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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 09 March 2016
The actions of india on May 18, 1974 reinforced the fears of forecasters of horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Indian detonation of a nuclear device gave tremendous credence to the “Nth” power theory, but more importantly revealed the inadequacy of moral suasion and the need for only peaceful uses of nuclear energy as the basis for nuclear non-proliferation. Since Canada had co-operated with India in the construction of the CIRUS reactor from which the plutonium for the Indian explosion was produced, much attention has been focused upon Canadian actions in co-operation and transfer of nuclear energy technology. The impetus provided by the action of India has produced an insistence by Canada and other nuclear energy suppliers for stricter safeguards to avoid further state action in obtaining nuclear explosive capability.
1 The move towards stricter safeguards came from unilateral actions of individual supplier states and collectively through meetings of suppliers in London. The so-called “London agreement” was announced in January 1976. Constance D. Hunt, “Canadian Policy and the Export of Nuclear Energy,” (1977) 27 U. of T. L.J. 92.
2 For a discussion of the Canadian scientific contributions to the wartime development of atomic weapons, see Eggleston, Wilfred, Canada’s Nuclear Story (Toronto, 1965).Google Scholar
3 Ibid., 23.
4 Gowing, Margaret, Britain and Atomic Energy 1939–1945, at 67 (London, 1964)Google Scholar.
5 Stacey, C. P., Arms, Men, and Governments: The War Policies of Canada 1939–1945, at 515 (Ottawa, 1970).Google Scholar
6 The Directorate of Tube Alloys was the cover name of the organization directing the development of the atomic bomb in England.
7 The Anglo-American controversies, which arose again after the war, usually centred around the extent of interchange of information on atomic energy. The United States was hesitant to reveal to the Montreal team of scientists such information as the method of extraction of plutonium, the design of heavy water plants for the production of plutonium, and the methods of preparing heavy water. The reason for the American policy seems to have been a fear of security leaks because the Cambridge group in Montreal was composed largely of non-British scientists. Another dispute between Great Britain and the United States centred around a series of secret contracts between the United States Army and Eldorado, which effectively gave the United States a monopoly on Canadian uranium. However, C. D. Howe solved the problem by obtaining informal assurances from the United States that the uranium requirements of the Montreal project would be met.
8 Articles of Agreement Governing Collaboration between the Authorities of the U.S.A. and the U.K. in the Matter of Tube Alloys, 5 UST 1114.
9 Ibid., Clause 5(a).
10 Stacey, op. cit. supra note 5, at 533.
11 Articles of Agreement Governing Collaboration between the Authorities of the U.S.A. and the U.K. in the Matter of Tube Alloys, supra note 8, Clauses 5(b) (c) (d).
12 Ibid., Clause 4.
13 Eggleston, op. cit. supra note 2, at 88.
14 Growing, op. cit. supra note 4, at 273.
15 Canada’s representative on the Combined Development Trust was Bateman, George. Groves, Leslie, Now It Can be Told: The Story of the Manhattan Project, at fn. 174 (New York, 1962).Google Scholar
16 Agreed Declaration by the President of the United States, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, and the Prime Minister of Canada, [1945] Can. T.S. No. 13.
17 Truman, Harry S., Memoirs by Harry S. Truman, Volume One: Year of Decisions 544 (Garden City, N.Y., 1955).Google Scholar
18 Gowing, Margaret, Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy, 1945–1953, Volume I: Policy Making, 245–51, 266–72 (New York, 1974).Google Scholar
19 Ibid., 250.
20 Ibid., 251.
21 i U.N.T.S. XX, dated December 14, 1946, Resolution No. 97.
22 Gowing, op. cit. supra note 18, at 298.
23 Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America for Cooperation Regarding Atomic Information for Mutual Defence Purposes, [1955] Can. T.S. No. 16. In force July 22, 1955.
24 Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America for Cooperation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defence Purposes, [1959] Can. T.S. No. 16. In force July 27, 1959.
25 Article 12, D defines this as “parts of atomic weapons systems, other than non-nuclear parts of atomic weapons, which contain or reveal atomic infor-mation and which are not made, in whole or in part, of special nuclear material.”
26 Article 12, D defines non-nuclear parts of atomic weapons as “parts of atomic weapons which are specially designed for them and are not in general use in other end products and which are not made, in whole or in part, of special nuclear materials.…”
27 Lyon, Peyton V., Canada in World Affairs 1961–63, at 77 (Toronto, 1968).Google Scholar
28 [1956] Can. T.S. No. 4. In force for Canada, March 29, 1956.
29 John Gellner, Canada in NATO 44 (Toronto, 1970). However, it appears that the decision on nuclear weapons for NATO had been reached by December 1954. Pearson, Lester B., Mike: The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson, Volume II, at 90 (Toronto, 1973).Google Scholar
30 Lyon, op. cit. supra note 27, at 80.
31 NATO Bibliography 142 (Paris, 1963).
32 Lyon, op. cit. supra note 27, at 81.
33 McMahon-Douglas Act (Atomic Energy), U.S. Code 1976 Title 42, ss. 2011 et seq. August 1, 1946, c. 724, 60 Stat. 755.
34 (1962–63) 3 H.C. Deb. 5574–75 (Ottawa, 1963).
35 Ibid.
36 Gelmer, op. cit. supra note 29, at 101.
37 Defence 1971, at 63 (Ottawa, 1972).
38 Agreement to Extend for a Period of Five Years the Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America Concerning the Organization and Operation of the North American Air Defence Command Signed at Washington, D.C., May 12, 1958, [1968] Can. T.S. No. 5. In force May 30, 1968; in effect from May 12, 1968.
39 Ibid., 2.
40 Gellner, op. cit. supra note 29, at 101.
41 White Paper on Defence 20 (Ottawa, 1971 ).
42 Correspondence from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, dated September 23, 1976.
43 White Paper on Defence, op cit. supra note 40, at 31.
44 Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of the U.S.A. Constituting an Agreement to Extend the Agreement of May 12, 1958, as Extended on March 30, 1968, Relating to the Organization and Operation of NORAD, [1973] Can. T.S. No. 17. In force May 10, 1973.
45 Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America Constituting an Agreement Concerning the Organization and Operation of the North American Air Defence Command (NORAD), [1975] Can. T.S. No. 16. In force May 8, 1975; with effect from May 12, 1975.
46 Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of the U.S.A. Constituting an Agreement Extending for One Year the North American Air Defence Command (NORAD) Agreement, dated at Washington, D.C., May 12, 1980. In force May 12, 1980. (Correspondence with Treaty Section, Economic Law and Treaty Division, Department of External Affairs.)
47 Ibid. Note from Ambassador Peter M. Towe to the Secretary of State, Washington, D.C., dated May 12, 1980.