Do we need a code of conduct for politicians, or are the existing unwritten rules a sufficient safeguard against acts of political malfeasance? Based on interviews with 84 backbench MPs, this article examines politicians' informal codes of conduct. The study reveals considerable disagreement in assessments of particular acts, notably those involving conflicts of interest and constituency service. Differences among MPs are related to a number of factors including partisanship, political experience and spatial cleavages. Such divisions of opinion belie the presence of a single elite political culture of corruption and underline the need for a code of conduct to clarify and augment such unwritten rules as presently exist.

Three contrary theories of great power war are examined. The first is the common balance of power argument that parity preserves peace. The second is Organski's oft-cited alternative, “the power transition.” The third is a conflation of the first and second. Like the first, the inherent inability to measure power precisely is the basis of the conflated balance of power theory. Like the second, the conclusion is that parity encourages war. Unlike either the first or second theory, the third provides an explanation of the incidence and extent of warfare between great powers. The basic proposition tested is that nonseparated great powers fight as they approach parity in power capabilities. The evidence is from the relations between the European great powers during 1815–1939.

This article attempts to illuminate a contradiction at the heart of the notion of natural rights. Natural rights are commonly thought to be both inalienable and the property of individuals. As the right or the law is privatized as my rights, her rights, our rights or their rights, rights come to be viewed as personal properties. A distinction is made between personal possession and private property (which entails the title to alienate what is owned) in order to speak significantly of our possession of inalienable rights. For Locke, we possess an inalienable right to life and liberty precisely because we do not own our lives and liberties. Moreover, we can alienate our person, or our ability to labour, precisely because it is our private property. For Nozick, rights are individual properties. Thus, for Nozick as distinct from Marx, one has the right to sell anything (one's life, liberty, labour or soul) at the market price.

The principle of guaranteed parliamentary representation for the Maori remains a contentious feature of New Zealand's political structure. This concession originated in 1867 to solve the “Maori problem” by means consistent with the competing interests of government and Maori. But despite intrinsic drawbacks within the present system, neither Maoris nor the major political parties have initiated fundamental reforms in the design of Maori seats for fear of tampering with the status quo. Recently, with the resurgence of Maori assertiveness, developments have transpired aimed at redefining the status of separate representation. Whether or not this strategy for the political accommodation of minority groups can be transferred to other contexts—such as Canada—is open to debate.

This article explores contemporary political ideologies in English Canada, francophone Quebec and the United States using cross-national attitudinal survey data. Drawing central hypotheses from the qualitative Canadian-American political culture literature, the analysis focusses on three dimensions of political ideology—ideological polarization, the issue content of the respective lefts and rights, and ideological coherence. Evidence of distinctive national “lefts,” together with fundamental similarities in the English-Canadian and American ideological “rights” and important differences in the ideological structures of the three political cultures, call into question some conventional generalizations found in the nonquantitative literature.

In the course of arguing his case for electoral reform, John Stuart Mill proposes a criterion of government by majority which has gone largely unnoticed. Mill holds that any majority coalition of representatives in an assembly must directly represent a majority of electors. A representative directly represents those electors, and only those electors, who voted in his favour at his election. An implication of Mill's version of the principle of majority rule is that, given an assembly of any considerable size, all but a small fraction of the electorate must have direct representation.