¹ “No other issue divided North and South more intensely or high-lighted the conflict between environment and development more vividly than forests.” Jahnke, M., “Rio Conference on Environment and Development” (1992) 22 Env. Pol’y & L 204 at 222.Google Scholar

² Johnson, S.P., The Earth Summit: The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development [UNCED] 103 (London: Graham & Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff, 1993).Google Scholar

³ Adopted June 13, 1992. UN Doc A/CONF.151/6/Rev.i, reprinted in (1992) 31 I.L.M. 882 (hereinafter “Forest Principles”).

⁴ For a discussion of this issue, and the additional negative impact of inter-agency disputes within the UN system, see Szekely, A., “The Legal Protection of the World’s Forests After Rio ‘92,” in Campiglio, L., Pineschi, L., Siniscalco, D., Treves, T. (eds.), The Environment After Rio: International Law and Economics 65 at 67 (London: Graham & Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff, 1994).Google Scholar

⁵ Ibid., 68. See also Johnson, supra note 2 at 6: “The Statement of Forest Principles which the Conference finally managed to adopt after anguished debate was immediately condemned by non-governmental groups present in Rio as a Chain-Saw Charter.”

⁶ The UNCSD was created by resolution of the General Assembly to provide for a progress review on the results of UNCED and to encourage co-operation in its implementation: Institutional Arrangements to Follow up the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Dec. 22, 1992, GA Res. A/47/191.

⁷ See pp. 163–66, infra, for a description of these initiatives.

⁸ The working group was initially referred to as the Intergovernmental Working Group on Global Forests: see Report: First Meeting of the Intergovernmental Working Group on Global Forests (Kuala Lumpur, Apr. 8–21, 1994) (hereinafter “IWGF First Meeting Report”). The word “global” was subsequendy dropped; see Report: Second Meeting of the Intergovernmental Working Group on Forests (Ottawa/Hull, Oct 10–14, 1994) (hereinafter “IWGF Second Meeting Report”). “IWGF” is used here to refer to the process, including the first meeting, except where a direct quote from the record refers to “IWGGF.”

⁹ See IWGF First Meeting Report, supra note 8 at 1, and IWGF Second Meeting Report, supra note 8 at 1.

¹⁰ The importance of this role is recognized in the Discussion Paper For the Canada-Malaysia Inter-Governmental Working Group On Global Forests (IWGGF): Institutional Linkages 4 (Kuala Lumpur, 1994): “The success of current planned endeavours to move the forest agenda ahead is direcdy dependent on the building of new alliances and the strengthening of existing partnerships amongst governments, non-government organizations and the private sector, in full collaboration with recognized international institutions charged with this role.”

¹¹ IWGF First Meeting Report, supra note 8 at 1–2.

¹² On the divisions within the two broad categories of states, see Kindall, M.P.A., “Talking Past Each Other at the Summit” (1993) 4 Col. J. Int’l Env. L. & Pol’y 69 at 71.Google Scholar These multiple interests are acknowledged, but for convenience the “shorthand” of North/South and developed/developing is applied to the general positions taken on either side.

¹³ See Johnson, supra note 2 at 7: “Another reason why the ‘global bargain’ was not struck in Rio, at least in the eyes of the G-77, was the unwillingness of the OECD countries to do anything about their profligate life-styles, or even to admit there was a problem.”

¹⁴ See Kindall, supra note 12 at 73–74: “To the ears of the developed countries, the G-77 refrain sounded suspiciously like: ‘If you want us to protect our environment, you have to pick up the tab; otherwise we will not lift a finger.’ To developing countries, on the other hand, the richer countries … appeared to be saying, ‘we want you to implement a 500-page action plan to save the environment; paying for it is your responsibility.’”

¹⁵ Statement by Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, Prime Minister of Malaysia, quoted in “Extracts from Statements: Plenary and Summit Segment” (1992) 22 Env. Pol’y & L. 226 at 232.

¹⁶ Although there has been some improvement in the state of the “debt crisis” in recent years, the gains have not been uniform and many of the poorest countries still face severe difficulties. The UN Commission On Sustainable Development Inter-sessional Ad Hoc Open-Ended Working Group on Finance, in its Report of the Secretary General — Financial resources and mechanisms for sustainable development: overview of current issues and developments (Feb. 22, 1994), E/CN.17/ISWG.II/1994/2 (hereinafter, “UNCSD: Financial Resources”) stated at para. 37: “Expanded overall resource flows and the improved debt situation have largely bypassed them. For many, debt obligations are still well beyond their ability to meet service payments, resulting in the build-up of arrears. Even for those that have been able to keep up with obligations, many struggle to do so, leaving little foreign exchange earnings for other purposes.”

¹⁷ Many, however, would regard it as an imbalance rather than a balance, in that the obligations side of the equation remains unrealized: see e.g., Szekely, supra note 4 at 67.

¹⁸ This basic dichotomy is echoed throughout the text, both between and within principles. Thus Principle 2(b) combines recognition of the value of forests to the “social, economic, ecological, cultural, and spiritual human needs of present and future generations,” a clear balancing of concerns for intergenera-tional and intragenerational equity. Similarly, Principle 4 recognizes the “vital role of all types of forests in maintaining the ecological processes and balance,” while others acknowledge more extractive uses such as energy (Principle 6) and other products (Principle 2(b)).

¹⁹ This was a reflection of the broader debates on right to development and permanent sovereignty over natural resources that ran through the UNCED discussions. See Mensah, C., “The Environment After Rio: The Role of the Developing Countries,” in Campiglio, et al, supra note 4, 33 at 41–44.Google Scholar

²⁰ See, e.g., Principle 3(c): “All aspects of environmental protection and social and economic development as they relate to forests and forest lands should be integrated and comprehensive.”

²¹ Organizing Committee for the Establishment of An Independent World Commission on Forests and Sustainable Development, Possible Mandate, Key Issues Strategy and Work Plan (1993) at 8: “When critical issues concerning the sustainable development of forests are considered in connection with the questions of interdependence, sustainability, equity and security, they become complex geo-political problems that do not respond to existing methods of international discussion and cooperation.”

²² A debate over which of these underlying assumptions justifies which particular approach is not helpful. The common thread is the recognition that “consideration of [developing countries’] … particular situation and needs can provide them with added incentive and improve their capacity to participate in, and implement” environmental treaties: Conclusions of the Siena Forum on International Law of the Environment (Apr. 1990), reprinted in (1990) 2oEnv. Pol’y & L. 232 at para. 7.

²³ Netherlands National Committee for the IUCN, Report of the Global Consultation on the Development and Enforcement of International Environmental Law, with a special focus on the Preservation of Biodiversity and the International Environmental Law Conference, adopted Aug. 16, 1991. Reprinted in Bilderbeek, S., ed., Biodiversity and International Law 193 (Washington: IOS Press, 1992).Google Scholar This report, at paragraph 3(f), highlights the dual basis of this principle: “[C]osts [of global environmental protection] should be shared equitably among states, taking into account historic responsibilities and present technical and financial capabilities.”

²⁴ See e.g., Article 3(1) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, concluded May 9, 1992 at New York, in force Mar. 21, 1994, reprinted in (1992) 31 I.L.M. 849 (hereinafter “Climate Change Convention”), which provides a general statement of this principle: “The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. Accordingly, the developed country Parties should take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof.”

²⁵ Conclusions of the SienaForum on International Law and the Environment, supra note 22 at para. 11 (b). An example of a more specific measure is found in Art. 5 of the Montreal Protocol On Substances That Deplete The Ozone Layer, concluded Sept. 16, 1987, in force Jan, 1, 1989, reprinted at (1987) 26 I.L.M. 1550; amended by the London Adjustments and Amendments, June 29, 1990, reprinted at (1991 ) 30 I.L.M. 537, and the Copenhagen Adjustments and Amendments, Nov. 25, 1992, reprinted at (1993) 32 I.L.M. 874 (hereinafter “Montreal Protocol”). This Article provides for a ten year compliance delay for developing countries with low consumption levels of certain substances.

²⁶ See United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, concluded June 5, 1992, in force Dec. 29, 1993, reprinted in (1992) 31 I.L.M. 818 (hereinafter “Biodiversity Convention”). Art. 16(1) provides inter alia as follows: “Each Contracting Party, recognizing that technology includes biotechnology … undertakes subject to the provisions of this Article to provide and/or facilitate access for and transfer to other Contracting Parties of technologies that are relevant to the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity or make use of genetic resources and do not cause significant damage to the environment.” See also Climate Change Convention, Art. 5.

²⁷ See e.g., Biodiversity Convention, Art. 17 (facilitating exchange of information, “taking into account the special needs of developing countries”); Art. 18 (promotion of technical and scientific co-operation, with emphasis on “human resources development and institution building”); Art 12(b) (promotion of research, “especially in developing countries”). See also Art. 5 of the Climate Change Convention.

²⁸ See e.g., Biodiversity Convention Art. 12(a).

²⁹ Art. 15 provides for access to these resources only on “mutually agreed terms” and “subject to prior informed consent of the Contracting Party providing such resources.”

³⁰ Art. 10(1) of the Montreal Protocol provides for the establishment of a “mechanism for the purposes of providing financial and technical cooperation,” intended to “meet all agreed incremental costs of [developing country Parties]. . . .” Under Art. 10(2) it is specified that the mechanism “shall include a Multilateral Fund … [and may] also include other means of multilateral, regional and bilateral cooperation.”

³¹ The Biodiversity Convention deals separately with the commitment of financial resources, the financial mechanism, and an interim arrangement for provision of financial support. Art. 20(2) sets out the general obligations of developed country parties to provide assistance in furthering the objectives of the Convention, including the provision of new and additional financial resources, Art. 21 sets out the broad structure of the permanent financial mechanism, and Art. 39 establishes the Global Environment Facility (GEF) as an interim arrangement. (The issue of the GEF is discussed further, infra at note 47.)

³² The Climate Change Convention takes a similar approach to that found in the Biodiversity Convention, including the use of the GEF as an interim arrangement (under Art. 21).

³³ Forest Principles, Principle 1 (b): “The agreed full incremental cost of achieving benefits associated with forest conservation and sustainable development requires increased international cooperation and should be equitably shared by the international community.” This Principle is obviously subject to restrictive interpretations should states find it convenient, but it does serve to state the underlying premise for the more specific provisions.

³⁴ Forest Principles, Principle 11.

³⁵ This issue was especially difficult in the context of the Biodiversity Convention. See Chandler, M., “The Biodiversity Convention: Selected Issues of Interest to the International Lawyer” (1993) 4 Col. J. Int’l Env. L. & Pol’y 141 at 161–65.Google Scholar

³⁶ Forest Principles, Principle 8(b).

³⁷ Forest Principles, Principle 12, incorporates at least four basic approaches to the problem of research and development First, particular research efforts of national institutions “should be strengthened through effective modalities, including international cooperation.” Second, beyond individual programmes, the Principle stresses the development of institutional capability in related disciplines such as education, the sciences, and social sciences. Third, international information exchange is to be “enhanced and broadened.” Finally, the important role of indigenous knowledge is noted and supported.

³⁸ Forest Principles, Principle 8.

³⁹ Forest Principles, Principle 7(b). The conditionality is reflected in the reference to recipient countries that set aside conservation areas, including “natural forest areas.”

⁴⁰ Similar wording was used in various contexts at Rio, with the phrase “new and additional” inserted “to distinguish the financial resources contained in the conventions [and the Principles] from other bilateral or multilateral aid going to the developing countries.” Mensah, supra note 19 at 51.

⁴¹ On the earlier debate, see generally the following: Chandler, supra note 35; Bell, D.E., “The 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity: The Continuing Significance of U.S. Objections at the Earth Summit” (1993) 26 Geo. Wash. J. Int’l L. & Econ. 479 Google Scholar; and Ashford, N. and Ayers, C., “Policy Issues for Considera-tion in Transferring Technology to Developing Countries” (1985) 12 Ecol. L. Q. 871 Google Scholar, passim. At the Feb. 1994 meeting of the Working Group on Technology Transfer and Cooperation (convened to prepare recommendations for the Commission on Sustainable Development), this issue continued to cause divisions: see (1994) 5 Earth Neg. Bull. (No. 14) at 4.

⁴² The generally restricted tone is illustrated by the wording of Art. 16(2), which provides that “fair and most favourable” transfer terms include “concessional and preferential terms where mutually agreed” [emphasis added]. Specific protection of the contrary interest is also included in Art. 16(2), which provides that “access and transfer shall be provided on terms which recognize and are consistent with the adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights.”

⁴³ See e.g., Art. 10( 1 ) of the Montreal Protocol and Principle 1 (b) of the Forest Principles.

⁴⁴ The United States was unprepared to sign the Biodiversity Convention at Rio in any event, although it has since done so. The key United States objections were centred on financing arrangements, technology transfer, and intellectual property issues. For general reviews of these issues see Bell, supra note 41, and Chandler, supra note 35.

⁴⁵ See e.g., Barratt-Brown, E.P., Hajost, S.A. and Sterne, J.H. Jr., “A Forum for Action on Global Warming: The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change” (1992) 4 Col. J. Int’l Env. L. & Pol’y 103 at 114.Google Scholar See also Pulvenis, J.-F., “The Framework Convention on Climate Change,” in Campiglio, et al., supra note 4, 71 at 89Google Scholar, on the “closed door” meetings that produced the final draft. Chandler, supra note 35 at 169-74, considers that the time-pressured approach to negotiations on the Biodiversity Convention contributed to a vague and ambiguous text. This impression is supported by the illuminating account of the Agenda 21 (Chapter 33) negotiations provided by Ambassador Ricupero of Brazil, co-ordinator of the Contact Group on Finances at UNCED, in Ricupero, R., “Chronicle of a Negotiation: The Financial Chapter of Agenda 21 at the Earth Summit” (1992) 4 Col. J. Int’l Env. L. & Pol’y 82 at 86Google Scholar, which details how “agreement” was reached by half-starved negotiators at two o’clock in the morning, “approving entire pages in a matter of minutes.”

⁴⁶ See Ricupero, ibid, at 100–101, referring to developments such as the following: the attempts to transfer the Montreal Protocol funding functions transferred to the GEF; the omission of any mention of UNCED from the communiqué of the subsequent meeting of the G-7; the failure to establish an “earth increment” as part of the International Development Association replenishment in Dec. 1992.

⁴⁷ E.g., agreement was reached in March 1994 on a restructuring of the GEF. This issue had caused substantial controversy, given the general dissatisfaction of developing countries with the role of this UNDP/UNEP/World Bank facility as the interim financial mechanism for the Biodiversity Convention: see, e.g., the summary of discussions at the First Conference of Parties in (1994) 4 Earth Neg. Bull. (No. 55). The agreement on governance, decision-making, and operations cleared the way for the first replenishment of the GEF, in the amount of US$ 2.02 billion. See also the Instrument for the Establishment of the Restructured Global Environment Facility (Report of the GEF Participants Meeting, Geneva, Mar. 14–16 1994) (hereinafter “GEF Restructuring”). None-theless, the amount of funding is still not of the scale anticipated in Agenda 21.

⁴⁸ Johnson, supra note 2 at 7, argues that the contending parties were so far apart on key issues at Rio that in fact the ‘“global bargain’ was never on the table.”

⁴⁹ Useful versions of the necessary provisions can be found, e.g., in the Model for A Convention For the Conservation and Wise Use of Forests, prepared by the Global Legislators’ Organization for a Balanced Environment (GLOBE) (Brussels: GLOBE International, Apr. 1992).

⁵⁰ Some have referred to UNCED as creating funding “obligations,” but, while this may be so in a moral sense, it is difficult to discern a legal obligation, and assessments such as the following are at best optimistic, even with reference to the finalized conventions: “There is obligation on the part of the North to provide financial resources to the South so that the South can meet its own obligation of implementing the mandate of the Earth Summit.” Mensah, supra note 19 at 51.

⁵¹ The euphoria, such as it was, surrounding Agenda 21 was remarkably shortlived. Within a few months of UNCED, close observers feared that the necessary money would not be forthcoming. See Ricupero, supra note 45 at 100–101; see also Strong, M., “Beyond Rio: Prospects and Portents” (1992) 4 Col. J. Int’l Env. L. & Pol’y 21 at 25.Google Scholar

⁵² See e.g., the difficulties experienced at the Intergovernmental Committee on the Convention on Biological Diversity over such issues as the nature of contri-butions (mandatory or obligatory) and the scale of contributions: (1994) 9 Earth Neg. Bull. (No. 17) at 6–7.

⁵³ The experience of the intervening period has not been any more encouraging; see, e.g., the continuing debate over the need for adequate financial resources at the First Meeting of the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the Convention on Biological Diversity (Nassau, 28/11/94-9/12/94), where even the limited issue of the Secretariat budget caused significant difficulty; for a summary of these discussions see (1994) 4 Earth Neg. Bull. (No. 55). Concern about the failure to deliver on the financial aspects of Agenda 21 has also been clearly stated in discussions related to the UNCSD. In the 1994 session (New York, 16/5/94-27/5/94), members “determined that, although some progress has been made, until there is an increase in official development assistance and an improvement in the international economic climate, it will continue to be difficult to translate the Rio commitments into action”: (1994) 5 Earth Neg. Bull. (No. 26).

⁵⁴ Overall assistance flows have, if anything, fallen in real terms in recent years: UNCSD: Financial Resources, supra note 16 at para. 17; see also Ricupero, supra note 45 at 101.

⁵⁵ It was, however, clearly seen as one of the reasons for seeking a binding convention. See, e.g., Tropical Forestry Action Plan: Report of the Independent Review 47 (Kuala Lumpur, 1990) (hereinafter, “TFAP Independent Review”). See also The World Bank, The Forest Sedor: A World Bank Policy Paper (Washington: World Bank, 1991) (hereinafter “The Forest Sector”) at 54.

⁵⁶ See Muldoon, P.R., “The International Law of Ecodevelopment: Emerging Norms for Development Assistance Agencies” (1986) 22 Texas Intl. L.J. 1, passim.Google Scholar See also, McGee, H. Jr. and Zimmerman, K., “The Deforestation of the Brazilian Amazon: Law, Politics, and International Cooperation” (1990) 21 Inter-Amer. L. Rev. 513, passim.Google Scholar

⁵⁷ See e.g., Winterbottom, R., Taking Stock: The Tropical Forestry Action Plan After Five Years 30–31 (Washington: World Resources Institute, 1990)Google Scholar: “An international convention and protocols should be negotiated on a range of TFAP-related and parallel actions that are needed to address global deforestation issues, in order to achieve net afforestation within a ecade.”

⁵⁸ Ibid, at 9. The critical importance of the TFAP is in its influence on the national planning of the countries that become part of the TFAP process. By 1990, 70 countries “that together possess roughly 60 per cent of the world’s remaining tropical forests have completed or started to prepare national action plans for the forest sector,” although not all of these followed FAO guidelines.

⁵⁹ The Bank has been a powerful influence in the sector, and as of 1992 had “financed nearly too projects in the forest sector, with total commitments of $2500 million.” Muthoo, M., Response to Rio: International Development Agencies, Agenda 21 and Forests 12 (Rome: FAO, 1993).Google Scholar This does not, of course, include the massive impacts of Bank-funded projects in other sectors upon forests; on this issue, see McGee and Zimmerman, supra note 56, passim.

⁶⁰ See Winterbottom, supra note 57 at 27–30. See also The Forest Sector, supra note 55 at 12–17; Roberts, R., Pringle, S. and Nagle, G., CIDA Discussion Paper: World Forestry Leadership —An Update (Ottawa: CIDA, May 1993)Google Scholar; TFAP Independent Review, supra note 55.

⁶¹ Agenda 21 (UNCED, 1992), reprinted in Johnson, supra note 2 at 125–508. Chapter 11, “Combating Deforestation,” incorporates programmes or specific actions relevant to many of these concerns, including the following: improvement of scientific knowledge; creation of National Forestry Action Programmes consistent with the Forest Principles; expansion of protected areas; improved management of areas adjacent to forests; obtaining and applying local and indigenous knowledge; promotion of non-wood forest products; use of regulation and economic incentives; increased afforestation efforts.

⁶² Thus the following comment on a contradiction that “undermines the TFAP framework” in general: “The plan acknowledges that deforestation is largely driven by forces outside of the forestry sector and by policy decisions, development planning priorities, and programs beyond foresters’ control”: Winterbot-tom, supra note 57 at 24.

⁶³ Ibid, see also The Forest Sector, supra note 55 at 17–18.

⁶⁴ The Forest Sector, supra note 55 at 13: “General economic development, including increased diversification of the national economy, reductions in inequality and poverty, and slower population growth, are necessary for a long-term solution to the forestry problem.”

⁶⁵ See, e.g., the non-binding nature of the various references to integration in the Climate Change Convention, including the Preamble, Arts. 3(4) and 4(1) (f).

⁶⁶ See Winterbottom, supra note 57 at 24, 28; see also TFAP Independent Review, supra note 55 at 45–46 on the need to broaden decision making and consultation in the TFAP process.

⁶⁷ Winterbottom, supra note 57 at 28.

⁶⁸ Ibid. A distinct issue that has not been dealt with in this paper but forms part of the same milieu is that of participation by women in the forest sector: see The Forest Sector, supra note 55 at 53: “Because of the traditional gender division of labour, women have specific needs and interests in forestry that have often been ignored in planning forestry projects. . . . If forestry projects are to successfully involve and benefit women, there is a need for more refined gender-based planning during the preparation phase.

⁶⁹ See e.g., Winterbottom, supra note 57 at 28; see also TFAP Independent Review, supra note 55 at 47.

⁷⁰ The Forest Sector, supra note 55 at 66. This approach to conditionality is explicit in the Bank’s policy paper of 1991: “Other lending operations [other than for conservation and for small-scale farmers] will be conditional on government commitment to sustainable and conservation-oriented forestry.... If these conditions are present, projects will be judged on their individual merits. If they are not present, Bank support will be restricted to operations that directly help countries to achieve them.”

⁷¹ This summary has been drawn from the review of activities related to the UNCSD in (1994) 5 Earth Neg. Bull. (No. 26). In addition, countries of the Amazon basin have engaged in a less formal process of consultation and cooperation dealing with the problems of criteria and indicators. At the time of going to press, two additional initiatives have progressed. First, the UNCSD Third Session in 1995 decided to establish “an open-ended ad hoc Intergovern-mental Panel on Forests” to pursue implementation matters arising out of the Forest Principles. See United Nations, Commission On Sustainable Development — Report On The Third Session, New York, April 11–28, 1995, Economic and Social Council Official Records, 1995 Supplement No. 12 (United Nations: New York, 1995), Doc. E/CN.17/1995/36 at para. 204 and Annex I, Part II. para. 1. Second, the independent World Commission on Forests and Sustainable Development (WCFSD), referred to above, began its operations with a first meeting in June 1995, with a mandate to report before the Fifth Session of the UNCSD. See personal communication, David Drake (Director, International Affairs, Canadian Forest Service, Natural Resources Canada).

⁷² IWGF Second Meeting Report, supra note 8 at 2.

⁷³ Ibid., 1.

⁷⁴ Ibid., 2.

⁷⁵ The GEF is available for programmes in the “focal areas” of climate change, biological diversity, international waters, and ozone layer depletion. See GEF Restructuring, supra note 47 at 2. While forest-related programmes might be funded insofar as they affect climate change or biological diversity, integrated forest activities would presumably not be supported.

⁷⁶ At the time of writing (Dec. 1994), an imposing calendar of events related to UNCED follow-up awaited for 1995, including the first meeting of the Con-ference of Parties to the Climate Change Convention (Mar.-Apr.),the Sixth Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee on Desertification, the Third Session of the UNCSD (Apr. 1995) and a host of UNCED-related formal and informal sessions on issues such as financial resources (Kuala Lumpur, Jan. 1995).

⁷⁷ See e.g., the Untied Nations Convention to (Combat Desertification in Those Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and Desertification, Particularly in Africa, adopted June 17, 1994; opened for signature, Paris Oct. 14, 1994, (1994) 33 I.L.M. 1328 (hereinafter “Desertification Convention”).

⁷⁸ See e.g., Burhenne-Guilman, F. and Casey-Lefkowitz, S., “The Convention on Biological Diversity: A Hard Won Global Achievement” (1993) 3 Y.B. Int’lEnv. L. 43 at 57Google Scholar: “[T]he Convention, even more than is usual with international legal instruments, is the beginning of a process rather than the end. Implemen-tation action is needed at both international and national levels and it is this process of implementation which will determine the success or failure of the Convention.”

⁷⁹ Full implementation of a convention and actual progress in the real world are distinct phenomena, and it is possible to have a fully implemented but misconceived convention that would not bring about desired change.

⁸⁰ Freestone, D., “The Road From Rio: International Environmental Law After the Earth Summit” (1994) 6 J. Env. L. 193 at 218.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁸¹ This “pressure-cooker” approach to negotiating complex and difficult documents did not end with Rio. The last session of the Desertification Convention reflected a similar last minute rush to conclude, if not truly agree upon, a final text. As reported in (1994) 4 Earth Neg. Bull. (No. 55): “After three all-night sessions capped by a closing Plenary that did not even begin until 4:00 AM, the Convention was finally adopted. Few delegates were totally pleased with the outcome, yet most were hopeful that this Convention could have some impact on the 900 million people around the world affected by desertification.”

⁸² In general, the process associated with formal negotiations, particularly in the UN system, lends itself to excessive delay and formalism, as exemplified by the following complaint about the second session of the UNCSD in 1994: “Delegates spent more time negotiating the procedural text on matters relating to intersessional arrangements than they did on any of the substantive issues”: (1994) 5 Earth Neg. Bull. (No. 25).

⁸³ Some observers have questioned whether the very idea of a “forestry” chapter of Agenda 21 is to some degree antithetical to a fully integrated approach. See Roberts et ai, supra note 60 at 9: “In fact the strong focus of Chapter 11 as the ‘forestry chapter’ of Agenda 21 may not have been in the long run interest of the proposed expansion of sector horizons to include a broad sustainable development outlook.”

⁸⁴ A convention might have more than an incremental effect on the institutional issue; any move to some form of global forest agency would probably necessitate a convention.

⁸⁵ See supra notes 51–53, and accompanying text.