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Political Conditions for Electoral Accountability in Federalism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 August 2017

Fred Cutler
Fred Cutler*
Affiliation:
University of British Columbia
*
Department of Political Science, University of British Columbia, 1866 Main Mall, Vancouver BC, V6 T 1Z1, email: [email protected]
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Abstract

A theory of voting under federalism requires that attributions of responsibility moderate the strength of retrospective voting. Scholars have spotty evidence that voters do this but put this down to the effects of institutions and citizens’ capabilities. I show that political variation also affects electoral accountability. Using panel surveys across provincial and federal elections and qualitative media content analysis, I show that voters only live up to a federal theory of voting when governments make policy changes independent of the other level and those changes and their consequences are prominent in political discourse. Federal institutions affect electoral accountability through the politics that they generate.

Résumé

Une théorie du vote dans un cadre fédéraliste demande à ce que la force du vote rétrospectif soit modérée par une attribution correcte de la responsabilité des différents paliers de gouvernements. Les recherches passées offrent des preuves limitées que les électeurs agissent de cette façon et y voient un effet des institutions et des capacités des citoyens. Dans cet article, je montre que certaines variations politiques ont également un effet sur la responsabilité électorale. À partir de données de panel d'élections provinciales et fédérales ainsi qu'une analyse qualitative de contenu médiatique, je montre que les électeurs suivent cette « théorie du vote fédéral » uniquement lorsque les gouvernements font des changements de politiques indépendamment des autres paliers de gouvernements et que ces changements et leurs conséquences sont très présents dans le discours politique. Les institutions fédérales affectent la responsabilité électorale à travers les dynamiques politiques entourant les politiques publiques qu'elles génèrent.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique , Volume 50 , Issue 4 , December 2017 , pp. 1037 - 1059
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Political Science Association (l'Association canadienne de science politique) and/et la Société québécoise de science politique 2017 

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Footnotes

This research was supported by a grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. I thank Amanda Bittner for superb research assistance. Thanks also to participants in seminars at the Australian National University, McGill University and the University of British Columbia for probing questions and comments that improved the work.

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