1 Kay, Barry J., “Voting Patterns in a Non-partisan Legislature: A Study of Toronto City Council,” this JOURNAL 4 (1971), 224–42Google Scholar.

2 Wahalke, C. Wahlke, Heinz, Eulau, William, Buchanan, and Ferguson, Leroy C., The Legislative System: Explorations in Legislative Behavior (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1962), 221–23Google Scholar.

3 Kay, Barry J. and Wichem, Philip H., “Legislative Decision-Making in Two Canadian Cities: Toronto and Winnipeg Compared,” a paper presented to the annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Saskatoon, 1979Google Scholar.

4 Masson, Jack K., “Decision-Making Patterns and Floating Coalitions in an Urban City Council,” this JOURNAL 8 (1975), 128–37Google Scholar.

5 Robert, Easton and Paul, Tennant, “Vancouver Civic Party Leadership,” in Masson, Jack K. and Anderson, James D. (eds.), Emerging Party Politics in Canada (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1972), 110–23Google Scholar.

6 Paul, Tennant, “Vancouver City Council Roll-Call Analysis,” comments for the annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Edmonton, 1975Google Scholar.

7 Alan, Alexander, “The Institutional and Role Perceptions of Local Aldermen,” in Masson, and Anderson, , Emerging Party Politics in Canada, 114–40Google Scholar.

8 Higgins, Donald J. H., “Mother Stubbs and her Fourteen Alderchildren: A Short Story of a Happy Family that Fell Apart,” a paper presented to the annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Edmonton, 1975Google Scholar.

9 This particular period was selected for analysis because of the volatility in Toronto City Council membership at this time which witnessed a turnover of 11 members out of the 23-person body between the 1967–1969 and 1970–1972 terms, and a turnover of 9 members between the 1970–1972 and 1973–1974 terms. By contrast, the council terms preceding and following the period of investigation saw changes that resulted in turnovers of four members each. Moreover, since 1974 the relative factional balance on Toronto City Council has not altered substantially.

10 These data are drawn from competitive roll-call votes recorded in the City Council minutes. Competitive votes were defined as those resolved by a majority not greater than 75 per cent of those members present and voting. The 1967-n1969 term scores were based upon 187 competitive votes whose mean agreement was 51.8 per cent. The 1970–1972 term scores were based upon 540 competitive votes whose mean agreement was 51.6 per cent, and the 1973–1974 term scores were based upon 570 competitive votes whose mean agreement was 52 percent. The agreement scores were based upon 253 possible pairings of council members taken two at a time. The shorter duration of the 1973–1974 council term is attributable to a change mandated by the provincial governmen's desire to synchronize local elections in Ontario municipalities.

11 Higgins, Donald J. H., Urban Canada: Its Government and Politics (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1977), 273–80Google Scholar.

12 Ibid., 279.

13 Heinz, Eulau and Katherine, Hinckley, “Legislative Institutions and Processes,” in Robinson, James A. (ed.), Political Science Annual, Vol. 1 (Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill, 1966), 87.Google Scholar

14 David, Easton, “An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems,” World Politics 9 (1957), 383–400Google Scholar.

15 Rae, Douglas W., The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), 133–48Google Scholar.

16 Banfield, Edward C. and Wilson, James Q., City Politics (New York: Vintage Books, 1966), 89–96Google Scholar.

17 This change is documented in such works as Jon Caulfield, The Tiny Perfect Mayor (Toronto: James Lorimer and Company, 1974Google Scholar); John, , Up Against City Hall (Toronto: James, Lewis and Samuel, 1972); and Stephen Clarkson, City Lib (Toronto: A. M. Hakkert, 1972Google Scholar).

18 This discussion is shaped by the literature pertaining to the United States Supreme Court, a forum which, although not an elective legislature, functions as an elite political body, whose member’ personal interactions are analogous to those occurring on a nonpartisan council. See, for example, Sprague, John D., Voting Patterns of the United States Supreme Court (Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill Co., 1968), 146–47; and Snyder, Eloise C., “The Supreme Court as a Small Group,” Social Forces 36 (1958), 238Google Scholar.

19 Teger, Stuart H., “Presidential Strategy for the Appointment of Supreme Court Justices, ” Public Choice 21 (1977), 1–22.Google Scholar

20 This procedure is based upon the Rice-Beyle cluster bloc technique, and emphasizes the proximity of the next closest member. Hence atT₁, because CD < DE and BC < DE, then A and Dare joined in one group while Dand E are not, even though DE < AD.

21 Kay, Barry J., “A Model of Non-partisan Legislative Bargaining and the Impact of Toronto Counci's Partisanization 1967–1972,” a paper presented to the annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Toronto, 1974)Google Scholar.

22 This phenomenon seems in line with the notion of the size principle limiting the formation of coalitions to that of a minimal winning majority as expressed in Rike's, William H., The Theory of Political Coalitions (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962)Google Scholar.

23 This city-suburban split was reported by Harold Kaplan in his earlier study of the body, Urban Political Systems: A Functional Analysis of Metro Toronto (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), 217Google Scholar.

24 The mean agreement score for the 101 pairings of Metro councilmen from the same borough was 66.6 per cent, while the mean score for the 395 pairings from different boroughs was 48.7 per cent, a variance that easily satisfied the difference of proportions test at the .01 significance level. The Metro Council data are drawn from 152 competitive votes during the 1973–1974 term where the mean overall agreement was 52.3 per cent.

25 Godfrey was chosen to succeed Ab Campbell as chairman by Metro Council in July 1973. His support was almost exclusively suburban. His anti-city predisposition can be traced back to his previous role as a North York controller where he had the third lowest record of agreement with city members among any of the 20 suburban delegates on Metro Council.

26 The possibility that the greater cohesion at Metro Council might be attributable to idiosyncratic behaviour occurring on specific issue dimensions was checked by examining the issues most comparable at both council levels, Transportation and Budget and Bureaucracy. In both cases, however, the agreement at Metro Council was higher by an amount approximating the average level for all votes.

27 This included all City representatives except Aldermen Archer and Beavis. The use of representational focus is derived from Wahlke et al., The Legislative System, 291.

28 The 10 cells in Table 4 which represented pairings of legislators with a pro-city allegiance at both Metro and City Councils, saw an increase in agreement at Metro from 68.7 percent to 77.5 percent. However, the 35 cells in which at least one member did not have an unqualified city orientation at Toronto Council, witnessed a mean jump from 64.3 per cent to 79.8 per cent. Since Aldermen Archer and Beavis did not possess a pro-city position at Metro, pairings including them are omitted from these calculations.

29 Riker, The Theory of Political Coalitions, 32–33Google Scholar.

30 An alternate hypothesis that success in winning votes might be attributable to better attendance among city representatives is contradicted by the evidence. In fact, suburban members were present 84.2 per cent of the time for competitive votes, compared to 78.7 per cent for their city counterparts, thus creating an additional obstacle to the City of Toronto's voting success on Metro Council.