Previous research has shown that the public tends to see some groups as less deserving of social rights. Our focus in this article is whether they are also seen as less entitled to engage in political claims-making. Recent theorists of inclusive nationalism argue that whether minorities are seen as having the right to codetermine the future may depend on whether the majority believes minorities are morally committed to the nation. Drawing on a unique survey experiment, we test this intuition by analyzing how majority perceptions of a minority's commitment to the larger society influence support for claims-making by immigrants and national minorities. We show that immigrants, French-speaking Quebeckers, and Indigenous peoples are judged more harshly about their right to make claims and that this is in part explained by the majority's views that these groups are not, in fact, committed members of the larger political community.

This article summarizes the conclusions of a comparative study of the environmental policy experiences of two Canadian provinces, Alberta and Ontario, in the period 1971–1993. The examination led to the conclusion that there is a pattern of environmental politics and policy-making common to both provinces, although it emerges at a different pace. This divergence is a function of well-known societal differences between the two provinces. Furthermore, in the Ontario and Alberta experiences, the policy-making capacity of the state can be seen to be severely challenged by the cross-sectoral nature of environmental policy issues. A number of observations regarding the effects of federal-provincial relations and of American influences on environmental policy-making at the provincial level in Canada are also possible.

Abstract. The Quebec labour movement's decision to withdraw its support for Canada's federal system in the 1970s and instead embrace the sovereignist option was unquestionably linked to the intersection of class and nation in Quebec. In this period, unions saw the sovereignist project as part of a larger socialist or social democratic societal project. Because the economic inequalities related to ethnic class, which fuelled the labour movement's support for sovereignty in the 1970s, were no longer as prevalent by the time of Quebec's 1995 referendum, organized labour's continued support for the sovereignist option in the post-referendum period cannot adequately be explained using the traditional lens of class and nation. This paper employs an institutional comparative analysis of Quebec's three largest trade union centrals with a view to demonstrating that organized labour's primary basis for supporting sovereignty has changed considerably over time. While unions have not completely abandoned a class-based approach to the national question, they have tended to downplay class division in favour of an emphasis on Quebec's uniqueness and the importance of preserving the collective francophone identity of the nation. Party–union relations, the changing cultural, political and economic basis of the sovereignist project and the emergence of neoliberalism in Quebec are offered as key explanatory factors for the labour movement's shift in focus.

Résumé. La décision du mouvement syndical québécois de retirer son soutien du système fédéral, dans les années 1970, et d'embrasser l'option souverainiste, a été liée incontestablement à l'intersection de classe et nation au Québec. Dans cette période, les syndicats ont vu le projet souverainiste en tant qu'élément d'un plus grand projet de société à caractère social démocratique ou socialiste. Toutefois, puisque les inégalités économiques associées à la classe ethnique qui avaient poussé le mouvement syndical dans le camp de la souveraineté n'étaient plus aussi prononcées lors du référendum de 1995, l'analyse traditionnelle de classe et nation ne peut plus expliquer le maintien de sa position souverainiste durant la période postréférendaire. Cet article se fonde sur une analyse comparative et institutionnelle des trois plus grandes centrales syndicales québécoises en vue de démontrer que les motifs premiers de l'appui syndical au projet souverainiste ont changé considérablement avec le temps. Même si les syndicats n'ont pas complètement abandonné l'approche militante surla question nationale, ils ont relégué les divisions de classes au second plan et plutôt mis l'accent sur le caractère distinct du Québec et sur l'importance de préserver l'identité francophone collective de la nation. Les relations entre les syndicats et les partis politiques, la base culturelle, politique et économique du projet souverainiste, et l'introduction du néolibéralisme au Québec sont présentées en tant que facteurs principaux expliquant l'évolution de la position syndicale à l'égard de la question nationale.

This article is a critique of C. B. Macpherson's interpretation of Hobbes's Leviathan. In reading possessive individualism into Hobbes's work, Macpherson assumes two basic theses: a logical claim, that a specific model of society is required to derive a universal opposition among men's powers; and a textual claim, that this universal opposition is implied by Hobbes as an unstated postulate in chapters 10–11 of Leviathan. These basic claims are both unfounded. Logically, the postulated universal opposition of powers does not require Macpherson's model of society for its derivation. Indeed, on premisses preferred by Macpherson, the two are logically inconsistent. Textually, the postulated universal opposition of powers does not occur in Leviathan: a careful sifting of the text indicates that there is no direct evidence at all for this postulate. Notwithstanding the brilliance of possessive individualism as a contribution to modern political understanding, this theory cannot properly be ascribed to Hobbes.

Abstract. Health expenditure is influenced by health system efficiency, but it is also the result of societal decisions and preferences. Existing cross-national efficiency evaluations often do not fully take this into account, misinterpreting differences in preferences as differences in efficiency. This article estimates health system efficiency by taking preferences fully into account. The empirical findings confirm the theoretical argument, that omitting preferences leads to biased efficiency estimates. Countries and health systems differ with regard to health expenditure not so much because their institutional setting affects their efficiency, but because preferences and demands of their “customers” differ.

Résumé. L'efficacité du système de santé influe, certes, sur les dépenses de soins de santé, mais celles-ci sont également le résultat des décisions et des préférences de la société. Souvent, les évaluations transnationales existantes de l'efficacité du système de santé ne tiennent pas pleinement compte de ce facteur et prennent des différences de préférences pour des différences d'efficacité. Cet article évalue l'efficacité des systèmes de santé en tenant pleinement compte des préférences. Les données empiriques confirment l'argument théorique voulant que l'omission des préférences mène à des estimations d'efficacité déformées. Les dépenses de soins de santé varient d'un pays et d'un système à l'autre, non pas tant parce que leur cadre institutionnel influe sur l'efficacité, mais plutôt parce que les préférences et les demandes de leurs «clientèles» varient.

The study of politics in the United States today is something in size, content, and method unique in Western intellectual history. As Professor Pendleton Herring has recently said: “Political science as a subject of systematic enquiry started with Aristotle but as a profession it has won its greatest recognition in the United States and within our generation. One fact is clear: no other country in the world has so large, so well trained, so competent a profession dedicated to the teaching and analysis of government… . This profession … is now part of our national strength.” Not merely has the size of “the profession” grown so much since Aristotle's day, but the method has also markedly changed. American methods have consciously aspired to the modern concepts of natural science. There has been an advocacy of an integrated science of society, resting especially on concepts drawn from modem physics, biology, and psychology, and on a marked displacement of speculative philosophy and historical study. There now follow, from a sceptical foreigner, some reflections on the claims of Professor Herring. It is surely important for friends and neighbours to make some judgment on how a political science profession can become a “partof … national strength” and how relevant these new methods can be to the peculiar historical experience of the United States.

Here are two sciences—Philosophy and Political Economy—both bankrupt. The one went through the courts at least a hundred years ago and is now a cheery old bankrupt, bright and garrulous in old age. It talks most interestingly about its case, citing a long list of opinions and judgments that go back to the Greeks. The other bankrupt has just been thrown into the receiver's hands, still protesting angrily, still claiming that it has wonderful assets, that everything will be all right. It cites a wilderness, not of opinion, but of statistics and facts, all apparently bearing on nothing, gets confused, breaks down and cries—a very picture of senile collapse.

There are those who dislike metaphor; let us say the same thing in a plain way. Philosophy means the attempt to discover the ultimate nature of existence, of consciousness, of time and space. Has it found it? No. Is it going to? Not a chance of it. Where is it? Nowhere. Some people do not understand this. They read of the work of the Mayos and the Carrels and the Rutherfords and think that they are getting somewhere. In the philosophical sense it is not so. No ultimate dissection of the human body will ever find the human soul. The substitution of Rutherford's atom for Huxley's—replacing a solid particle infinitely small by a huge cavern empty except for centres of force—does not carry us one inch further in our quest of the final relations of mind and matter. Our greatest medical men know no more of the ultimate nature of consciousness than did a horse doctor in Asia Minor B.C. 500. Einstein, as far as the ultimate truth of space, time, and number goes, is no further on than Rodin's “Penseur”—his statue of the primitive man, buried in stubborn thought and trying, let us say, to think out whether two and two is four, or is five.

Through his writings, Walter Bagehot gave order and meaning to the institutions of parliamentary government. The English Constitution (1867) acknowledges the Crown as centrepiece but relegates it to the category of symbol. Institutions, Bagehot said, were “dignified” or “efficient” according to their constitutional function, and the Crown was the apotheosis of a dignified element. By contrast, the author argues that the Crown is an integral part of a practical form of government in Canada, and advances as proof three areas of Crown influence: representation, information and participation. The discussion concludes by noting the relevance of the Crown for the study of Canadian federalism.

Leadership succession in the Soviet Union has always had some impact on the composition of the ruling Communist party, which is otherwise determined normally by the force of social status. As the CPSU constitutes the pool from which the Soviet political elite is drawn, changes in that pool brought about by the succession of Gorbachev are bound to have implications for the future. Apparently unable at the beginning of his term to stem the intake of new members, Gorbachev has made dramatic use of expulsions to regulate the composition of the party. In their overall effect, his policies have shown a remarkable continuity with the Brezhnev period. This includes the enhancement of workers’ and peasants’ chances of being drawn into full-time political roles at the expense of white-collar persons. The net effect is likely to be a widening of the gap between the party and the intelligentsia, who are effectively excluded from membership in the political elite.

While much has been written about the politics of retrenchment, in a number of advanced industrial societies social policy expansion does occur today, which raises issues about how to study it in a post-retrenchment era. The present article explores the new politics of social policy expansion in Canada. Drawing on the work of Paul Pierson, we use an integrated framework that highlights the interaction of five factors: the availability of fiscal resources; the emergence of new social risks; the intensity and nature of partisan competition; the policy preferences of the main political parties; and the role of political institutions, especially federalism. Empirically, the article studies the politics of federal social policy expansion during the Harper (2006–2015) and Justin Trudeau (2015–) years, with a focus on three policy areas: child benefits (Universal Child Care Benefit and Canada Child Benefit), pensions (Old Age Security and Canada/Quebec Pension Plan) and Employment Insurance.

At a congress of the International Political Science Association held at The Hague in 1952, Professor Georges Langrod delivered a paper entitled “Local Government and Democracy,” subsequently published in the British journal Public Administration. The incisive logic and unorthodox conclusions of that paper seemed at the time to demolish, once for all, the justification of local representative government commonly found in much traditional liberal political theory. Mr. Keith Panter-Brick, facing a skilled prosecutor, and doing the best he could with a difficult case, replied in a later issue of the same journal. Dr. Leo Moulin next entered the discussion in defence of Langrod, and Panter-Brick wrote a second rejoinder. I felt that the contest, although conducted with flair by all parties, left far too many important questions unsettled. The object of this paper, however, is not to reopen points raised in dispute by the recent combatants; it is rather to suggest that the problems connected with the theory of local self-government ought to be approached in different terms.

The question to be considered refers to the relation between local self-government and democracy. By local self-government is meant that system of subordinate local authorities which has developed in many modern states. Each unit of local government in any system is assumed to possess the following characteristics: a given territory and population; an institutional structure for legislative, executive, or administrative purposes; a separate legal identity; a range of power and functions authorized by delegation from the appropriate central or intermediate legislature; and lastly, within the ambit of such delegation, autonomy—including fiscal autonomy—subject always, at least in the Anglo-American tradition, to the limitations of common law such as the test of reasonableness.

“It appears that aggregation may be pushed much further in inventory analysis than has heretofore been generally felt justified.” Originating with P. G. Darling and confirmed by M. C. Lovell, this oft-quoted assertion has in large measure been responsible for what might be termed a “consensus” (albeit implicit) on the usefulness of aggregation in empirical inventory studies. Professors Eisner and Strotz carry this interpretation to its extreme by declaring that they “prefer, at the theoretical level, to disaggregate by motive rather than stage [of fabrication].”

The purpose of this study is to take a closer look at the role of the inventory components (i.e., finished goods, goods in process, and raw materials) in aggregate inventory behaviour. Paramount among the issues addressed is the Eisner-Strotz assertion: is it meaningful to speak (on a theoretical or empirical level) of motives for holding inventories without reference to the stages of fabrication?

It is well to state explicitly at the outset that the society considered in this essay is the sovereign democratic state, that is, a modern Western nation, where law is made and enforced by a responsible government within the context of representative institutions. Only a free society living under democratic government confronts or deals with social problems—problems of and for society as a unit. It is assumed that public opinion is committed to the general ideal of a practical maximum of individual freedom and freedom of association, hence to a minimum of enforced or “jural” law, prescribing or restricting personal conduct. That is, it holds to the ideal of association by free agreement or assent, subject to the state and its laws. The concepts are imprecise, and to make them workable and definite is a major function of law and government.

The field of association to be chiefly considered here is that of “economic” relations. In the form now prevalent in the Western world, free economic association is a historical novelty, in origin closely intertwined with democracy or political freedom. It will be argued that these and other modes of freedom are in fact inseparable aspects of “liberal” culture. “Liberal” culture arose through a radical and historically swift transformation of the order which prevailed in mediaeval Western Europe. Without looking farther back in history, what is important is the antithetical character in essential respects of mediaeval and contemporary society in their structure and operation and in their accepted ideals.

I wish to consider how industries exploiting natural resources may be expected to develop. It is not my purpose to consider their entire relation with the economy of which they form a part. Rather, I wish to examine the logic of their own changes in technology and technique in response to stimuli from the rest of the economy. In tracing this development, I shall stress the changing technology itself; the adjustment of property and tenure concepts; some aspects of location and transportation; and the impact of all these changes on industrial and market organization.

As an analytical technique for tracing these changes, I shall make use of a “stages of development” approach. It will be shown that most industries working natural resources may be said to be in one of three, roughly consecutive stages. The precise dating of the transitions between the stages is highly arbitrary, but this defect is unimportant since the chief function of the stages approach in its present context is to bring out the successive impacts on resource exploitation of two outside forces. The first of these is a mechanical, capital-using technology. The second is the application of science to “control” the resource, biological or mineral, in the same sense that agricultural and manufacturing industries have control over their processes.

In the model, stress is laid on the industries that today are still extracting raw materials from nature: fishing, hunting, logging, oil and gas, metals, and water. Agricultural activity also properly belongs with these industries. However, since agriculture has already passed well into the third stage, it is referred to chiefly for purposes of example and comparison. The farmer no longer “hunts” his cattle, nor “collects” wild rice or fruit.