Although the English tradition of analytical economics was established at least as long ago as the publication of David Ricardo's Principles in 1817, doubt has never ceased to exist concerning the fruitfulness of abstract and deductive methods in economics. Indeed, although the significant advances made since Ricardo's day were the products of men following closely the theoretical tradition, this doubt has increased rather than lessened. While the established methods weathered the attacks of the historical school during the latter part of the nineteenth century, they were severely shaken by the fundamental questionings of Thorstein Veblen. No one has emerged in our day as a true inheritor of the Veblenian mantle, but the institutionalist school of economics, which acknowledges him as its source of inspiration, is undeniably a very serious critic of orthodox economic theorizing.

This paper stems in part from the most recent controversy on the methods and conclusions of economic theory. It attempts to meet the sense of dissatisfaction with which I read the arguments of both attackers and defenders. Perhaps also the fact that during the past few years I have frequently been asked embarrassing questions by students may have something to do with my interest in this problem. I am surely not the only person who has had to contend with the remark that “it looks all right in theory but how does it work out in fact?” For some time now I have been either a consumer or a purveyor of economic theory and I feel motivated to demonstrate (at least to myself) that the activity constitutes productive labour. If that has given this paper the character of rationalization, I hope that it will not be one that cannot be put to good professional service.

The subject which I have chosen is not one that it is possible to discuss adequately, much less exhaust, in a short paper. I believe, however, that it is fast becoming one of the major fundamental problems of democracies. With a world-wide challenge confronting democratic institutions, no one can feel complacent about our political future in the broad sense, and no amount of wishful or traditional thinking will replace serious reconsideration of some aspects of government as we understand it.

It might be appropriate to start with a few definitions. It is relatively easy to find a comprehensive definition of the term “public administration.” A former president of the United States, some fifty years ago, defined it as “a detailed and systematic execution of public law.” Leonard D. White, in his book Introduction to the Study of Public Administration, writes: “In its broadest sense, public administration consists of all those operations having for their purpose the fulfillment or enforcement of public policy, as declared by the competent authorities.”

It is not so easy, however, to obtain agreement as to what exactly represents public interest as applied to public administration. In a democracy, the public must reach wide agreement on the duties to be performed by government; or in other words, the objectives of public policy must correspond fairly well with public views concerning the proper functions which should belong to governmental activity. Otherwise the efficient administration of these functions becomes almost a practical impossibility. But the word public is difficult to encompass in a restrictive definition. It is composed of individuals, groups, institutions with different ideals, philosophies, and interests. Consequently, public interest must necessarily represent a working compromise and be subject to continuous redefinition, as need arises, in the process of achieving an often delicate balance among conflicting interests.

Canada's recent return to a pegged exchange rate marks the end of a highly interesting experiment in international economic policy and the end of an era in the history of the Canadian balance of payments. It is now appropriate, therefore, to look backwards and to examine the effects of changes in the balance of payments on the Canadian economy during the period in which the value of the Canadian dollar was allowed to fluctuate freely. Only a very narrow aspect of the problem is examined in this paper, namely, the effect of the large long-term capital inflow of the 1950s on the Canadian business cycle. This problem is interesting not only for its own sake, but also because the cyclical effect of a capital inflow is extremely important in determining whether the borrowing country achieves its potential or required growth rate.

If, for our purposes, we define the potential supply of goods and services available to an economy as domestic production at full employment plus imports minus exports, a capital inflow increases that supply by bidding up the value of the Canadian dollar until sufficient upward pressure on imports and downward pressure on exports is imposed to transfer the capital inflow in real terms. This increase in supply implies that planned aggregate expenditures in Canada can increase without exerting inflationary pressures on the economy. A capital inflow allows a higher level of investment expenditure and this raises the potential rate of growth of the productive capacity of the economy.

The expansion of the Niagara Peninsula has occurred with its advance from a frontier of conflict to one of contact. Lying at the western extremity of the Hudson-Mohawk, that “greatest of all routes of continental migration,” it forms a major land bridge from New York to Ontario, and exerts the same attraction today, when it has become one of the chief international regions linking Canada with the United States, as it did in the mid-nineteenth century, when it formed part of the great overland route drawing immigrants to the West, or even earlier, when it was itself a pioneer zone. At the same time it is a prime water link between west and east, and, being used both by American and Canadian, has helped to bring them together, first in the commercialization of the St. Lawrence, and later in its industrialization. As a result it is one of the few districts of Canada able to show a continued native growth, together with a “pull on the northern margins of the neighbouring states at all comparable to that of the numerous urban and industrial regions of the United States.”

Thanks to these advantages, its population has increased fifteen times in the last 120 years, with an expansion in recent decades only exceeded by that of the early pioneer influx (see Figure 1). Its problems, therefore, are associated with growth, and with the attempts to work out a series of integrations with each new stage of development, in order to preserve equilibrium in expansion, and create new organizations of settlement and society. Its chequered history, especially as represented in the urban centre, has shown the varying success with which these issues have been met.

The presence in Canada of substantial minorities of Oriental race interests us both as citizens and as social scientists. Even those who believe that the task of good citizenship has been made harder by immigration from Asia must recognize that the interest of Canada to the social scientist has been enhanced.

The racial minorities are three in number and are very unequal in importance. There are about 25,000 persons of Japanese race in Canada, of whom 23,000 live in the province of British Columbia. The Chinese are somewhat more numerous in Canada, although there are only 21,769 in British Columbia. There are very few East Indians and it is significant that the Special Committee on Orientals in British Columbia which reported in December, 1940, treated “Orientals” and “Persons of Japanese and Chinese racial origins” as interchangeable terms.

The figures cited concern race (as determined by paternal descent) and do not indicate nationality or culture. Of the 23,000 persons of Japanese race in Canada approximately 2,400 are naturalized Canadians, and 13,400 Canadians by birth. This leaves an alien group of 7,200 but it must not be overlooked that many of those who are Canadians by birth may claim Japanese nationality by descent, or may have Japanese nationality imposed upon them because their parents have registered their births at the consulates. It is probable that almost all the Canadian-born are more Canadian than Japanese in culture, and this is true of some of the immigrants from Japan who entered Canada at early ages. Not many Chinese are Canadian either by birth or naturalization. For the former the figure is 900, for the latter 200. Of the East Indians probably none are aliens.

This article puts three discourses about resistance and violence, coming from two distinct settler colonial contexts, in conversation, to highlight a distinctive theory of change associated with contemporary Indigenous movements. The first, from South Africa, can be seen in the writings of Nelson Mandela. It offers a dialectical view of resistance, where the oppressor sets the terms of the confrontation and where violence is allowable in the pursuit of change. The second discourse can be seen in the writings of James Tully and offers a theoretical bridge between the first and the third. It focuses on civic citizenship as a nonviolent engagement with terms of governance. The third can be seen in the writings of Indigenous theorists whose work focuses on resurgence. It offers a disjunctive theory of change that centres transgression and prefigurative practices. The conclusion of the article braids these discourses to discuss how they both converge and diverge.

Do international reputations matter and are they transferable from one context to another? These critically important questions continue to frame policy debates surrounding US responses to crises in Syria and Ukraine. For skeptics, past actions and reputations for resolve have no bearing on an adversary's assessment of US credibility; relative “power” and “interests” explain behaviour (Hopf, 1994; Mercer, 1996; Press, 2005; Walt, 2013; Zakaria 2013). We argue that scholars who dismiss the relevance of reputations typically sidestep important questions about how adversaries actually acquire relevant information about US interests and power. Building on an extensive collection of qualitative and quantitative studies of US deterrence encounters in asymmetric conflicts over the last two decades, we argue that lessons from past actions inform an adversary's interpretation of US interests in any given case and provide crucial information about Washington's willingness to deploy military force (capabilities). By implication, lessons learned from Bosnia 1992–1995 informed actions in Kosovo 1999, which, in turn, informed subsequent assessments of US interests and commitments in Iraq 1991, 1998 and 2003. Similarly, lessons about US reputations and credibility in Iraq from 1991 to 2003 were critically important to successful WMD diplomacy in Syria. Policy implications are addressed in the conclusion.

No one can delineate the precise state of affairs likely to prevail at the conclusion of the present world conflict. The drama is too kaleidoscopic, too much is hidden in the wings, and the number of acts is uncertain. The best that one can hope for is to distinguish the main threads of the unfolding mystery and to guess the probable position of the dramatis personae at the final curtain. Yet a few things are becoming increasingly apparent.

From facts already before our eyes it is clear that economic rehabilitation and reconstruction on a grand scale will be necessary before life can begin to function again in many parts of the world. Moreover economic reconstruction will be something more than the distribution of “K” rations and bowls of soup to the undernourished peoples of Europe and Asia. The physical destruction of factories, industrial plants, railways, harbours, gas and electric works, and all the rest of the means of production by which civilized peoples provide themselves a living, of course will have to be made good. Yet this is not all. Much of the world's population—in south-eastern Europe, in China, in India—subsisted at an almost unbelievably low standard of living even before the war began. To tender these peoples no better prospect than a return to the miserable pittance that was theirs before the war would not augur well for world peace and order, nor make more than a hollow mockery of the solemn promises of the United Nations. Their standards of living cannot be raised by driblets of charity and pious good wishes, but only by making available to them the capital instruments by which they themselves can raise their per capita productivity and hence their material welfare. The task of relief, rehabilitation, reconstruction, and development that will confront the world at the war's end promises to exceed anything of a similar nature that has ever been undertaken. Yet it is a task which lies inevitably before the world and one for which the penalties of inept handling are certainly severe and possibly disastrous.