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Whodunnit? Voters and Responsibility in Canadian Federalism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 October 2008

Fred Cutler
Fred Cutler*
Affiliation:
University of British Columbia
*
Fred Cutler, University of British Columbia, Department of Political Science, Buchanan Building C425, 1866 Main Mall, Vancouver, British Columbia, CanadaV6T 1Z1, [email protected].
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Abstract

Abstract. Government accountability in Canada depends on Canadian voters' attributing responsibility to multiple levels of government for policy outcomes. This study presents the first comprehensive account of these responsibility judgments. The data are from panel surveys of voters in Ontario and Saskatchewan as they faced provincial elections in the fall of 2003 and then the federal election of 2004. Voters were asked about conditions in a number of policy areas and then asked to separately attribute responsibility to the two senior levels of government. Voters do not strongly differentiate the governments' roles and there is little variation across issues. Attentiveness to politics only very slightly improves the quality of responsibility attributions, and only on issues where responsibility is objectively clearer. The results suggest that federalism is a major challenge for Canadian voters wishing to reward or punish their governments for policy outcomes.

Résumé. La responsabilisation gouvernementale au Canada dépend de la capacité du citoyen à différencier clairement les sphères d'activité des divers paliers de gouvernement. Cette étude offre, pour la première fois, un portrait exhaustif des mécanismes d'attribution de la responsabilité dans le système fédéral canadien. Les données sont tirées de deux enquêtes en panel réalisées durant les campagnes électorales provinciales de l'Ontario et de la Saskatchewan à l'automne 2003, puis durant la campagne fédérale de 2004. Deux aspects principaux de ces enquêtes ont été retenus pour cette étude. Tout d'abord, les répondants ont été interrogés sur leur perception de l'état des choses quant à une série d'enjeux de politique publique (économie, système de santé, et ainsi de suite). Ils ont ensuite dû attribuer la responsabilité de ces politiques aux deux paliers supérieurs de gouvernement au Canada. Il s'avère que les électeurs ne différencient que faiblement le rôle de chaque palier de gouvernement et ce, quel que soit l'enjeu. La capacité d'attribution de la responsabilité n'est que légèrement affectée par le niveau d'attention à la politique de l'électeur. Les résultats de l'analyse suggèrent que la nature fédérale du système politique canadien demeure un défi important à surmonter pour l'électeur qui désire récompenser ou punir ses gouvernements pour une politique publique donnée.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique , Volume 41 , Issue 3 , September 2008 , pp. 627 - 654
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Political Science Association 2008

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