Forty per cent of Europeans refuse to have Roma as their neighbours, while 80 per cent of these do not even have direct contact with them. Using these statistics as a point of departure, this study analyzes how attitudes toward Roma are constructed. It proposes to investigate this process in two similar environments but where local integration policies directed toward Roma differ, resulting in disparate forms of intergroup contact. The analysis is premised on two theoretical assumptions: that the integration of migrants is a local public policy issue and that intergroup contact frames attitudes between majority and minority groups. From semi-structured interviews in the French municipalities of La Courneuve and Ivry-sur-Seine, four theories are empirically tested: the contact theory, the halo effect, the impact of local immigrant integration policies and media influence. This study demonstrates that the implementation of municipal policies in favour of Roma integration can improve their living conditions and thus deconstruct prejudices attributable to their precarious situation. In addition, it illustrates how the media activate, maintain or solidify the way Roma are perceived.

La doctrine Gérin-Lajoie, qui fonde l'action internationale du Québec depuis les années 1960, s'exprime conventionnellement comme le prolongement externe des compétences internes du Québec. Comment alors expliquer que les élus québécois prennent régulièrement position sur certains conflits internationaux, qui relèvent pourtant clairement de la compétence du gouvernement fédéral ? Cet article offre un premier éclairage sur les motivations des élus québécois à se positionner sur des enjeux militaires ainsi qu'aux dynamiques qui les entourent. Trois hypothèses sont avancées et confrontées tour à tour à l'ensemble des prises de position des élus québécois depuis le 11 septembre 2001 en matière d'intervention militaire. Premièrement, la paradiplomatie québécoise pourrait être marquée par un nationalisme identitaire, agissant comme outil d'affirmation et de différenciation nationales par-delà les compétences provinciales. Deuxièmement, plutôt que de représenter une tendance à connotation identitaire, l'affirmation québécoise sur des enjeux de compétence fédérale pourrait être la manifestation d'une protodiplomatie. Troisièmement, les élus québécois pourraient s'aventurer sur le terrain de la sécurité internationale en raison de calculs électoraux. En somme, l'article cherche à évaluer si l'affirmation québécoise en matière de sécurité internationale est le fruit de motivations identitaires, souverainistes ou électorales.

Protection as an economic creed has been largely an expression of industrial capitalism in Canada. It is true that Ministers of Finance have endorsed the tariff as a means of providing revenue independently of the interests of manufacturers, that such groups as farmers at various times have favoured the imposition of duties on particular commodities, and that certain newspapers, political parties, and organizations of a reform or patriotic character have advanced the general philosophy of protection. But in none of these cases has the support of tariff increases grown out of any broad economic movement. The tariff system developed with the growth of manufacturing industries, and it was pressed upon the Government as a necessary policy by organizations formed to advance the interests of manufacturers.

The first organized attempt of Canadian manufacturers to secure protection of which we have knowledge was made at a meeting in Toronto, April 14, 1858, called “for the purpose of recommending such a readjustment of the tariff as would place the manufacturers of Canada on a footing of greater equality with those of the United States.” Previous to the meeting, consultations had taken place between a committee in Toronto, the Tariff Reform Association of Montreal, and manufacturers scattered throughout the country, and, as a result of these deliberations, a detailed draft of the necessary tariff changes was drawn up.

Whatever may be regarded as the immediate motives which impelled the Price Spreads investigation it will be generally agreed that a careful examination of the Canadian economy as a whole is long overdue, and that present conditions and current trends require the formulation of intelligent and co-ordinated economic policies. We are now in the sixth year of a major industrial depression and, while there has been a substantial measure of recovery from the low points of 1933, there is no clear indication of continued improvement and there is at least a possibility of the crumbling of the statistical ledge to which we have been rather precariously and nervously clinging for the past twelve months. Canada, with its large measure of dependence on the exports of two or three staple products, has always been in a vulnerable position, but this has been greatly accentuated by the widespread trend towards economic nationalism and self-sufficiency. Our professional optimists to the contrary, Canada has been one of the heaviest sufferers during the past five years and the outlook for the future is still uncertain and still threatening.

It is not necessary to elaborate the familiar problems of the Canadian economy: an income that fluctuates violently with the volume and value of our exports, and expenses that are made highly rigid by the dominating factors of heavy overhead costs; the wide differences in the technological problems of the several major industries; the concentration of staple industries in specialized geographical areas and the growing political and cultural domination of metropolitan centres which accentuate political and economic sectionalism, and at the same time a high degree of concentration of the control of finance, commerce, and manufacturing on a national scale—a concentration to which it is difficult to apply social regulation and control within the present framework of the British North America Act.

The maintenance of a satisfactory relationship between the financial resources and the responsibilities of a government is one of the most fundamental problems of all states. The difficulties are greatly complicated in those states in which a central government shares its tax resources and its responsibilities with local administrations. The complexities reach their peak in federations where central, provincial, and municipal governments all have strong traditions of independence, all draw their revenue from sources which overlap to a greater or lesser degree, and all compete for the support of the same voting public. As there develops a recognition of the nation-wide and not merely the local significance of such services as schools, roads, welfare services, etc., it becomes increasingly necessary for each local government to keep its services up to a level not too far below the accepted national standard. As the cost of these government services increases, an ever increasing proportion of the wealth of the community must be diverted to these uses and the point is eventually reached where the less wealthy communities are unable to raise the tax revenue necessary to maintain an acceptable standard.

Two conflicting courses of action offer themselves as possible solutions to such a situation. On the one hand there has been a movement toward larger administrative areas and toward centralization of services under the control of the authority operating over the larger area.

Before World War I a relatively high degree of regional specialization in the production of agricultural commodities had developed throughout the world, and the Canadian prairies had turned to the production of wheat. During the 1920's this structure of regional specialization was seriously undermined and the depression of the 1930's brought disaster to many specialized regions, including the Canadian prairies. Two significant conditions upon which the settlement of the prairies had been premised, relative freedom of trade and an upward trend in the population of Occidental countries, were altered adversely. When, in addition, a series of droughts afflicted the prairies during the 1930's, the economic plight of the region became nothing short of desperate. Its inhabitants felt that they had been “let down” by their own federal government and by the world in general, and they protested in a variety of ways. In Alberta, a dynamic leader spearheaded the Social Credit movement which captured the provincial government, attempted to set up a provincial monetary system, and defaulted on the provincial government debt.

For one year after liberation in 1945, Czechoslovakia seemed to offer a picture of relative harmony between the political forces of democracy and communism personified by Eduard Beneš, the President, and Klement Gottwald, deputy Prime Minister, and leader of the Communist party. The themes of continuity and revolution, introduced during the wartime struggle for national liberation and developed for one post-war year in apparent concord, were soon to break off in open disharmony. Profound divergences appeared within the National Front of the six political parties concerning the course to be followed in future. On the Communist side there was a wish to complete a revolution that remained, in their view, unfinished. On the non-Communist side, there was a desire to end the course of drastic change and to establish order and legal stability on the Western pattern. These differences were for some time hidden by, or at least subordinated to, the unity symbolized by the National Front. By late 1947 what amounted to a deadlock had resulted, and prospects of continuing co-operation of Communists and non-Communists were slight. The climax in February, 1948, to be correctly appreciated, must be placed in the context of this deep and protracted crisis.

The first year of the liberated republic was one of reconstruction and revolution. The legal order was restored, with substantial new elements incorporated. The main organs of government were reconstituted, sometimes in greatly changed form. The punishment of war criminals, and the purification of Czech and Slovak life of “fascist elements,” were begun, through special “people's tribunals.” The property confiscated from German and Czech “traitors” was placed under “national administration.” Extensive nationalization of industry was begun, and a system of planning was prepared.

The purpose of this paper is to suggest the close relationship between economic development and movements of moral reform in Canada. From the beginning of Canadian history, organized attempts have been made to control such problems as intemperance, crime, gambling, juvenile delinquency, sexual promiscuity, and prostitution. These movements were indicative of a condition of disintegration of the mores, and their role was that of establishing a new moral code to govern behaviour. But disturbances which resulted in the breakdown of moral standards extended throughout the range of society, and affected the organization of economic and political life as well. Movements of moral reform, like those of an economic or political (or purely religious or cultural) character, were products of economic expansion.

This fact becomes evident if consideration is given to the broad features of the social development of Canada. Beginning with the establishment of the fishing industry in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, Canadian development may be represented in terms of a series of stages marked by the emergence of new areas or forms of economic exploitation. The expansion of economic life involved new accommodations in economic, political, and social institutions, and the points of greatest social disturbance were to be found where the impacts of the new techniques of production were most felt. It was within these interstitial areas of social organization, where the traditional culture came in conflict with new economic developments, that movements of reform took their rise.

This article examines the effect of the resource amendment (section 92A) on Canada's political economy. The analysis of the consequences of section 92A moves beyond the immediate changes in the distribution of legislative jurisdiction to examine the broader political implications. It is argued that the resource amendment is politically significant in several respects. It removes certain irritants from federal-provincial relations. By augmenting and clarifying provincial powers, the provinces' role in resource development is strengthened. The expansion of provincial legislative capacity gives the provinces more legitimacy and power at the political bargaining table.

Only in Prince Edward Island have voters tended to elect provincial administrations of the same party stripe as the federal government. The authorargues that this has not occurred purely by chance and that, in fact, provincial campaigns have historically revolved around the issue of being “in line” with Ottawa. Presently, support for federal-provincial partisan congruence is rooted in those Islanders who can be characterized as “political animals” as well as in the dominant groups of the Island's social structure. The author concludes that the deviating provincial election of 1982 does not represent a fundamental change in the Islanders’ political orientations.

The subject which I have chosen is not one that it is possible to discuss adequately, much less exhaust, in a short paper. I believe, however, that it is fast becoming one of the major fundamental problems of democracies. With a world-wide challenge confronting democratic institutions, no one can feel complacent about our political future in the broad sense, and no amount of wishful or traditional thinking will replace serious reconsideration of some aspects of government as we understand it.

It might be appropriate to start with a few definitions. It is relatively easy to find a comprehensive definition of the term “public administration.” A former president of the United States, some fifty years ago, defined it as “a detailed and systematic execution of public law.” Leonard D. White, in his book Introduction to the Study of Public Administration, writes: “In its broadest sense, public administration consists of all those operations having for their purpose the fulfillment or enforcement of public policy, as declared by the competent authorities.”

It is not so easy, however, to obtain agreement as to what exactly represents public interest as applied to public administration. In a democracy, the public must reach wide agreement on the duties to be performed by government; or in other words, the objectives of public policy must correspond fairly well with public views concerning the proper functions which should belong to governmental activity. Otherwise the efficient administration of these functions becomes almost a practical impossibility. But the word public is difficult to encompass in a restrictive definition. It is composed of individuals, groups, institutions with different ideals, philosophies, and interests. Consequently, public interest must necessarily represent a working compromise and be subject to continuous redefinition, as need arises, in the process of achieving an often delicate balance among conflicting interests.

The time is, I think, opportune for introspection by Canadian social scientists. The present is a transitional period in the life of the nation. Five years of war have profoundly altered Canadian society: Canada has become a great industrial nation; the paternalistic state has arrived at least at adolescence under the stimulus of war; for the time being the Canadian people have become military-minded, a condition which may well continue into the peace in view of the shift of world power in favour of North America; everywhere social values hitherto accepted are under fire, and traditional folkways have been rudely disturbed; new social goals are being raised and new patterns of life are being established.

It is probable also that we are in a transitional stage in higher education. At any rate Canadian universities, like other social institutions, will be compelled to adjust themselves to the changed conditions of the post-war world. One condition likely to obtain is an increasing interest in the social sciences, if for no other reason than the increasing demand for social technicians to manage a paternalistic society. It is not improbable also that Canadian society faces a prolonged and acrimonious, if not violent, debate on social objectives. Under these conditions I suggest it is of first importance that social scientists should have firm opinions as to the nature of their calling, both with 'a view to guiding educational expansion, and assisting them in deciding their personal responsibilities in a distracted world.

Canada's recent return to a pegged exchange rate marks the end of a highly interesting experiment in international economic policy and the end of an era in the history of the Canadian balance of payments. It is now appropriate, therefore, to look backwards and to examine the effects of changes in the balance of payments on the Canadian economy during the period in which the value of the Canadian dollar was allowed to fluctuate freely. Only a very narrow aspect of the problem is examined in this paper, namely, the effect of the large long-term capital inflow of the 1950s on the Canadian business cycle. This problem is interesting not only for its own sake, but also because the cyclical effect of a capital inflow is extremely important in determining whether the borrowing country achieves its potential or required growth rate.

If, for our purposes, we define the potential supply of goods and services available to an economy as domestic production at full employment plus imports minus exports, a capital inflow increases that supply by bidding up the value of the Canadian dollar until sufficient upward pressure on imports and downward pressure on exports is imposed to transfer the capital inflow in real terms. This increase in supply implies that planned aggregate expenditures in Canada can increase without exerting inflationary pressures on the economy. A capital inflow allows a higher level of investment expenditure and this raises the potential rate of growth of the productive capacity of the economy.