¹ According to Leonard Beaton, Canada has just under a third of the uranium that is known to exist; reserves for Canada were estimated in 1962 to be 145,000 tons, for U.S.A. 134,000, and South Africa 115,000 tons. As to Canada’s capacity to produce nuclear weapons, Beaton is of the opinion that “the three Canadian research reactors could produce enough for about 16 weapons a year and the Candu power [plant] which went into operation in 1964, could produce enough for about 45 bombs. The vast HWR-1800, which will start producing power in 1970, could provide plutonium for 180 bombs a year.” See Beaton, Leonard, Must the Bomb Spread?, at 139 Google Scholar and “Capabilities of Non-Nuclear Powers” in Alastair Buchan (ed.), A World of Nuclear Powers? (The American Assembly, 1966), at 16.

² The danger of proliferation of nuclear weapons has been vividly described by a representative of the U.S.S.R. as follows: “The threat of the spread of nuclear weapons is universal. Their proliferation constitutes threats to the great Powers, because they run the risk of being dragged into a nuclear war as a result of conflicts in this or that part of the world. Equally, the proliferation of nuclear weapons constitutes a threat to the smaller countries because for them as for all other countries of the world, a nuclear war would be a calamity…” (ENDC/PV297 at 11–12).

³ See United Nations Document, The United Nations and Disarmament, 1945–1965, at 185.

⁴ The United Kingdom tested its first atomic weapon in 1952 and its first thermonuclear bomb in 1958. Although France did not explode her first bomb in the Sahara until February 13, i960, the decision to make both nuclear bombs and nuclear submarines had been taken by Pierre Mendès-France in 1954 and ratified by the Mollete government in 1956. See H. A. DeWeed, “The British Effort to Secure an Independent Deterrent, 1952–1962” and Ciro Zoppo: “France as a Nuclear Power” in Rosecrance, R.N. (ed.), The Dispersion of Nuclear Weapons respectively at 90, xai, and 117.Google Scholar

⁵ See supra note 3, at 187–88.

⁶ Ibid., 189–90.

⁷ A/5002, found also in Yearbook of the United Nations, 1961, at 31.

⁸ In response to this inquiry by the Secretary-General, Canada’s position was stated in a communication dated March 21, 1962 as follows: “Canada has continually asserted its strong support for a comprehensive system of disarmament, particularly for measures to deal effectively with nuclear weapons. Despite the advanced technology which Canada possesses in this field, the Canadian Government has taken the firm stand that it does not intend to manufacture such weapons. Canada has also refrained from otherwise acquiring them. . . . In addition, my Government has more than once asserted that no effort should be spared to achieve a lasting international accord which would prohibit altogether the wider spread of nuclear weapons. This remains a matter of great urgency, since the fear that these weapons may be acquired by an ever widening circle of Powers can only increase international tension and magnify already existing fears about the dangers of nuclear war. My Government firmly believes that it is only through such a safeguarded international agreement, binding on the Powers which possess nuclear weapons as well as those which do not, that all countries and peoples can be assured that the further dissemination of nuclear weapons will be effectively prevented”: see DC/201/Add s, at 13.

⁹ Text quoted in Arthur J. Goldberg’s Statement, April 26, 1968 at First Committee oí the General Assembly, A/Ci/PV. 1556, at 17–18.

¹⁰ See E. L. M. Burns, Megamurder 265.

¹¹ See supra note 3, at 206–08.

¹² For text, see ENDC/192/Rev. 1. The support of Canada is reiterated in the most recent policy statement of Mr. Pierre Elliot Trudeau that “All around the earth nations suffer the nervous exhaustion of living in an atmosphere of armed threat. It is risky that two super-powers, armed even now for overkill, continue their competition for the most advanced weaponry. It does not help that secondary powers have embarked on nuclear arms programmes”: Office of Prime Minister, Press Release, May 29, 1968.

¹³ ENDC/PV.224, at 18–20.

¹⁴ ENDC/PV.336, at 9.

¹⁵ Text of statement in Canadian Mission to UN Press Release No. 19, May 23, 1968.

¹⁶ On this point declarations were made by both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. representatives at a meeting of the First Committee of the General Assembly on April 26, 1968. Mr. Arthur J. Goldberg said that the proposal was “designed to establish a new and solemn treaty obligation, especially upon the nuclear-weapon Powers, to press forward the search for nuclear disarmament” and Mr. Kuznetsov stated that “The Soviet Union is prepared to proceed to talks on implementing other measures as well, including such as stopping the manufacture of nuclear weapons, reducing their stockpiles and eventually banning completely and scrapping nuclear weapons under appropriate international control; limiting and, pursuant to this, reducing strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons; banning flights by bombers with nuclear weapons on board beyond national borders; limiting the zones of navigation for rocket-carrying submarines; banning underground nuclear weapon tests; banning chemical and bacteriological warfare; eliminating foreign military bases on other countries’ territory; formalization in an appropriate form of such a regime for the sea’s bed and ocean’s floor that would ensure their solely for peaceful purposes.” For texts, see A/C. i/PV. 1556 respectively at 13–15 and 53–56.

¹⁷ ENDC/196, at ι.

¹⁸ Statement and Speeches, Dept. of External Affairs No. 67/4, at 140. The issue of the so-called peaceful explosive device was also discussed at an informal meeting of experts held in the Spring of 1967 to assist in the drafting of the Report of the Secretary-General of the UN on the effects of the acquisition of nuclear weapons; it is reported that “The question was put to them whether there was any difference between nuclear explosive devices that might be used for peaceful purposes and those that might be used for military nuclear weapons. The answer was that there was no difference and there was no dissent by any of the experts from that opinion” : see ENDG/ PV.336, at 12.

¹⁹ At a meeting of the First Comm., General Assembly, General Burns stated: “The scientists and engineers who have placed and kept Canada in the forefront of the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes have not found that Canadian progress has been impeded by lack of information regarding nuclear weapons or lack of information which might be derived from testing nuclear weapons. Canadian scientific and industrial teams have been able to design, produce and market nuclear reactors for the generation of electric power which are competitive internationally with those designed by the nuclear-weapon Powers. Our national facilities for nuclear research and development, our universities and a number of industrial laboratories, find ample scope for their time and talents and ample data on which to base their efforts without wondering whether they might somehow have found some short-cut through familiarity with the narrow field of weapons technology. It is difficult for us, in the light of our own experience, to understand the fear that renunciation of weapons manufacture will have adverse effects on the ability to develop in the science, technology and utilization of nuclear energy”: see A/C. 1/PV.1573, at 23–26.

²⁰ Text of General Burns’ Speech of April 30, 1968, Canadian Mission to UN Press Release No. 15.

²¹ Text of speech at meeting of ENDC, August 24, 1965, supplied by courtesy of the Department of External Affairs. As regards the reciprocal application of safeguards on nuclear states, Canada seemed to have agreed on March 13, 1968 to a compromise solution on the basis of public undertakings to be made separately by nuclear Powers permitting safeguards on their own non-military nuclear activities: see ENDC/PV.378, at 27. It may be observed that until some agreement on nuclear arms control, which may take a long time to accomplish, is reached, discussion of control over diversion applicable to nuclear states is in fact academic. The obduracy of the U.S.S.R. against inspection is well known.

²² General Burns’ statement, ibid.

²³ See Statement of Rep. of the United Kingdom in ist Com., Gen. Assembly, May 28, 1968, A/G. 1 PV./1575, at 42.

²⁴ Text in Report of the Conference of ENDC to General Assembly, A/7072, DC/230, Annex II. The five abstainers were France, India, Brazil, Pakistan, and Algeria.

²⁵ Text of speech, in Canadian Mission to the United Nations, Press Release No. 15, April 30, 1968, and A/C. 1/P.V.1557, at 6.

²⁶ Text of statement in Canadian Mission to UN Press Release No. 19, May 23, 1968. On June 18, 1968, the Canadian representative, Mr. Ignatief, stated in the Security Council that the assurances “seem to us the best answer attainable at the present time to this extremely difficult question.”

²⁷ For final text of the Treaty, see Report of the Conference of the ENDC, to the General Assembly, A/C. 1/L.421/Rev. 2/Add. 1.

²⁸ Text in New York Times, June 13, 1968.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ The Federal Republic of Germany, not being a member of the United Nations of course did not participate in the voting of the General Assembly on the Treaty. The official view of the Federal Republic had been set forth in a statement, circulated to the 18 nations represented on the ENDC, reading in part as follows: “The Federal Government… declares that it is prepared to consent to any agreement in which the countries concerned pledge themselves not to increase the number of nuclear weapons in Europe but to reduce them in stages. Such an agreement, however, would have to extend to the whole of Europe, preserve the over-all balance of power, provide for effective control, and be linked with essential progress in the solution of political problems in Central Europe.” This statement is quoted in General Burns’ remarks at the meeting of ENDC on April 4, 1966. The text was supplied by courtesy of the Department of External Affairs, Ottawa. It was reported that Chancellor Kiesinger had indicated that the Federal Republic would first seek American guarantee against military aggression by the U.S.S.R. before accepting the Non-Proliferation Treaty: New York Times, July 6, 1968.

³¹ See article entitled “Soviet Revisionism Steps Up Collaboration with U.S. Imperialism,” Peking Review, December 25, 1967. The most recent comment of the People’s Daily (Renmin Ribao) stated that the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. “not only want to fan up anti-China feelings internationally through the so-called ‘treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons’ but also want to accelerate the rigging up of an anti-China encirclement by providing their ‘nuclear umbrella’ to India and other countries bordering China”: Peking Review, June 21, 1968.

³² Verbatim Record of First Comm., General Assembly (22nd Session), May 3, 1968 A/C. 1/PV.1560, at 26.

³³ Verbatim Record, First Comm., Gen. Ass. (22nd Ses.), May 10, 1968, A/G. 1/PV.1565, at 31.

³⁴ Ibid., May 8, 1968, A/C.1/PV.1563, at 23–25.

³⁵ Ibid., June 6, 1968, A/C.1/PV.1580, at 32.

³⁶ Ibid., May 2, 1968, A/G.1/PV. 1559, at 31–32.

³⁷ Ibid., May 29, 1968, A/C.1/PV.1576, at 46.

³⁸ For Australia’s view, see A/C.1/PV.1570, at 16-17; Nationalist China’s view, A/C.1/PV.1574, at 27.

³⁹ Ibid., A/C. ι/PV. 1569, at 7–11.