¹ For a review of the historical antecedents of the mandates system, see Potter, Pittman B., “Origin of the System of Mandates under the League of Nations,” 16 Am. Pol. Sc. Rev. 563 (1922)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Potter, Pittman B., “Further Notes,” 20 Am. Pol. Sc. Rev. 842 (1926)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Evans, Luther H., “Some Legal & Historical Antecedents of the Mandatory System,” 5 Proceedings of the Southwestern Political Association 143 (1924)Google Scholar; Evans, Luther H., The Mandates System & the Administration of Territories under C. Mandate, Part I (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Dept. of Political Science, Stanford University)Google Scholar; Temperley, H. W. V. (ed.), A History of the Peace Conference of Paris, Vol. 2, at 236, Vol. 6, Part 4 (1920)Google Scholar; Van Maanen-Helmer, Elizabeth, The Mandates System in Relation to Africa & the Pacific Islands c. 1 & 2 (1929)Google Scholar; Louis, Wm. Roger, “African Origins of the Mandates Idea,” 19 Int’l Organ. 20 (1965)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; The Mandates System: Origin, Principles, Application, League of Nations Publication, Series IV.A, “Mandates” (1945); Wright, Quincy, Mandates Under the League of Nations c. 1 (1930).Google Scholar

² For a detailed summary of the secret treaties, see Baker, Ray Stannard, Woodrow Wilson & World Settlement, Vol. 1, c. III & IV (1922).Google Scholar See also Bemis, Samuel Flagg, A Diplomatic History of the United States 619–21 (4th ed. rev. 1955).Google Scholar On the subject generally, see Gottlieb, W. W., Studies in Secret Diplomacy During the First World War (1957).Google Scholar

³ See generally Mayer, Arno J., Political Origins of the New Diplomacy, 1917–1918, passim (1959).Google Scholar

⁴ On the origins and significance of the Fourteen Points, see ibid., 341–44, 352–53; Seymour, Charles, The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, Vol. 3, at 331 (1928)Google Scholar; Tillman, Seth P., Anglo-American Relations at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, at 24–32 (1961).Google Scholar For text, see Scott, James Brown (ed.), Official Statements of War Aims & Peace Proposals, December 1916 to November 1918, at 234–39 (1921).Google Scholar

⁵ Note that this language in Point 5 does not at all refer to mandates. On the contrary, it clearly implies that territories will be annexed, but that the various claims shall be equitably settled, taking into account the interests of the native population as well. Smuts in his initial work on the League of Nations also interpreted Point 5 in this manner. See infra. The Commentary to the Fourteen Points, however, did interpret this passage to refer to mandates; see infra.

⁶ On the background to Lloyd George’s address, see Baker op. cit. supra note 2, Vol. I, at 40; Mayer, op. cit. supra note 3, at 322–28; Tillman, op cit. supra note 4, at 26–28.

⁷ For text see Scott, op. cit. supra note 4, at 225–33.

⁸ Beer, George Louis, African Questions at the Paris Peace Conference, (ed. Gray, Louis Herbert, 1923).Google Scholar

⁹ For a description of the formation and work of the inquiry, see Mezes, Sidney Edward, “Preparations for Peace,” in House, and Seymour, (ed.), What Really Happened at Paris 1 (1921)Google Scholar; Baker, op. cit. supra note 2, Vol. I, at 97; Charles Seymour, op. cit. supra note 4, Vol. Ill, at 168; Gelfand, Lawrence E., The Inquiry: American Preparations for Peace, 1917–1919 (1963).Google Scholar

¹⁰ Beer, op. cit. supra note 8, at 424-25, 431. Beer, however, recommended that South West Africa and New Guinea be annexed by South Africa and Australia respectively: ibid., 453–58.

¹¹ Cited in Tillman, op. cit. supra note 4, at 87.

¹² President Wilson confirmed his acceptance of the Commentary as “a satisfactory interpretation of the principles involved” on October 30, 1918: ibid., 153.

The reference in the concluding sentence to ‘“a code binding on all colonial powers” relates only to former enemy colonies; it has no relationship to general colonial policy. See the opening paragraph of the Commentary on this Point.

¹³ Notes taken by Dr. Isaiah Bowman, December 10, 1918. Dr. Bowman’s memorandum may be found in Shotwell, James T., At the Paris Peace Conference 73–78 (1937)Google Scholar; Seymour, , Intimate Papers, Vol. 4, at 280–83 (1928)Google Scholar; Miller, David Hunter, The Drafting of the Covenant, Vol. 1, at 41–44 (1928).Google Scholar

¹⁴ House to Wilson, October 30, 1918, Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1919, The Paris Peace Conference, Vol. 1, at 407 (1942–1947); hereinafter referred to as Foreign Relations. For a review of the attempts to have the United States assume a mandate under the League Covenant, see Louis, Wm. Roger, “The United States & The African Peace Settlement of 1919 : The Pilgrimage of George Louis Beer,” 4 Journal of African History 413 (1963).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁵ Quoted in Zimmern, Alfred, The League of Nations and the Rule of Law, 1918–1935, at 202–03 (1936).Google Scholar For the full text of the memorandum, see Ibid., 196-208. This memorandum is particularly important since it was to be the starting point for the Smuts draft. It is to be noted, however, that the memorandum does not envisage a regime for South West Africa and the Pacific Islands different from that of the other colonies: see ibid., 209. See also Hall, H. Duncan, Mandates, Dependencies & Trusteeship 110, n.13 (1948).Google Scholar

¹⁶ George, David Lloyd, The Truth About the Peace Treaties, Vol. 1, at 114, (1928).Google Scholar

¹⁷ Ibid., 118.

¹⁸ Ibid., 123. Smuts appears to have opposed application of the mandates system to any part of Africa, and not just to South West Africa. This would coincide with the viewpoint expressed in his League of Nations pamphlet that Africa was not suited to the institution of mandates. See infra.

¹⁹ Smuts, Jan C., The League of Nations: A Practical Suggestion (1919).Google Scholar

²⁰ This reference to the peoples and territories of Russia, Austria-Hungary and Turkey, coupled with exclusion from the plan of the peoples of Africa and the Pacific Islands (as noted below) has been interpreted in some quarters to mean that Smuts’ plan, far from being a “plan for the betterment of backward peoples” was rather “something not far removed from a twentieth-century Holy Alliance.” Zimmern, op. cit. supra note 13, at 212. D. H. Miller likewise considers Smuts’ ideas on mandates to have been quite opposite to those of President Wilson, : “The Origin of the Mandates System,” 6 For. Affairs 281 (1928).Google Scholar

²¹ Smuts, op. cit. supra note 19, at 10.

²² Ibid., 12. Wilson’s fifth point as noted above made no reference to mandates, and in the words of Hall, “definitely-implied annexation”: op. cit. supra note 15, at 112. This interpretation of Point V, differs of course from the one presented in the Commentary. See supra.

²³ David Lloyd George, op. cit. supra note 16, at 184.

²⁴ Ibid., 190.

²⁵ Ibid., 191.

²⁶ Ibid. This strong opposition to Japanese control of the islands north of the equator demonstrates that Wilson, for all his idealism, was not unmindful of American security interests. Further evidence that this consideration engaged his thoughts during the negotiations on the mandate compromise is revealed by the following events:

On January 30, after the Class C agreement had been completed, Wilson remarked to David Hunter Miller that “he did not trust the Japanese; that he had trusted them before — in fact they had broken their agreement about Siberia.” Miller, David Hunter, My Diary at the Conference of Paris, Vol. 1, at 100 (1924).Google Scholar Referring to the islands to be mandated to Japan, the President “said that these islands lie athwart the path from Hawaii to the Philippines and that they were nearer to Hawaii than the Pacific coast was and they could be fortified and made naval bases by Japan, that indeed they were of little use for anything else and that we had no naval base except at Guam” : ibid. See also Miller, , The Drafting of the Covenant, Vol. 1, at 114.Google Scholar Earlier, when the Smuts compromise resolution on Class C mandates was presented to him, Wilson had penned the following comment: “ I could agree to this if the interpretation were in practice to come from General Smuts. My difficulty is with the demands of men like Hughes and the certain difficulties with Japan. The latter loom large. A line of islands in her possession would be very dangerous to the United States”: cited in Walworth, Arthur, Woodrow Wilson, Vol. 2, at 250 (1958).Google Scholar American officials, it is clear, had repeatedly stressed the potential danger posed to U.S. interests by Japanese retention of the islands: see Fifield, Russell H., Woodrow Wilson & the Far East: The Diplomacy of the Shantung Question 120–39 (1952)Google Scholar; see also Tillman, op. cit. supra note 4, at 98–100.

Appreciation of this set of circumstances permits speculation as to whether President Wilson would have actually fought as tenaciously as he did to uni-versalize the mandates system had these security considerations not been present. Wilson would apparently have preferred to bar the Japanese completely from the islands; as a minimum he was prepared to accept a system of international control which would prohibit militarization and fortification. If this sort of regime was to be applied to the islands north of the equator, it had to be equally applied both to the islands south of the equator and to South West Africa, since the various territories were basically bracketed together. As a result, no exceptions could be allowed for annexation, even in the case of South West Africa, where Wilson was at first prepared to recognize the contiguity argument, as noted in the text.

It might be noted, incidentally, that such a strategy regarding the regarding the Japanese had been advocated by Beer early in 1918. He had suggested that the smaller South Pacific islands be mandated to Australia and New Zealand, not because this was really necessary, but in order to bind Japan with mandatory commitments with regard to the islands north of the equator. Japan could only be thus bound if the principle were generalized. See Beer, op. cit. supra note 8, at 453–58; Birdsall, Paul, Versailles Twenty Years After 75 (1941).Google Scholar New Guinea and South West Africa as noted earlier would, according to Beer, best be annexed by Australia and South Africa respectively.

²⁷ Hughes scorned the attempt of the President “to dictate … how the world was to be governed.” America, he declared, had entered the war late and had suffered very little. “If the saving of civilization had depended on the United States, it would have been in tears and chains today.” Above all, he thought the President was talking of a problem which he did not really understand. See ibid., 194–97.

²⁸ See particularly the remarks of Lord Reading, ibid., 198, and Lord Robert Cecil, ibid., 200–01.

²⁹ Haas, Ernst B., in an article entitled, “The Reconciliation of Conflicting Colonial Policy Aims: Acceptance of the League of Nations Mandate System,” 6 Int’l Organ. 521 (1952),CrossRefGoogle Scholar has argued that the mandates system and particularly the Class C mandates, were conceived partly as a compromise formula to reconcile the clash between Empire elements seeking annexation and those objecting to any further expansion of British territory. Jessup, Judge in his dissenting opinion in South West Africa, Second Phase, Judgment , [1966] I.C.J. Rep., 398–99Google Scholar (hereinafter cited as SWA 1966 Judgment) quotes Haas approvingly and refers to the final “compromise” of January 30, 1919, as “a domestic matter concerning the internal arrangements of the British Empire.” It is respectfully submitted that the foregoing material demonstrates quite clearly that opposition to extending British colonial territory was not at all related to the question of Dominion annexation of the colonies adjoining their own territories. Domestic opposition may have induced acceptance of the mandates principle for Britain itself. The Dominion drive for annexation was not in issue and was in fact fully supported by the British government both before and during the Conference. The Class C mandates came about not because of internal opposition to the expansion of the British Empire, but solely to accommodate President Wilson’s demands for universal application of the mandates principle. See infra.

³⁰ The President had been deeply impressed by the Smuts plan which he considered “thoroughly statesmanlike in character … He was struck by the extraordinary resemblance of General Smuts’ views on such subjects as the League of Nations to the American views.” Letter from General T. H. Bliss to Newton D. Baker, January 4, 1919, quoted in Curry, George, “Woodrow Wilson, Jan Smuts, and the Versailles Settlement,” 66 Am. Hist. Rev. 968, 976 (1961).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³¹ The extent to which the President drew upon the Smuts draft is analyzed by Potter, , “Origin of the System of Mandates under the League of Nations,” 16 Am. Pol. Sc. Rev. 563 (1922).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³² See Quincy Wright, op. cit. supra note 1, at 32.

³³ For the text of this first Paris Draft (which was actually Wilson’s second draft), see Miller, David Hunter, The Drafting of the Covenant, Vol. 2, Doc. 7, at 65 Google Scholar; and Baker, op. cit. supra note 2, Vol. 3, Doc. 12, at 100.

³⁴ For the text, see Miller, , The Drafting of the Covenant, Vol. 1, at 106–07.Google Scholar

³⁵ Ibid. It is to be noted that the provisions on “vested territories” contained no reference to independence.

³⁶ Ernst B. Haas, op. cit. supra note 29, at 535, maintains that inclusion of the Permanent Mandates Commission clause in Article 22 of the Covenant came about as a result of “the insistent demand of the American delegation.” It was instituted solely at the behest of President Wilson. He cites no evidence. Haas apparently overlooked Miller’s comment on the subject. “The provision for a Mandates Commission … seems to have its origin in Clause 7 of the British Draft Convention”: Miller, David Hunter, Drafting of the Covenant, Vol. 2, at 111–12.Google Scholar Judge Jessup, in his dissenting opinion in SWA 1966 Judgment, 399, in the course of rejecting South Africa’s argument that the compromise worked out on January 30, 1919, was the sum total of obligation to which South Africa had been prepared to subscribe, points out that that compromise had not contained the provision for the Permanent Mandates Commission, which was only added at a later date. It is evident, however, that South Africa and the remaining Dominions were familiar with this provision, since it was part of Cecil’s draft, completed on January 24. The provision in fact was re-inserted into the mandates article by General Smuts himself, when he presented the final version of that article to the Commission on the League of Nations on February 8, 1919. See Miller, , Drafting of the Covenant, Vol. 1, at 185;Google Scholar Vol. II, Doc. 19, at 272–75.

³⁷ The similarity between British and American views was, of course, not due to mere coincidence, but rather to their common derivation from the Smuts plan.

³⁸ Wilson actually favoured giving precedence to European territorial questions since these, he felt, were more demanding. Lloyd George, however, pushed for prior consideration of the colonial question. The matter was resolved by allotting ten days for the submission of all territorial claims. Since the Dominion claims were ready the next day, these were taken up first. Baker, in accordance with his conspiratorial interpretation of events at Paris, maintains that this manoeuver by Lloyd George was deliberately designed to obtain “a division of the spoils before discussion of the League or of the mandatory system could even be begun”: see op. cit. supra note 2, Vol. 1 at 251.

³⁹ Council of Ten, January 24, 1919, 3 p.m., Foreign Relations, 1919, The Paris Peace Conference, Vol. 3 at 719–28; George , Lloyd, The Truth About the Peace Treaties, Vol. 1, at 517–23Google Scholar; Baker, op. cit. supra note 2, Vol. 1, at 257–58; Birdsall, Paul, Versailles Twenty Years After 60–62 (1941).Google Scholar

⁴⁰ Tillman, op. cit. supra note 4, at 91.

⁴¹ Council of Ten, January 27, 1919, 3 p.m., Foreign Relations, 1919, The Paris Peace Conference, Vol. 3 at 741–43. Over the weekend, the plenary meeting of the Conference had adopted a resolution for establishing the League of Nations.

⁴² On this point, see Wilson’s Third Draft, January 20, 1919, in Miller, , Drafting of the Covenant, Vol. 2, Doc. 9, at 104.Google Scholar

⁴³ On a possible inconsistency in Wilson’s views on security, see supra.

⁴⁴ That evening, January 27, Arthur Balfour, British Foreign Minister, presented a memorandum to Lloyd George that seriously questioned the feasibility of the President’s proposal regarding finances. The necessity for checking on both expenditures and budget of a mandate, plus the requirement of assessing members, would make for “an almost unworkable fiscal system.” He was also critical of that aspect of the President’s plan which would empower the League to dispossess a mandatory power upon application of the inhabitants of the mandated territory. Absence of fixity of tenure would seriously weaken the whole system and could well “supply a perpetual incentive to agitation and intrigue.” Finally, independent powers of inspection by the League — which Balfour acknowledged was an essential element in any effective mandate system — raised the constant peril of collision between the League and the mandatory power. George, Lloyd, The Truth About the Peace Treaties, Vol. 1 at 554–57.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ Council of Ten, January 28, 1919, 11 a.m., Foreign Relations, 1919, The Paris Peace Conference, Vol. 3 at 749–50.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 751–53.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 753–54. Was this a veiled hint that any Japanese threat to New Zealand would automatically involve the United States, and that reliance on American involvement would offer New Zealand far more security than mere procurement of a small Pacific island?

⁴⁸ Council of Ten, January 28, 1919, 4 p.m., Foreign Relations, 1919, The Paris Peace Conference, Vol. 3, at 758–63.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 765–67.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 768–69.

⁵¹ Ibid., 769–70.

⁵² Ibid., 769.

⁵³ Ibid., 770.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 771.

⁵⁵ Birdsall, op. cit. supra note 26, at 64.

⁵⁶ Phone conversation with Colonel House, January 28, 1919: see Seymour, , Intimate Papers of Colonel House, Vol. 4, at 297.Google Scholar

⁵⁷ Birdsall, op. cit. supra, note 26, at 68; Tillman, op. cit. supra note 2, at 93; Scott, Ernest, Australia During the War, in XI The Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–1918, at 781–84 (1936).Google Scholar

⁵⁸ Borden, Henry (ed.), Robert Laird Borden: His Memoirs, Vol. 2, at 906 (1938).Google Scholar Hughes, in describing this scene, relates, “For the first time we gave up English and went into Welsh”: Ernest Scott, op. cit. supra note 57, at 784.

⁵⁹ General Smuts, after formulating the draft resolution, had consulted with Colonel House who approved of the document as “a “fair compromise”: Seymour, Intimate Papers of Colonel House, Vol. IV, at 298. Parenthetically, it is noteworthy that Colonel House intimated in conversation with Lord Cecil (with Wiseman and Miller also present) that, if the Dominions would be willing to accept the colonies as mandates for the meanwhile, they would probably be able to annex them in a short time. In the light of subsequent developments this trend of thought is rather significant, more particularly since the idea is attributed to President Wilson. The accuracy of this House-Cecil conversation is confirmed from various sources. In a Wiseman Memo-random dated January 27, 1919, it is reported as follows: “House argues that the League of Nations must reserve the right to cancel the mandate in cases of gross mismanagement, but says the President would agree that the peoples concerned should be able at any time to vote themselves part of Australia and South Africa, thereby cancelling the mandate”: Seymour, , Intimate Papers of Colonel House, Vol. 4, at 294.Google Scholar In the House diary the concluding thought is expressed in the following manner: “I convinced him that it was best for Great Britain as a whole to take what we had proposed rather than what the Dominions proposed. The result I thought would be presumably the same and in the end the Mandatory Power would in a short time persuade the colony to annex itself” : ibid., 296. Similarly, in David Hunter Miller’s diary the entry for January 27, 1919, reads: “Colonel House said … that the President’s plan was that the Colonies should not go back to Germany but that they should be held by Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Great Britain, France, etc., with a provision permitting them to be annexed when the inhabitants so wished. He thought this would result in annexation in a few years of good management.” In a footnote, Miller comments: “This reads like a very free translation of the President’s ideas”: Miller, David Hunter, My Diary at the Conference of Paris, Vol. 1, at 94, 341.Google Scholar Later in London, during the Milner Commission discussion on the Mandate Agreements, a draft C Mandate agreement was submitted on July 9 (origin not clear), which would have permitted the natives of a mandated territory to express a desire to be united to the mandatory Power and would have permitted incorporation of the Mandate into the territory of the mandatory Power. As a result of French opposition the proposal was not adopted: see Conference de la Paix 1919–1920, Recueil des Actes de la Conference, Partie 4B(1), at 354–56 (1934). The idea for such a proposai arose, no doubt, out of the discussions that had taken place at this stage of the Paris negotiations.

The Smuts resolution, with minor modifications, was ultimately adopted as Article 22 of the Covenant: see Appendix. The text of the Smuts resolution may be found in Miller, , The Drafting of the Covenant, Vol. 1, at 109–10Google Scholar; Foreign Relations, 1919, The Paris Peace Conference, Vol. 3 at 795–96; George, Lloyd, The Truth About the Peace Treaties, Vol. 1, at 538–41.Google Scholar

⁶⁰ Clause 6.

⁶¹ Clause 8. The principal obligation omitted from the Class C group was the open door requirement. Most writers credit General Smuts with exclusive authorship of this compromise resolution. However Ernest Scott, op. cit. supra .note 57, at 781, claims that an Australian officer, Lieut-Commander Latham, in fact originated the concept of a Class C group of mandates. Latham, Scott says, pointed out that the term “open door” was undefined and could mean “whatever the conference said it meant. For example, in the case of the territories that were so important to South Africa and Australia, it could be given a connotation which, so far as their interest was concerned was equivalent to ownership.” Latham drafted a paragraph showing what he meant. Colonel Hankey submitted it to Lloyd George and General Smuts. The latter then showed it to Colonel House who found it a satisfactory compromise. Only then did Lloyd George present it to the Cabinet for endorsement: ibid. See also Seymour, , Intimate Papers of Colonel House, Vol. 4, at 298 Google Scholar; Birdsall, op. cit. supra note 26, at 66–68.

⁶² Ernest Scott, op. cit. supra note 57, at 784.

⁶³ In the course of the discussion this dialogue resulted. Lloyd George: “Did Mr. Hughes object to the prohibition of both slavery and the sale of strong drink to the natives?” No, Mr. Hughes did not object. “Are you prepared to receive missionaries?” “Of course,” replied Hughes, “the natives are very short of food and for some time past they have not had enough missionaries to eat.” See Lord Riddell’s Intimate Diary of the Peace Conference and After, 1918–1923, at 17 (1933); Birdsall, op. cit. supra note 26, at 69.

⁶⁴ Ernest Scott, op. cit. supra note 57, at 784.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 541; Council of Ten, January 30, 1919, 11 a.m. Foreign Relations, 1919, The Paris Peace Conference, Vol. 3, at 785–94.

⁶⁶ Council of Ten, op. cit. supra, 788–89.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 789–90.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 791.

⁶⁹ Council of Ten, January 30, 1919, 3:30 p.m., Foreign Relations, 1919, The Paris Peace Conference, Vol. 3 at 797–802; Miller, , The Drafting of the Covenant, Vol. 2 at 206–15Google Scholar; George, Lloyd, The Truth About the Peace Treaties, Vol. 1 at 542–46.Google Scholar

⁷⁰ Ernest Scott, op. cit. supra note 57, at 786, n.56.

⁷¹ Council of Ten, January 30, 1919, 3.30 p.m., Foreign Relations, 1919, The Paris Peace Conference, Vol. 3, at 800–02. South Africa repeatedly cited Botha’s statement in the pleadings on the South West Africa case, as an indication of the restricted nature of the commitment undertaken by South Africa: see I South West Africa case — I.C.J. Pleadings 222 (1966) (hereinafter cited as SWA Pleadings).

⁷² George, Lloyd, The Truth About the Peace Treaties, Vol. 1, at 546.Google Scholar

⁷³ Ibid., 546; Council of Ten, January 30, 1919, 3.30 p.m. Foreign Relations, 1919, The Paris Peace Conference, Vol. 3, at 802; Miller, , The Drafting of the Covenant, Vol. 2, at 215.Google Scholar Birdsall, op. cit. supra note 26, at 73. Lloyd George’s interpretation of the provisional nature of the decision was quite different from that which the President had suggested in the morning. According to the President, the whole issue would be open to reconsideration upon creation of the League. Lloyd George, on the other hand, implies that the agreement was the sum total of the matter and would only be modified to the extent that it would be necessary to fit it in with the Covenant of the League. Birdsall, mistakenly, it is submitted, equates the two interpretations.

⁷⁴ Council of Ten, Foreign Relations, 1919, The Paris Peace Conference, Vol. 3, at 816.

⁷⁵ Council of Four, May 5, 1919, 11 a.m., Foreign Relations, 1919, The Paris Peace Conference, Vol. 5, at 472-73. Note omission of any reference to the islands to be mandated to Japan; this omission was probably deliberate: see discussion supra on Wilson’s attitude towards Japan.

⁷⁶ Council of Four, May 7, 1919, 4:15 p.m., ibid., 507–08.

⁷⁷ Temperley, op. cit. supra note I, Vol. 2, at 236.

⁷⁸ At a later date, a further question would be posed: what was the content of international accountability? Was it an obligation owed to each and every member - state of the international community individually, or was it owed only to the organs of the League of Nations, as such? But this question only assumed actual significance after the League of Nations had ceased to exist.

⁷⁹ See Miller, , Drafting of the Covenant, Vol. 1, at 185–90Google Scholar; Vol. II, at 271–76.

⁸⁰ Ibid., 275. Subsequently, the terms, “High Contracting Parties” was replaced by “Members of the League”; ibid., 680. Whether or not this change signified a substantive change in meaning was an issue of major contention in the subsequent 1962 and 1966 Judgments.

⁸¹ Ibid., 275. The latter part of this draft provision was retained intact throughout all the readings of the Covenant, but was changed by Hurst and Miller in the text which they presented to the Drafting Committee on March 31, 1919, to read: “and to advise the Council on all matters relating to the observance of the mandates” (the final form) : ibid., 665. Although there is no explanation for this change, by its terms it modifies the power of the Commission and tones down the spirit of compulsion in supervision, which the previous version seemed to reflect. This writer has not found any reference to the significance of this modification in any of the opinions in the 1962 or 1966 Judgments, but it would seem to lend weight to the view of the 1966 Court that the idea of compulsion was quite alien to the constitution and operation of the mandates system, and would tend to confirm the view of that Court, that the provision for an adjudicatory clause in the Mandates was not designed to impart compulsory supervisory power to the Court.

⁸² Ibid., Vol. II, at 272.

⁸³ Ibid., 306.

⁸⁴ Ibid., Vol. I, at 190; Vol. II at 273.

⁸⁵ Ibid., Vol. I, at 188–90; Vol. II, at 273. The text of the amendment read as follows: “The Mandatory Commission may also, when it shall deem the time proper, suggest that the independence of any such people may be proclaimed and recognized with a view to the eventual admission of such people as a member of the League”: ibid., Vol. I at 188.

⁸⁶ Bonsai, Stephen, Unfinished Business 36 (1944).Google Scholar Bonsai’s is the only verbatim record of that meeting in existence, since Miller’s record merely presents the minutes. According to Bonsai, Smuts, in presenting the mandates draft article, apologized for the ambiguity and lack of clarity, saying, “We admit that the original purpose with which we set out upon our task is not easily recognizable, but upon patient scrutiny you will find that it is there and that while it may not be an ideal solution, it is, I can assure you, the best that your delegates will agree to at this juncture in world history”: ibid., 35. Bonsai notes that Wilson was quite pleased with Smuts’ performance: “He is not so insistent now upon details as he was a few weeks ago. He is pinning his faith to the cooling-off influences of time and the interpretive work of the League”: ibid.

⁸⁷ Hudson, Manley O., The Permanent Court of International Justice, 1920–1942, at 229 (1943).Google Scholar

⁸⁸ See supra 135. In a memorandum dated May 5, 1919 to Colonel House, Hughes, referring to the differences between the various Mandates, said: “Whereas a Mandate under Class 1 looks to the mandated country being ultimately ‘able to stand alone’, the Mandate under Class 3 provides for the mandated territory being administered as an ‘integral portion of the territory’ of the Mandatory, and looks to its ultimate incorporation by the free will of its inhabitants”; see Miller, David Hunter, Diary, Doc. 936.Google Scholar

⁸⁹ P.M.C., Min., Annex 6, at 92 (1922). In similar vein, Lord Balfour subsequently referred to mandates as “self imposed limitations by the conquerors on the sovereignty which they obtained over conquered territory” : cited in Quincy Wright, op. cit. supra note 1, at 62 n. 115.

⁹⁰ Plenary Sess., February 14, 1919, Foreign Relations, 1919, The Paris Peace Conference, Vol. 3 at 214. See also Miller, , Drafting of the Covenant, Vol. 2, at 564.Google Scholar At a subsequent meeting of the Council of Four, Wilson said: “The whole theory of mandates is not the theory of permanent subordination. It is the theory of development, of putting upon the mandatory the duty of assisting in the development of the country under mandate, in order that it may be brought to a capacity for self-government and self-dependence, which for the time being it has not reached, and that therefore the countries under mandate are candidates, so to say, for full membership in the family of nations”: Council of Four, May 17, 1919, 4:30 p.m., Foreign Relations, 1919, The Paris Peace Conference, Vol. 5 at 700.