¹ The English text of Article 3 of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, UN Doc. S/RES/955 (8 November 1994) [ICTR Statute], provides: “The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible for the following crimes when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds: (a) murder; (b) extermination; (c) enslavement; (d) deportation; (e) imprisonment; (f) torture; (g) rape; (h) persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds; (i) other inhumane acts.” For its part, Article 5 of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, UN Doc. S/RES/827 (25 May 1993) [ICTY Statute], provides as follows: “The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible for the following crimes when committed in armed conflict, whether international or internal in character, and directed against any civilian population: (a) murder; (b) extermination; (c) enslavement; (d) deportation; (e) imprisonment; (f) torture; (g) rape; (h) persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds; (i) other inhumane acts.”

² The French text of Article 3 of the ICTR Statute, supra note 1, provides: “Le Tribunal international pour le Rwanda est habilité à juger les personnes responsables des crimes suivants lorsqu’ils ont été commis dans le cadre d’une attaque généralisée et systématique dirigée contre une population civile quelle qu’elle soit, en raison de son appartenance nationale, politique, ethnique, raciale ou religieuse: (a) assassinat; (b) extermination; (c) réduction en esclavage; (d) expulsion; (e) emprisonnement; (f) torture; (g) viol; (h) persécutions pour des raisons politiques, raciales et religieuses; (i) autres actes inhumains.” And the French text of Ardele 5 of the ICTY Statute, supra note 1, provides as follows: “Le Tribunal international est habilité àjuger les personnes présumées responsables des crimes suivants lorsqu’ils ont été commis au cours d’un conflit armé, de caractère international ou interne, et dirigés contre une population civile quelle qu’elle soit: (a) assassinat; (b) extermination; (c) réduction en esclavage; (d) expulsion; (e) emprisonnement; (f) torture; (g) viol; (h) persécutions pour des raisons politiques, raciales et religieuses; (i) autres actes inhumains.”

³ As the ICTY Trial Chamber noted in Prosecutor v. Delalić & Ors (Judgment), “[a]t common law, the term ’malice’ is often utilised to describe the necessary additional element that transforms a homicide from a case of manslaughter to one of murder. Yet again, however, there is a strong danger of confusion if such terminology is transposed into the context of international law, without explanation of its exact meaning. Malice does not merely refer to ill will on the part of the perpetrator of the killing, but extends to his intention to cause great bodily harm or to kill without legal justification or excuse and also “denotes a wicked and corrupt disregard of the lives and safety of others.” In most common law jurisdictions, the mens rea requirement of murder is satisfied where the accused is aware of the likelihood or probability of causing death or is reckless as to the causing of death. In Australia, for example, knowledge that death or grievous bodily harm will probably result from the actions of the accused is the requisite test. Under Canadian law, the accused is required to have a simultaneous awareness of the probability of death and the intention to inflict some form of serious harm, and this is also the position in Pakistan.” Prosecutor v. Delalić & Ors (Judgment) (16 November 1998), Case no. IT-96-21-T (ICTY Trial Chamber) at para. 434 [Delalić].

⁴ Nigerian Criminal Code (1916), Cap. 77 of the Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990. See <http://www.nigeria-law.org/Criminal%20Code%20Act-PartV.htm#Chapter%2027> (30 July 2006).

⁵ See <http://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/LEGISLTN/CURRENT/C/CriminCode.pdf> (30July 2006).

⁶ The murder provisions of the Tanzanian Penal Code, Cap. 16 of 1945, are also interesting to note. Section 196 provides: “Any Person who of malice aforethought causes the death of another person by an unlawful act or omission is guilty of murder.” And section 200 defines malice aforethought as follows: “Malice aforethought shall be deemed to be established by evidence proving any one or more of the following circumstances: — (a) an intention to cause the death of, or to do grievous harm to, any person, whether such person is the person actually killed or not; (b) knowledge that the act or omission causing death will probably cause the death of or grievous harm to some person, whether such a person is the person actually killed or not, although such knowledge is accompanied by indifference whether death or grievous bodily harm is caused or not, or by a wish that it may not be caused; (c) an intent to commit a felony; (d) an intention by the act or omission to facilitate the flight or escape from custody of any person who has committed or attempted to commit a felony.”

⁷ Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 222(2).

⁸ Ibid. at section 222(1).

⁹ Ibid. at section 222(4).

¹⁰ Paragraph 210.3 of the Model Penal Code makes provision in respect of manslaughter. It provides as follows: “(1) Criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter when: (a) it is committed recklessly; or (b) a homicide which would otherwise be murder is committed under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable explanation or excuse. The reasonableness of such explanation or excuse shall be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the actor’s situation under the circumstances as he believes them to be.”

¹¹ Bell, J., Boyron, S., and Whittaker, S., Principles of French Law (1998) at 242.Google Scholar More specifically, Article 221–21 of the New Penal Code of France provides: “Le fait de donner volontairement la mort à autrui constitue un meurtre. Il est puni de trente ans de réclusion criminelle.”

¹² See Bell, Boyron, and Whittaker, supra note 11; Deysine, A., ed., Dictionnaire de l’anglais économique et juridique et du commerce international (1996) at 256.Google Scholar One notes the striking similarity between this provision and the language of Article 221–23 of the New Penal Code of France, which describes “assassinat” as follows: “Le meurtre commis avec préméditation constitute un assassinat. Il est puni de la réclusion criminelle à perpétuité.”

¹³ See Criminal Code of Canada, supra note 7 at section 231.

¹⁴ (Murder is first degree murder when it is planned and deliberate). Ibid. at section 231 (2).

¹⁵ Prosecutor v. Akayesu (Judgment), (2 September 1998) Case no. ICTR-96-4 (International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), Trial Chamber I, composed of Judges Kama, Aspegren, and Pillay) at paras. 588 and 58g [Akayesu].

¹⁶ Ibid. at para. 588.

¹⁷ Ibid. at para. 589.

¹⁸ Prosecutor v. Rutaganda (Judgment), (6 December 1999) Case no. ICTR-96-3 (ICTR Trial Chamber I, composed of Judges Kama, Aspegren, and Pillay) at para. 79; and Prosecutor v. Musema (Judgment) (27 January 2000) Case no. ICTR-96-13 (ICTR Trial Chamber I, composed of Judges Kama, Aspegren, and Pillay) at para. 214.

¹⁹ Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana (Judgment) (21 May 1999) Case no. ICTR-95-01 (ICTRTrial Chamber II, composed of judges Sekule, Ostrovsky, and Khan) at paras. 137–40 [Kayishema and Ruzindana].

²⁰ The Kayishema and Ruzindana Trial Chamber, supra note 19, did eventually question the position that customary international law favours murder rather than assassinat as the prevailing notion of homicide as a crime against humanity. According to them, “the ICTR and ICTY Statutes did not reflect customary international law at the time of drafting. This is evident by the inclusion of the need for armed conflict in the ICTY Statute and the inclusion of the requirement that the crimes be committed with discriminatory intent in the ICTR Statute” (at para. 138). This indeed is a curious case of mixing apples and oranges, for the Akayesu Trial Chamber did not say that every concept contained in the provision on crimes against humanity reflects the position of customary international law, so as to engage the point about discriminatory intent versus the context of armed conflict. The point with which the Akayesu Trial Chamber was dealing was murder versus assassinat, as reflecting customary international law.

²¹ Ibid. at para. 138.

²² Ibid. at para. 139.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ The chamber does not specifically discuss whether the victim must be the same person intended to be killed or caused grievous bodily harm, although the chamber’s language does speak of the intention to kill or cause grievous bodily harm to “any person.”

²⁵ Prosecutor v. Bagilishema (Judgment) (7 June 2001) Case no. ICTR-95-1A (ICTR Trial Chamber I, composed of Judges M0se, Gunawardana, and Güney) at paras. 84 and 85.

²⁶ See Prosecutorv. Jelesic (Judgment), ( 14 December 1999) Case no. IT-95-10-T (ICTY Trial Chamber) at paras. 35 and 51; Prosecutorv. Kupreskic (Judgment) (January 2000) Case no. IT-95-16 (ICTY Trial Chamber) at paras. 560 and 561; Prosecutor v. Blaskic (judgment) (3 March 2000) Case no. IT-95-14 (ICTY Trial Chamber) at paras. 216 and 217; Prosecutor v. Kordic (Judgment) 28 February 2001 Case no. IT-95-14/2 (ICTYTrial Chamber) at paras. 235 and 236 [Kordic]; Prosecutorv. Krslic ( judgment) (2 August 2001) Case no. IT-98-33 (ICTYTrial Chamber) at para. 485; Prosecutorv. Kvocka (Judgment) (2 November 2001) Case no. IT-98-30/1 (ICTYTrial Chamber) at paras. 132 and 136; Prosecutorv. Vasiljevic (Judgment) (28 November 2002) Case no. IT-98-32 (ICTYTrial Chamber) at para. 205; Prosecutorv. Naletilić & Anor (judgment), (31 March 2003) Case no. IT-98-34 (ICTYTrial Chamber) at paras. 248 and 249 [Naletilić]; and Prosecutor v. Stallìe (Judgment) (31 July 2003) Case no. IT-97-24 (ICTYTrial Chamber) at paras. 5847 and 631 [Stakić].

²⁷ Kordic, supra note 26 at para. 235.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Stakić, supra note 26 at para. 584. It should probably be noted here that this was the definition of murder as a crime against humanity as formulated in Akayesu, supra note 15.

³⁰ Stakić, supra note 26 at para. 586: “The Trial Chamber finds that in the context of Article 3 of the Statute ‘murder’ means taking another person’s life. If murder is conceived in the narrow sense only, ordinary killings, namely the taking of another person’s life without any additional subjective or objective aggravating elements, do not fall under the Article. This Trial Chamber believes, however, that murder should be equated to killings, that is meurtre in French law and Moral in German law.”

³¹ According to the ICTY Statute, supra note 1, Article 3: “The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons violating the laws or customs of war. Such violations shall include, but not be limited to: (a) employment of poisonous weapons or other weapons calculated to cause unnecessary suffering; (b) wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity; (c) attack, or bombardment, by whatever means, of undefended towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings; (d) seizure of, destruction or wilful damage done to institutions dedicated to religion, charity and education, the arts and sciences, historic monuments and works of art and science; (e) plunder of public or private property.”

³² This is to be contrasted with the only war crimes provision in the ICTR Statute, supra note 1, Article 4, which specifically lists murder — with the French version listing meurtre — as a war crime. The English version provides as follows: “The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the power to prosecute persons committing or ordering to be committed serious violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 for the Protection of War Victims, and of Additional Protocol II thereto of 8 June 1977. These violations shall include, but shall not be limited to: (a) Violence to life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in particular murder as well as cruel treatment such as torture, mutilation or any form of corporal punishment; (b) Collective punishments; (c) Taking of hostages; (d) Acts of terrorism; (e) Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault; (f) Pillage; (g) The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgement pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilised peoples; (h) Threats to commit any of the foregoing acts.” And the French version provides: “Le Tribunal international pour le Rwanda est habilité à poursuivre les personnes qui commettent ou donnent l’ordre de commettre des violations graves de l’Article 3 commun aux Conventions de Genève du 12 août 1949 pour la protection des victimes en temps de guerre, et du Protocole additionnel II auxdites Conventions du 8 juin 1977. Ces violations comprennent, sans s’y limiter: (a) Les atteintes portées à la vie, à la santé et au bien-être physique ou mental des personnes, en particulier le meurtre, de même que les traitements cruels tels que la torture, les mutilations ou toutes formes de peines corporelles; (b) Les punitions collectives; (c) La prise d’otages; (d) Les actes de terrorisme; (e) Les atteintes à la dignité de la personne, notamment les traitements humiliants et dégradants, le viol, la contrainte à la prostitution et tout attentat à la pudeur; (f) Le pillage; (g) Les condamnations prononcées et les exécutions effectuées sans un jugement préalable rendu par un tribunal régulièrement constitué, assorti des garantiesjudiciaires reconnues comme indispensables par les peuples civilisés; (h) La menace de commettre les actes précités.”

³³ According to the English version of the ICTY Statute, supra note 1, Article 2: “The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons committing or ordering to be committed grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1 949, namely the following acts against persons or property protected under the provisions of the relevant Geneva Convention: (a) wilful killing; (b) torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments; (c) wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health; (d) extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly; (e) compelling a prisoner of war or a civilian to serve in the forces of a hostile power; (f) wilfully depriving a prisoner of war or a civilian of the rights of fair and regular trial; (g) unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a civilian; (h) taking civilians as hostages.” And the French version provides: “Le Tribunal international est habilité à poursuivre les personnes qui commettent ou donnent l’ordre de commettre des infractions graves aux Conventions de Genève du 12 août 1949, à savoir les actes suivants dirigés contre des personnes ou des biens protégés aux termes des dispositions de la Convention de Genève pertinente: (a) l’homicide intentionnel; (b) la torture ou les traitements inhumains, y compris les expériences biologiques; (c) le fait de causer intentionnellement de grandes souffrances ou de porter des atteintes graves à l’intégrité physique ou à la santé; (d) la destruction et l’appropriation de biens non justifiées par des nécessités militaires et exécutées sur une grande échelle de façon illicite et arbitraire; (e) le fait de contraindre un prisonnier de guerre ou un civil à servir dans les forces armées de la puissance ennemie; (f) le fait de priver un prisonnier de guerre ou un civil de son droit d’êtrejugé régulièrement et impartialement; (g) l’expulsion ou le transfert illégal d’un civil ou sa détention illégale; (h) la prise de civils en otages.”

³⁴ Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th edition (1990), for example, defines manslaughter as “[t]he unjustifiable, inexcusable and intentional killing of a human being without deliberation, premeditation, and malice” [emphasis added].

³⁵ See Ashworth, A., Principles of Criminal Law, 3rd edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999) at 274–75.Google Scholar

³⁶ See also Naletilić, supra note 26 at para. 248.

³⁷ Stakić, supra note 26 at para. 587.

³⁸ Presided over by Judge Wolfgang Schomburg of Germany.

³⁹ Akayesu, supra note 15 at para. 589.

⁴⁰ Stakić, supra note 26 at para. 631.

⁴¹ Naletilić, supra note 26 at para. 248. See also para. 249 where the Trial Chamber said: “The general requirements under Articles 2, 3 and 5 of the Statute apply to these crimes.”

⁴² Prosecutor v. Semanza (Judgment) (15 May 2003) Case no. ICTR-97-20 (ICTR Trial Chamber III, composed of Judges Ostrovsky, Williams, and Dolenc) [Semanza].

⁴³ Ibid. at para. 335.

⁴⁴ Ibid. at para. 336.

⁴⁵ Ibid. at para. 337.

⁴⁶ Ibid. at para. 338.

⁴⁷ Ibid. at para. 339.

⁴⁸ Ibid. [emphasis added].

⁴⁹ Kayishema and Ruzindana, supra note 19 at para. 140 [emphasis added].

⁵⁰ See Semanza, supra note 42 at para. 586.

⁵¹ Ibid. at paras. 169 and 170 and 209-12.

⁵² Ibid. at para. 213.

⁵³ Ibid, at para. 337. See also Kayishema and Ruzindana, supra note 19 at para. 139.

⁵⁴ Semanza, supra note 42 at para. 337.

⁵⁵ Kayishema and Ruzindana, supra note 19 at para. 139.

⁵⁶ Bowers v. Gloucester Corporation, [1963] 1 Q.B. 881 at 887 (Divisional Court).

⁵⁷ Director of Public Prosecution v. Ottewell, (1968) 52 Cr. App. R. 679 at 686 (House of Lords).

⁵⁸ Reference by the Attorney-General under Section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act (No. 1 of 1988), (1989) 88 Cr. App.R. 191 at 201 (Court of Appeal of England and Wales). As he put it, “[f]inally, it is submitted on behalf of the respondent that this being a penal enactment any ambiguity should be resolved in favour of the defence. This principle of construction is of limited application. As stated in Halsbury’s Laws of England, vol. 44, para, 910, it ‘means no more than that if, after the ordinary rules of construction have first been applied, as they must be, there remains any doubt or ambiguity, the person against whom the penalty is sought to be enforced is entitled to the benefit of the doubt.’”

⁵⁹ Farrell and Another v. Alexander, [1976] Q.B. 34531358 (Court of Appeal of England and Wales) [Farrell].

⁶⁰ Delalić, supra note 3 at para. 413 [emphasis added].

⁶¹ Prosecutor v. Hadžihasanović and Ors (Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Challenging Jurisdiction in relation to Command Responsibility) (16 July 2003) Case no. IT-01-47 (ICTY Appeals Chamber, Separate Opinion of’Judge Shahabuddeen) at para. 12.

⁶² Attorney-General v. Prince Ernest Augustus of Hanover, [1957] A.C. 436 at 463 (House of Lords).

⁶³ Director of Public Prosecutions v. Schildkamp, [1971] A.C. 1 at 23 (House of Lords) [emphasis added]. See also R. v. Samuel, (1988) 87 Cr. App. R. 232 at 237–38 (Court of Appeal of England and Wales); Higgins and Ors v. Dawson and Ors, [1902] A.C. 1 at 3–4 (House of Lords, per Lord Halsbury LC); and Master and Fellows of St Catharine’s College, Cambridge v. Rosse, [1916] 1 Ch. 73 at 82 (Court of Appeal of England and Wales, per Lord Cozens-Hardy MR).

⁶⁴ R. v. Goulis (1981), 60 C.C.C. (2d) 347 at 351 (Ontario Court of Appeal).

⁶⁵ Food Machinery Corp. v. Canada (Registrar of Trade Marks), 1946, Carswell Nat. 2 at para. 11; 5 Fox Pat. C 150; [1946] Ex. C.R. 266, 5 C.P.R. 76; [1946] 2 D.L.R. 258.

⁶⁶ Slaighl Communications Inc. v. Davidson, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038 at 1071.

⁶⁷ R. v. Daoust (2004), [2004] 1 S.C.R. 217; 2004 SCC 6, at para. 26; citing with approval Côté, P.-A., Interpretation of Legislation in Canada, 3rd edition (Cowansville: Editions Yvon Biais, 2000) at 324.Google Scholar

⁶⁸ According to Article 22(2) of the Statute of International Criminal Court (also referred to as the Statute of Rome), Doc. A/CONE 183/9 (17 July 1998) [ICC Statute]: “The definition of a crime shall be strictly construed and shall not be extended by analogy. In case of ambiguity, the definition shall be interpreted in favour of the person being investigated, prosecuted or convicted.”

⁶⁹ It is, perhaps, noteworthy that the rule even as it appears in the Statute of Rome is provided for under the heading “General Principles of Criminal Law.” Clearly, the reference to “general principles of criminal law” must have been derived from domestic criminal law, considering that international law had not traditionally concerned itself with criminal law as such, especially in terms of its administration, so as to develop any general principles of law applicable in that realm.

⁷⁰ Jennings, R. and Watts, A., eds., Oppenheim’s International Law, 9th edition (Harlow, UK: Longman, 1996), Volume 1, Introduction and Part 1, at 36–38 Google Scholar; Malanczuk, P., Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Laxo, 7th revised edition (London: Routledge, 1997) at 48.Google Scholar

⁷¹ Shaw, M., International Laxo, 4th edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) at 78.Google Scholar

⁷² Malanczuk, supra note 70 at 50.

⁷³ International Status of South-West Africa, [1950] I.C.J. Rep. 128 at 148. See also South West Africa (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa) (Second Phase) [1966] I.C.J. Rep. 6 at 295.

⁷⁴ See McAuley, F. and McCutcheon, J. P., Criminal Liability (Dublin: Sweet and Maxwell, 2000) at 1–3.Google Scholar

⁷⁵ Smith, K. J. M., Lawyers, Legislators and Theorists — Developments in English Criminal Jurisprudence 1800–1957 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998) at 56–59.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Professor Smith describes Romilly’s reformist campaigns at the turn of the nineteenth century to repeal provisions in English law that imposed capital punishments on not only pick-pocketing but also on the following offences: stealing to the value of five shillings in shops, stealing to the value of forty shillings in a dwelling house, and stealing to the value of forty shillings from vessels on navigable rivers. Ibid, at 59, note 10.

⁷⁶ Ibid, at 56.

⁷⁷ See R. v. Paré, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 618 at para. 26 (Supreme Court of Canada, per Wilson J.); see also Kloepfer, S., “The Status of Strict Construction in Canadian Criminal Law” (1983) 15 Ottawa L. Rev. 553 at 556–60.Google Scholar In Paré, however, Madam Justice Wilson noted that notwithstanding that criminal law penalties have become far less severe over the past two centuries, criminal law has remained “the most dramatic and important incursion that the state makes into individual liberty. Thus, while the original justification for the doctrine has been substantially eroded, the seriousness of imposing criminal penalties of any sort demands that reasonable doubts be resolved in favour of the accused.” Quite so. But it bears recognizing that the attenuation of criminal penalties in recent times has brought with it an attenuation of the vigour with which the judiciary have embraced the in duìno pro reo rule. Evidence of this is the greater emphasis that the judiciary have “nowadays” (in the words of Lord Denning MR in Farrell, supra note 59) placed on their insistence that (1) the decision-maker must not be quick to declare an ambiguity when they encounter difficulties, rather the ambiguity must be real, and even then (2) other canons of construction must be explored before employing the in dubio pro reo rule. We have already seen this legal phenomenon.

⁷⁸ For instance, in the Nürnberg case of US v. Josef Altstoetter el. al., which is popularly known as the Justice case, the US Military Tribunal III, described the case for the prosecution as follows: “The very essence of the prosecution case is that the laws, the Hitlerian decrees and the Draconic, corrupt, and perverted Nazi judicial system themselves constituted the substance of war crimes and crimes against humanity … The charge, in brief, is that of conscious participation in a nation wide government-organized system of cruelty and injustice, in violation of the laws of war and of humanity, and perpetrated in the name of law by the authority of the Ministry of Justice, and through the instrumentality of the courts. The dagger of the assassin was concealed beneath the robe of the jurist.” Trials of War Criminals before the Nürnberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10, vols. I and II at 984 and 985.

⁷⁹ Regina v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate and Others, Ex Parte Pinochet Ugarle (No 3), [2000] 1 A.C. 147 at 288 (House of Lords) [emphasis added].

⁸⁰ According to Article 1(a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (done at Vienna on 23 May 1969, entered into force on 27 January 1980) [VCLT] “(a) ‘treaty’means an international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation.” In that sense, the ICTR Statute, being an annex to UN Security Council Resolution 955 of 1994 cannot be a treaty.

⁸¹ Brownlie, I., Principles of Public International Law, 6th edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003) at 580.Google Scholar Insofar as customary international law constitutes the reference material for the interpretation of Security Council resolutions (see Byers, M., “The Shifting Foundations of International Law: A Decade of Forceful Measures against Iraq” (2002) 13(1) Eur. J. Int’l L. 21 at 27),CrossRefGoogle Scholar it is therefore not inconsistent to refer to the VCLT.

⁸² [Emphasis added].

⁸³ Article 32 of the VCLT, supra note 80, provides as follows: “Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31: (a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or (b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.”

⁸⁴ UN Security Council Resolution 955, UN Doc. S/RES/955 (8 November 1994) [emphasis added].

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ UN Security Council Resolution 808, UN Doc. S/RES/808 (22 February 1993). See also “Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808,” presented on 3 May 1993, UN Doc. S/25704 (1993).

⁸⁷ Meron, T., “Rape as a Crime under International Humanitarian Law” (1993) 87(3) Am. J. Int’l L. 424.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁸⁸ Nürnberg Code of Permissible Medical Experiments, in Trials of War Criminals before the Nürnberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10, volumes I and II at 181–2 [Medical case]. See also Nuremberg Code (1947), in Mitscherlich, A. and Mielke, F., Doctors of Infamy: The Story of the Nazi Medical Crimes (New York: Schuman, 1949)Google Scholar at xxiii-xxv, <http://www.cirp.org/library/ethics/nuremberg> (12 August 2006).

⁸⁹ Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (1949), 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (1949), 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (1949), 75 U.N.T.S. 135; and Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (1949), 75 U.N.T.S. 287.

⁹⁰ Prosecutor v. Tadic (Judgment), (15 July 1999), Case no. IT-94-1 (ICTY Appeals Chamber) at para. 285 [Tadic].

⁹¹ It may further be noted that the English version of Article 2 describes genocide, as among other things, “killing” members of a group with intent to destroy the targeted group in whole or in part. The French version of Article 2 refers to “meurtre” where “killing” appears in the English version.

⁹² Tadic, supra note 90 at para. 286.

⁹³ Semanza, supra note 42 at para. 335.

⁹⁴ Kayishema and Ruzindana, supra note 19 at para. 138.

⁹⁵ See, for instance, the opinion of Lord Upjohn in the House of Lords case of DPP v. Schildkamp, [1969] 3 All. E.R. 1640; [1970] A.C. 1, following the related opinion of Simonds, Lord in Attorney-General v. Prince Ernest Augustus of Hanover [1957]Google Scholar A.C. 436; [1957] 1 All. E.R. 49.

⁹⁶ Tadic, supra note go at para. 287 [emphasis added].

⁹⁷ Charter of the International Military Tribunal (1945), available at <http://www.damocles.org/article.php3?id_article=3953> (12 August 2006). The French version of Article 6(c) of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal: “Les actes suivants ou l’un quelconque d’entre eux sont des crimes soumis à la juridiction du Tribunal et entraînant une responsabilité individuelle: … Les crimes contre l’humanité: c’est à dire l’assassinat, l’extermination, la réduction en esclavage, la déportation et tout autre acte inhumain commis contre toutes populations civiles, avant ou pendant la guerre, ou bien les persécutions pour des motifs politiques, raciaux ou religieux, lorsque ces actes ou persécutions, qu’ils aient constitué ou non une violation du droit interne du pays où ils ont été perpétrés, ont été commis à la suite de tout crime entrant dans la compétence du Tribunal, ou en liaison avec ce crime.” See Accord concernant la poursuite et le châtiment des grands criminels de guerre des Puissances européennes de l’Axe et statut du tribunal international militaire, Londres, 8 août 1945, available at <http://www.icrc.org/dih.nsf/FULL/350POpenDocument> (12 August 2006)

⁹⁸ Sunga, L., “The Crimes within the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court Statute (Partii, Articles 5–10)” (1998) 6 Eur. J. Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 377 at 385.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁹⁹ Article 5(c) of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East provides in French: “Les crimes contre l’Humanité. A savoir, meurtre, extermination, réduction à l’esclavage, déportation et autres actes inhumains, commis contre toute population civile, avant ou pendant la guerre, ou persécutions pour des raisons politiques ou raciales, en exécution de ou en relation avec tout crime tombant sous la juridiction du Tribunal, que ce soit ou non en violation de la législation intérieure du pays où fut perpétré le crime. Les chefs, organisateurs, instigateurs et complices participants à l’élaborations ou à l’exécution d’un plan commun ou à un complot en vue de commettre l’un quelconque des crimes énoncés, sont responsables de tous actes accomplis par toute personne en exécution dudit plan.” Bazelaire, J.-P. and Cretin, T., La justice pénale internationale: Son évolution, son avenir de Nuremberg á La Haye (2000),Google Scholar Annexe 3.

¹⁰⁰ United Slates v. Karl Brandt and Ors, in Medical case, supra note 88.

¹⁰¹ It should be recalled that the purposes of the Control Council Law no. 10 was expressed in the preamble as “[i]n order to give effect to the terms of the Moscow Declaration of 30 October 1943 and the London Agreement of 8 August 1945, and the Charter issued pursuant thereto and in order to establish a uniform legal basis in Germany for the prosecution of war criminals and other similar offenders, other than those dealt with by the International Military Tribunal.”

¹⁰² See Medical case, supra note 88 at para. 11.

¹⁰³ See ibid. at paras. 6, 7, 11, and 12.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid. at 183.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid. at 199.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid. at 201.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid. at 202.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid. at 206.

¹¹⁰ Ibid. at 206–7.

¹¹¹ Ibid. at 207 [emphasis added].

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ Ibid. at 298.

¹¹⁴ United Nations, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-Eighth Session 6 May-26 July 1996, UN General Assembly, 51st Session, Supp. no. 10, Doc. UNGAOR (A/51/10) (1996) at 94, para. 2 [Report of Its Forty-Eighth Session].

¹¹⁵ Where committed in execution of, or in connection with, any crime against peace or any war crime as specified in the principles.

¹¹⁶ “[B]y the authorities of a State or by private individuals acting at the instigation or with toleration of such authorities.” See Article 2(11) of the Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 1954, UN GAOR Supp. (No. 9) at 11, UN Doc. A/ 2693 (1954).

¹¹⁷ When committed in a systematic manner or on a large scale and instigated or directed by a government or by any organization or group.

¹¹⁸ Report of Its Forty-Eighth Session, supra note 114 at 48, para. 7.

¹¹⁹ See Akayesu, supra note 15 at para. 587.

¹²⁰ Nations Unies, Rapport de la Commission du droit international sur les travaux de sa quarante-huitième session, 6 mai-26 juillet 1996, Assemblée générale Documents officiels, Cinquante et unième session, Supplément no. to, Doc. A/51/10 (1996) at 95

¹²¹ Report on Its Forty-Eighth Session, supra note 114 at 47, para. 2 of commentary.

¹²² ICC Statute, supra note 68, Article 7(1) provides as follows: “For the purpose of this Statute, ‘crime against humanity’ means any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack: (a) Murder; (b) Extermination; (c) Enslavement; (d) Deportation or forcible transfer of population; (e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law; (f) Torture; (g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity; (h) Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law, in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; (i) Enforced disappearance of persons; (j) The crime of apartheid; (k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.” And the French text provides as follows: “Aux fins du présent Statut, on entend par crime contre l’humanité l’un quelconque des actes ci-après lorsqu’il est commis dans le cadre d’une attaque généralisée ou systématique lancée contre toute population civile et en connaissance de cette attaque: (a) Meurtre; (b) Extermination; (c) Réduction en esclavage; (d) Déportation ou transfert forcé de population; (e) Emprisonnement ou autre forme de privation grave de liberté physique en violation des dispositions fondamentales du droit international; (f) Torture; (g) Viol, esclavage sexuel, prostitution forcée, grossesse forcée, stérilisation forcée ou toute autre forme de violence sexuelle de gravité compara.ble; (h) Persécution de tout groupe ou de toute collectivité identifiable pour des motifs d’ordre politique, racial, national, ethnique, culturel, religieux ou sexiste au sens du para.graphe 3, ou en fonction d’autres critères universellement reconnus comme inadmissibles en droit international, en corrélation avec tout acte visé dans le présent para.graphe ou tout crime relevant de la compétence de la Cour; (i) Disparitions forcées de personnes; (j) Crime d’apartheid; (k) Autres actes inhumains de caractère analogue causant intentionnellement de grandes souffrances ou des atteintes graves à l’intégrité physique ou à la santé physique ou mentale.”

¹²³ For instance, in the French text of section 4(3) of Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes Act of 2000 of Canada, 1985, R.S.C. 24, crimes against humanity are defined as follows: “[C]rime contre l’humanité meurtre, extermination, réduction en esclavage, déportation, emprisonnement, torture, violence sexuelle, persécution ou autre fait — acte ou omission — inhumain, d’une part, commis contre une population civile ou un groupe identifiable de personnes et, d’autre part, qui constitue, au moment et au lieu de la perpétration, un crime contre l’humanité selon le droit international coutumier ou le droit international conventionnel, ou en raison de son caractère criminel d’après les principes généraux de droit reconnus par l’ensemble des nations, qu’il constitue ou non une transgression du droit en vigueur à ce moment et dans ce lieu.”

¹²⁴ See Décret n. 2002–925 du 6 juin 2002, portant publication de la convention portant statut de la Cour pénale internationale, adoptée à Rome le 17 juillet 1998.

¹²⁵ In Belgium, paragraph 2 of Loi du 16 juin 1993 relative à la répression des violations graves de droit international humanitaire (as amended by Loi du 10 février 1999) provides as follows: “Constitue un crime de droit international et est réprimé conformément aux dispositions de la présente loi, le crime contre l’humanité, tel que défini ci-après, qu’il soit commis en temps de paix ou en temps de guerre. Conformément au statut de la Cour pénale internationale, le crime contre l’humanité s’entend de l’un des actes ci-après commis dans le cadre d’une attaque généralisée ou systématique lancée contre une population civile et en connaissance de cette attaque: Io meurtre; 2° extermination; 3° réduction en esclavage; 4° déportation ou transfert forcé de population; 5° emprisonnement ou autre forme de privation grave de liberté physique en violation des dispositions fondamentales du droit international; 6° torture; 70 viol, esclavage sexuel, prostitution forcée, grossesse forcée, stérilisation forcée et toute autre forme de violence sexuelle de gravité compara.ble; 8° persécution de tout groupe ou de toute collectivité identifiable pour des motifs d’ordre politique, racial, national, ethnique, culturel, religieux ou sexiste ou en fonction d’autres critères universellement reconnus comme inadmissibles en droit international, en corrélation avec tout acte visé dans le présent article.”

¹²⁶ See Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes Act of 2000, supra note 123 at section 4(2) (a).

¹²⁷ See Ibid, at section 4(2) (b).

¹²⁸ For Cassese, murder as a crime against humanity means “intentional killing, whether or not premeditated.” Cassese, A., International Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) at 74.Google Scholar

¹²⁹ Semanza, supra note 42 at para. 338 [emphasis added].

¹³⁰ ICTY Statute, supra note 1, Article 4(2) (a).

¹³¹ Ibid., Article 4(2).

¹³² Ibid., Article 5.

¹³³ It should perhaps be said that this requirement of discrimination indicated in the general clause of the provision, in order to convert a crime into a crime against humanity, is not a matter of mens rea for each of the crimes listed. In other words, it is not required that the accused must possess such a discriminatory animus against the victim when he committed the offence. It is only sufficient to show that the general widespread or systematic attack against the civilian population (as part of which the accused committed any of the listed crimes) was motivated by discrimination against the civilian population under attack. The only listed crime for which the discriminatory animus is specially required is persecution. See the judgment of the Appeals Chamber in Prosecutor v. Akayesu (Judgment) (1 June 2001) Case no. ICTR-96-4 (ICTR Appeals Chamber) at paras. 453–69 [Akayesu 2001]; see also Tadic, supra note 90 at paras. 281–305.

¹³⁴ See Report of its Forty-Eighth Session, supra note 114 at 94–95, paras. 3–5.

¹³⁵ Writing back in 1947, for instance, Descheemaeker observed as follows: “En effet, tous les actes qui constituent les crimes contre l’humanité, ne sont que la transposition sur le plan international et avec un caractère d’amplitude et de généralité qui vient d’être souligné, de crimes de droit commun prévus et frappés par la législation pénale interne de tous les pays. Il est exact que le droit pénal interne sanctionne des actes individuels ou groupant un nombre relativement peu élevé d’individus, alors que les crimes contre l’humanité ont eu pour victimes des populations entières.” Descheemaeker, J., Le tribunal militaire international des grand criminéis de guerre (1947) at 20–21 Google Scholar [emphasis in original text].

¹³⁶ Tadić, supra note 90 at paras. 285 and 305. See also Akayesu 2001, supra note 133 at paras. 453–69.

¹³⁷ Jennings and Watts, supra note 70, parts 2–4 at 1273, note 12.