1 Although a net importer of fuel oil, the overall trade surplus in energy products inCanada is almost $9 billion. In mining, Canada is the world's largest exporter ofminerals; some 80 per cent of Canadian production is sold outside the country. Foragood summary of the place of natural resources in the economy, see the RoyalCommission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada, Report, Vol. 2 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1985). 465–503.Google Scholar Especiallyuseful is Wilkinson, B., “Canada's Resource Industries: A Survey,” in Canada's Resource Industries and Water Export Policy, vol. 14Google Scholar of the studies prepared for theRoyal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985).

2 Although the new Charter of Rights and Freedoms may also have some eventual effecton the resource industry, section 92A can be expected to be the main agent of anysignificant impact. For potential implications of the charter on natural resources, see Lucas, A. R., “Natural Resources and the Constitution.” Resources: The Newsletterof the Canadian Institute of Resources Law (September 1982).Google Scholar and Ballem, J. B.. “Oiland Gas Under the New Constitution,” Canadian Bar Review 61 (1983). 556–58Google Scholar

3 For this distinction between legal and political effects, see Peter Russell. “The Supreme Court and Federal-Provincial Relations,”Canadian Public Policy 11 (1985), 161–70.CrossRefGoogle Scholar See also Smiley, D. V., Canada in Question: Federalism in the Eighties (3rd ed.; Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1980), chap. 2.Google Scholar

4 For a description of the early phases of energy policy, see, for example, McDougall, John, Fuels and the National Policy (Toronto: Butterworths. 1982):Google ScholarDoern, G. Bruce and Toner, Glen. The Politics of Energy (Toronto: Methuen, 1985).Google Scholar chaps. 3, 4, 5; and Nelles, H. V., “Canadian Energy Policy, 1945–1945: A Federalist Perspective.” in Carty, R. Kenneth and Ward, W. Peter (eds.). Entering the Eighties (Toronto: Oxford University Press. 1980). 91–119.Google Scholar For mineral policy, see MacDonald, W.. Constitutional Change and the Mining Industry (Kingston: Centre for Resources Studies. Queen's University. 1980):Google ScholarPatton, D.. “The Evolution of Canadian Federal Mineral Policies” in Beigie, Carl E. and Hero, Alfred O. (eds.). Natural Resources in U.S.-Canadian Relations (Boulder: Westview Press. 1979). 203–46.Google Scholar

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8 See Thring, David, “Alberta, Oil and the Constitution,” Alberta Law Review 17 (1970), 70.Google Scholar

9 See Lucas, A. and McDougall, Ian, “Petroleum and National Gas and Constitutional Change,” in Beck, S. M. and Bernier, Ivan (eds.), Canada and the New Constitution (Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1983), vol. 2, 27Google Scholar; and McDougall, John, “Natural Resources and National Politics: A Look at Three Canadian Resource Industries,” in The Politics of Economic Policy, vol. 40Google Scholar of the studies prepared for the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985).

10 See Helliwell, John, “Canadian Energy Policy,” Annual Review of Energy (1979), 175–229Google Scholar, and Hunt, A. D. and Toombs, R. B., “Canadian Energy Policy and Federalism: A Background Paper,” in Thur, L. (ed.), Energy Policy and Federalism (Toronto: The Institute for Public Administration, 1981), 53–96.Google Scholar

11 See Yudelman, David, Canadian Mineral Policy Past and Present: The Ambiguous Legacy (Kingston: Centre for Resource Studies, 1985).Google Scholar

12 See Courchene, Thomas J. and Melvin, J.. “Energy Revenues Consequences for the Rest of Canada.” Canadian Public Policy 6 (1980)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, special supplement. 192–192.

13 Norrie, Ken. “Energy, Canadian Federalism and the West,” Piihlius 14(1984), 83–84.Google Scholar

14 Although Quebec is a large consumer of petroleum and does not produce its own oil to speak of, it did not join with Ontario. Quebec supported the western provinces“ demands for control over their resources. On the two different models of development, see Simeon, Richard, “Natural Resource Revenues and Canadian Federalism: A Survey of Issues,” Canadian Public Policy 5 (1980), 182–91:CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Ken Norrie, “Natural Resources, Economic Development and U.S.-Canadian Relations: A Western Canadian Perspective,” in Beigie, and Hero, (eds.). Natural Resources in U.S.-Canadian Relations. 289–92.Google Scholar See also. Pratt, Larry, “Energy, Roots of National Policy,” Studies in Political Economy 7 (1982), 27–60.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

15 Courchene, Thomas J.. “Energy and Equalization,” in Energy Policies for the 1980s(Toronto: Ontario Economic Council. 1980). 118–20.Google Scholar In the 1982–1982 arrangements the formula has changed. It is based on a representative average standard. This standard is determined by the average per capita yield for five provinces (BC, Manitoba, Ontario, Quebec and Saskatchewan). Obviously the equalization payments from natural resource revenue sources will be much smaller because Alberta revenues are excluded from the standard. See David Perry, “The Federal-Provincial Fiscal Arrangements for 1982–1982,” Canadian Tax Journal 20 (1983), 30–47.Google Scholar

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18 ForananalysisoftheNEPsee Dobson, W., The National Energy Program (Montreal: C. D. Howe Institute. 1980)Google Scholar, and Doern, and Toner, , The Politics of Energy;Google Scholar see also Carmichael, E. and Stewart, J., Lessons From the National Energy Program (Toronto: C. D. Howe Institute, 1983).Google Scholar

19 See, for example, Eric Keirans, Natural Resource Policy in Manitoba (Report to Manitoba Secretariat of Cabinet, Winnipeg, 1973). On the changes in public perceptions, see D. V. Smiley, “The Political Context of Resource Development in Canada,” in Scott, Anthony (ed.), Natural Resource Revenues: A Test of Federalism (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1976), 61–72.Google Scholar

20 Chandler, Marsha A., “The Politics of Provincial Resource Policy,” in Atkinson, Michael M. and Chandler, Marsha A. (eds.), The Politics of Canadian Policy (Toronto:University of Toronto Press, 1983), 43–68.Google Scholar Some provinces like Alberta, raised royalty rates; others, like Manitoba, instituted new forms of revenue collection like the super royalty. In each case the object was to give provinces a share in the economic rents that would have gone to the industry. Within the provinces there was also a greater appreciation of many of the social costs of resource development including: building infrastructure, the vulnerability to boom-and-bust cycles of one-industry mining towns, and environmental damage. On the tax battles, see Brown, R.. “The Fight Over Resource Profits,” Canadian Tax Journal 19 (1974). 315–31.Google Scholar On provincial management strategies, see for example, Richards and Pratt, Prairie Capitalism. chaps. 7, 8, 9, 10; and various studies of the Queen's University Centre for Resource Studies, including Ron Murray, Provincial Mineral Policies: Saskatchewan 1944–1944 (1978), and Owen, B. and Kops, W., The Impact of Policy Changes oii Decisions in the Mineral Industry (1979).Google Scholar

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24 See Simeon, Richard, “Fiscal Federalism in Canada-A Review Essay,” Canadian Tax Journal 29 (1982), 41–51Google Scholar. See also Berry, G., “The Oil Lobby and the Energy Crisis,” Canadian Public Administration 17 (1974), 600–35.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

25 Carmichael and Stewart, Lessons from the National Energy Program, 44–44; see also Doern and Toner, The Politics of Energy, chap. 6.

26 Foran analysis that indicates the costs to various groups, see Helliwell, J. F. and McRae, R. N., “Resolving the Energy Conflict: From National Energy Program to the Energy Agreements,” Canadian Public Policy 8 (1982), 14–23.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

27 Each of these important cases has received a good deal of attention. See Arne Paus-Jenssen, “Resource Taxation and the Supreme Court of Canada: The CIGOL Case,“ Canadian Public Policy 5 (1979), 45–58:CrossRefGoogle ScholarBushnell, S.. ”The Control of Natural Resources Through the Trade and Commerce Power and Proprietary Rights.” Canadian Public Policy 6 (1980). 313–24:CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Moull, W. D.. “Natural Resources: The Other Crisis in Canadian Federalism.” Osgoode Hall Law Journal 18 (1980). 1–48.Google Scholar

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29 Weiler, Paul, In the Last Resort (Toronto: Carswell Methuen, 1974). 164.Google Scholar

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31 The CCMC, made up of federal and provincial ministers of justice and intergovernmental affairs, was charged with preparing draft amendments for a second constitutional conference in 1979.

32 See Meekison, J. Peter and Romanow, Roy J., '“Western Advocacy and Section 92A of the Constitution,”Google Scholar in Meekison, J.Peter, Moull, William D. and Romanow, Roy J.. The Origin and Meaning of Section 92 A(Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1985), 15.Google Scholar

33 The object here is to provide a summary of the key legal changes in resource powers. For a detailed legal exegesis of 92A, see William. Moull, “Section 92A of the Constitution Act. 1867.” Canadian Bar Review 61 (1983), 715–34;Google Scholar and Moull, William D., “The Legal Effect of the Resource Amendment-What's New in Section 92A,”Google Scholar in Meekison, Moull. and Romanow, Origin and Meaning of Section 92A. I am indebted to Professor Moull for his assistance.

34 See Ballem, “Oil and Gas Under the New Constitution,” 551.

35 Russell, Peter, “The Supreme Court and Federal-Provincial Relations: The Political Use of Legal Resources,” Canadian Public Policy 11 (1985), 162.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

36 Lucas, and McDougall, . “Petroleum and Natural Gas.”Google Scholar

37 See Prichard, J. R. S., “Securing the Canadian Economic Union: Federalism and International Barriers to Trade,”Google Scholar in Trebilcock, Michael J., Prichard, J. Robert S., Courchene, Thomas J., and Whalley, John. Federalism awl tlw Canadian Economic Union (Toronto: Ontario Economic Council. 1983). 3–51.Google Scholar

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39 Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada, Report, Vol. 3, 442.Google Scholar

40 See Ballem, Oil and Gas Under the New Constitution, 553.

41 Ibid., 556.

42 Reference Re the Offshore Mineral Rights of British Columbia [1967] S.C.R. 792, and Reference Re Property In and Legislative Jurisdiction Over the Seabed and Subsoil of the Continental Shelf Offshore Newfoundland [1984] S.C.R. 86.

43 See Thring, “Alberta, Oil and the Constitution,” 81–81.

44 See Meekison and Romanow, “Western Advocacy and Section 92A of the Constitution.”

45 Norrie points out that through much of the 1970s the federal government's view of nation-building was in fact a view that sought to preserve central Canadian dominance rather than to promote wealth-inducing regional and sectoral shifts of resources (“Energy, Canadian Federation and the West”).

46 See Toner, Glen and Bregha, F., “The Political Economy of Energy.” in M. S. Whittington and Glen Williams, Canadian Politics in the 1980s (Toronto: Methuen, 1981), 22–23.Google Scholar

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49 Dupré, J. S., “Reflections on the Workability of Executive Federalism,” Intergovernmental Relations, vol. 63Google Scholar of the study prepared for the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects forCanada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985).

50 Bushnell, S. l., “Control of Natural Resources,” Canadian Public Policy 61 (1980), 313–24.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

51 Prichard, J. R. S. (ed.), Crown Corporations in Canada (Toronto: Butterworths, 1983);Google ScholarTupper, Allan and Doern, G. Bruce (eds.), Public Corporations and Public Policy in Canada (Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1981):Google Scholar and Gordon, Marsha, The State in Business (Montreal: C. D. Howe Institute, 1981).Google Scholar

52 On the question of the reach of section 125, see Whyte, John. The Constitution and Natural Resources (Kingston: Institute of Intergovernmental Relations. 1982)Google Scholar. Huffman, K., Langford, J. and Neilson, W. argue that the tax immunity for crown corporations derives from the Federal Income Tax Act. section I49(l)(d)Google Scholar, and that the meaning of the constitutional provision is an unresolved question. See “Public Enterprise and Federalism in Canada,” in Intergovernmental Relations, vol. 63.Google Scholar study prepared for the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985).

53 Rowland Harrison. “Natural Resources and the Constitution: Some Recent Developments and their Implication for Future Regulations of the Resource Industry,” Alberta Law Review 18 (1980), 1–21.Google Scholar