatif.

In 1974 there took place in Geneva the first session of a diplomatic conference called by Switzerland at the instance of the International Committee of the Red Cross to update the provisions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, particularly with a view to the more careful definition and exposition of what might be described as the fundamental humanitarian principles of law with regard to armed conflict. While it would be an unduly narrow assumption that humanitarian law is only relevant to an armed conflict, it must not be forgotten that breaches thereof are more likely to occur at such a time, for the man in the field has normally been trained to overthrow and if possible kill enemy personnel, even to the extent that occasionally his basic training may be in conflict with the requirements of the law of war. Generally speaking, the ordinary noncommissioned officer is unlikely to stress overmuch the restriction on the permitted means and methods of warfare to be found in the Regulations attached to Hague Convention IV of 1907. Moreover, the ideological campaigns which accompany any major war, with comments by politicians, commanders, and media alike, implying that the enemy has resorted to conduct that might only be expected from those who have placed themselves outside the protection of law or morality accompanied by insulting nicknames that suggest the enemy is not even human, all contribute to the ordinary soldier's idea that destruction of the enemy is the aim and the end regardless of the means employed to achieve it. Examples of this type of situation may be seen in both world wars, as well as in relation to the campaigns in Korea and Vietnam. However, international law has always recognized that there is a law of war and that breaches thereof may result in punishment. The simplest means of imposing such punishment, without at the same time appearing to abandon all sense of legal propriety, is by way of the trial of war criminals.