The signing of the Nis[vBar ]ga'a Final Agreement in August of 1998 was an event of singular importance in the history of “First Nations relations” in Canada. It marked the completion of the first treaty negotiations in British Columbia in the twentieth century and will soon be followed by many others as nearly province–wide negotiations redefine the relationship between First Nations, the province and Canada. Given a political climate hostile to Aboriginal rights, the treaty is a significant achievement and deserves the support of fair–minded Canadians. It certainly does not “give too much” to the Nis[vBar ]ga'a Nation as its critics in the Liberal and Reform parties of British Columbia frequently assert.

It is widely recognized that the traditional institutions and processes of Canadian politics, such as executive federalism, elite accommodation and brokerage parties have fallen into disrepute with large sections of the Canadian public, and political scientists have noted their failure to resolve long–standing conflicts in the area of constitutional politics. I argue that the reasons why these processes have failed to manage constitutional political conflict have not been properly diagnosed. In particular, Canadian political scientists have not adequately differentiated executive federalism from accommodation and brokerage, often assuming they are contingent on each other (as they are, by definition, in the commonly used expression “elite accommodation”). The pessimism among some Canadian political scientists about Canada's ability to amend the Constitution to the satisfaction of major groups stems in large part from the misplaced assumption that the brokerage and accommodation necessary in Canada require executive federalism. This conventional wisdom suggests that since executive federalism is discredited and has been replaced by a populist requirement for citizen participation, usually through referendums, shuns accomodation in favour of a mojoritarianism which is unable to deal adequately with the problems of a multinational federation like Canada.

Adam Smith argued that division of labour was the basis of wealth: the greater the division of labour the greater the wealth. He also held that the extent of the division of labour was determined by the opportunity to exchange, or by the size of the market. Although Smith understood market exchange to be constrained by distance and natural impediments, he insisted that public policy should not add additional artificial obstacles to market exchange. Thus, in general, he argued that governments should be committed to “free trade.”

Traditionally, Canadian commentary on the Judicial Committee has focused on the effect or impact of the imperial tribunal's decisions on the nature of Canadian federalism. Numerous studies have examined the issue of whether or not the Judicial Committee strengthened the powers of provincial governments at the expense of the federal government by misinterpreting the Constitution Act, 1867 and by ignoring the intentions of the fathers of Confederation who sought to create a strong centralized government. The Canadian preoccupation with the merits of this debate has led one distinguished political scientist, David E. Smith, to suggest that “perhaps too much” has been written about the Judicial Committee. The literature examining the relationship between the Judicial Committee and Canada has not, however, addressed the significance of the imperial context in which the tribunal's decisions were written. The Judicial Committee was not only the final appellate body for Canada but was also responsible for hearing disputes from other parts of the Empire. Decisions written for one Dominion or colony could have profound legal and political effects on another.

Le développement et l'institutionnalisation de la statistique sociale sont intimement liés à l'État. En effet, trés tôt dans l'histoire de l'État moderne, celui–ci devint un important patron de la production statistique et l'État est aujourd'hui un producteur direct de statistiques via ses organismes nationaux. Quels facteurs ont bien pu motiver les gouvernements à investir le champ de la mesure de la société?

In The Clash of Rights, Paul. M . Sniderman, Joseph Fletcher, Peter Russell and Philip Tetlock have challenged the orthodox view of “democratic elitism” and “value consensus” with respect to support for civil rights and liberties. Based on analysis of Canadian attitudes toward the 1982 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Sniderman et al, found that support for rights claims varied more among elites than between elites and masses. They extend this finding to a hypothesis that competing political elites are prone to exploit disagreement over rights issues for purposes of partisan electoral advantage. They find that the Conservative officeholders are typically less supportive of rights claims, while New Democratic party and Parti Québécois legislators tend to be more supportive. On most issues, the Liberals are (surprise!) in between. These findings lead to conclusions such as “the issue of bilingualism is political, not social.” More generally, Sniderman and his colleagues suggest that there is broad, evenly distributed support for rights among the Canadian public, and that conflict over rights is largely attributable to partisan competition among political leaders.

Recensions / Reviews