I have little to add to this discussion for the simple reason that my colleague, Dr. Coats, has said much of what I wanted to say, said it more interestingly, with a Dorothy Dix touch which I, in my academic restraint, cannot give, and also said it with more authority because of his long and distinguished public service. I can do little more than underscore a few broad propositions.

My first proposition is an emphasis upon the basic fact that public administration is the administration of the state, and not simply the administration of individual departments of government. It has to deal with the management of the state in its aggregated activities, and hence broadly with the whole subtle art of government. The tone of that management never depends simply upon what industrious and zealous civil servants in their offices may do, or how they may do it, but, among other things, upon the effective organization of parliamentary committees, the conscience and intelligence of their members, the modes of planning parliamentary work, and even the quality of discussion within the conclaves of parties, or the antics and verbal orgies of the demagogue in public debate. The genuine and profitable study of public administration in a democratic state cannot be narrower than the broad frame of government, if we are to appreciate duly the ultimate end sought—the competent management of the state. One phase of national government, designated by text-book writers as the administrative, cannot logically or wisely be isolated from other phases which in turn determine its character. To the institutions of general government must be applied those principles and axioms concerning organization which Henri Fayol, Major Urwick, Mary Follett, and many others, with varying wisdom and clarity, have done much to elaborate.

“All economic problems which are concerned with overhead costs, whether those of the individual farm enterprise or those of communities or governmental bodies, are rendered active or quiescent by the fluctuations of net agricultural income.” Herein, lies the fundamental economic problem of the West. It is the purpose of this paper to examine provincial and municipal finance in the Prairie Provinces in the light of this fact, in an attempt to reveal some of the more important problems and possible lines of attack on them. The area designated as the Prairie Provinces, however, is not a unit with uniform geographic and economic characteristics. Therefore, the factors of diversity, as well as those of variability, constitute the background against which the problems of government finance should be examined. Since these factors are vital to a consideration of the problems, there must be some preliminary account of them.

The prairie economy is “exposed” to the fluctuations characteristic of a variable climate, of extreme specialization, and of dependence upon prices determined in world markets. The contrast between an almost exclusively agricultural and an agricultural-industrial region, sheltered by a kindly federal government, is most marked. The climatic and economic instability of the West has been thoroughly studied by Professor Mackintosh in two volumes in the series “Canadian Frontiers of Settlement”. The instability reflected in variable community income is highly significant, because it is the net income “which must carry the fixed charges of both the individual enterprise and the agricultural community at large”.

By “The Social Sciences and Public Administration,” the title assigned me by Professor Clokie, I am assuming he meant “Special Teaching in the Social Science Departments of Canadian Universities for Students Contemplating the Civil Service as a Career,” which is both more definitive and (being of eight words or over) even long enough for copyright. It is to “lead off” a symposium on “Training for Public Administration,” a vasty frame of reference indeed, taking in (some might go so far as to think) a course in the great school of Practical Politics itself.

Insinuating this role upon me, Professor Clokie pointed out that I had been a long time in the Public Service, and was now a teacher in a university. It is the logic of the redoubtable Pott, Mr. Pickwick's editor-friend, on Chinese metaphysics—an impregnable logic, says Mr. Bernard Shaw. In my case, however, whilst I was undoubtedly in the Service a long time indeed, at Toronto I am only what is called a “Visiting Professor,” i.e., one who lectures merely on what he knows, and can be let out at any time. Moreover, that new flower, the Course in Public Administration, which (again in the search for the particular) seems to represent a fortiori the “special teaching” aforesaid, was unknown in my generation as a student, and late-blooming in my generation as a civil servant. But one must not let one's style be cramped, and today therefore I take it as a sort of text, if only in the grand manner to which educationally speaking so old-fashioned a civil servant is accustomed.

In the nineteenth century, the dominant theory of the state restricted the latter's activity to external and domestic defence and the provision of an adequate law of contract by reference to which disputes between individuals could be settled. The theory, however, never represented much more than an ideal. In the twentieth century, it became necessary to abandon even the ideal. Already, before the turn of the century, technological progress had created problems which could be solved only by state action. The demand of organized labour for a measure of security and improved working conditions produced others. Still others resulted from the concentration of capital and mass production. These and other factors forced the state to intervene in spheres which had been traditionally reserved for private enterprise. With the war came even greater problems; and the state became more and more involved. In 1918, a vain effort was made in some countries to return to “normal” conditions; but for the most part the evolution continued unabated though not always in the same tempo or in the same angle of direction. In a few states it produced collectivism, in others a “new deal,” in others fascism; but in none did laissez-faire survive.

There is a popular impression that the contemporary family has lost that position of dominance which it held in the days of our forefathers. Many have come to regard the family as an institution with a great and historic past but with a dark and uncertain future. Meyer F. Nimkoff has assembled some of the evidence in support of this position. “Some students,” he writes, “think they see the eventual demise of the family in the growing restlessness of large numbers of people over the limitations of conventional family life.” He draws attention to the trend towards unconventional sex arrangements as revealed in recent studies of sexual phenomena, to changing public opinion as shown in the changed attitudes towards the family of representative modern novelists, to statements concerning the evolutionary supersession of the family made by scholars such as Müller-Lyer, to increase of childlessness, and to the possibilities of ectogenesis. Though of qualified significance, he might have cited statistics on divorce.

Whatever may be regarded as the immediate motives which impelled the Price Spreads investigation it will be generally agreed that a careful examination of the Canadian economy as a whole is long overdue, and that present conditions and current trends require the formulation of intelligent and co-ordinated economic policies. We are now in the sixth year of a major industrial depression and, while there has been a substantial measure of recovery from the low points of 1933, there is no clear indication of continued improvement and there is at least a possibility of the crumbling of the statistical ledge to which we have been rather precariously and nervously clinging for the past twelve months. Canada, with its large measure of dependence on the exports of two or three staple products, has always been in a vulnerable position, but this has been greatly accentuated by the widespread trend towards economic nationalism and self-sufficiency. Our professional optimists to the contrary, Canada has been one of the heaviest sufferers during the past five years and the outlook for the future is still uncertain and still threatening.

It is not necessary to elaborate the familiar problems of the Canadian economy: an income that fluctuates violently with the volume and value of our exports, and expenses that are made highly rigid by the dominating factors of heavy overhead costs; the wide differences in the technological problems of the several major industries; the concentration of staple industries in specialized geographical areas and the growing political and cultural domination of metropolitan centres which accentuate political and economic sectionalism, and at the same time a high degree of concentration of the control of finance, commerce, and manufacturing on a national scale—a concentration to which it is difficult to apply social regulation and control within the present framework of the British North America Act.

In the Spring of 1951, after more than three years of planning, the organized leadership of the Canadian co-operative movement made a determined effort to persuade the Government of Canada to support before Parliament a bill to incorporate a national co-operative credit society–a national co-operative central bank. While this attempt did not succeed, the co-operative leaders, far from abandoning the proposal, intensified their efforts to secure this incorporation, and a campaign is being conducted throughout the country. In this article an examination will be made of the central co-operative credit societies now existing in the different provinces of Canada; their economic function will be considered and elements of strength and weakness found in them will be analysed. While the emphasis will centre on the provincial units, certain observations on the proposed national co-operative credit society will also be made.

The principles of co-operative banking can be derived from observation of existing institutions. During the 1930's well-developed systems of co-operative credit were operating in almost every civilized country in the world. While these banking systems professed a certain similarity of purpose, embracing such characteristics as non-profit operation, low interest rates to borrowers, the accumulation of funds for the development of co-operatives, and the like, they exhibited a wide variety of organizational structures. Some of these societies served only co-operatives, while others dealt with the general public; some served only credit societies, others all types of co-operatives; some were primarily systems of agricultural credit, while others served urban tradesmen and producers; some operated under the aegis of the state while others were independent of state aid; some practised open membership, while others accepted as members only certain racial or religious segments of the population. Thus the problem of classification of co-operative banking systems is a difficult one.

From an early date Canada has been on an export basis in respect of dairy products considered as a group. From Confederation until the early years of the present century, expansion of production was to a large extent dependent upon the expansion of export markets. The extent of this dependence is indicated by the figures showing the exports of cheese and butter which, in the period in question, were the only dairy products exported. In the case of cheese, exports mounted steadily from 6,141,570 pounds in 1868 to the high point of 233,980,716 pounds in 1904. As for butter the amount exported, while somewhat irregular, was on the whole very considerable and in the later years of the period became extremely large. In 1868 exports of butter amounted to 10,649,733 pounds, whereas in each of the two high years, 1903 and 1906, they exceeded 34 million pounds. Since the latest years mentioned above, however, exports of both cheese and butter have tended decidedly downward. From the high point reached in 1904, cheese exports have fallen until for the year ending March 31, 1935, they were only 60,213,000 pounds. The amount of butter exported has varied widely but in only three different years since 1906 have exports exceeded 20 million pounds and in most years they have been well under 10 million pounds. In several years they have been from one to two million pounds and in the year ended March 31 last they fell to the record low level of 446,600 pounds.

The purpose of this paper is to suggest the close relationship between economic development and movements of moral reform in Canada. From the beginning of Canadian history, organized attempts have been made to control such problems as intemperance, crime, gambling, juvenile delinquency, sexual promiscuity, and prostitution. These movements were indicative of a condition of disintegration of the mores, and their role was that of establishing a new moral code to govern behaviour. But disturbances which resulted in the breakdown of moral standards extended throughout the range of society, and affected the organization of economic and political life as well. Movements of moral reform, like those of an economic or political (or purely religious or cultural) character, were products of economic expansion.

This fact becomes evident if consideration is given to the broad features of the social development of Canada. Beginning with the establishment of the fishing industry in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, Canadian development may be represented in terms of a series of stages marked by the emergence of new areas or forms of economic exploitation. The expansion of economic life involved new accommodations in economic, political, and social institutions, and the points of greatest social disturbance were to be found where the impacts of the new techniques of production were most felt. It was within these interstitial areas of social organization, where the traditional culture came in conflict with new economic developments, that movements of reform took their rise.

Only in Prince Edward Island have voters tended to elect provincial administrations of the same party stripe as the federal government. The authorargues that this has not occurred purely by chance and that, in fact, provincial campaigns have historically revolved around the issue of being “in line” with Ottawa. Presently, support for federal-provincial partisan congruence is rooted in those Islanders who can be characterized as “political animals” as well as in the dominant groups of the Island's social structure. The author concludes that the deviating provincial election of 1982 does not represent a fundamental change in the Islanders’ political orientations.