The cybernetic approach used here rests on the concept of the feedback loop. In contrast to the classical models of political science, the perspective adopted here is not oriented toward the construction of a taxonomy, but toward a more advanced formulation of interaction among the elements of a given system. The analysis develops around eight main principal problems: location; information-consultation; institutional constraints; ecology; agriculture; the economy; health; and the controlling agency. Each of these problems is treated as a sub-system of a model which constitutes a simplified replica of the problems which the participants confronted.

The major empirical results of this research are as follows: (1) as expected, the various actors did not pursue the same kinds of regulations; (2) contrary to what one might have expected, the perception of the position of Hydro-Quebec articulated by the groups which contested the project did not question the desired impacts of the state agency; (3) contrary to what one might have anticipated, the contesting groups anticipated effects which were opposite to those expected by Hydro for most of the options considered in the analysis; (4) contrary to an intuitive expectation, the conflict of perceptions between Hydro and the opposition groups did not reach maximum intensity on environmental questions; (5) the positions advanced by the opposing groups did not differ radically from positions taken by Hydro—again contrary to expectations; (6) the interconnections of sub-systems may lead to undesirable consequences, contrary to those one might have anticipated intuitively; (7) the behaviour of the global system is less dependent upon the regulation of sub-systems than upon the network of connections among the sub-systems.

This article first presents a brief survey of the role and functions filled by the personal aide (chef de cabinet) of a minister in Quebec. The analysis continues, in a comparative perspective, by tracing a sociological and professional portrait of the Liberal“chefs de cabinet” in April 1976 and their successors in the pequiste government in July 1977.

We then test the hypothesis that the cleavage between the government and the dominant economic forces has increased since November 15, 1976 as a result of the ideology articulated by the“chefs de cabinet” regarding the social and economic aims of the state. This hypothesis was confirmed.

The hypothesis that the pequiste“chefs de cabinet” exercise a more pronounced influence on the decision-making process is also confirmed. Nevertheless, one cannot argue that the pequiste“chefs de cabinet” usurped the power of the legislators; their influence is more political than technocratic. The growing influence of the pequiste“chefs de cabinet” neverthelsss helps to accentuate the tensions and conflicts between the higher civil service and the ministerial aides.

Bien qu'il ait reçu l'attention de certains spécialistes, le phénomène de la participation politique au Canada est loin d'avoir été abordé sous tous ses aspects. Certains types de participation politique tels que la participation électorale ou le militantisme politique ont fait l'objet d'études récentes tandis que d'autres types n'ont, pour des raisons diverses, que peu retenu l'attention du monde universitaire. Il en est ainsi, par exemple, de cette forme de participation politique que constituent les contributions monétaires versées aux partis politiques. L'absence d'études canadiennes portant sur la motivation des dons aux partis politiques est d'autant plus étonnante qu'il s'agit là d'une forme de participation dont l'importance n'a, si l'on en juge par les dispositions contenues tant dans la Loi électorale du Canada que dans les diverses lois électorales provinciales, pas échappé au législateur.