¹ Kaplan, Robert D, “The South China Sea Is the Future of Conflict: The 21st Century’s Defining Battleground Is Going to Be on Water,” Foreign Policy (15 August 2011), online: <http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/08/15/the-south-china-sea-is-the-future-of-conflict>.Google Scholar

² Kaplan, Robert D, Asia’s Cauldron: The South China Sea and The End of a Stable Pacific (New York: Random House, 2014) at 9.Google Scholar

³ For comparison’s sake, the Marshall Plan amounted to US $130 billion in current US dollars; “Our Bulldozers, Our Rules,” The Economist (2 July 2016), online: <https://www.economist.com/news/china/21701505-chinas-foreign-policy-could-reshape-good-part-world-economy-our-bulldozers-our-rules>; Lam Wo-lap, Willy, “Getting Lost in ‘One Belt, One Road’,” Ejinsight (16 April 2016), online: <http://www.ejinsight.com/20160412-getting-lost-one-belt-one-road/>;Google Scholar see generally Huang, Yiping, “Understanding China’s Belt & Road Initiative: Motivation, Framework and Assessment” (2016) 40 China Economic Review 314 at 318.Google Scholar

⁴ Buszynski, Leszek, “The South China Sea: Oil, Maritime Claims, and US–China Strategic Rivalry” (2012) 35:2 Washington Quarterly 139 at 143–44;Google Scholar Storey, Ian James, “Creeping Assertiveness: China, the Philippines and the South China Sea Dispute” (1999) 21:1 Contemporary Southeast Asia 95 at 97–98;Google Scholar Zhong, Hui & White, Michael, “South China Sea: Its Importance for Shipping, Trade, Energy and Fisheries” (2017) 2:1 Asia-Pacific Journal of Ocean Law and Policy 9 at 21–23.Google Scholar

⁵ This figure is based on a 2008 estimate, “Analysis: China Unveils Oil Offensive in South China Sea Squabble,” Reuters (1 August 2012), online: <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-southchinasea-china/analysis-china-unveils-oil-offensive-in-south-china-sea-squabble-idUSBRE8701LM20120801>.

⁶ E.g. Associated Press, “China Seeks to Control East Asia, US Commander Tells Senators,” The Guardian (23 February 2016), online: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/23/south-china-sea-east-asia-control-us-military>;;>Google Scholar Cheng, Dean, Sea Power and the Chinese State (Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation, 2011) at 2;Google Scholar Cheng, Joseph YS & Paladini, Stephanie, “China’s Ocean Development Strategy and Its Handling of the Territorial Conflicts in the South China Sea” (2014) 35:2 Philippine Political Science Journal 185 at 193–95.Google Scholar

⁷ Rosenberg, David & Chung, Christopher, “Maritime Security in the South China Sea: Coordinating Coastal and User State Priorities” (2008) 39:1 Ocean Dev & Intl L 51 at 52;Google Scholar Buszynski, supra note 4 at 145.

⁸ Koh, Tommy TB, “The Origins of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea” (1987) 2 Mal L Rev 1 at 2–3;Google Scholar Welch, Andrew, “The History of International Law in the Caribbean and the Domestic Effects of International Law in the Commonwealth Caribbean” (2014) 1 SOAS LJ 124;Google Scholar this theme has been the subject of a debate, see e.g. Lapidoth, Ruth, “Freedom of Navigation: Its Legal History and Normative Basis” (1975) 6:2 J Mar L & Com 259.Google Scholar

⁹ Yoshihara, Toshi & Holmes, James R, “Can China Defend a ‘Core Interest’ in the South China Sea?” (2011) 34:2 Washington Quarterly 45 at 53.Google Scholar

¹⁰ E.g. Dutton, Peter, “Three Disputes and Three Objectives: China and the South China Sea” (2011) 64:4 Naval War College Review 42 at 53–55;Google Scholar Fravel, M Taylor, “China’s Strategy in the South China Sea” (2011) 33:3 Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs 292 at 296;Google Scholar Rowan, Joshua P, “The US-Japan Security Alliance, ASEAN, and The South China Sea Dispute” (2005) 45:3 Asian Survey 414 at 429.Google Scholar

¹¹ E.g., writes, Kaplan “China’s position vis-à-vis the South China Sea, is akin to America’s position vis-à-vis the Caribbean Sea in the 19th and early 20th centuries.” Kaplan, supra note 1;Google Scholar Holmes, James R & Yoshihara, Toshi, “China’s ‘Caribbean’ in the South China Sea” (2006) 26:1 SAIS Review of International Affairs 79;Google Scholar Pan, Chengxin, “The ‘Indo-Pacific’ and Geopolitical Anxieties about China’s Rise in the Asian Regional Order” (2014) 68:4 Australian Journal of International Affairs 453 at 457;Google Scholar Rossi, Christopher R, “Treaty of Tordesillas Syndrome: Sovereignty Ad Absurdum and the South China Sea Arbitration” (2017) 50 Cornell Intl LJ 231 at 266;Google Scholar Pham, Hung, “Case: Philippines v. China: The South China Sea Finally Meets International Law” (2016) 16:2 Chicago-Kent J Intl & Comp L 1 at 2;Google Scholar Walt, Stephen M, “Dealing with a Chinese Monroe Doctrine,” New York Times (2 May 2012), online: <https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/05/02/are-we-headed-for-a-cold-war-with-china/dealing-with-a-chinese-monroe-doctrine>;Google Scholar for some sceptical thoughts on this analogy, see e.g. Acharya, Amitav, “Power Shift or Paradigm Shift? China’s Rise and Asia’s Emerging Security Order” (2014) 58 International Studies Quarterly 158 at 158–62.Google Scholar

¹² E.g. Symmons, Clive R, “Historic Waters and Historic Rights in the South China Sea: A Critical Appraisal” in Wu, S & Valencia, M, eds, UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the South China Sea (London: Routledge, 2015) 191 at 206.Google Scholar

¹³ E.g. Kline, Robert T, “The Pen and the Sword: The People’s Republic of China’s Effort to Redefine the Exclusive Economic Zone through Maritime Lawfare and Military Enforcement” (2013) 216 Military L Rev 122 at 135.Google Scholar

¹⁴ E.g. Wright, Charles R, “Security in the Asia-Pacific Region” (1994) Brown Journal of World Affairs 331 at 335;Google Scholar David, Conrad D, Lawfare in the Near Seas: How China’s Maritime Claims Impact Regional Security (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2010) at 27 [unpublished];CrossRefGoogle Scholar Solomone, Stacey, “Sino-US Security Relations: The PLA Factor” (1996) 5:11 Journal of Contemporary China 81 at 87;Google Scholar Cossa, Ralph A, “Security Implications of Conflict in the South China Sea: Exploring Potential Triggers of Conflict,” Pacific Forum (March 1998) at 9.Google Scholar

¹⁵ United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 3 (entered into force 16 November 1994) [UNCLOS].

¹⁶ Scott, Shirley V, “International Law as Ideology: Theorizing the Relationship between International Law and International Politics” (1994) 5 EJIL 1 at 4–5.Google Scholar

¹⁷ Burley, Anne-Marie Slaughter, “International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda” (1993) 87:2 AJIL 205 at 239.Google Scholar

¹⁸ See notes 124–26 below.

¹⁹ This is particularly true of the South China Sea dispute where China has failed to provide a clear legal basis for its claims; see section “China’s Legal Claims” below.

²⁰ Saul, Ben, “China, Natural Resources, Sovereignty and International Law” (2013) 37:2 Asian Studies Review 196 at 197–98;Google Scholar deLisle, Jacques, “China’s Approach to International Law” (2000) Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law) 267 at 273.Google Scholar

²¹ Hsiu-An Hsiao, Anne, “China and the South China Sea ‘Lawfare’” (2016) 52:2 Issues and Studies: A Social Science Quarterly on China, Taiwan, and East Asian Affairs 1 at 20–21;Google Scholar Greenfield, Jeanette, China’s Practice in the Law of the Sea (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992) at 4; deLisle, supra note 20 at 271.Google Scholar

²² Chesterman, Simon, “Asia’s Ambivalence about International Law and Institutions: Past, Present and Futures” (2017) 27:4 EJIL 945 at 962;Google Scholar Hoffheimer, Daniel J, “China and the International Legal Order: An Historical Introduction” (1979) 11:2 Case W Res J Intl L 251 at 254.Google Scholar

²³ Xue, Hanqin, Chinese Contemporary Perspectives on International Law, History, Culture and international Law (The Hague, Netherlands: The Hague Academy of International Law, 2012) at 28, 71–72.Google Scholar

²⁴ Saul, supra note 20 at 196.

²⁵ Buzan, Barry, “China in International Society: Is ‘Peaceful Rise’ Possible?” (2010) 3 Chinese Journal of International Politics 5 at 30.Google Scholar

²⁶ DeLisle, supra note 20 at 272.

²⁷ Ibid at 269; in the South China Sea dispute, see Kline, supra note 13 at 168. China’s embrace of realism may explain the predominance of the neo-realist approach in security studies of the region, see Weissmann, Mikael, “The South China Sea Conflict and Sino-ASEAN Relations: A Study in Conflict Prevention and Peace Building” (2010) 34:3 Asian Perspective 35 at 36.Google Scholar

²⁸ Hsiao, supra note 21 at 21.

²⁹ Dunlap, Charles J, “Lawfare Today: A Perspective” (2008) 3 Yale Journal of International Affairs 146 at 146;Google Scholar various definitions of lawfare exist, see e.g. Kittrie, Orde, Lawfare: Law as a Weapon of War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016) at 5–8.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³⁰ Kittrie, supra note 29 at 162; Beck, Andrea, “China’s Strategy in the Arctic: A Case of Lawfare?” (2014) 4:2 Polar Journal 306 at 307–08.Google Scholar

³¹ Wang, Dong, China’s Unequal Treaties: Narrating National History (New York: Lexington Books, 2005) at 128.Google Scholar

³² Liang, Qiao & Xiangsui, Wang. Unrestricted Warfare (Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House Arts, 1999), an abridged translation is available at <http://fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/WEBRES3.htm >.Google Scholar

³³ Kittrie, supra note 29 at 162 cites three examples (Analysis of 100 Cases of Legal Warfare (2004); Legal Warfare in Modern War (2005); and Under Informatized Conditions: Legal Warfare (2007)).

³⁴ DeLisle, supra note 20 at 269.

³⁵ Cheng, supra note 6 at 2.

³⁶ Kittrie, supra note 29 at 3.

³⁷ Eckhardt, William, “Lawyering for Uncle Sam When He Draws His Sword” (2003) 4 Chicago J Intl L 431 at 444;Google Scholar David, supra note 14 at 12–14.

³⁸ Dokos, Thanos P, Countering the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: NATO and EU Options in the Mediterranean and the Middle East (New York: Routledge, 2014) at 21.Google Scholar

³⁹ US Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress, Military Power of the People’s Republic of China (2007) at 13, online: <https://fas.org/nuke/guide/china/dod-2007.pdf>.

⁴⁰ E.g. Dupuy, Florian & Dupuy, Pierre-Marie “A Legal Analysis of China’s Historic Rights Claim in the South China Sea” (2013) 107:1 AJIL 124 at 128;Google Scholar Zhang, Jian, “China’s South China Sea Policy: Evolution, Claims and Challenges” in Buszynski, Leszek & Roberts, Christopher B, eds, The South China Sea Maritime Dispute: Political, Legal and Regional Perspectives (New York: Routledge, 2014) at 60;Google Scholar Keyuan, Zou, “China’s U-Shaped Line in the South China Sea Revisited” (2012) 43:1 Ocean Dev & Intl L 18 at 29;Google Scholar although some commentators have argued that China claims full sovereignty over the entirety of the South China Sea, rather than over certain features of the Sea, see Park, Choon-ho, “The South China Sea Disputes: Who Owns the Islands and the Natural Resources?” (1978) 5:1 Ocean Dev & Intl L 27 at 54.Google Scholar

⁴¹ In the Matter of the South China Sea Arbitration (Republic of the Philippines v People’s Republic of China), PCA Case no 2013-19, Award on Merits (12 July 2016) at para 692 [South China Sea (Merits)].

⁴² Varying divisions have been presented in the academic literature. See e.g. Dupuy & Dupuy, supra note 40 at 129–31, who prefer to divide the South China Sea dispute timeline into three periods: 1958–96, 1998, 2009–11.

⁴³ Roque, Harry H, “China’s Claim to the Spratlys Islands under International Law” (1997) 15:3 J Energy & Natural Resources L 189 at 192.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ Shen, Jianming, “China’s Sovereignty over the South China Sea Islands: A Historical Perspective” (2002) 1 Chinese Intl L J 94 at 138.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ Art 2(f) reads: “Japan renounces all right, title and claim to the Spratly Islands and to the Paracel Islands.” Treaty of Peace with Japan, signed at San Francisco, 8 September 1951, 136 UNTS 45 (1952) (entered into force 28 April 1952).

⁴⁶ Shen, supra note 44 at 99.

⁴⁷ Fravel, supra note 10 at 298.

⁴⁸ Dupuy & Dupuy, supra note 40 at 126.

⁴⁹ Larson, David L, Roth, Michael W & Selig, Todd I, “An Analysis of the Ratification of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea” (1995) 26:3 Ocean Dev & Intl L 287 at 288–89.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ Standing Committee of National People’s Congress, Resolution of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress of the Approval of the Declaration of the Government on China’s Territorial Sea (4 September 1958), an English translation is available online: <http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/rotscotnpcotaotdotgocts1338/>.

⁵¹ Ibid at para 1.

⁵² In addition to the Penghu Islands, Pratas Islands, Paracel Islands, Macclesfield Bank, and the Spratlys, the law added the Diaoyu Islands found in the East China Sea to its sovereign claim. Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, National People’s Congress, 25 February 1992, an English translation is available online: <http://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/CHN_1992_Law.pdf> [1992 Law].

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ UNCLOS, supra note 15.

⁵⁵ United Nations, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: Declarations Made upon Signature, Ratification, Accession or Succession or Anytime Thereafter (29 October 2013), online: <http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_declarations.htm>.

⁵⁶ Adopted by the Standing Committee of the Ninth National People’s Congress, 26 June 1998, an English translation is available online: <http://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/chn_1998_eez_act.pdf> [1998 Law].

⁵⁷ Ibid, art 1.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Keyuan, Zou, “Historic Rights in International Law and in China’s Practice” (2001) 32 Ocean Dev & Intl L 149 at 162.Google Scholar

⁶⁰ Ibid at 160; 1998 Law, supra note 56.

⁶¹ Dupuy and Dupuy, supra note 40 at 129;

⁶² For a review of the historical evidence, see Shen, supra note 44; Shen, Jianming, “International Law Rules and Historical Evidences Supporting China’s Title to the South China Sea Islands” (1997) 21 Hastings Intl & Comp L Rev 1;Google Scholar Shen’s review of this historical evidence and his assessment of Admiral Zheng He’s activities should be nuanced, as scholars have pointed out that several non-Chinese dynasties had a presence in these waters and that China’s historical interest in the Sea may be a recent phenomenon. See e.g. Hayton, Bill, The South China Sea: The Struggle for Power in Asia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014) at 11–28.Google Scholar

⁶³ Thao, Nguyen Hong, “China’s Maritime Moves Raise Neighbors’ Hackles” (1998) 4:47 Vietnam L & Legal Forum 1 at 21–22;Google Scholar Thao, Nguyen Hong, “Vietnam and the Code of Conduct for the South China Sea” (2001) 32:2 Ocean Dev & Intl L 105 at 107.Google Scholar

⁶⁴ Keyuan, supra note 59 at 162; UNCLOS, supra note 15, art 57.

⁶⁵ United Nations, “Vietnam: Dispute Regarding the Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf of the People’s Republic of China Which Was Passed on 26 June 1998” (1998) 38 UN Law of the Sea Bulletin 54 at 55.

⁶⁶ The ten members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are: Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. See ASEAN, Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (4 November 2002), online: <http://asean.org/?static_post=declaration-on-the-conduct-of-parties-in-the-south-china-sea-2> [2002 Declaration].

⁶⁷ Ibid, preamble.

⁶⁸ Duong, Wendy, “Following the Path of Oil: The Law of the Sea or Realpoltik — What Good Does Law Do in the South China Sea Territorial Conflicts Chinese Law in the Global Context” 30 Fordham Intl LJ 1098 at 1110;Google Scholar in retrospect, 2002 Declaration seems to be a part of ASEAN’s approach to regional integration that may be described as “long on rhetoric and short on implementation.” David Martin Jones & Michael LR Smith, “Making Process, Not Progress: ASEAN and the Evolving East Asian Regional Order” (2007) 32:1 International Security 148 at 175; see also Quang Minh Pham, “The South China Sea Security Problem: towards Regional Cooperation” (2010) 8 Asia Europe Journal 427 at 429–30.

⁶⁹ Duong, supra note 68 at 1174–80; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Oil Companies of China, the Philippines and Vietnam Signed Agreement on South China Sea Cooperation (15 March 2005), online: <http://ph.china-embassy.org/eng/zt/nhwt/t187333.htm>.

⁷⁰ Act no 9522 to Amend Certain Provisions of Republic Act no 3046, as Amended by Republic Act no 5446, to Define the Archipelagic Baselines of the Philippines and for Other Purposes, Fourteenth Congress Second Regular Session, The Philippines (10 March 2009), online: <http://www.lawphil.net/statutes/repacts/ra2009/ra_9522_2009.html>.

⁷¹ Ibid, s 1.

⁷² Ibid, s 2; UNCLOS, supra note 15, art 121.

⁷³ The Philippines “expressly reserves its right to make other submissions for such other areas of the continental shelf beyond 200 M at a future time in conformity with the provisions of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure of the Commission.” Philippines, A Partial Submission of Data and Information on the Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf of the Republic of the Philippines Pursuant to Article 76(8) of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (21 April 2009) at 12, online: <http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/phl22_09/phl_esummary.pdf>.

⁷⁴ Joint Submission by Malaysia and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (6 May 2009), online: <http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_mysvnm_33_2009.htm>.

⁷⁵ Note Verbale no CML/17/2009 from the Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the UN Secretary-General (7 May 2009), online: <http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/chn_2009re_mys_vnm_e.pdf>.

⁷⁶ Ibid at para 2 [emphasis added].

⁷⁷ See Note Verbale no CML/17/2009, supra note 75; see also Note Verbale no. CML/18/2009 from the Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the UN Secretary-General (7 May 2009), online: <http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/chn_2009re_mys_vnm_e.pdf>.

⁷⁸ For a more detailed discussion of the map’s probative and legal value and for varying perspectives on the map, see e.g. Dupuy and Dupuy, supra note 40 at 131–36; Gao, Zhiguo & Jia, Bing Bing, “The Nine-Dash Line in the South China Sea: History, Status and Implications” (2013) 107:1 AJIL 98;Google Scholar Jinming, Li & Dexia, Li, “The Dotted Line on the Chinese Map of the South China Sea: A Note” (2003) 34:3–4 Ocean Dev & Intl L 287 at 291–93.Google Scholar

⁷⁹ For historical reasons, various terms have been used to describe the line, such as the U-shaped line and the eleven-dotted line; for a more detailed explanation of these terms, see Sheng-Ti Gau, Michael, “The U-Shaped Line and a Categorization of the Ocean Disputes in the South China Sea” (2012) 43:1 Ocean Dev & Intl L 57.Google Scholar

⁸⁰ Chung, Chris PC, “Drawing the U-Shaped Line: China’s Claim in the South China Sea, 1946–1974” (2016) 42:1 Modern China 38 at 39;Google Scholar Jinming & Dexia, supra note 78 at 293; Robert Beckman, “The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Maritime Disputes in the South China Sea” (2013) 107:1 AJIL 142 at 154.

⁸¹ Some believe the map was published in either 1947 or 1948 (Dupuy and Dupuy, supra note 40 at 131); others believe the map was published in 1946 or earlier (Shen, supra note 44 at 128–30; Keyuan, Zou, “The Chinese Traditional Maritime Boundary Line in the South China Sea and Its Legal Consequences for the Resolution of the Dispute over the Spratly Islands’’ (1999) 14 Intl J Mar & Coast L 27 at 32–33).Google Scholar

⁸² Beckman, supra note 80 at 154.

⁸³ Dupuy & Dupuy, supra note 40 at 134.

⁸⁴ Beckman, supra note 80 at 154.

⁸⁵ Dupuy & Dupuy, supra note 40 at 131–34; Fravel, supra note 10 at 294–95; Dutton, supra note 10 at 50.

⁸⁶ Dupuy & Dupuy, supra note 40 at 132.

⁸⁷ Beckman, supra note 80 at 153; Shen, supra note 44 at 129.

⁸⁸ Dupuy & Dupuy, supra note 40 at 132; for a sceptical assessment of its probative value and other legal uncertainties, see Erik Franckx and Marco Benatar, “Dots and Lines in the South China Sea: Insights from the Law of Map Evidence” (2012) 2 Asian J Intl L 89 at 103–16.

⁸⁹ Jinming & Dexia, supra note 78 at 291.

⁹⁰ Song, Yann-Huei & Kien-hong Yu, Peter, “China’s ‘Historic Waters’ in the South China Sea: An Analysis from Taiwan, ROC” (1994) 12:4 American Asian Review 83.Google Scholar

⁹¹ Jinming & Dexia, supra note 78 at 290 observe “[u]pon the declaration of the nine-dotted line, the international community at no time expressed dissent. None of the adjacent states presented a diplomatic protest. This silence in the face of a public declaration may be said to amount to acquiescence, and it can be asserted that the dotted line has been recognized for half a century”; also in support of the estoppel view, see Shen, supra note 62 at 57.

⁹² Note Verbale no CML/8/2011 from the Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the UN Secretary-General (14 April 2011), online: <http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/chn_2011_re_phl_e.pdf>.

⁹³ Ibid at para 2.

⁹⁴ Ibid at para 4.

⁹⁵ Nguyen-Dang Thang & Nguyen Hong Thao, “China’s Nine Dotted Lines in the South China Sea: The 2011 Exchange of Diplomatic Notes between the Philippines and China” (2012) 43:1 Ocean Dev & Intl L 35 at 46; Dupuy & Dupuy, supra note 40 at 131.

⁹⁶ Admittedly, China’s reference to “publicity” since the 1930s could include the various iterations of the map, although such an interpretation would still minimize the relative importance of the map.

⁹⁷ The tensions were provoked on 8 April 2012 when the Philippine navy apprehended eight mainland Chinese fishing vessels in the Scarborough Shoal. Hong Zhao, “Sino-Philippines Relations: Moving beyond South China Sea Dispute?” 26:2 Journal of East Asian Affairs 57 at 60–61.

⁹⁸ Hsiao, supra note 21 at 9; UNCLOS, supra note 15, art 287: “When signing, ratifying or acceding to this Convention or at any time thereafter, a State shall be free to choose, by means of a written declaration, one or more of the following means for the settlement of disputes concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention: … (c) an arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex VII.”

⁹⁹ In conformity with Annex VII of UNCLOS, supra note 15.

¹⁰⁰ South China Sea (Merits), supra note 41. China did present arguments on the tribunal’s jurisdiction to hear the case; China essentially argued that the subject matter of the case was beyond UNCLOS and that China’s declaration in connection with UNCLOS ratification and the process goes against the negotiation process. Position Paper of the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Matter of Jurisdiction in the South China Sea Arbitration Initiated by the Republic of the Philippines (7 December 2014), online: <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1217147.shtml>; Duncan French, “In the Matter of the South China Sea Arbitration: Republic of Philippines v People’s Republic of China, Arbitral Tribunal Constituted under Annex VII to the 1982 United Nations Law of the Sea Convention, Case No. 2013–19, Award of 12 July 2016” (2017) 19:1 Envtl L Rev 48 at 50; this arbitration could be a part of a larger trend of scepticism regarding UNCLOS’s compulsory and binding dispute settlement regime. Jensen, Øystein & Bankes, Nigel, “Compulsory and Binding Dispute Resolution under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: Introduction” (2017) Ocean Dev & Intl L 1 at 5.Google Scholar

¹⁰¹ South China Sea (Merits), supra note 41 at para 116.

¹⁰² Ibid at para 34.

¹⁰³ Ibid at paras 7–10.

¹⁰⁴ Torode, Greg & Collett-White, Mike, “Ahead of Key Court Ruling, Beijing in Propaganda Overdrive,” Reuters (3 July 2016), online: <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-southchinasea-ruling-idUSKCN0ZJ117>.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁵ A comprehensive analysis of its reasoning and ramifications is beyond the scope of this article.

¹⁰⁶ South China Sea (Merits), supra note 41 at para 278.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid at paras 643–47.

¹⁰⁸ The tribunal found that archipelagic baselines can only apply to archipelagic states (such as the Philippines). See South China Sea (Merits), supra note 41 at para 573; pursuant to art 47.1 of UNCLOS, supra note 15.

¹⁰⁹ South China Sea (Merits), supra note 41 at paras 571–76.

¹¹⁰ Ibid at paras 716, 757, 814.

¹¹¹ Ibid at paras 992–93.

¹¹² Pemmaraju, Sreenivasa Rao, “The South China Sea Arbitration (The Philippines v. China): Assessment of the Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility” (2016) 15 Chinese J Intl L 265 at 306–07.Google Scholar

¹¹³ In the Matter of the South China Sea Arbitration (Republic of the Philippines v People’s Republic of China), PCA Case no 2013–19, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (29 October 2015) at para 152–53 [South China Sea (Jurisdiction)].

¹¹⁴ Kopela, Sophia, “Historic Titles and Historic Rights in the Law of the Sea in the Light of the South China Sea Arbitration” (2017) 48:2 Ocean Dev & Intl L 181 at 198;Google Scholar past arbitrations have held that arbitral tribunals do not have jurisdiction in cases where issues of sovereignty over land territories is more than ancillary to the dispute. Keyuan Zou and Qiang Ye, “Interpretation and Application of Article 298 of the Law of the Sea Convention in Recent Annex VII Arbitrations: An Appraisal” (2017) Ocean Dev & Intl L 1 at 8–9.

¹¹⁵ South China Sea (Jurisdiction), supra note 113 at para 168.

¹¹⁶ French, supra note 100 at 50.

¹¹⁷ Kopela, supra note 114 at 184, 197–98.

¹¹⁸ E.g. Yu, Minyou & Xie, Qiong, “Why the Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility of the South China Sea Arbitration Is Null and Void-Taking Article 283 of the UNCLOS as an Example” (2017) China Oceans L Rev 45.Google Scholar Noting that the tribunal spent relatively little space on elaborating its reasoning, see Talmon, Stefan, “The South China Sea Arbitration: Observations on the Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility” (2016) 15:2 Chinese J Intl L 309 at 391.Google Scholar

¹¹⁹ Makinen, Julie, “China’s Claims in South China Sea Are Invalid, Tribunal Rules, in Victory for the Philippines,” LA Times (12 July 2016), online: <http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-south-china-sea-ruling-20160712-snap-story.html>.Google Scholar

¹²⁰ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lu Kang’s Remarks on Statement by Spokesperson of US State Department on South China Sea Arbitration Ruling (13 July 2016), online: <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1380409.shtml>.

¹²¹ UNCLOS, supra note 15, art 296 reads: “1. Any decision rendered by a court or tribunal having jurisdiction under this section shall be final and shall be complied with by all the parties to the dispute. 2. Any such decision shall have no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that particular dispute.” For a more detailed discussion on the finality of the award and the role of state practice in accepting the award, see Stefan Talmon, “The South China Sea Arbitration and the Finality of ‘Final’ Awards” (2017) 8 Journal of International Dispute Settlement 388 at 398–401.

¹²² Hsiao, supra note 21 at 14.

¹²³ In South China Sea (Merits), supra note 41 at para 573, the tribunal noted: “China, however, is constituted principally by territory on the mainland of Asia and cannot meet the definition of an archipelagic State.” Julian Ku & Christopher Mirasola, “The South China Sea and China’s ‘Four Sha’ Claim: New Legal Theory, Same Bad Argument,” Lawfare (25 September 2017), online: <www.lawfareblog.com/south-china-sea-and-chinas-four-sha-claim-new-legal-theory-same-bad-argument>.

¹²⁴ Beckman, supra note 80 at 155; Dutton, supra note 10 at 45, 53; Dupuy & Dupuy, supra note 40 at 131; Duong, supra note 68 at 1111; Swe, Lim Kheng, Hailong, Ju, & Mingjiang, Li, “China’s Revisionist Aspirations in Southeast Asia and the Curse of the South China Sea Disputes” (2017) 15:1 China: An International Journal 187 at 208–09;Google Scholar Lee, Wei-chin, “Taiwan, the South China Sea Dispute, and the 2016 Arbitration Decision” (2017) 22:2 Journal of Chinese Political Science 229 at 231.Google Scholar

¹²⁵ Cheng, supra note 6 at 10.

¹²⁶ Christensen, Thomas J, “The Advantage of an Assertive China” (2011) 90:2 Foreign Affairs 54 at 59;Google Scholar Dupuy & Dupuy, supra note 40 at 124; Dobson, William J and Taylor Fravel, M, “Red Herring Hegemon: China in the South China Sea” (1997) 96 Current History 258 at 259;Google Scholar Guoxing, Ji, “China Versus South China Sea Security” (1998) 29:1 Security Dialogue 101 at 103;Google Scholar Womack, Brantly, “The Spratlys: From Dangerous Ground to Apple of Discord” (2011) 33:3 Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs 370 at 379;Google Scholar other claimant states have also been vague in their claims, Wallace, Dustin E, “An Analysis of Chinese Maritime Claims in the South China Sea” (2014) 63 Nav L Rev 128 at 144;Google Scholar Rosenberg, David, “The Rise of China: Implications for Security Flashpoints and Resource Politics in the South China Sea” in Pumphrey, Carolyn W, The Rise of China in Asia: Security Implications (Collingdale, PA: Diane Publishing, 2002) at 237.Google Scholar

¹²⁷ South China Sea (Jurisdiction), supra note 113 at para 160; South China Sea (Merits), supra note 41 at para 180.

¹²⁸ Kline, supra note 13 at 147–48; Pham, supra note 11 at 5–6; Dupuy & Dupuy, supra note 40 at 131.

¹²⁹ This would include the territories defined in the 1992 Law, supra note 52, art 2(2): “Taiwan and the various affiliated islands including Diaoyu Island, Penghu Islands, Dongsha Islands, Xisha Islands, Nansha (Spratly) Islands and other islands that belong to the People’s Republic of China.” The 1992 Law, art 2(3) further defines China’s territorial sea as the “waters adjacent to its territorial land” and China’s territorial waters as “the waters along the baseline of the territorial sea facing the land.”

¹³⁰ Ibid art 6 reads: “Non-military foreign ships enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea of the People’s Republic of China according to law. To enter the territorial sea of the People’s Republic of China, foreign military ships must obtain permission from the Government of the People’s Republic of China.”

¹³¹ UNCLOS, supra note 15, art 17; Shao Jin, “The Question of Innocent Passage of Warships- after UNCLOS Ill” (1989) 13:1 Marine Policy 56 at 58.

¹³² 1992 Law, supra note 52, arts 8–13. These are areas where a State may regulate under UNCLOS, supra note 15, arts 19, 21.

¹³³ State Council of the People’s Republic of China, Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on the Management of Foreign-Related Marine Scientific Research (promulgated 18 June 1996 and effective as of 1 October 1996), online: <http://www.soa.gov.cn/bmzz/jgbmzz2/gjhzsgatbgs/201211/t20121109_14902.html>; Standing Committee of the Seventh National People’s Congress, Surveying and Mapping Law of the People’s Republic of China, Order of the President no 75 (adopted 29 August 2002; effective as of 1 December 2002), online: <http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383865.htm>.

¹³⁴ 1998 Law, supra note 56, arts 3, 4, 7.

¹³⁵ Ibid, arts 4–5.

¹³⁶ UNCLOS, supra note 15, arts 19, 21 for research, survey, and fishing activities; UNCLOS, arts 60, 76–78, 80–81 for natural resources.

¹³⁷ 1998 Law, supra note 56, arts 3–4.

¹³⁸ 1992 Law, supra note 52.

¹³⁹ UNCLOS, supra note 15, art 33(1).

¹⁴⁰ 1992 Law, supra note 52, art 13 reads: “The People’s Republic of China has the authority to exercise powers within its contiguous zone for the purpose of preventing or punishing infringement of its security, customs, fiscal sanitary laws and regulations or entry-exit control within its land territories, internal waters or territorial sea” [emphasis added].

¹⁴¹ Pedrozo, Raul, “Close Encouters at Sea: The USNS Impeccable Incident” (2009) 62:3 Naval War College Review 101 at 105–06, 108; David, supra note 14 at 14.Google Scholar

¹⁴² Law of the People’s Republic of China on Island Protection, Decree no 22 (adopted 26 December 2009), art 1, unofficial translation online: <http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/natlex4.detail?p_lang=en&p_isn=85808&p_country=CHN&p_count=1097>; Nengye, Liu, “Recent Developments: Law on Island Protection of People’s Republic of China” (2010) 2 Environmental Law Network International Review 1 at 3.Google Scholar

¹⁴³ Ibid. arts 22, 52. UNCLOS, supra note 15, arts 60, 80, allows for the construction of artificial islands under certain conditions.

¹⁴⁴ Vanhullebusch, Matthias & Shen, Wei “China’s Air Defence Identification Zone: Building Security through Lawfare” (2016) 16:1 China Review 121 at 135.Google Scholar

¹⁴⁵ Keyuan, supra note 59 at 160; Jinming & Dexia, supra note 78 at 293.

¹⁴⁶ China’s varying use of the terms “historic” and “historical” have contributed to the ambiguity of China’s claims. Dupuy & Dupuy, supra note 40 at 128–38; Kline, supra note 13 at 144–47.

¹⁴⁷ See e.g. Law of the People’s Republic of China on Marine Environmental Protection, Revised (adopted on 25 December 1999 and came into force on 1 April 2000), online: <http://www.mlr.gov.cn/mlrenglish/laws/200710/t20071012_656329.htm>, where the notion of jurisdiction (rather than sovereignty) is mentioned, it is provided that “the Law shall apply to internal waters, territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone, continental shelf of the People’s Republic of China and other sea areas under the jurisdiction of the People’s Republic of China” (art 2).

¹⁴⁸ Some regard China’s claim as a full sovereignty claim over all of the features in the Sea, despite China’s actions suggesting a tempered sovereignty claim. See e.g. Kline, supra note 13 at 126.

¹⁴⁹ Fravel, supra note 10 at 303–07.

¹⁵⁰ Rowan, Joshua, “The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance, ASEAN, and the South China Sea Dispute” (2005) 45:3 Asian Survey 414 at 427;Google Scholar Rahman, Chris & Tsamenyi, Martin, “A Strategic Perspective on Security and Naval Issues in the South China Sea” (2010) 41 Ocean Dev & Intl L 315 at 324–29.Google Scholar

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¹⁵⁶ As quoted in Van Dyke, supra note 154 at 33.

¹⁵⁷ Vanhullebusch & Shen, supra note 144 at 123.

¹⁵⁸ Fravel, supra note 10 at 310.

¹⁵⁹ Folkmanis, Jason, “China Warns Some Oil Companies on Work with Vietnam, U.S. Says,” Bloomberg (16 July 2009), online: <http://www.amchamvietnam.com/china-warns-some-oil-companies-on-work-with-vietnam-u-s-state-department/>.Google Scholar

¹⁶⁰ See generally Odom, Jonathan G, “The True “Lies” of the Impeccable Incident: What Really Happened, Who Disregarded International Law, and Why Every Nation (Outside of China) Should Be Concerned” (2010) 18:3 MSU-DCL J Intl L 1.Google Scholar

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¹⁶² Kline, supra note 13 at 157–58.

¹⁶³ Pedrozo, supra note 141 at 102.

¹⁶⁴ Weitz, Richard, “China, Russia, and the Challenge to the Global Commons” (2009) 24:3 Pacific Focus 271 at 275–76.Google Scholar

¹⁶⁵ Fravel, supra note 10 at 309–10.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹⁶⁷ Kline, supra note 13 at 159–60.

¹⁶⁸ “China Harasses Indian Naval Ship on South China Sea,” Times of India (2 September 2011), online: <http://www.articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-09-02/india/301055141south-china-sea-spratly-ins-airavat>.

¹⁶⁹ Scott, David, “India’s Role in the South China Sea: Geopolitics and Geoeconomics in Play” (2013) 12:2 India Review 51 at 58.Google Scholar

¹⁷⁰ Beckman, supra note 80 at 156; Buszynski, supra note 4 at 141.

¹⁷¹ Cheng & Paladini, supra note 6 at 195.

¹⁷² Buszynski, supra note 4 at 141–42; Cheng & Paladini, supra note 6 at 195.

¹⁷³ China has thus far had a mixed record of compliance, see Ku, Julian & Mirasola, Christopher, “Tracking Compliance with the South China Sea Arbitral Award” (2017) 9:1 Asian Politics & Policy 139 at 149.Google Scholar

¹⁷⁴ South China Sea (Merits), supra note 41 at paras 757, 1181.

¹⁷⁵ “Country: China,” Asia Maritime Transparency Institute, online: <https://amti.csis.org/island-tracker/chinese-occupied-features/>.

¹⁷⁶ The tribunal concluded that China violated the Philippines’s sovereign rights by interfering with Philippine fishing and petroleum exploration. See South China Sea (Merits), supra note 41 at para 716; Lynn Kuok, “Progress in the South China Sea?” Foreign Affairs (21 July 2017), online: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/east-asia/2017-07-21/progress-south-china-sea?cid=int-lea&pgtype=hpg>.

¹⁷⁷ Six states outright oppose the ruling, and 147 states remain neutral as to the award. “Who Is Taking Sides After the South China Sea Ruling?” Asia Maritime Transparency Institute (15 August 2016), online: <https://amti.csis.org/sides-in-south-china-sea/>.

¹⁷⁸ Ku, Julian, “Assessing the South China Sea Arbitral Award after One Year: Why China Won and the U.S. Is Losing,” Lawfare (12 July 2017), online: <https://lawfareblog.com/assessing-south-china-sea-arbitral-award-after-one-year-why-china-won-and-us-losing>.Google Scholar

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.

¹⁸⁰ Biba, Sebastian, “It’s Status, Stupid: Explaining the Underlying Core Problem in US–China Relations” (2016) 2:5 Global Affairs 455 at 462;Google Scholar Webster, Graham, “Would a Military Sail-by at Mischief Reef be a FON Operation?” Lawfare (1 November 2016), online: <https://www.lawfareblog.com/would-military-sail-mischief-reef-be-fon-operation>.Google Scholar

¹⁸¹ Lubold, Gordon, “U.S. Navy Conducts First South China Sea Navigation Operation under President Trump,” Wall Street Journal (24 May 2017), online: <https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-navy-conducts-south-china-sea-navigation-operation-1495664647>.Google Scholar

¹⁸² Brown, Ryan & Lendon, Brad, “US Destroyer Sails Close to Disputed Island in South China Sea,” CNN (2 July 2017), online: <http://www.cnn.com/2017/07/02/politics/us-navy-south-china-sea/index.html>.Google Scholar

¹⁸³ The USS John S McCain conducted a freedom of navigation operations (FONOP) mission six nautical miles from the artificial island on the Mischief Reef. “US Destroyer Challenges China’s Claims in South China Sea,” Ejinsight (11 August 2017), online: <http://www.ejinsight.com/20170811-us-destroyer-challenges-chinas-claims-in-south-china-sea/>.

¹⁸⁴ Griffiths, James, “UK Wants to Send ‘Colossal’ Warships to Test Beijing’s Claims in S. China Sea,” CNN (28 July 2017), online: <http://www.cnn.com/2017/07/28/asia/south-china-sea-uk-johnson/index.html>.Google Scholar

¹⁸⁵ Connor, Neil, “China ‘Warned’ US Warship after It Sailed Near South China Sea Reef Claimed by Beijing,” The Telegraph (25 May 2017), online: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/05/25/us-warship-sails-near-south-china-sea-reef-claimed-beijing/>.Google Scholar

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¹⁸⁷ Brown & Lenden, supra note 182.

¹⁸⁸ South China Sea (Merits), supra note 41 at para 1177.

¹⁸⁹ A “sea power” may be defined as “the sum total of forces and factors, tools and geographical circumstances, which operated to gain command of the sea, to secure its use for oneself and to deny that use to the enemy.” William Edmund Livezy, Mahan on Sea Power (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1947) at 277.

¹⁹⁰ Kaplan, Robert D, “The Geography of Chinese Power: How Far Can Beijing Reach on Land and at Sea” (2010) 89:3 Foreign Affairs 22 at 34;Google Scholar Holmes, James R and Yoshihara, Toshi, “The Influence of Mahan upon China’s Maritime Strategy” (2006) 24:1 Comparative Strategy 23 at 24–26.Google Scholar

¹⁹¹ Holmes & Yoshihara, supra note 11 at 79.

¹⁹² Ibid at 82–83.

¹⁹³ Ibid at 81–82.

¹⁹⁴ Holmes, James R, “Strategic Features of the South China Sea: A Tough Neighborhood for Hegemons” (2014) 67:2 Naval War College Review 30 at 40.Google Scholar

¹⁹⁵ Ibid at 43.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid at 34.

¹⁹⁷ See generally Mahan, Alfred Thayer, Mahan on Naval Strategy: Selections from the Writings of Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2015) at 142–77.Google Scholar

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¹⁹⁹ Holmes, supra note 194 at 39–48.

²⁰⁰ Cheng & Paladini, supra note 6 at 187–90; “The West Need Not Fear China’s War Games with Russia,” The Economist (29 July 2017), online: <https://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21725560-fact-americas-navy-should-co-operate-more-chinas-too-west-need-not-fear-chinas-war>.

²⁰¹ Dutton, supra note 10 at 56–58; Eric Hyer, “The South China Sea Dispute: Implications of China’s Earlier Settlements” (1995) 68:1 Pacific Affairs 34 at 34.

²⁰² Lei, David, “China’s New Multi-Faceted Maritime Strategy” (2007) 52:1 Orbis 139 at 145;Google Scholar Holmes and Yoshihara, supra note 11 at 81–84.

²⁰³ E.g. it was reported that China agreed to end its expansion in the South China; it remains to be seen whether this will result in a change in the status quo. Mogato, Manuel, “Philippines Says China Agrees on No New Expansion in South China Sea,” Reuters (15 August 2017), online: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southchinasea-philippines-china-idUSKCN1AV0VJ>;Google Scholar Holmes, supra note 194 at 28; Hyer, supra note 201 at 35; Fravel, supra note 10 at 296–303.

²⁰⁴ 2002 Declaration, supra note 66.

²⁰⁵ Fravel, supra note 10 at 310–13; Buszynski, supra note 4 at 144; Dutton, supra note 10 at 63.

²⁰⁶ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Position Paper of the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Matter of Jurisdiction in the South China Sea Arbitration Initiated by the Republic of the Philippines (7 December 2014), online: <www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1217147.shtml>.

²⁰⁷ South China Sea (Merits), supra note 41 at para 13.

²⁰⁸ Ibid at para 160.

²⁰⁹ Pham, supra note 11 at 4.

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²²⁰ Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Denmark v Norway), (1933) PCIJ (Ser A/B) No 53 [Eastern Greenland].

²²¹ Award of the Arbitral Tribunal in the First Stage of the Proceedings between Eritrea and Yemen (Territorial Sovereignty and Scope of the Dispute) (1998) 22 UNRIAA 268 at para 239 [Eritrea and Yemen]; Barbara Kwiatkowska, “The Eritrea-Yemen Arbitration: Landmark Progress in the Acquisition of Territorial Sovereignty and Equitable Maritime Boundary Delimitation” (2001) 32 Ocean Dev & Intl L 1 at 14.

²²² E.g. Valencia, Mark J, “Spratly Solution Still at Sea” (1993) 6:2 Pacific Review 155 at 157; Jacques deLisle, “Troubled Waters: China’s Claims and the South China Sea” (2012) 56:4 Orbis 608 at 625.Google Scholar

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²³⁰ Ibid at 10–15.

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²³² Island of Palmas, supra note 219 at 840.

²³³ Eastern Greenland, supra note 220 at 46.

²³⁴ E.g. Eritrea and Yemen, supra note 221 at para 452; Janice Cavell, “Historical Evidence and the Eastern Greenland Case” (2008) 61:4 Arctic 433 at 434.

²³⁵ Clipperton, supra note 225 at 390.

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²⁴⁷ South China Sea (Merits), supra note 41 at para 278.

²⁴⁸ See generally Kopela, supra note 114 at 184, 199, who argues that the tribunal neglects the lex specialis character of historic rights.

²⁴⁹ South China Sea (Merits), supra note 41 at para 278; similar reasoning is also found in the South China Sea (Jurisdiction), supra note 113 at para 168.

²⁵⁰ Dupuy & Dupuy, supra note 40 at 136.

²⁵¹ Symmons, supra note 246 at 15–16.

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²⁵⁶ E.g. Thayer, Carl, “China’s Oil Rig Gambit: South China Sea Game- Changer?” The Diplomat (12 May 2014), online: <http://www.iacspsea.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Chinas-Oil-Rig-Gambit-May-12-2014.pdf>.Google Scholar

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²⁶⁶ Ibid at 34.

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²⁷⁵ Fravel, supra note 10 at 297.

²⁷⁶ Kline, supra note 6 at 148, 165–66.

²⁷⁷ Guano Islands Act, 18 August 1856, 48 USC, ch 8 §§ 1411–19, reprinted in 11 Stat 119; Cushman, Gregory T, Guano and the Opening of the Pacific World: A Global Ecological History (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013) at 2.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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²⁸¹ These territories are Baker Island, French Frigate Shoals, Howland Island, Jarvis Island, Johnston Atoll, Kingman Reef/Danger Rock, Midway Atoll, Navassa Island, Palmyra Atoll, Bajo Nuevo Bank, Serranilla Bank, and Swains Island. United States Government Department of the Interior, Acquisition Process of Insular Areas (9 May 2010), online: <https://www.doi.gov/oia/islands/acquisitionprocess>; Jon M Van Dyke, Joseph R Morgan & Jonathan Gurish, “Exclusive Economic Zone of the Northwestern Hawaiian Islands: When Do Uninhabited Islands Generate an EEZ” (1988) 25 San Diego L Rev 425 at 431.

²⁸² Saul, supra note 20 at 203; Pham, supra note 11 at 8.

²⁸³ South China Sea (Merits), supra note 41, para 278.

²⁸⁴ Beckman, supra note 80 at 153.

²⁸⁵ David, supra note 14 at 6–8.

²⁸⁶ Beckman, supra note 80 at 163; David, supra note 14 at 9–11.

²⁸⁷ Duong, supra note 68 at 1138; UNCLOS, supra note 15, arts 59, 300.

²⁸⁸ Regarding its broader approach to international law, see Congyan Cai, “New Great Powers and International Law in the 21st Century” (2013) 24:3 EJIL 755 at 795 argues that China’s latest legal practice has been marked by a struggle “to carry out its declared international legal policy.”

²⁸⁹ DeLisle, supra note 20 at 274.

²⁹⁰ Duong, supra note 68 at 1149.

²⁹¹ Saul, supra note 20 at 201, 203.

²⁹² Buzan, supra note 25 at 29.

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²⁹⁵ Rossi, supra note 11 at 279.

²⁹⁶ Proclamation no 2667, 3 CFR 67 (1945), reprinted in 59 Stat 884 (1945).

²⁹⁷ 1998 Law, supra note 56, arts 1, 3.