¹ 2 Beale, J., A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws 1078 (1935)Google Scholar, hereinafter 2 Beale.

² American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law on the Conflict of Laws (1934), cited hereinafter Restatement (First).

³ American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law, Second: Conflict of Laws 2nd (1971), hereinafter Restatement (Second).

⁴ Beale distinguished between the law administered by the federal courts in the District of Columbia and that administered by the rest of the federal courts.

⁵ 16 Pet. 1 (U.S. Sup. Ct. 1842).

⁶ 2 Beale 1079, 1172–79.

⁷ Ibid., 1173.

⁸ Story, J., Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws 233 (2d ed. 1841 ).Google Scholar Although Story fixes on the lex loci solutionis, his treatment points towards all three of the theories being discussed. He states, “generally speaking, the validity of a contract is to be decided by the law of the place, where it is made,” but qualifies this statement 32 pages later by saying that “where the contract is, either expressly or tacitly, to be performed in any other place, there the general rule is, in conformity to the presumed intention of the parties, that the contract, as to its validity, nature, obligation, and interpretation, is to be governed by the law of the place of performance” (Ibid., 201).

⁹ 2 Beale 1173.

¹⁰ Ibid., 1172.

¹¹ Ibid. 1172, notes 1 and 2. Kansas is in fact included in the list of lex loci contractus states and not unclassified as the note suggests.

¹² Ibid., 1105–8.

¹³ Restatement (First) s. 332; 2 Beale 1090–92.

¹⁴ 2 Beale 1079–82. This view had the strong support of Judge Learned Hand: “Some law must impose the obligation, and the parties have nothing whatever to do with that: no more than with whether their acts are torts or crimes.” E. Gerli & Co., Inc. v. Cunard Steamship Co., 48 F. 2d 115, 117 (2d Cir. 1931).

¹⁵ 2 Beale 1174.

¹⁶ Ibid., 1086–90.

¹⁷ Ibid., 1090–91.

¹⁸ Cook, , “‘Contracts’ and the Conflict of Laws,” 31 Ill. L. Rev. 143 (1936)Google Scholar; Cook, , “‘Contracts’ and the Conflict of Laws: ‘Intention’ of Parties,” 32 Ill. L. Rev. 899 (1938).Google Scholar

¹⁹ Lorenzen, , “Validity and Effects of Contracts in the Conflict of Laws,” 30 Yale L.J. 565, 655; 31 Yale L.J. 53 (1921).CrossRefGoogle Scholar Lorenzen, however, shared Beale’s view that the parties’ intention could not logically be permitted to decide what law should govern the contract: 30 Yale L.J. at 658. His solution was to regard a contract as valid if it satisfied the law of any state with which the contract had a reasonable connection (Ibid., 672), a view that survives, substantially modified, in the writings of Weintraub, , “Choice of Law in Contract,” 54 Iowa L. Rev. 399 (1968)Google Scholar, and Ehrenzweig, A., Conflicts in a Nutshell 165–67 (3d ed. 1974)Google Scholar; A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws 465 (1962).

²⁰ Restatement (First) s. 311, comment d.

²¹ Ibid., s. 332.

²² Ibid., s. 370.

²³ Ibid., s. 372.

²⁴ Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).

²⁵ Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).

²⁶ Colorado: Carlson v. Boryla, 490 P. 2d 700 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971); Western Enterprises, Inc. v. Robo-Sales, Inc., 470 P. 2d 931 (Colo. Ct. App. 1970); United Telecommunications, Inc. v. American Television & Communications Corp., 536 F. 2d 1310 (ioth Cir. 1976) ; Mr. Steak, Inc. v. River City Steak, Inc., 460 F. 2d 666 (10th Cir. 1972). But compare Dworak v. Olson Const. Co., 551 P. 2d 198 (Colo. 1976) (issue combined tort and contract; old lex loci delicti rule rejected); Walker Adjustment Bureau v. Wood Bros. Homes, Inc., 582 P. 2d 1059 (Colo. Ct. App. 1978) (rejection of lex loci contractus rule considered, but not necessary to decide on the facts).

Delaware: Hill v. Hill, 262 A. 2d 661 (Del. Ch. 1970), affd. 269 A. 2d 212 (Del. 1970); Wilmington Trust Co. v. Paul Hardeman, Inc., 172 A. 2d 63 (Del. 1961); Norse Petroleum A/S v. LVO International, Inc., 389 A. 2d 771 (Del. Super. Ct. 1978); Oliver B. Cannon & Sons, Inc. v. Dorr-Oliver, Inc., 312 A. 2d 322 (Del. Super. Ct. 1973); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Jardell Co., 421 F. 2d 1048 (3d Cir. 1970).

Florida: Goodman v. Olsen, 305 So. 2d 753, on remand 307 So. 2d 842 (Fla. 1974); Wingold v. Horowitz, 292 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 1974) ; Boat Town U.S.A., Inc. v. Mercury Marine Div. of Brunswick Corp., 364 So. 2d 15 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Chas. L. Bowman & Co. v. Erwin, 468 F. 2d 1293 (5th Cir. 1972). The question whether the lex loci contractus rule should be abandoned in favour of the rules in the Second Restatement was expressly left open in Gillen v. United Services Automobile Assn., 300 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1974).

Louisiana: U.S. Leasing Corp. v. Keiler, 290 So. 2d 427 (La. Ct. App. 1974). (Louisiana’s Civil Code, Art. 10, lends support to the place of contracting rule, but does not dictate it: see Lester v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 295 F. Supp. 1208, 1211 (W.D. La. 1968).) The Court of Appeals of Louisiana may be changing its view: see Wickham v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 366 So. 2d 951 (La. Ct. App. 1978).

Maine: Boscho, Inc. v. Knowles, 83 A. 2d 122 (Me. 1955); Dole Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 269 F. Supp. 72 (D. Me. 1967).

Maryland: Traylor v. Grafton, 332 A. 2d 651 (Md. 1975); Haines v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 428 F. Supp. 435 (D. Md. 1977); Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. of Maryland v. Allegheny Const. Co., 340 F Supp. 734 (D. Md. 1972); Becker Pretzel Bakeries, Inc. v. Universal Oven Co., 279 F. Supp. 893 (D. Md. 1968).

Massachusetts: Cameron v. Gunstock Acres, Inc., 384 N.E. 2d 791 (Mass. 1976); Dicker v. Klein, 277 N.E. 2d 514 (Mass. 1972); West Side Motor Exp., Inc. v. Finance Discount Corp., 165 N.E. 2d 903 (Mass. 1960); Molinar v. Western Electric Co., 525 F. 2d 521 (1st Cir. 1975), cert. den. 96 S. Ct. 1485 (1976).

Michigan: Waldorf v. KMS Industries, Inc., 181 N.W. 2d 85 (Mich. 1970).

New Jersey: Ray v. Beneficial Finance Co. of North Jersey, 224 A. 2d 143 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1966); Farris Eng’r Corp. v. Service Bureau Corp., 406 F. 2d 519 (3d Cir. 1969); Doyle v. Northrop Corp., 455 F. Supp. 1318 (D. N.J. 1978); Louis Schlesinger Co. v. Kresge Foundation, 312 F. Supp. 1011 (D. N.J. 1970).

New Mexico: Boggs v. Anderson, 381 P. 2d 419 (N.M. 1963); Sandoval v. Valdez, 580 P. 2d 131 (N.M. Ct. App. 1978).

North Carolina: Fast v. Gulley, 155 S.E. 2d 507 (N.C. 1967); Tanglewood Land Co. v. Wood, 252 S.E. 2d 546 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979); Suitt Const. Co. v. Seaman’s Bank for Savings, 226 S.E. 2d 408 (N.C. Ct. App. 1976); Hardy-Latham v. Willons, 415 F. 2d 674 (4th Cir. 1968); Willis Bros., Inc. v. Ocean Scallops, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 1151 (E.D. N.C. 1972).

Oklahoma: Telex Corp. v. Hamilton, 576 P. 2d 767 (Okl. 1978); Sampson Const. Co. v. Farmers Co-Op. Elevator Co., Marshall, Okl., 382 F. 2d 645 (10th Cir. 1967); Caribbean Mills, Inc., v. McMahon, 217 F. Supp. 639 (N.D. Okl. 1963).

Rhode Island: C. Beats Co. v. Rhode Island Hospital, 292 A. 2d 865 (R.I. 1972) ; Union Sav. Bank v. DeMarco, 254 A. 2d 81 (R.I. 1969).

South Carolina: Noland Co. v. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., 301 F. 2d 43 (4th Cir. 1962); Associated Spring Corp. v. Wilson, 410 F. Supp. 967 (D. S.C.1976).

South Dakota: Minnesota Amusement Co. v. Larkin, 299 F. 2d 142 (8th Cir. 1962).

Utah: Petrof Trading Co. v. Intermountain Research & Eng’r Co., 424 F. 2d 704 (10th Cir. 1970); Trans-American Collections, Inc. v. Continental Account Servicing House, Inc., 342 F. Supp. 1303 (D. Utah 1972); Cyclo Floor Mach. Corp. v. National Housewares, Inc., 296 F. Supp. 665 (D. Utah 1968).

West Virginia: Poffenbarger v. New York Life Insurance Co., 277 F. Supp. 726 (S.D. W. Va. 1967).

²⁷ Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Utah.

²⁸ For example, the courts of Florida and Massachusetts, both of which states have so far stayed loyal to the place of contracting doctrine (supra note 26), have recently held that the parties’ intention will normally be respected if expressed: Hirsh v. Hirsh, 309 So. 2d 47 (Fla. Ct. App. 1975); Steranko v. Inforex, Inc., 362 N.E. 2d 222 (Mass. Ct. App. 1977).

²⁹ Cavers, , “A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem,” 47 Harv. L. Rev. 173 (1933).Google Scholar

³⁰ Ibid., 190.

³¹ Ibid., 192–93.

³² 248 N.E. 2d 576 (N.Y. 1969).

³³ Gurrie, , “Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws,” in Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws 177, at 183–84 (1963).Google Scholar

³⁴ Cavers, supra note 29, at 180, 188–90; Currie, , “Married Women’s Contracts: A Study in Conflict of Laws Method,” in Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws 77 (1963).Google Scholar

³⁵ Some rules about formation, like those requiring special notice of terms, or prescribing that a certain form of contract must be used, obviously may have a more particularly protective function.

³⁶ One commentator has dubbed them “anti-contractual” laws: Sedler, , “The Contracts Provisions of the Restatement (Second) : An Analysis and a Critique,” 72 Col. L. Rev. 279 (1972).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³⁷ I am not suggesting that every contractual rule can be pigeonholed neatly into one of these categories. Some are borderline cases. But a large part of them belong reasonably clearly to one of these three classes, based on the purpose they are designed to serve.

³⁸ See, for example, the discussion in Cavers, “Re-Stating the Conflict of Laws: The Chapter on Contracts,” in Nadelmann, K., von Mehren, A., and Hazard, J., eds., XXth Century Comparative and Conflicts Law 349, at 356–57 (1961).Google Scholar

³⁹ 395 Ρ. 2d 543 (Ore. 1964).

⁴⁰ Wickham v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 366 So. 2d 951 (La. Ct. App. 1978).

⁴¹ On this distinction, see Kegel, , “The Crisis of Conflict of Laws,” [1964] 2 Hague Rec. 95, at 180–84.Google Scholar

⁴² Supra note 40, at 954.

⁴³ Even if, illogically, we were to equate a state’s material interests with its interest in social regulation, the result is unjustified. In fact, it should have been the reverse, because applying Louisiana’s rule meant that the Mississippi beneficiary recovered.

⁴⁴ Another case on variation of a contract is Schlosser v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 271 N.W. 2d 879 (Wis. 1978). There an employer purported to vary unilaterally a group insurance plan for its employees under which it was obliged to provide non-contributory life insurance benefits. The terms of the plan provided that such unilateral changes could be made. Wisconsin law, however, made such a term inoperative in the employees’ interests. The laws of many other states in which the employer had employees gave effect to the term. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin decided that all the employees were protected by the Wisconsin law, one of the grounds being Wisconsin’s “interest” in seeing employees fairly treated. “Governmental interest” reasoning was much more appropriate here than in the Louisiana case, because the rule in question was palpably one that involved social order (giving employees security of expectations despite the contract) rather than just the functioning of the contractual mechanism.

⁴⁵ Supra note 22 and accompanying text.

⁴⁶ See the itemized summary of his method in “Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws,” supra note 33, at 183–84. Although he later modified his method somewhat with respect to giving legislative policies a “moderate and restrained interpretation,” see Note, 63 Col. L. Rev. 1233, at 1242, and “The Disinterested Third State,” 28 Law & Contemp. Prob. 754, 763–64 (1963), he did not depart from the view that the accommodation of state legislative interests was of the essence of the choice of law process. See Cavers, D., The Choice of Law Process 72–74 (1965)Google Scholar; Leflar, R., American Conflicts Law 185–86 (3d ed. 1977).Google Scholar Hereinafter “Cavers” and “Leflar.”

⁴⁷ Supra note 30 and accompanying text.

⁴⁸ Cavers 181, 184.

⁴⁹ Leflar 205–19.

⁵⁰ von Mehren, A. and Trautman, D., The Law of Multi-State Problems (1965), esp. at 76–79, 215 ff.Google Scholar

⁵¹ Ibid., 230–32, 313–27. See also Mehren, von, “Special Substantive Rules for Multi-State Problems: Their Role and Significance in Contemporary Choice of Law Methodology,” 88 Harv. L. Rev. 347 (1974).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁵² Von Mehren and Trautman, supra note 50, at 246–53.

⁵³ 360 P. 2d 906 (Cal. 1961).

⁵⁴ I would argue, for the reasons discussed above in connection with “social order” and “risk-fixing” rules, that Nevada’s interests were not really “govern-mental interests” in the proper sense.

⁵⁵ Supra note 53, at 910. The difficulties inherent in the court’s reliance on the “expectations” of the parties are explored in Cavers, “Oral Contracts to Provide by Will and the Choice of Law Process: Some Notes on Bernkrant,” in Pound, R., Griswold, E., and Sutherland, A., eds., Perspectives of Law: Essays for Austin Wakeman Scott 38 (1964).Google Scholar

⁵⁶ Cavers 181, 184. See also Cavers, , “Contemporary Conflicts Law in American Perspective,” [1970] 3 Hague Rec. 75, at 225–27.Google Scholar

⁵⁷ Cavers 181. He adds that if the “centring” outside the state was due to facts that were fortuitous or had been manipulated to evade the protective law, the case should be treated as if it were centred in the state.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 189.

⁵⁹ Supra note 39 and accompanying text.

⁶⁰ Cavers 191–92.

⁶¹ Ibid., 195.

⁶² Ibid., 195–96.

⁶³ The phrase “local law” is meant to exclude renvoi, but the foreign state’s conflicts rules may still be relevant in assessing the degree to which it is interested in the application of its domestic law to the facts. Restatement (Second), s. 188, comment b.

⁶⁴ The draft of April 22, 1960, which was commented on by Cavers, supra note 38, was not clear on this point, or indeed on the whole question whether choice of law in contracts should proceed on an issue-by-issue basis.

⁶⁵ Restatement (Second), s. 188, comment b, at 577–78.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Ibid., s. 6, comment i. The Reporter for the Second Restatement has admitted that, absent a choice of law provision, “there is little in the current law on which one can confidently rely [in predicting the law applicable to an issue] other than, perhaps, on the tendency of the courts to apply a law under which the contract will be valid.” Reese, , “Choice of Law in Torts and Contracts and Directions for the Future,” 16 Col. J. of Transnat. L. I, at 37–38 (1977).Google Scholar

⁶⁸ Restatement (Second), s. 187, comment c.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Ibid., s. 187, comment e.

⁷¹ Ibid., s. 187, comment g.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Inaccurately, if the argument made earlier, about the difference between a state’s material interests and its “governmental interests” proper, is correct.

⁷⁴ Restatement (Second), s. 187, comment b.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Ibid., s. 188(3).

⁷⁷ Ibid., s. 189.

⁷⁸ Ibid., s. 190.

⁷⁹ Ibid., s. 191.

⁸⁰ Ibid., s. 192.

⁸¹ Ibid., s. 193.

⁸² Ibid., ss. 194–97 resp.

⁸³ Ibid., s. 198.

⁸⁴ Ibid., s. 199.

⁸⁵ Ibid., s. 202.

⁸⁶ Ibid., s. 203. This rule was applied in O’Brien v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., 586 P. 2d 830 (Wash. 1978) ; the 25 per cent rate permissible under New York law was found to be “greatly in excess” of Washington’s 12 per cent permissible rate, and the application of New York law was therefore rejected in favour of that of Washington, the state with the most significant relationship.

⁸⁷ See the extensive critique by Sedler, supra note 36, at 315–27.

⁸⁸ Restatement (Second), s. 187, comment e. Presumably if the chosen law invalidates only one term, the choice of law clause will be denied effect only as to that term, leaving the chosen law to govern the rest. This part of comment e is criticized by Sedler, supra note 36, at 292–94.

⁸⁹ Ehrenzweig, A., Conflicts in a Nutshell 163 (3d ed. 1974)Google Scholar; Ehrenzweig, A., A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws 458 (1962).Google Scholar For another expression of concern about the indeterminacy of the Second Restatement’s rules, see Shapira, , “‘Grasp All, Lose All’ : On Restraint and Moderation in the Reformulation of Choice of Law Policy,” 77 Col. L. Rev. 248 (1977).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁹⁰ Ehrenzweig, , Conflicts in a Nutshell, supra note 89, at 165–67Google Scholar; Ehrenzweig, , A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws, supra note 89, at 467–85.Google Scholar

⁹¹ Sedler, supra note 36, at 302–15, 327.

⁹² Arkansas: Standard Leasing Corp v. Schmidt Aviation, Inc., 576 S.W. 2d 181 (Ark. 1979), anticipated by Edwin F. Armstrong & Co. v. Ben Pearson, Inc., 294 F. Supp. 163 (E. D. Ark. 1967), aff’d mem. 404 F. 2d 610.

California: Berkrant v. Fowler, supra note 53; Seidman and Seidman v. Wolfson, 123 Cal. Rptr. 873 (Ct. App. 1975) ; Dixon Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Walters, 122 Cal. Rptr. 202 (Ct. App. 1975); Boskuhl v. Family Life Ins. Co., 76 Cal. Rptr. 602 (Ct. App. 1969); Younker v. Manor, 63 Cal. Rptr. 197 (Ct. App. 1967); Ury v. Jewelers Acceptance Corp., 38 Cal. Rptr. 376 (Ct. App. 1964). Accord: Strassberg v. New England Mutual Life Ins. Co., 575 F. 2d 1262 (gth Cir. 1978); Colonial Gas Energy System v. Unigard Mutual Ins. Corp., 441 F. Supp. 765 (N.D. Cal. 1977) ; Denny v. American Tobacco Co., 308 F. Supp. 219 (N.D. Cal. 1970).

Georgia: Nasco, Inc. v. Gimbert, 238 S.E. 2d 368 (Ga. 1977). Accord: Brown v. Inter-Ocean Ins. Co., 438 F. Supp. 951 (N.D. Ga. 1977) ; Eldon Industries, Inc. v. Paradies & Co., 397 F. Supp. 535 (N.D. Ga. 1975).

Idaho: Rungee v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 449 P. 2d 378 (Idaho 1968).

Indiana: W. H. Barber Co. v. Hughes, 63 N.E. 2d 417 (Ind. 1945); Clow Corp. v. Ross Township School Corp., 384 N.E. 2d 1077 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979). Accord: Casey v. Transamerica Life Ins. & Annuity Co., 511 F. 2d 577 (7th Cir. 1975).

Iowa: Joseph L. Wilmotte & Co. v. Rosenman Bros., 258 N.W. 2d 317 (Iowa 1977).

Kentucky: Lewis v. American Family Ins. Grp., 555 S.W. 2d 579 (Ky. 1977). Accord: Travelers Ins. Co. v. Fields, 451 F. 2d 1292 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. den. 406 U.S. 919.

Mississippi: Craig v. Columbus Compress & Warehouse Co., 210 So. 2d 645 (Miss. 1968). Accord: FMC Finance Corp. v. Reed, 592 F. 2d 238 (5th Cir. 1979); Blue Bird Body Co. v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 583 F. 2d 717 (5th Cir. 1978). Cf. two cases decided on the choice of law provision of the U.C.C.: Dunavant Enterprises, Inc. v. Ford, 294 So. 2d 788 (Miss. 1974); Bunge Corp. v. Bigione, 418 F. Supp. 1159 (S.D. Miss. 1976).

Missouri: National Starch & Chem. Corp. v. Newman, 577 S.W. 2d 99 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979). The federal courts took the lead in this state: Bernstein v. Fidelity Union Life Ins. Co., 449 F. Supp. 327 (E.D. Mo. 1978); Citizens & Southern Nat. Bk. v. Bruce, 420 F. Supp. 795 (E.D. Mo. 1976); Moss v. National Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 385 F. Supp. 1291 (W.D. Mo. 1974) ; Nelson v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 359 F. Supp. 271 (W.D. Mo. 1973).

New Hampshire: Consolidated Mutual Ins. Co. v. Radio Foods Corp., 240 A. 2d 47 (N.H. 1968). Accord: Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Consolidated Milk Producers’ Assn., 354 F. Supp. 879 (D.N.H. 1973).

New York: Intercontinental Planning Ltd. v. Daystrom, Inc., supra note 32; Haag v. Barnes, 216 N.Y.S. 2d 65 (1961) ; Auten v. Auten, 124 N.E. 2d 99 (N.Y. 1954) ; Hornel Intern. Corp. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 390 N.Y.S. 2d 457 (App. Div. 1977); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Minkoff, 338 N.Y.S. 2d 444 (App. Div. 1972), aff’d 347 N.Y.S. 2d 437 (1973); Crisafulli v. Childs, 307 N.Y.S. 2d 701 (App. Div. 1970) ; Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp. v. Barletta, 295 N.Y.S. 2d 75 (App. Div. 1968) ; Anderson v. A/S Berge Sigval Bergesen, 287 N.Y.S. 2d 712 (App. Div. 1968), affd 295 N.Y.S. 2d 161 (1968); Lavey v. Saphier, 370 N.Y.S. 2d 808 (Super. Ct. 1975); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Sullam, 349 N.Y.S. 2d 550 (Super. Ct. 1973). Accord: Speare v. Consolidated Assets Corp., 367 F. 2d 208 (2d Cir. 1966); Zogg v. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., 276 F. 2d 861 (2d Cir. 1960); Kristinus v. H. Stern Com. e Ind. S.A., 463 F. Supp. 1263 (S.D. N.Y. 1979); Transatlantic Cement, Inc. v. Lambert Frères & Cié., 462 F. Supp. 363 (S.D. N.Y. 1978); Ingrassia v. Shell Oil Co., 394 F. Supp. 875 (S.D. N.Y. 1975); Teledyne Industries, Inc. v. Eon Corp., 373 F. Supp. 191 (S.D. N.Y. 1974).

Ohio: Osborn v. Osborn, 226 N.E. 2d 814 (Ohio Com. PL 1966). Federal Courts seem to have overlooked this case: Arsham v. Band, 511 F. 2d 1108 (6th Cir. 1975); McCluskey v. Rob San Services, Inc., 443 F. Supp. 65 (S.D. Ohio 1977) ; Perlmutter Printing Co. v. Strome, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 409 (N.D. Ohio 1976).

Oregon: Lilienthal v. Kaufman, supra note 39.

Vermont: Pioneer Credit Corp. v. Carden, 245 A. 2d 891 (Vt. 1968); Boston Law Book Co. v. Hathorn, 127 A. 2d 120 (Vt. 1956). Compare Fellows v. Mauser, 302 F. Supp. 929 (D. Vt. 1969), which applied the lex loci contractus rule.

Washington: O’Brien v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., supra note 86; Granited Equipment Leasing Corp. v. Hutton, 525 P. 2d 223 (Wash. 1974); Potlatch No. 1 Fed. Credit Union v. Kennedy, 459 P. 2d 32 (Wash. 1969); Baffin Land Corp. v. Monticello Motor Inn, Inc., 425 P. 2d 623 (Wash. 1967); Nelson v. Kaanapali Properties, 578 P. 2d 1319 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978). Accord: United Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Cody, 286 F. Supp. 552 (W.D. Wash. 1968).

Wisconsin: Schlosser v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., supra note 44; Handal v. American Farmers Mutual Cas. Co., 255 N.W. 2d 903 (Wis. 1977) ; Haines v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 177 N.W. 2d 328 (Wis. 1970); Urhammer v. Olson, 159 N.W. 2d 688 (Wis. 1968); Peterson v. Warren, 143 N.W. 2d 560 (Wis. 1966). Accord: Kisting v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 290 F. Supp. 141 (W.D. Wis. 1968).

The two possible additions are Colorado, because of the two cases noted supra note 26, and Louisiana, because of the Wickham case, discussed in the text accompanying notes 40–44 supra. The latter case is supported by several federal decisions: Southern Ins. Co. v. Consumer Ins. Agency, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 30 (E.D. La. 1977); Berryhill v. Marshall Exploration, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 198 (W.D. La. 1976); Dean v. General Motors Corp., 301 F. Supp. 187, 194 (E.D. La. 1969); Lester v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 295 F. Supp. 1208 (W.D. La. 1968). The state courts have generally followed the lex loci contractus rule: supra note 26.

⁹³ “[I]t is the duty of the United States District Court to ascertain what the state law is, not what it ought to be ; otherwise we would be formulating the legal policy and mind of the state in an area if there is already a clearly enunciated state rule.” Bunge Corp. v. Bigione, 418 F. Supp. 1159, 1163 (S.D. Miss. 1976).

⁹⁴ Hawaii: Commercial Ins. Co. of Newark, N.J. v. Pacific-Peru Const. Corp., 558 F. 2d 948 (9th Cir, 1977). There have been no previous state decisions on the point.

North Dakota: National Farmers Union Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Gibbons, 338 F. Supp. 430 (D.N.D. 1972). The state courts have followed the lex loci solutionis rule: First Nat. Bk. of Wibaux v. Dreher, 202 N.W. 2d 670 (N.D. 1972) ; Bjerken v. Ames Sand 6 Gravel Co., 189 N.W. 2d 366 (N.D. 1971); Nordenstrom v. Swedberg, 143 N.W. 2d 848 (N.D. 1966).

Pennsylvania: Melville v. American Home Ass. Co., 584 F. 2d 1306 (3d Cir. 1978); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Davis, 490 F. 2d 536 (3d Cir. 1974); Mixing Equipment Co. v. Philadelphia Gear, Inc., 312 F. Supp. 1269 (E.D. Pa. 1970), modified 436 F. 2d 1308 (3d Cir. 1971); Neville Chemical Co. v. Union Carbide Corp., 422 F. 2d 1205 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. den. 400 U.S. 826 (1970); Rhodes v. Superior Investigative Services, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 1012 (E.D. Pa. 1977); American East India Corp. v. Ideal Shoe Co., 400 F. Supp. 141 (E.D. Pa. 1975) ; Azriel v. Frigitemp Corp., 397 F. Supp. 871 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Interpace Corp. v. Penbrook Hauling Co., Inc., 389 F. Supp. 590 (M.D. Pa. 1975); American Home Assurance Co. v. American Emp. Ins. Co., 384 F. Supp. 3 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Siata Intern. U.S.A., Inc. v. Ins. Co. of N. America, 362 F. Supp. 1355 (E.D. Pa. 1973), revd. on other grnds. 498 F. 2d 817 (3d Cir. 1974); Weddington v. Jackson, 331 F. Supp. 1271 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Continental-Wirt Electronics Corp. v. Sprague Elee. Co., 329 F. Supp. 959 (E.D. Pa. 1971). The only state court decision cited in all these is a tort case: Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 203 A. 2d 796 (Pa. 1964). There seems to be no recent state decision in the area of contracts.

Texas: Lipschutz v. Gordon Jewelry Corp., 373 F. Supp. 375 (S.D. Tex. 1974). The state courts seem to follow the lex loci solutionis rule; Austin Building Co. v. Nat. Union Fire Ins. Co., 432 S.W. 2d 697 (Tex. 1968); Castillera v. Cámaro, 414 S.W. 2d 424 (Tex. 1967); Frey v. Sargent’s Est., 533 S.W. 2d 142 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976); Hatchett v. Williams, 437 S.W. 2d 334 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968). Most federal court decisions have also followed the lex loci solutionis rule: see Crouch v. Crouch, 566 F. 2d 486 (5th Cir. 1978); Ramirez v. Autobuses Blancos Flecha Roja, S.A. De C.V., 486 F. 2d 493 (5th Cir. 1973); Associated Press v. Berger, 460 F. Supp. 1003 (W.D. Tex. 1978) ; Continental Oil Co. v. General American Transportation Corp. 409 F. Supp. 288 (S.D. Tex. 1976).

⁹⁵ McCrossin v. Hicks Chevrolet, Inc., 248 A. 2d 917 (D.C. 1969); Blair v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 472 F. 2d 1356 (D.C. Cir. 1972); In re Parkwood, Inc., 461 F. 2d 158 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Dorothy Κ. Winston & Co. v. Town Heights Development, Inc., 376 F. Supp. 1214 (D.D.C. 1974); Legg, Mason & Co., Inc. v. Mackall & Coe, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 1367 (D. D.C. 1972).

⁹⁶ Siegelman v. Cunard White Star, 221 F. 2d 189 (2d Cir. 1955); Ahmed v. American S.S. Owners Mut. Protn. & Idemnity Assn., 444 F. Supp. 569 (N.D. Cal. 1978); Navegacion Goya, S.A. v. Mutual Boiler & Mach. Ins. Co., [1972] A.M.C. 650 (S.D. N.Y.).; Fricke v. Isbrandtsen Co., 151 F. Supp. 465 (S.D. N.Y. 1957).

⁹⁷ Iowa, Missouri (doubtful), New Hampshire, Vermont (doubtful), and Colorado. For Beale’s classifications, see supra note 6 and accompanying text.

⁹⁸ Idaho (doubtful), Mississippi, New York (doubtful), Oregon, Washington, and Wisconsin.

⁹⁹ Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana (doubtful), Kentucky, Ohio, and Louisiana.

¹⁰⁰ California.

¹⁰¹ 124 N.E. 2d 99 (N.Y. 1954).

¹⁰² The issue seems not to have been a purely “risk-fixing” one about what constituted repudiation of the agreement, but one that concerned the English rule that it is against public policy for a matrimonial separation agreement to bar either spouse from resort to the courts.

¹⁰³ 2I6 N.Y.S. 2d 65 (1961).

¹⁰⁴ 248 N.E. 2d 576 (N.Y. 1969).

¹⁰⁵ Supra note 32 and accompanying text.

¹⁰⁶ Some recent examples: Standard Leasing Corp. v. Schmidt Aviation, Inc., 576 S.W. 2d 181 (Ark. 1979); Eldon Industries, Inc. v. Paradies & Co. 397 F. Supp. 535 (N.D. Ga. 1975) ; Commercial Ins. Co. of Newark, N.J. v. Pacific-Peru Const. Corp., 558 F. 2d 948 (9th Cir. 1977); Clow Corp. v. Ross Township School Corp., 384 N.E. 2d 1077 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979); Lewis v. American Family Ins. Grp., 555 S.W. 2d 579 (Ky. 1977); Blue Bird Body Co. v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 583 F. 2d 717 (5th Cir. 1978); Transatlantic Cement, Inc. v. Lambert Frères & Cie., 462 F. Supp. 363 (S.D. N.Y. 1978) ; Teledyne Industries, Inc. v. Eon Corp., 373 F. Supp. 191 (S.D. N.Y. 1974); American Home Assurance Co. v. American Emp. Ins. Co., 384 F. Supp. 3 (E.D. Pa. 1974) ; Stata Intern. U.S.A., Inc. v. Ins. Co. of N. America, 362 F. Supp. 1355 (E.D. Pa. 1973), revd. on other grnds. 498 F. 2d 817 (3d Cir. 1974).

¹⁰⁷ Supra note 39 and accompanying text.

¹⁰⁸ Younker v. Manor, 63 Cal. Rptr. 197 (Ct. App. 1967). For a similar result, see CIT Credit Corp. v. Hulett, 151 So. 2d 705 (La. Ct. App. 1963).

¹⁰⁹ Supra note 53.

¹¹⁰ Mixing Equipment Co. v. Philadelphia Gear, Inc., 312 F. Supp. 1269 (E.D. Pa. 1970), modified 436 F. 2d 1308 (3d Cir. 1971 ).

¹¹¹ 238 S.E. 2d 368 (Ga. 1977).

¹¹² Ibid., 369. Courts have also tended to hold that the state where the employee resides has the greatest interest in whether a non-competition covenant binds him after he leaves his employer: see Boskuhl v. Family Life Ins. Co., 76 Cal. Rptr. 602 (Ct. App. 1969); National Starch & Chem. Corp. v. Newman, 577 S.W. 2d 99 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979).

¹¹³ Nasco, Inc. v. Gimbert, supra note 111. For a similar reliance on public policy in connection with a non-competition covenant, see Cerniglia v. C. & D. Farms, Inc., 203 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1967).

¹¹⁴ Zogg v. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., 276 F. 2d 861 (2d Cir. 1960).

¹¹⁵ Haines v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 177 N.W. 2d 328 (Wis. 1970).

¹¹⁶ Nelson v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 359 F. Supp. 271 (W.D. Mo. 1973).

¹¹⁷ S. 192.

¹¹⁸ S. 192, comment h. The comment was applied in Hofeld v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 322 N.E. 2d 454 (Ill. 1975).

¹¹⁹ Supra note 116, at 292, 296.

¹²⁰ Ibid., 296.

¹²¹ Haines v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., supra note 115.

¹²² Supra note 49 and accompanying text. The court cited Heath v. Zellmer, 151 N.W. 2d 664, 672 (Wis. 1967).

¹²³ Supra note 115, at 332–33.

¹²⁴ Allstate Ins. Co. v. Sullam, 349 N.Y.S. 2d 550 (Super. Ct. 1973).

¹²⁵ Ibid., 565.

¹²⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁷ Fricke v. Isbrandtsen Co., supra note 96, at 468. Cf. Siegelman v. Cunard White Star, supra note 96.

¹²⁸ Business Incentives Co. v. Sony Corp. of America, 397 F. Supp. 63 (S.D. N.Y. .975).

¹²⁹ The list of factors in s. 6 was referred to in Lipschutz v. Gordon Jewelry Corp., 373 F. Supp. 375 (S.D. Tex. 1974), but the case was disposed of by saying that New York law should apply to the contract, which was one for the shipment on consignment of diamonds from New York to Texas, on the simply stated ground that the diamond industry was concentrated in New York. Two other cases where choice-influencing factors besides governmental interests were canvassed were Rungee v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 449 P. 2d 378 (Idaho 1968), and Schlosser v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., supra note 44. In the latter case the “better law” notion was included among the factors.

¹³⁰ See Part I of this article, 16 Canadian Yearbook of International Law 230, at 259 (hereinafter Choice of Law, Part I).

¹³¹ Nasco, Inc. v. Gimbert, supra note 111 ; Nelson v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., supra note 116; Business Incentives Co. v. Sony Corp. of America, supra note 128.

¹³² Bernkrant v. Fowler, supra note 53 (statute of frauds) ; Dorothy K. Winston & Co. v. Town Heights Development, Inc., supra note 95 (real estate brokers’ licensing requirements) ; Granited Equipment Leasing Corp. v. Hutton, 525 P. 2d 223 (Wash. 1974) (corporate ultra vires rule).

¹³³ See Potlatch No. 1 Federal Credit Union v. Kennedy, 459 P. ad 32 (Wash. 1969).

¹³⁴ Compare the German court’s reasoning in the Turkish airline case, Choice Law, Part I, 267–68.

¹³⁵ Nelson v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., supra note 116 (master policy issued to company with headquarters in Oklahoma; Missouri law applied to employee’s claim); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Sullam, supra note 124 (insurance policy issued in Massachusetts to driver representing himself as temporary Massachusetts resident, car said to be garaged in Massachusetts; New York law applied to claim ).