¹ SirEden, Anthony, The Memoirs of Sir Anthony Eden: Full Circle 118–19 (1960).Google Scholar In the opinion of a well-known specialist on Indo-China, the origin of the Viet Minh’s intervention in Laos may be traced to the conclusion of a Vietnam-Khmer-Lao Alliance on March 11, 1951, which paved the way for the entry of the North Vietnamese volunteers into Laos. The Viet Minh treated the Pathet Lao area as an extension of its own, Laos being divided into three operational zones, north, central and south, each of which was made subordinate to its neighbouring Viet Minh “inter-zone” to insure close co-ordination. See Fall, Bernard B., Anatomy of a Crisis: The Story of the Laotian Crisis of 1960–61 44–45 (1969).Google Scholar In a speech in the 7th session of the 1954 Geneva Conference, Sir Anthony Eden stated that “Laos was first invaded by regular Viet Minh forces in April 1953. These forces came from North Vietnam. … In December last year, a further invasion took place … into central Laos. These were regular battalions belonging to Viet Minh divisions … with heavy weapons including artillery and anti-aircraft guns”: Cmd. No. 9186, Documents relating to the Discussion of Korea and Indo-China at the Geneva Conference April 27-June 15, 1954, at 166.

² Sir Anthony Eden stated in his Memoirs that “Chou En-lai and the Viet Minh delegate were persuaded, with some help from Molotov, to agree to the conclusion of separate armistice agreements for each of the three Associated States”: Sir Anthony Eden, op. cit. 124.

³ Cmd. No. 9239, Further Documents Relating to the Discussion of Korea and Indo-China at the Geneva Conference June 16-July 21, 1954, at 18–26. In connection with the third point, the Royal Government of Laos issued on July 21, 1954, a declaration asserting that it would never permit the territory of Laos to be used for purposes of aggression; that it would not join any military alliance contrary to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations; and that it would not request foreign aid, whether in war material or personnel, except for its effective territorial defense. The Conference took note of the declaration in paragraphs 4 and 5 of its Final Declaration: ibid., 41–42 and 9–10.

⁴ Cmd. No. 9186, Soviet proposal at 145 and British proposal at 166.

⁵ Chou En-lai’s final proposal in Eden, op. cit. supra note 1, at 141.

⁶ This list of states was mentioned by Mr. William H. Sullivan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs in a Senate Subcommittee Hearing in October 1969: Hearings before Subcom. on U.S. Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad: Kingdom of Laos 427 (Committee on For. Rel., U.S. Senate, 1969).

⁷ Lall, Arthur, How Communist China Negotiates 119 (New York, 1968).Google Scholar This work is a most detailed account of the negotiations at the 1962 Geneva Conference.

⁸ Cmd. No. 9186, at 161–62. Chou also characterized the majority rule as “an instrument for attempting to impose the will of the majority of states on the minority of states.”

⁹ Cmd. No. 9239, at 25–26.

¹⁰ The hazardous nature of the operations in Laos was reflected in a jeep accident which took the life of Mr. J. H. Thurrott, a political adviser of the Canadian Delegation: Cmd. No. 9445, at 6.

¹¹ Cmd. No. 9445, First Interim Report of the I.C.S.C. in Laos 15.

¹² The geopolitical significance of these two provinces in terms of the struggle over Laos can scarcely be exaggerated. At the time of the first cease-fire after Geneva, the Pathet Lao was in control of the bulk of the Laotian highlands, approximately two-thirds of the country with the exception of the Plain of Jars. They also set up paragovernmental structures and exercised de facto administrative power on the modality of the Communist-controlled enclaves in China at the end of the Second World War. This key area under the Pathet Lao developed later into a strategic base of operation against Luang Prabang and Vientiane as well as the avenue for the invasion by the Viet Minh of the south through the famous Ho Chi Minh Trail. For detailed analysis, see Halpern, A.M. and Fredman, H.B., Communist Strategy in Laos (Rand Corp. study, Santa Monica, Calif. 1960)Google Scholar and Fall, Bernard B., “The Pathet Lao,” in Scalapino, Robert A. (ed.) The Communist Revolution in Asia, 194–97 (New Jersey, 1969).Google Scholar

¹³ For claims and counter-claims of the two sides, see Cmd. No. 9445, 41–45. The assertion of the right of the Royal Government to restore its administration in the disputed provinces was also challenged by the Pathet Lao on the factual ground that there had been no government forces in the area at the time of the cease-fire in August 1954, in fact ever since their expulsion from the territory in 1953. On this point, the International Commission directed its Military Committee to conduct an investigation. On the basis of the findings of the Military Committee, the Canadian Delegation tabled on April 7, 1955, a draft resolution declaring that “the maps, documents and reports taken as a whole establish that the Royal Government forces did operate in areas of the Provinces of Phongsaly and Sam Neua before and up to 6th August 1954 and that the territory which they militarily controlled on that date should, therefore, be respected by the other Party under Article 19 of the Geneva Agreement.” Although the Indian Chairman was in sympathy with the proposal, the Polish Member was opposed to it. The Commission adopted on April 20, 1955, by majority vote a resolution requesting both parties to refrain from increasing their military strengths in the two provinces. The Polish Member, however, declared that the action was invalid since the resolution according to him constituted an amendment of Article 14 and could only be adopted unanimously. See Cmd. No. 9630, at 14–16.

¹⁴ Cmd. No. 9445, at 46.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Text in Cmd. No. 9630, Second Interim Report of I.C.S.C., Appendix A, 34–35.

¹⁷ Cmd. N0. 9445, Appendix G, 70–73; Cmd. No. 9630, at 9–11; and Cmd. No. 314, Third Interim Report of I.C.S.C. 6–9.

¹⁸ Cmd. No. 9630, at 35–36.

¹⁹ Ibid., 11.

²⁰ Ibid., 36–38.

²¹ Ibid., 15.

²² Text of Canadian draft resolution in Cmd. No. 9630, Appendix D, 38–39.

²³ Text of letter, ibid., 17.

²⁴ Cmd. No. 314, at 9. For text of Final Declaration, see Cmd. No. 9239, at 9.

²⁵ Cmd. No. 314, at 9.

²⁶ Ibid., 9; text of resolution in Annexure 3, at 47–49.

²⁷ Text of letter from the Chairman of the Commission to the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference, ibid., Annexure 4, at 49–50.

²⁸ At the Bandung Conference held in April 1955, Nehru, Chou En-lai, Pham Van Dong of North Vietnam, and Katay D. Sasorith, Prime Minister of Laos, held a meeting resulting in a Joint Statement issued on April a 9, 1954, in which it was stated that “the settlement which is due to take place between the Royal Government of Laos and Pathet Lao, by virtue of the Geneva Agreements, is a question of internal order which the Royal Government and the Pathet Lao are entirely free to solve in the best way possible in the higher interests of the country and the people of Laos.” Text of statement in Frankland, Noble (ed.), Documents on International Affairs 426 (Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1958).Google Scholar

²⁹ Souvanna Phouma’s endeavours to bring about détente with the Pathet Lao were facilitated also by Moscow’s approval and by his personal visits to Peking and Hanoi in 1956. These episodes are described in detail by Bernard B. Fall, op. cit. supra note 1, at 71–74.

³⁰ Texts of the so-called “Vientiane Agreements” including Joint Declaration of the two Princes, Mixed Political Communique, Sam Neua Agreement, etc. in Cmd. No. 314, at 54–80.

³¹ Ibid., 12–13. This resolution has been interpreted as an indirect response to a joint démarche by the United States, Britain and France, addressed to the Laotian Government, indicating their disapproval of the fact that “the Pathet Lao have sought to place extraneous conditions upon their acceptance of the authority of the Royal Government” and expressing the hope that the latter “will continue its determination that the political future of the Kingdom of Laos shall not be dictated by dissident groups enjoying no constitutional status.” Text of note in 36 Dept. State Bull. 771–72 (1957).

³² According to a report of the Military Committee of the International Commission, some 1,500 Pathet Lao soldiers were officially accepted into the National Army and another 4,284 were discharged: Cmd. No. 541, 4th Interim Report of I.C.S.C., May 17, 1957-May 31, 1958, at 153.

³³ For details of the political settlement including the legal recognition of the transformation of the Pathet Lao into a political party, called Neo Lao Hak Xat, see Cmd. No. 541, at 10–14.

³⁴ Ibid., 11–112.

³⁵ Ibid., 15–17.

³⁶ Ibid., 122.

³⁷ Quoted in King, Gillian, Documents on International Affairs, 1959, Note 4, 252 (Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1963).Google Scholar

³⁸ The confused political scene in Laos and the exteraal pressures are described in the following works with different appreciations: Barraclough, Geoffrey, Survey of International Affairs, 1959–60, 285–98 (R. I. of I. Aff. 1964)Google Scholar; Ackland, Len E., “No Place for Neutralism: The Eisenhower Administration and Laos,” in Adams, Nina S. & McCoy, Alfred W., Laos: War and Revolution 139–54 (1970)Google Scholar; Bernard B. Fall, op. cit. supra note 1, at 93–156; and Mirsky, Jonathan and Stonefield, Stephen E., “The United States in Laos, 1945–62,” in Friedman, Edward and Seiden, Mark (ed.), America’s Asia 253–323 (1971).Google Scholar

³⁹ Note from the Laotian Mission to the United Nations, U.N. Doc. S/4212, Security Council Official Record, Supplements for July-Sept. 1959, at 7–8; text of Security Council Resolution of Sept. 7, 1959, in S/ 4216; and summary of Report of the Subcommittee, in S/4236, Security Council Off. Rec, Supplement for Oct., Nov. & Dec. 1959, at 91–99. As a result of the debate in the Security Council in September 1959, a fact-finding Subcommittee of the Council was dispatched to Laos. On Nov. 6, the Subcommittee reported that “the body of information submitted to the Subcommittee did not clearly establish whether there were crossings of the frontier by regular troops of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.” The Report also added that “the hostile elements received support from the territory of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam consisting mainly of equipment, arms and supplies and the help of political cadres.”

⁴⁰ Report of Senators Mike Mansfield, Muskie, Edmund S., Inouye, D.K., Aiken, G.D. and Boggs, J.C. on The Vietnam Conflict: The Substance and the Shadow 24 (Committee on For. Rel. of the Senate, Washington, 1966).Google Scholar

⁴¹ Texts of communications between Moscow, London and Peking on reconvening the Geneva Conference in Documents on International Affairs, 1959, at 258–59 (London, 1963).

⁴² Text of President Kennedy’s statement in Documents on American Foreign Relations 305 (Council on For. Rel., New York, 1961).

⁴³ Texts of aides memoires of the British and Soviet governments accepting Sihanouk’s proposal for reconvening the Geneva Conference, New York Times, April 2, 1961. Text of official invitation to the Conference in Cmd. No. 1828,International Conference on the Settlement of the Laotian Question, Geneva, May 12, 1961-July 23, 1962, at 6.

⁴⁴ Chou En-Iai’s reply to Prince Sihanouk in Peking Review, Jan. 20, 1961, at 5.

⁴⁵ The United Kingdom expressed concurrence with the American position in an aide memoire dated March 23, 1961, addressed to the Soviet Government, stating that “Her Majesty’s Government suggest that this conference should meet as soon as the International Commission can report that the cease-fire has become effective”; text of aide memoire in New York Times, April 2, 1961.

⁴⁶ Quoted in Arthur Lall, op. cit. supra note 7, at 47.

⁴⁷ Text of President Kennedy’s “Report to the American People” in 44 Dept. State Bull. 993 (1961). In that Report, Kennedy stated that “The one area which afforded some immediate prospect of accord was Laos. Both sides recognized the need to reduce the dangers in the situation. Both sides endorsed the concept of a neutral and independent Laos.”

⁴⁸ Text of Joint Communique of the Three Princes in Cmd. No. 1828, at 13–14.

⁴⁰ Text of Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos, ibid., 15–18. For an unofficial account of the negotiations at the Conference, see Arthur Lall, op. cit. supra note 7, at 113–51; for a brief study of the Conference, see Czyzak, John J., “The International Conference on the Settlement of the Laotian Question and the Geneva Agreements of 1962,” 57 Am. J. Int’l L., 300–17 (1963).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁵⁰ Text of Declaration and Protocol to the Declaration, Cmd, No, 1828, at 15–24.

⁵¹ At the Senate Subcommittee hearing of October 20, 1969, Mr.Sullivan, William H. stated that “it was clear by September 1962 that Hanoi had left some 6,000 N.V.A. military personnel in Laos and maintained radio contact with, and control over, both these forces and the Pathet Lao”: Hearings of Subcom. on U.S. Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad (Laos), Pt 2, at 373 (Senate Comm. on For. Rel., 1970).Google Scholar Summary of the Hearings on Laos in Paul, Roland A., “Laos: Anatomy of an American Involvement,” Foreign Affairs, April 1971.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁵² At the 14-Power Geneva Conference of 1962, the Canadian Delegation opposed the unanimity provision for the International Commission as demanded by the Communist bloc: see Lyon, Peyton V., Canada in World Affairs, 1961–63, at 313 (Toronto, 1968).Google Scholar

⁵³ The events leading to the transmission of Message No. 31 to the two Co-Chairmen are fully described by General Phoumi Nosavan in his address before the United Nations General Assembly in 1964: see U.N. Doc, General Assembly Official Record, 18th Sess., 1294th Meeting, Dec. 8, 1964, at 1–4.

⁵⁴ Message No. 35 of 16 September 1965 from the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Laos to the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference: text made available to the author by courtesy of the Department of External Affairs, Ottawa.

⁵⁵ Report of an Investigation by the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Laos on an Attack on Dong Hene by North Vietnamese Troops: text made available to the author by courtesy of the Department of External Affairs, Ottawa.

⁵⁶ Annual Report of the Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, 1970, at 32.

⁵⁷ For official explanation of the U.S. action, see Dept. of State Publication No. 8634, United State Foreign Policy 1971, a Report of the Secretary of State 80–81. President Nixon gave a vigorous defence of his sanctioning American air bombings as follows: “Since early 1963, the North Vietnamese have in effect conducted two wars in Laos. In the north, they have kept up constant pressure against the neutralist government established in 1962 at their own urging. In the south they have occupied and fortified the Ho Chi Minh Trail area to attack South Vietnam. In the face of these continuing North Vietnamese actions, we believe that the U.S. role we inherited remained important. Our material aid and our air operations in the north were needed to support the Royal Government and preserve the 1962 Geneva Agreements. In the south, Vietnamization called for continued air strikes against the enemy to protect allied forces. Since 1965 at least 630,000 North Vietnamese troops have streamed down the Trail. They have brought with them more than 400,000 weapons, over 100 million pounds of ammunition, and at least 200 million pounds of food.” In the same report, he also mentioned the presence of 90,000 North Vietnamese troops in Laos. President Nixon, Richard M., A Report to Congress on U.S. Foregin Policy for the 1970s 82 and 88–89 (Washington, 1971).Google Scholar

⁵⁸ H. C. Deb. (Can.), 1971, Vol. 53, at 3137. In the debate in the House of Commons on Feb. 8, 1971, an N.D.P. member commented on External Affairs Minister Sharp’s statement as follows: “I wonder whether it is consistent with the dignity of Canada any longer to remain a member of the International Control Commission which controls nothing in these countries. I wonder whether serious thoughts should not be given to Canada’s withdrawal.”

⁵⁹ New York Times, Feb. 11, 1971.

⁶⁰ U.N. Doc, General Assembly Official Record, 18th Sess., 1210th Mtg., 1963, at 3.

⁶¹ Text of Mr. Martin’s address at Columbia University on April a 7, 1967, entitled “Canada’s Approach to the Vietnam Conflict,” in 19 External Affairs 227–28 (1967).

⁶² The most recent development regarding a United Front between the Vietnamese, Laotians and Cambodians took the form of a “Summit Conference” of the revolutionary leaders of “the Indo-Chinese Peoples,” held in April 1970. Obviously with Peking’s support, the Conference issued a Declaration expressing its determination “to strengthen their relations of mutual trust and reciprocal respect for each other’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity on the basis of the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Indo-China and the 1962 Geneva Agreement on Laos and on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence”: Peking Review, May 22, 1970.