All Canadian governments say that Canada must look to its friends and allies and like-minded partners to achieve greater cooperation on global issues. But who are these countries exactly? To gain a better understanding of where Ottawa stands in the world, with whom and under what conditions, we analyze Canada's voting patterns in the United Nations General Assembly from 1980 to 2017. We find that Canada's overall record tends toward that of Western European states. We find no evidence of greater affinity with US positions either when the Democrats are in power in Washington or when the conservative parties are in power in Ottawa. We identify a sharp pro-US turn in the Harper years and also confirm that the government of Justin Trudeau started off by maintaining rather than reversing this trend.

Scholars of the political left-right divide often see equality as the core issue of contention, with the left seeking greater equality than the right. Though partially agreeing with this consensus, I propose a modified left-right conceptualization that offers three novel contributions. First, while accepting the idea of a single fundamental dimension underlying conflict in global politics, I argue the key issue is not necessarily equality but rather the diffusion or concentration of power within and across nations, communities and individuals. Second, given the inescapable complexity of politics, I argue in favour of distinguishing between those who seek to de-concentrate power and broaden inclusion (the left) from those advocating for a concentration of power (the right) in specific issue domains. Third, I illustrate the utility of this “one dimension, multiple domains” theoretical framework through a comparative analysis of eight contemporary political parties across the domains of economic, foreign and social policy.

Abstract. Although many historical injustices in Canada have BC roots, the ensuing debates have tended to frame redress as a federal responsibility. The article analyzes this dynamic and calls it “reparation displacement.” Reparation displacement saves the recalcitrant community or group from fighting aggressively to avoid its unpleasant past, shunting questions of cause, blame, and obligation away instead. Reparation displacement receives special attention here as an obstacle hindering BC's reconciliation with First Nations. The article also links the emphasis in “postpositivist” policy studies on civic deliberation to the focus in the reparations literature on historical acknowledgment. It suggests further that reparation displacement requires further research from scholars of federalism and multilevel governance.

Résumé. La Colombie-Britannique est le site de plusieurs injustices commises dans l'histoire du Canada. Pourtant, les débats qui s'ensuivent tendent à concevoir la question de la réparation comme relevant de la responsabilité du gouvernement fédéral. Cet article examine cette dynamique et y réfère en tant qu'elle témoigne d'un «déplacement de la réparation». Un tel déplacement permet à la communauté ou au groupe récalcitrant d'éviter d'affronter les aspects malheureux de son histoire. Il fait dévier les questions de cause, de blâme et d'obligation hors des responsabilités de la communauté concernée. Une attention spéciale est dédiée ici à ce phénomène parce qu'il constitue un obstacle entravant le processus de réconciliation entre la Colombie-Britannique et les Premières Nations. Enfin, cet article établit un rapport entre l'emphase que mettent les études «post-positivistes» de politiques sur la délibération civique et l'importance accordée à la reconnaissance historique dans la littérature portant sur les enjeux de réparation. Il suggère, en outre, que ce phénomène de déplacement devrait faire l'objet de recherches approfondies dans les domaines d'étude du fédéralisme et de la gouvernance multipalier.

A vigorous debate surrounding the “democratic dialogue” has done much for the understanding of our post-Charter parliamentary democracy. At the same time, it has diverted valuable attention from the settlement of the Charter with Canada's other constitutional pillar: federalism. This paper argues that the reconciliation of the Charter's national standards with the provincial diversity recognized by our federal Constitution is given expression by a federalist dialogue, occurring alongside, and even before, its democratic counterpart. An examination of several recent cases before the Supreme Court in which provincial policies have been impugned by the Charter provides evidence that provincial governments and the principles of federalism have a role to play in Charter interpretation, and that this role is often conceded by the Supreme Court in response to provincial factums. This discussion does not conclude the grand questions of federalism in the Charter era, but it does raise some definitive questions to propel the debate.

It is with great pleasure that we present this special issue showcasing contemporary feminist political research, theories and practices in Canada. In an era characterized by global movements and numerous transformations that range from the economic to the environmental, the political to the cultural, from macro- through to micro-scales, including complex debates about the fluidity of gender, and where “backlash” against the symbols and agents of past feminist activism is rife, this special issue queries where do we find feminism(s) today? The responses to this question, as well as to the interrogation of the place of gender in the discipline of political science more generally, are undoubtedly diverse and contested. The collective efforts contained in this special issue feature a mere taste of the rich range of thought-provoking recent scholarship on feminisms. And even with this necessarily condensed portrayal (the articles in this issue are shorter than is normally the case to allow for more work to be featured), the special issue is ground-breaking in that it marks the first time the Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique has dedicated an entire issue to topics of gender and feminisms.

Over the three decades of teaching and research allotted Harold Innis, no subject concerned him more than, the state of economics. He looked to economic history to enrich and broaden economic thought, and he sought to explain fashions in economics and to make economists intelligible to themselves. Although Veblen's influence left its mark on his work, Innis remained throughout a disciple of Adam Smith and no name appears more frequently in his observations on economics past and present. His plea was, as he put it, for “a general emphasis on a universal approach” and in his unfinished paper he writes, “The economic historian must test the tools of economic analysis by applying them to a broad canvas and by suggesting their possibilities and limitations when applied to other language or cultural groups.”

Apart from this search for perspective in economic thought there were other elements of continuity in Innis's thinking which give his life's work a coherence and a unity whether his interest centred on Canadian economic history or the duration powers of empires. It is scarcely necessary here to refer to his dislike of concentrations of power in any form or to his uncompromising belief in the free and creative powers of the individual, attitudes which stamp his research from beginning to untimely end. In his writings on economic history, technological change, free or controlled, links past and present. In his more specific references to economics, the pricing system provides the key to his reflections on the state of the subject. Early in his work there is present the same price-technology dichotomy that is to be found throughout Veblen's writings; later Innis sought to resolve this dichotomy in his studies of communication in which he saw technology and pricing as elements interacting with politics, law, and religion in a larger network of human relationships.

The present period is one in which emphasis on the need for rendering economic theory “dynamic” is widespread. Yet there is little reference in the literature to the concepts and measures of time which are appropriate for the economist. Indeed one is sometimes at a loss in examining certain dynamic theories to know precisely what notion of time is held by the authors. It is this situation which has prompted the present writer to ask a few questions concerning the problems posed for the economic theorist who would treat time specifically.

Some explanation of the origin of this short paper may assist in understanding its content and point of view. It is the result of a study of certain official papers dealing with cases of federal stress. These papers deserve, and indeed demand, careful study by all who exert any influence on government policy in Canada. I refer to (a) A Submission on Dominion-Provincial Relations and the Fiscal Disabilities of Nova Scotia within the Canadian Federation, presented by Professor Rogers to the Nova Scotia Royal Commission Provincial Economic Inquiry (1934); (b) Province of Nova Scotia, Report of the Royal Commission Provincial Economic Inquiry (1934), especially the supplementary report by Dr. Innis, and the memorandum by Professor R. A. MacKay on the “Financial Relations between the Provinces and the Dominion” published in the volume of Appendices to the Report; (c) British Columbia's Claim for Readjustment of Terms of Union presented by the Honourable T. D. Pattullo, the Honourable G. McG. Sloan, and the Honourable John Hart (1934); (d) The Case of the People of Western Australia in Support of their Desire to Withdraw from the Commonwealth of Australia (1934). Though these official papers have led me to try to think through the economic problems, and the economic philosophy, of federalism, the position I take is not new to me. It is simply a development of an attitude towards problems of regional conflict with an attempt to determine what difference exists when the state is federal rather than unitary. My attitude towards problems of regional conflict is exemplified in a paper contributed last year to The Canadian Economy and its Problems, but no reference is there made to the conflict of provinces as such. In view of this approach it may be less surprising if I add to the list of official papers given above one from the United Kingdom; (e) Reports of Investigations into the Industrial Conditions in Certain Depressed Areas of I West Cumberland, II Durham and Tyneside, III South Wales and Monmouthshire, IV Scotland (1934, Cmd. 4728).

Optional payment bonds are a distinctive feature of the Canadian debt structure and give rise to a set of conditions quite peculiar to the Canadian economy.

As to the facts, it may be said that a very considerable proportion of Canada's federal, provincial, municipal, and corporate indebtedness has been issued with principal and interest payable at the holder's option in either or both London and New York funds as well as in Canadian currency. A smaller amount is payable in London only and in New York only. The proportionate distribution of Canadian public issues according to payment feature is estimated, very approximately, as follows:

Something over 55 per cent, of Canada's bonded indebtedness, therefore, has an external payment feature in some form or other.

These combinations of payment feature are the consequence of several rather clearly defined phases of our economic development. The historical aspects of our capital imports constitute a study in itself beyond the scope of this article. Suffice it to say that most of our “Canada and London” and “London only” debt was acquired in the years from 1900 to 1913, a period in which we were absorbing outside capital at a more rapid rate than any other capital-importing nation and depending for our requirements almost solely on the London money market.

Successful political movements are frequently accompanied by, and well served by, theoretical defences of their positions which later reflection shows to be inadequate for purposes other than popular political polemics. The history of the reform movement in England in the early decades of the nineteenth century provides an excellent example. The defence of political democracy offered by Jeremy Bentham, James Mill, and their followers gave the Radicals of the 1820's and 1830's their main intellectual arguments for the Great Reform Act. A close examination of this theory suggests, however, that it is inadequate in its view both of the nature of a democratic society and of the process of policy formation therein. It is, moreover, also apparent that Bentham's theory of democracy is sharply inconsistent with the main body of Benthamite doctrines.

The basic problem in Bentham's political theory is a product of the manner in which he resolved a contradiction that exists between his ethical and his psychological theory. Utilitarian ethics rests on the principle that the rightness or wrongness of an act is decided by its effect on the happiness of the greatest number. Bentham's psychological theory, however, is egoistic and hedonistic. He offered no hope that a man will act other than in pursuit of his own interests, and little hope that these interests will naturally be associated with the interests of others.

If this psychology is valid, individuals will choose, voluntarily, the ethically proper act only when, by chance, it coincides with that act which they perceive will maximize their own personal pleasure. Bentham realized this. As a consequence, he argued that if individuals are to be brought into harmony and if the greatest happiness is to be achieved, then legal sanctions and incentives must be introduced to influence individual hedonistic calculations in favour of acts that do not diminish the happiness of others more than they increase the happiness of the doer.

A theory of voting under federalism requires that attributions of responsibility moderate the strength of retrospective voting. Scholars have spotty evidence that voters do this but put this down to the effects of institutions and citizens’ capabilities. I show that political variation also affects electoral accountability. Using panel surveys across provincial and federal elections and qualitative media content analysis, I show that voters only live up to a federal theory of voting when governments make policy changes independent of the other level and those changes and their consequences are prominent in political discourse. Federal institutions affect electoral accountability through the politics that they generate.

In a world torn with nationalistic conflicts, men's minds are naturally turning to projects of international government and to hopes for a wider acceptance of international loyalties, language, and civilization. One of the last epochs in which a measure of such international unity can be said to have actually existed was the European Middle Ages. The following study of the conditions underlying medieval unity, therefore, may offer some information on a topic of present interest.

Accounts of the rise of modern nationalism frequently begin with a picture of the spiritual, linguistic, and cultural unity of medieval Christendom. Mr. Carlton Hayes speaks of “the traditional internationalism of civilized Europe” before the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; other authors similarly use the Middle Ages as a point of departure. New forces are then pointed out, which in their rise toward the end of the Middle Ages broke up that unity into the present multitude of nations and sovereign states. This useful method of exposition, however, suggests further questions. How did that “traditional internationalism” of medieval Europe come to exist? What were the conditions favouring its spread, and how durable was it likely to be under the law of its own growth? Can the medieval vision of cultural unity again be recreated on similar foundations?

A great power in a dispute with a minor state does not require the weight which a coalition with a peer would provide, and may require peer toleration in order to throw its own weight around. An alliance with the rival is a prudent step fora predatory great power. This article examines nondefense alliances among the European great powers and activist wars with minor states during 1815–1939. Weak commitments favour activist war and strong ones induce such warfare. The strength of the commitment varies with the geopolitical location of the target.

Several phenomena which have been separately observed in Canada are linked: namely the diffusion of power within the executive-administrative branch, the proliferation and expanded role of pressure groups, and the increased attention parliament has been receiving from interest organizations. Suggesting that this last may reflect fundamental changes in the policy system as a whole, it is argued that a tendency toward bureaucratic pluralism has led agencies to develop extra-governmental support at the interest group level; and that both interest groups and agencies have found it useful to exploit the legitimating and publicizing capacities of parliament. In so doing they have contributed to the enhancement of parliament's role in the policy process.

This article first presents a brief survey of the role and functions filled by the personal aide (chef de cabinet) of a minister in Quebec. The analysis continues, in a comparative perspective, by tracing a sociological and professional portrait of the Liberal“chefs de cabinet” in April 1976 and their successors in the pequiste government in July 1977.

We then test the hypothesis that the cleavage between the government and the dominant economic forces has increased since November 15, 1976 as a result of the ideology articulated by the“chefs de cabinet” regarding the social and economic aims of the state. This hypothesis was confirmed.

The hypothesis that the pequiste“chefs de cabinet” exercise a more pronounced influence on the decision-making process is also confirmed. Nevertheless, one cannot argue that the pequiste“chefs de cabinet” usurped the power of the legislators; their influence is more political than technocratic. The growing influence of the pequiste“chefs de cabinet” neverthelsss helps to accentuate the tensions and conflicts between the higher civil service and the ministerial aides.

The Constitution Act, 1982 recognized certain rights for aboriginal peoples. These rights were to be identified and defined subsequently. Ten years later, after several rounds of negotiations, the question of the recognition and definition of an aboriginal right to self-government remains unresolved. Many specialists claim that the problems faced during these negotiations result from the incompatibility between the main philosophical traditions guiding the actors. Through an analysis of the relationship between the cosmology underlying the aboriginal demands on the one hand and three of the main trends in contemporary Canadian liberal political philosophy on the other hand, this article tries to shed some light on the philosophical incompatibility thesis. While a strictly individualist liberalism rejects outright the notion of collective rights and Will Kymlicka's revisionist liberal individualism limits considerably the scope of an aboriginal right to self-government, communitarian liberalism, like that of Charles Taylor, seems to provide a favourable framework for the integration of cultural co-existence with the First Nations, without repudiating its attachment to fundamental individual rights and freedoms.