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Choice of Law Methods in the Private International Law of Contract

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 March 2016

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For anyone who is interested in the methodology of choice of law, no field is more rewarding than that of contracts. As domestic laws of contracts develop a progressively more intricate relationship between the principles of social regulation and private autonomy, private international law is led to develop choice of law techniques that will keep an appropriate balance between these principles in interjurisdictional cases. Choice of law rules that underemphasize the interests of the parties, and rely instead on the regulatory concerns of states that are affected by the transaction, may place too many obstacles in the way of persons who should be left to arrange their transaction in the way they think best. At the same time, choice of law rules that give too much weight to the parties’ wishes may interfere unduly with a state’s ability to regulate a transtaction with which it has a legitimate concern. In this respect, balance is more difficult to achieve in contracts than it is elsewhere.

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Articles
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Copyright © The Canadian Council on International Law / Conseil Canadien de Droit International, representing the Board of Editors, Canadian Yearbook of International Law / Comité de Rédaction, Annuaire Canadien de Droit International 1979

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References

1 Cass, civ., February 23, 1864, S. 1864. I. 385; Batiffol, H., Les conflits de lois en matière de contrats 2729 (1939)Google Scholar, (hereinafter Batiffol, Contrats); 2 Batiffol, , Droit International Privé 222 (6th ed. 1976, with P. Lagarde)Google Scholar, (hereinafter Batiffol); 2 Rabel, E., Conflict of Laws 398 (2d ed. 1958).Google Scholar

2 Vorbe v. Vorbe, Cass, req., May 19, 1884, S. 1885. I. 113, note Lacointa.

3 Crowley v. Saint frères, Cass, civ., June 12, 1894, [1894] Journal de droit international (Clunet) 806 (hereinafter Clunet). All translations from French and German sources are my own, unless noted otherwise.

4 Cass, civ., December 5, 1910, S. 1911. I. 129, note Lyon-Caen.

5 The report is not clear on whether the clause was in a bill of lading or in a charterparty whose terms were incorporated into the bill of lading; the words “connaissement” and “charte-partie” are used interchangeably.

6 Act of Congress of February 13, 1893.

7 Supra note 4, at 132.

8 Idem.

9 “Charterparty” : see note 5 supra.

10 See Curti-Gialdino, , “La volonté des parties en droit international privé,” [1972] 3 Hague Rec. 499, at 765, n. 31Google Scholar, and see especially Pillet, A., Principes de Droit International Privé 434–38 (1903).Google Scholar

11 Niboyet, , “La théorie de l’autonomie de la volonté,” [1927] 1 Hague Rec. 1 Google Scholar; 5 Niboyet, J.-P., Traité de droit international privé français 5159 (1948)Google Scholar. See also Caleb, M., Essai sur le principe de l’autonomie de la volonté en droit international privé (1927), esp. chap. II, 61125.Google Scholar

12 Niboyet, “La théorie de l’autonomie de la volonté,” supra note 11, at 12–15, 36, 53–58.

13 Ibid., 54.

14 Ibid., 34–36.

15 Ibid., 112.

16 Ibid., 99–106.

17 References in this article to the First and Second Restatements are to, respectively, American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law on the Conflict of Laws (1934), and, by the same Institute, Restatement of the Law, Second: Conflict of Laws 2d (1971).

18 5 Niboyet, J.-P., Traité de droit international privé français 5658 (1948).Google Scholar

19 Ibid., 60–62. The full list of contracts not subject to a choice of law by the parties included contracts of incorporation and association; contracts of employment; contracts for the division of property on death; contracts to make gifts; stock exchange transactions; contracts infringing currency restrictions; contracts of insurance (except marine insurance) ; and contracts for services. A scheme very similar to Niboyet’s was proposed by Schnitzer, “La loi applicable aux contrats,” [1955] Revue Critique du Droit International Privé 459, (hereinafter Rev. Crit.). He would likewise first select a governing law on the basis of the type of contract involved, and then permit the parties a choice of law to the extent allowed by the governing law. His system differs from Niboyet’s in that he would permit a full choice of law if that were the conflicts rule in the country whose law governed, whereas Niboyet would merely permit the parties to incorporate laws to the extent that the facultative rules of the domestic foreign law allowed the parties freedom to fix their terms.

20 Batiffol, Contrats.

21 Lerebours-Pigeonnière, P. and Loussouarn, Y., Droit International Privé 440–45 (9th ed. 1970)Google Scholar; Toubiana, A., Le domaine de la loi du contrat en Droit International Privé 2427 (1972)Google Scholar; Curti-Gialdino, supra note 10, at 767–68, 779–82.

22 Batiffol, Contrats 38–39. For similar explanations, see 2 Batiffol 236–43; Batiffol, , “Subjectivisme et objectivisme dans le droit international privé des contrats,” in Batiffol, H., Choix d’Articles 249 (1976).Google Scholar

23 Batiffol, “Subjectivisme et objectivisme, etc.,” supra note 22, at 252–55.

24 2 Batiffol 233–34; Batiffol, “Subjectivisme et objectivisme, etc.,” supra note 22, at 252–54.

25 2 Batiffol 241. The most obvious answer to this question is that the conflicts rule of the forum gives it such effect; but Batiffol criticizes this solution on the ground that it subjects the validity of the parties’ agreement to a law that is fixed a posteriori and depends on the accidents of litigation, ibid., n. 21 bis.

26 Batiffol, Contrats 39–41; 2 Batiffol 239–40; Batiffol, “Subjectivisme et objectivisme, etc.,” supra note 22, at 261–63.

27 See Vischer, , “The Antagonism between Legal Security and the Search for Justice in the Field of Contracts,” [1974] 2 Hague Rec. 1, at 37.Google Scholar

28 Batiffol does not suggest different localizations for the purpose of different issues, so this “sphere of interest” would be one that took into account all of a state’s potential concerns with a contract.

29 2 Batiffol 258–72.

30 Ibid., 243.

31 Supra note 21, at 443, n. 3.

32 They also refer to Article a, para. 1 of the Hague Convention on the law applicable to international sales of tangible movable property, which provides that “the sale is governed by the internal law of the country designated by the contracting parties.” This convention came into force on September 1, 1964.

33 See supra note 31 and accompanying text.

34 For a general discussion of the application of multiple laws to agreements, see Lagarde, “Le dépeçage dans le droit international privé des contrats,” [1975] Revista di diritto internazionale privato e processuale 649.

35 Supra note 3. There is also a hint of such intentional dépeçage in Zanarelli v. Société BSN, Cass. soc., March 5, 1969, [1970] Rev. Crit. 279, note Batiffol. See esp. the note, at 286.

36 Compare the English case, G. E. Dobell & Co. v. Steamship Rossmore Co., [1895] 2 Q.B. 408 (C.A.).

37 Lagarde, supra note 34, at 670-71.

38 Cass, civ., June 21, 1950, S. 1951. I. 1, note Niboyet; [1950] Rev. Crit. 609, note Batiffol. For a slightly different example, see Comptoir d’Escompte de Genève v. Arnoux et Granier, Cass. req., August 2, 1926, [1927] Clunet 102, where it was held that a bank account had two monies of account, Swiss francs and French francs, which were to be treated as at par, although their values were different, because “the parity of the Swiss franc and the French franc was the contractual law to which the bank and its customers agreed to submit their reciprocal rights and obligations.” Ibid., at 103.

39 [1950] Rev. Crit. 609, at 610.

40 An exception is Epoux Roch v. Comptoir d’Escompte de Genève, Cass. req., March 1, 1926, [1926] Rev. Crit. 403, where the Chambre des Requêtes said: “The rules of private international law, which in these matters are based on the presumed intention of the parties, need not be applied when this intention has either been expressed by the parties or is implied by the facts as found and construed by the judges in the courts below.” Similar expressions were used in an almost identical case involving the same bank, Comptoir d’Escompte de Genève v. Arnoux et Granier, supra note 38.

41 Supra note 7 and accompanying text.

42 This is true particularly of the Cour de Cassation, which usually treats the choice of law issue as a question of construction of the agreement, a matter on which it seldom reverses the decision of the judges of fact in the lower courts.

43 Coopérative agricole de Maisse v. Getreide Import-Gesellschaft, Cour d’Appel de Paris, October 26, 1962, [1965] Rev. Crit. 535, note H.B.

44 Mutuelle Générale Française Accidents v. Consorts Lavezard, Cass, civ., 1re ch., November 21, 1973, Bull. civ. 1973. I. 283.

45 Veuve Wanègue v. S.A.R.L. “Air Outre-Mer,” Cour d’Appel de Paris, 1re ch., October 9, 1962, [1964] Rev. Crit. 467, note Simon-Depitre.

46 L’Etat v. Veuve Carathéodory, Cass. civ., May 31, 1932, S. 1933. I. 17, note Niboyet; Veuve Carathéodory Pacha v. l’Etat, Cass. req., November 2, 1937, S. 1938. I. 30.

47 Société Cametz v. Rousset, Cass. civ., June 28, 1966, [1967] Rev. Crit. 334, note Batiffol. Cf. Cie. française de l’Afrique occidentale v. Société du Haute Ogooué, Cass. civ., April 24, 1952, [1952] Rev. Crit. 502, note Motulsky; S. 1952. I. 185, where the sale of an immovable in French West Africa by one French company to another was held to be governed by the lex rei sitae.

48 Cie. française de l’Afrique occidentale v. Société du Haute Ogooué, supra note 47, at 503.

49 See the note by Motulsky to the case cited supra note 47, at 505.

50 Cour d’Appel de Paris, January 27, 1955, [1955] Rev. Crit. 330, note Motulsky.

51 Ibid., 335.

52 Idem. For another instance of a lower court’s handling of the “localization” problem, see Noblesse v. Société Haviland, Cour d’Appel de Limoges, November 10, 1970, [1971] Rev. Crit. 703.

53 Nasser v. Banque commerciale africaine, Cass. civ. June 29, 1971, [1972] Clunet 51, note Kahn.

54 Ibid., 52.

55 Société de Fourrures Renel v. Allouche, Cass. civ. July 6, 1959, [1959] Rev. Crit. 708, note Batiffol ("the judges below determine, based on the pattern of the agreement and the circumstances of the case, what law ought to govern the relations between the parties”) ; Richard v. The Shell Petroleum Co. Ltd., Cass. civ., November 9, 1960, [1961] Rev. Crit. 135; [1961] Clunet 774 (the Cour d’Appel could “decide that on the basis of its findings of fact, localizing the contract,” a certain law should apply).

56 Cass, civ., 1re ch., October 29, 1974, [1976] Rev. Crit. 91, note Batiffol.

57 Ibid., at 92.

58 See his note, ibid., 94.

59 Supra note 50 and accompanying text.

60 Cour d’Appel de Paris, June 10, 1967, [1968] Clunet 100. See also Société Nationale des entreprises de presse v. Robe, Trib. de grande inst. de la Seine, February 23, 1966, [1967] Rev. Crit. 130, note Dayant.

61 Supra note 7 and accompanying text.

62 2 Batiffol 271–72.

63 1 Batiffol 455.

64 Op. cit. supra note 21, at 500.

65 1 Batiffol 448–52.

66 Cie. algérienne de tracteurs v. Etablissements Bartagna, Trib. de grande inst. de la Seine, March 17, 1966, [1966] Clunet 831, note P.C.

67 Epoux Adouze v. Koninklijke Nederlandsche Petroleum Maatschappij (Royal Dutch), Cass. civ., October 17, 1972, [1973] Clunet 116, note Oppetit; [1973] Rev. Crit. 520.

68 Supra note 38 and accompanying text.

69 Crowley v. Saint frères, supra note 3; Cie. des messageries maritimes v. Cie. d’assurances générales, Cass. civ., February 21, 1950, [1950] Rev. Crit. 427.

70 Société SICAP v. Société Jager, Cour d’Appel d’Amiens, April 9, 1968, [1970] Rev. Crit. 448, note Batiffol.

71 C.P.C. Art. 1006, which provides that if the issues being litigated and the names of the arbitrators are not specified, the clause will be void.

72 Coopérative agricole de Maisse v. Getreide Import-Gesellschaft, supra note 43.

73 See 2 Batiffol 245–47; Batiffol, “Le Pluralisme des méthodes en droit internationale privé,” [1973] 2 Hague Rec. 75, at 136–45; Toubiana, op. cit. supra note 21, at 208–32.

74 Formerly Code du Travail, Liv. I, Art. 29k et seq.; now found in Code du Travail, Art. L. 751–1 et seq.

75 Code du Travail, Art. L. 751–59; formerly Liv. I, Art. 290.

76 Etablissements Mokotov v. Semeriva, Cass. soc, December 9, 1960, JCP 1961. II. 12029.

77 Zanarelli v. Société BSN, supra note 35.

78 Etablissements Maillard v. Hakenberg, Cass. soc, July 1 1964, [1965] Clunet 128; Société Lautier Fils v. Carton, Cass. comm., November 9, 1959, [1960] Rev. Crit. 566, note Simon-Depitre.

79 Decree No. 1345; [1959] Rec Gén. des Lois (Législation) 637-38.

80 Ibid., Art. 4, para. 2.

81 Dame Cipiletti v. Société COFPA, Cass. comm., January 19, 1976, [1977] Rev. Crit. 503, note Batiffol. See also Noblesse v. Société Haviland, supra note 52. The Cour d’Appel de Paris has similarly held that French workmen’s compensation legislation is applicable only to employees working in France; it was therefore not available to the dependents of a deceased airline employee who performed his duties mostly in Indochina, although the employee’s contract with the airline was held governed by French law: Veuve Boucher v. Cie. d’Assurances La Préservatrice, Cour d’Appel de Paris, March 9, 1961, [1964] Rev. Crit. 467, note Simon-Depitre.

82 C.C. Art. 1674.

83 Vinot v. Villerelle, Cour d’Appel de Paris, February 9, 1931, [1931] Rev. Crit. 348.

84 2 Batiffol 276, n. 25.

85 Batiffol, “Le Pluralisme, etc.,” supra note 73, at 138.

86 Association Prohuza, supra note 60, at 100.

87 Roux v. Agent judiciaire de trésor, Cour d’Appel de Paris, May 15, 1975, [1976] Rev. Crit. 690, note Batiffol.

88 Francescakis, P., La théorie du renvoi et les conflits de systèmes en droit international privé 1116 (1958)Google Scholar; Francescakis, , “Quelques précisions sur les ‘lois d’application immédiate’ et leurs rapports avec les règles de conflits de lois,” [1966] Rev. Crit. 1.Google Scholar

89 Francescakis, [1966] Rev. Crit. 1 at 16, describes the rules as those that “have this feature in common, that they involve the organization of the state (mettent en cause l’organisation étatique).” He elaborates on this by saying that conflicts rules should not be allowed to detract from “the political, cultural, social and economic objectives that the State seeks to implement through the structures it creates.” Ibid., 13.

90 “A formula like [M. Francescakis’] is capable of swallowing up all laws, because it is hard to see in what areas one might find laws that do not share this character.” Batiffol, “Le Pluralisme, etc.,” supra note 73, at 138. Sperdutti, G., “Les lois d’application nécessaire en tant que lois d’ordre public,” [1977] Rev. Crit. 259 Google Scholar, also argues for a restrained use of the concept of laws of immediate application.

91 Francescakis, “Quelques précisions, etc.,” supra note 88, at 12. 82 Supra note si.

92 Supra note 21.

93 Ibid., 268–97.

94 Ibid., 297–331.

95 Ibid., 254–56.

96 Ibid., 256.

97 Ibid., 258–66.

98 The court cited BGH, 1st civ. sen., September 30, 1952, 7 EBGHZ 231, 234; BGH, 1st civ. sen., 9 EBGHZ 221, 223; BGH, 4th civ. sen., March 30, 1953, 17 EBGHZ 89, 92.

99 BGH, 8th civ. sen., September 23, 1971, 57 EBGHZ 72, 75.

100 von Savigny, F., A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws 197–99 (2d ed. Guthrie trans. 1880)Google Scholar. At page 198 he explains: “The forum of the obligation (which coincides with the true seat of the obligation) depends on the voluntary submission of the parties, which, however, is generally indicated, not in an express, but in a tacit declaration of will, and is thus always excluded by an express declaration to the contrary. We have therefore to inquire to what place the expectation of the parties was directed — what place they had in their minds as the seat of the obligation.”

101 Sandrock, O., Zur ergänzenden Vertragsauslegung im materiellen und internationalen Schuldvertragsrecht 188–92 (1966).Google Scholar

102 Neumann, K., Vertragsgültigkeit und Parteiwille in Lehre und Rechtssprechung des internationalen Schuldrechts 145 (1930).Google Scholar

103 Ibid., 85–89.

104 Haudek, W., Die Bedeutung des Parteiwillens im IPR 4850 (1931)Google Scholar.

105 Ibid., 1.

106 Ibid., 19.

107 Gamillscheg, , “Rechtswahl, Schwerpunkt und Mutmasslicher Parteiwille im Internationalen Vertragsrecht,” 157 Archiv für die Civilistische Praxis 303 (1958)Google Scholar; Mann, , “Die internationalprivatrechtliche Parteiautonomie in der Rechtssprechung des Bundesgerichtshofs,” [1962] Juristenzeitung 6.Google Scholar

108 Gamillscheg, supra note 107, at 308.

109 Moser, R., Vertragsabschluss, Vertragsgültigkeit und Parteiwille im Internationalen Obligationenrecht 200 (1948)Google Scholar; Gamillscheg, supra note 107, at 313.

110 Raape, L., Internationales Privatrecht 284–85 (3d ed. 1950).Google Scholar

111 Raape, L., Internationales Privatrecht 460–62 (5th ed. 1961).Google Scholar

112 Kegel, G., Internationales Privatrecht: Ein Studienbuch 290 (4th ed. 1977)Google Scholar; 7 Soergel-Siebert, , Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch 114 (ed. Kegel, G.) (hereinafter Soergel-Kegel).Google Scholar

113 Soergel-Kegel 114.

114 Soergel-Kegel cites at 114 one case, in which two residents of Saxony made a marriage brokage contract, unenforceable under Saxon law, and included an express choice of law in favour of Prussian law and a choice of forum in favour of Berlin in an effort to make it enforceable. The Reichsgericht (44 ERGZ 300) held the contract void, but the grounds used were that the parties’ agreement merely incorporated Prussian law as a set of contractual terms, and that thus the applicability of Saxon law was unaffected. The court did, however, utter dicta to the effect that contracting parties could not avoid mandatory rules of law by a choice of law clause — a theory that has clearly been rejected since. See infra notes 115-19 and accompanying text.

115 RG, 5th civ. sen., October 3, 1923, 108 ERGZ 241.

116 Ibid., 243–44.

117 BGH, 8th civ. sen., November 15, 1976, [1977] NJW 1011, note Jochem. The court therefore characterized the issue as one of the substantive validity of the contract, rather than (as Jochem, in his note, suggests it should have done) as a law protective of the family, to be applied as the obligor’s personal law by analogy with Art. 14 EGBGB.

118 Soergel-Kegel 111.

119 Supra note 117, at 1012.

120 BGH, 7th civ. sen., January 30, 1961, [1961] NJW 1061.

121 Ibid., 1062.

122 Idem. See infra note 182 and accompanying text.

123 Law of December 9, 1976.

124 S. 1(1). There is an exception in s. 1(2) for contracts in which the terms were subject to individual negotiation by the parties. The other exceptions include contracts in the areas of labour, succession, family, and company law (s. 23(1)), and contractual terms agreed to by merchants, if the contract was made within the scope of their business (s. 24, para. 1 ), and terms agreed to by public agencies like the post office or the government railways (s. 24, para. 2). See Kegel op. cit. supra note 112, at 296–97.

125 AGB-Gesetz, s. 10, no. 8.

126 Supra note 112 and acompanying text.

127 Kegel, op. cit. supra note 112, at 290.

128 RG, 4th civ. sen., May 28, 1936, [1936] JW 2058.

129 Ibid., 2059.

130 Ibid., 2061 (note by Mügel).

131 Including the Second Restatement: s. 187, comment e.

132 2 Batiffol 241.

133 BGH, 5th civ. sen., August 4, 1969, [1969] NJW 1760. Matters of form of a juridical act are, by Art. 11 (1) EGBGB, to be decided according to the law governing the substantive validity of the juridical act, or, alternatively, by the law of the place where the act is done. (The second alternative is excluded for acts transferring title to property : Art. 11(2).) Because of the choice of law in this case, both alternatives pointed to German law.

134 Some exceptions are cited by Soergel-Kegel, at 118, n. 43.

135 E.g. BGH, 5th civ. sen., August 4, 1969, supra note 133; BGH, 8th civ. sen., August ι, 1964, [1964–65] IPRspr 136; BGH, 7th civ. sen., March 15, 1962, [1962–63] IPRspr 107.

136 BGH, 8th civ. sen., May 7, 1969, [1968–69] IPRspr 60; BGH, 8th civ. sen., October 19, 1960, [1961] NJW 25.

137 BGH, 7th civ. sen., February 29, 1968, 49 EBGHZ 384; contra, BGH, 7th civ. sen., January 30, 1961, [1961] NJW 1061, which treats the choice of forum as a procedural issue to be judged by lex fori on that account.

138 Soergel-Kegel 117.

139 BGH, 8th civ. sen., April 21, 1971, [1971] IPRspr 49; BGH, 8th civ. sen., March 27, 1968, 50 EBGHZ 32; BGH, 8th civ. sen., March 7, 1962, [1962] NJW 1005.

140 BGH, 7th civ. sen., November 21, 1960, [1960–61] IPRspr 116.

141 ZPO Article 293; Kegel op. cit. supra note 112, at 227-28. The appeal court may generally not review the findings of foreign law made by the court of first instance: ZPO Art. 550.

142 BGH, 8th civ. sen., November 29, 1961, [1960–61] IPRspr 134; BGH, 6th civ. sen., March 30, 1976, [1976] NJW 1581.

143 Soergel-Kegel 118.

144 Supra note 101 and accompanying text.

145 RG, 1st civ. sen., April 4, 1908, 68 ERGZ 203.

146 Ibid., 205.

147 Ibid., 207.

148 Sandrock, supra note 101 at 194–95. For application of the test of the parties’ presumed intention, see RG, 1st civ. sen., September 19, 1923, 107 ERGZ 121 ; RG, 7th civ. sen., January 27, 1928, 120 ERGZ 72; RG, 1st civ. sen., November 24, 1928, 122 ERGZ 316; RG, 3d civ. sen., March 20, 1936, 151 ERGZ 193; RG, 2d civ. sen., June 17, 1939, 161 ERGZ 296.

149 RG, 1st civ. sen., September 19, 1983, 107 ERGZ 121; RG, 4th civ. sen., December 8, 1930, 131 ERGZ 41.

150 BGH, 1st civ. sen., February 1, 1952, [1952] NJW 540. The report in 5 EBGHZ 35 does not include the judgment on the point in question.

151 Ibid., 541.

152 For a similar case, see BGH, 4th civ. sen., March 30, 1955, 17 EBGHZ 89, where the balance was found to be in favour of E. Germany.

153 Raape, op. cit. supra note 111, at 473 et seq.; Kegel, op. cit. supra note 112, at 292 et seq. (Kegel explicitly rejects “presumed” (mutmasslich) because it means the opposite of “certain” (sicher) rather than the opposite of “actual” (real), which is “hypothetical.” Ibid., 292.)

154 BGH, 6th civ. sen., March 30, 1976, [1976] NJW 1581.

155 Ibid., 1582.

156 Kegel op. cit. supra note 112 at 293 (emphasis in the original); see also Soergel-Kegel 121.

157 Soergel-Kegel 121.

158 BGH, 4th civ. sen., September 19, 1973, 61 EBGHZ 221.

159 BGH, 7th civ. sen., October 28, 1965, 44 EBGHZ 183 (date there incorrectly given as October 18; see [1964–65] IPRspr 165).

160 BGH, 2d civ. sen., November 23, 1964, [1964–65] IPRspr 141.

161 BGH, 2d civ. sen., November 16, 1972, [1972] IPRspr 27. See also BGH, 8th civ. sen., November 19, 1962, [1962–63] IPRspr 68; BGH, 7th civ. sen., November 25, 1957, [1956–57] IPRspr 103.

162 Some examples: BGH, 1st civ. sen., June 18, 1971, [1971] NJW 212; BGH, 8th civ. sen., May 7, 1969, [1968-69] IPRspr 60; BGH, 8th civ. sen., February 10, 1969, [1968–69] IPRspr 57; BGH, 8th civ. sen., June 26, 1968, [1968–69] IPRspr 56; BGH, 7th civ. sen., November 25, 1963, [1962-63] IPRspr 87.

163 Raape, op. cit. supra note 111, at 474, defines hypothetical intention the same way.

164 Gamillscheg, supra note 107, at 328-30; Mann, supra note 107.

165 Which the court took into consideration in BGH, 1st civ. sen., December 19, 1958, [1958–59] IPRspr 177.

166 Gamillscheg, supra note 107, at 329.

167 In addition to the Turkish airline case, supra note 154, see BGH, 8th civ. sen., October 19, 1960, [1960–61] IPRspr 109.

168 Supra note 101 and accompanying text.

169 F. von Savigny, supra note 100, at 195, 222–23.

170 2 E. Rabel, supra note ι, at 469–72; von Caemmerer, Note, [1959] Juristenzeitung 362, 363 ; Raape, op. cit. supra note 111, at 482–86.

171 The exception is BGH, 4th civ. sen., March 23, 1955, [1954–55] IPRspr 55, involving the obligation of the German buyer’s German bank to compensate a confirming Italian bank for payment on a letter of credit to the Turkish seller of eggs.

172 BGH, 8th civ. sen., September 22, 1971, 57 EBGHZ 72, 76 (emphasis in the original) ; see also BGH, 8th civ. sen., June 9, 1960, [1960] NJW 1720, 1721; BGH, 8th civ. sen., January 10, 1958, [1958–59] IPRspr 143, 145; BGH, 4th civ. sen., March 23, 1955, supra, note 171 at 56. See further Raape, op. cit. supra note in, at 488.

173 BGH, 8th civ. sen., February 14, 1958, [1958-59] IPRspr 155. This report is fuller than the one in [1958] NJW 750.

174 Apparently the orders were acted upon there by shipping the goods.

175 The court was fortunately not required to apply “full renvoi” by following the German conflicts rule a second time to Italian law, and determining whether Italian law would “accept” that reference back to itself, because EGBGB Art. 27, as interpreted by the German courts, forbids the use of full renvoi. See Soergel-Kegel 703.

176 Aside from the five cases cited in notes 171 and 172 supra, and the steel cable case, the only other post-war cases in the BGH that I have found, which have applied the lex loci solutionis rule are BGH, 1st civ. sen., May 20, 1952, 6 EBGHZ 127, and BGH, 8th civ. sen., June 26, 1963, [1962-63] IPRspr 81.

177 Soergel-Kegel 131; Raape, op. cit. supra note III, at 473.

178 BAG, April 10, 1975, [1975] NJW 2160; Graue, “Rück- oder Weiterverweisung im internationalen Vertragsrecht,” [1968] Aussenwirtschaftsdienst des Betriebsberaters 121, 125. Kegel dissents, but notes that there is a difference of opinion: Kegel, op. cit. supra note 112, at 173; Soergel-Kegel 131, n. 16.

179 Soergel-Kegel 766; Kekel, op. cit. supra note 112, at 233–34. For other provisions using the same expression, see BGB Arts. 138, 817, 826.

180 RG, 2d civ. sen., June 28, 1918, 93 ERGZ 182.

181 Supra note 120 and accompanying text.

182 [1961] NJW at 1062.

183 Mann, , “Kollisionsnorm und Sachnorm mit abgrenzendem Tatbestandsmerkmal,” in Baur, F., Esser, J., Kübler, F., and Steindorff, E., eds., Funktionswandel der Privatrechtsinstitutionen: Festschrift für Ludwig Raiser zum 70. Geburtstag 499, at 506–7 (1974).Google Scholar

184 Supra note 133 and accompanying text.

185 Kegel, op. cit. supra note 112, at 297.

186 Cf. Lando, , “Consumers Contracts and Party Autonomy in the Conflict of Laws,” in Mélanges de droit comparé en l’honneur du Doyen Ake Malmström 141, at 153–54 (1972).Google Scholar