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Recent Australian Trends in Tortious Choice of Law
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 09 March 2016
Extract
Under the traditional rule enunciated by Willes J. in Phillips v. Eyre both the lex fori and lex loci delicti are relevant, to some extent, in actions upon foreign torts. The requirements of the rule, that the wrong be actionable if committed in the jurisdiction of the forum and not justifiable by the law of the place, have been subjected to considerable judicial and extrajudicial scrutiny. In relation to the latter element, the recent and already famous House of Lords decision in Chaplin v. Boys establishes that it is not necessary to show actionability under the lex loci delicti for each and every substantive matter. In the opinion of Lord Pearson and Lord Donovan something less than complete civil liability sufficed to render an act not justifiable where donc, while Lord Wilberforce and Lord Hodson appeared to require compliance with the lex loci delicti in all respects, but were prepared to create an exception for appropriate cases.
- Type
- Notes and Comments
- Information
- Canadian Yearbook of International Law/Annuaire canadien de droit international , Volume 11 , 1974 , pp. 271 - 279
- Copyright
- Copyright © The Canadian Council on International Law / Conseil Canadien de Droit International, representing the Board of Editors, Canadian Yearbook of International Law / Comité de Rédaction, Annuaire Canadien de Droit International 1974
References
1 (1870), L.R. 6 Q.B. 1, at 28.
2 [1971] A.C. 356.
3 See, e.g., Nygh, , “ Boys v. Chaplin or the Maze of Malta ,” (1970) 44 A.L.J. 160 Google Scholar; Graveson, , “Towards a Modern Applicable Law in Tort,” (1969) 85 L.Q.R. 505 Google Scholar; North, Webb, and Karsten, “Foreign Torts and English Courts,” (1970) 19 I.C.L.Q. 24.
4 (1951), 84 C.L.R. 629, 644. Cf. the views of McTieman J. at 649.
5 (1965), 114 C.L.R. 20, 42.
6 See, e.g., Hartley v. Venn (1967), 10 F.L.R. 151, esp. at 155; Potter v. The Broken Hill Proprietary Co. Ltd., [1905] V.L.R. 612.
7 McTieman J. in Koop v. Bebb, supra note 4.
8 [1966] S.A.S.R. 143.
9 Supra, note 6.
10 (1969), 72 S.R. (N.S.W.) 218.
11 (1970), 72 S.R. (N.S.W.) 437.
12 Ibid., 446.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid., 441. The disputed questions of fact were not determined by the court as the litigation itself was confined to the resolution of questions of law in advance of the trial of facts.
15 [1971] S.A.S.R. 25.
16 [1972] Qd. R. 386.
17 Cf. Zussino v. Zussino, [1969] 2 N.S.W.R. 227.
18 [1970] V.R. 825.
19 See ibid., 827, 830.
20 See Sykes, , Australian Conflict of Laws 237 (1972).Google Scholar
21 Some American courts have also resorted to the procedural/substantive dichotomy to effectuate the lex fori. For example, in Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines Inc., 172 N.E. 2d. 526 (1961), the only difference between the lex loci and the lex fori related to the quantum of damages. The lex fori was applied on the basis of a procedural classification. More recent American cases, however, have disapproved of this course. See, e.g., Davenport v. Webb, 183 N.E. 2d. 902 (1962); Griffith v. United Air Lines, 203 A. 2d. 796 (1964).