In recent decades, the field of comparative politics generally has retreated from grand explanatory models and narrowed its scope and research ambitions (Katznelson, 1997; Lichbach, 1997). This is particularly evident in the structural–historical approach as well as in the increasingly influential rational choice and postmodern approaches to comparative research (Kohli et al., 1995: 2; Lijphart, 1970: 682–93; Skocpol and Summers, 1980: 174–97). The 1995 World Politics Symposium, at which leading comparativists gathered to discuss “The Role of Theory in Comparative Politics” was clear evidence of this trend. Many analysts deemed the construction of theory, or the “messy centre” in comparative politics, problematic and some realized the attractiveness of alternative approaches (Kohli et al., 1995). As Katznelson noted of recent comparative scholarship, “compared to the work of their predecessors… scholars in comparative politics have shortened their time horizons, contracted their regime questions, and narrowed the range of considered outcomes” (Katznelson, 1997).

L'étude des idées politiques est, malgré l'apparente floraison des approches, d'une homogénéité étonnante. La raison m'en semble être l'incapacité générale des formes de pensée dominantes de dépasser la distinction théorique entre le monde-langage et le “monde-monde”. Que l'on se tourne vers l'exégèse développée par Leo Strauss, vers les différentes versions contemporaines du matérialisme et de la sociocritique, ou vers les théories de moyenne portée à la Quentin Skinner ou à la Pierre Bourdieu, une constante se révèle: les “idées” et la “réalité” sont deux choses bien distinctes, et nul n'oserait se pencher sur les phénomènes de la vie politique sans l'arme cognitive que constitue cette distinction. L'incapacité théorique de dépasser cette dernière, telle est l'intuition à la base de ce texte, est liée à une méconnaissance des idées politiques comme phénomène humain. Avant de donner le détail de cette intuition et d'indiquer le plan de son exploration théorique, il faut définir les notions qui seront ici mises en oeuvre.

At the time of the decision to negotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), advocates argued that closer integration with Canada and the United States would have a democratizing influence on Mexico's political regime (Baer and Weintraub, 1994: 174–79; Pastor, 1993: 67). Critics of the deal suggested just the opposite, insisting that NAFTA might perpetuate or even reinvigorate authoritarian rule (Aguilar Zinser, 1993: 203–15; Castañeda 1996). With the breakthrough elections of July 2000 and the transfer of executive power to an opposition party the — PAN, or National Action Party — it is timely to ask: were the advocates of NAFTA right all along? Was NAFTA the impetus for Mexico's long overdue transition to democracy?

In this article I critically assess the globalist position which claims that the forces of globalization have fundamentally debilitated nation–states, and that the fate of progressive politics and social movements now depends on the degree and extent of international solidarity and the shaping of a transnational civil society (for example, Beck, 2000; Bronner, 1999; Brysk, 2000; Strange, 1996). Against this globalist, internationalist or cosmopolitan position, I argue that the nation–state continues to be a critical sphere for the imposition of ruling capitalist interests. Likewise, any substantial modification in the economic, political and cultural conditions of subordinate groups, communities and classes will have to be fought and won at this level. While international solidarity will always be welcome, the internationalization of politics, by itself, will not have a substantial impact on the domestic balance of forces. In fact, the main locus of politics should remain local if significant changes in the life chances of subordinate groups, communities and classes are the goal. These subordinate groups will be able to affect domestic state interventions in their favour only to the extent that they constitute themselves politically at the local level. In order to do so, their main challenge may be posited as follows: How can they extract concessions from the state without at the same time being co–opted? Facing this challenge successfully continues to require the construction of democratic organizations for struggle, an accountable leadership and grassroots participation in decision–making.

In the last decade, the political institutions and practices under which economic decisions are made have received increasing attention in the analysis of the responsibility for economic underperformance. This attention has in turn led to a questioning of the issues of conceptualization and measurement of the variables involved. While economic variables are easily conceptualized and measured, political institutional factors present some difficulty. Although the aim of a democratic system is to assure the rights and freedoms for the citizens of a polity, for those polities in transition, the processes that drive societies towards or away from higher rights and freedoms for their citizens are more important. This paper attempts to cover the following topics: first, to construct measurable variables of democratization that can be used to determine the level of democratic development in a transition polity; and second, to apply these variables to determine the level and patterns of democratization in Nigeria. Section two highlights significant past research which has measured the levels of democracy across different countries. In section three Nigeriaxi' s political history is summarized to show a polity in continuing political transition. Section four identifies relevant dimensions of democratization in a transition polity. Section five applies the dimensions to derive indices to measure the level of democratization in Nigeria. In section six the pattern of the democratization process in Nigeria is established. Section seven justifies the measures for transition polities and suggests the use to which they may be put.

The immediate post–Second World War period saw women gain equal political rights in a number of countries, including France and India. Political participation researchers began to consider women's involvement in politics. However, because they focused on state institutions and political parties as the most important sites of political participation, and because the presence of women within these sites was insignificant, the conclusions drawn were either that women were uninterested in and/or uninformed about politics or that their interest and knowledge derived from the male head of household. Moreover, when women's political participation was considered, the preferred location of study was the Western liberal democratic nation–state (Dogan, 1955; Duverger, 1955).

From the first post–independence election in 1952 until the general elections of 1989, the Indian National Congress party won a plurality of the votes and a majority of the legislative seats in every national parliamentary election except for the one that was held in 1977. Although the party maintained its dominant position in the national party system for almost four decades, starting in 1967 it gradually lost it at the subnational level. Finally, the 1989 national election brought Congress dominance to a definite end in the national party system as well. Since 1989, Congress has neither remained the consistently strongest electoral party nor has it won a parliamentary majority in any single election.

The electoral surge of the National Front (NF) in the 2002 French presidential election was unprecedented. It marked the first time that a far–right candidate reached the second round of voting in a presidential election: Jean–Marie Le Pen, leader of the NF party, passed the first round on April 21, 2002, beating 16 other candidates with 16.86 per cent of the vote against 19.88 per cent for the incumbent President Jacques Chirac (Rassemblement pour la République RPR) and 16.18 per cent for the incumbent Prime Minister Lionel Jospin (Parti Socialiste PS).