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The Two Energy Crises and Canadian Oil and Gas Interest Groups: A Re-examination of Berry's Propositions*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 November 2009

Glen Toner  and
G. Bruce Doern
Glen Toner
Affiliation:
Carleton University
G. Bruce Doern
Affiliation:
Carleton University
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Abstract

This article examines the impact of two policy crises on the structure and behaviour of Canadian oil and gas interest groups. It first retests Glyn Berry's three propositions developed in 1974 after the first energy crisis, in light of the second energy crisis in 1979–1980. It then generates and examines two further propositions. The three propositions retested are: that interest group influence declines during a crisis; that if the crisis necessitates intensive federal-provincial bargaining, this tendency is accentuated, and that when facing a serious governmental threat the group under attack will seek to exert its influence as widely as possible. The article shows that the evidence from the second crisis supports the validity of the above propositions, but in addition two further hypotheses are examined and found valid. These are: that in post-crisis periods interest group influence is re-established, but that where crises broaden the scope of policy, interest groups are restructured so as to accommodate the broadened interests which both benefit from and are harmed by the crisis policy response. The interest groups examined are the Canadian Petroleum Association, the Independent Petroleum Association of Canada, the Canadian Association of Oilwell Drilling Contractors, and the Canadian Gas Association.

Résumé

Cet article examine l'impact de deux crises des politiques portant sur la structure et le comportement des groupes d'intérêt canadiens du pétrole et du gaz. II s'agira tout d'abord de réexaminer, à la lumière de la crise énergétique de 1979–1980, trois propositions avancées par Glyn Berry après la première crise énergétique de 1974. De ces propositions, ils en precèdent deux autres qui sont également examinées. Les propositions réexaminées sont les suivantes: l'influence des groupes d'intérêt décline lors d'une crise; si cette crise nécessite des négociations fédérale-provinciales intensives, cette tendance est accentuée, et face à une sérieuse menace gouvernementale le groupe ainsi attaqué cherchera à exercer son influence de la façon la plus étendue possible. Cet article démontre que les faits probants qui se dégagent de la seconde crise énergétique étayent les propositions ci-mentionnées. En outre deux nouvelles propositions ont été examinées et jugées valides. Ces propositions sont les suivantes: au cours des périodes subséquentes à une crise, l'influence des groupes d'intérêt est restaurée, mais quand les crises élargissent l'envergure d'une politique, les groupes d'intérêt se restructurent de façon à s'adapter à des intérêts élargis. Ces derniers sont à la fois favorisés et désavantagés par la réponse politique à la crise. Les groupes d'intérêt examines sont l'Association pétrolière canadienne, l'Association des pétrolières indépendantes du Canada, l'Association des entrepreneurs en forages pétroliers, et l'Association canadienne du gaz.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique , Volume 19 , Issue 3 , September 1986 , pp. 467 - 494
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Political Science Association (l'Association canadienne de science politique) and/et la Société québécoise de science politique 1986

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References

1 For the literature on business interest groups, see Pross, A. Paul (ed.), Pressure Group Politics in Canada (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1975)Google Scholar: Coleman, William D. and Jacek, Henry J., “The Roles and Activities of Business Interest Associations in Canada,” this JOURNAL 16 (1983), 257–80Google Scholar: Coleman, William D., “Canadian Business and the State,” in Banting, Keith (ed.), The State and Economic Interests (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985)Google Scholar; and Murray, V. V. and McMillan, C. J., “Business-Government Relations in Canada: A Conceptual Map,” Canadian Public Administration 26 (1983), 591–609.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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3 Ibid., 600–10.

4 Doern, and Toner, , The Politics of Energy, chaps. 1, 2, 5, 6 and 7.Google Scholar

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7 Crises can be characterized in various ways including whether they are objective, subjective or voluntaristic and manipulated. See, Jackson, Robert J., “Crisis Management and Policy Making: An Exploration of Theory and Research,” in Rose, Richard (ed.), The Dynamics of Public Policy (London: Sage, 1976), 209–36Google Scholar, and “The Impact of Crises and Crisis Management on Policy and Support in Canada and the Netherlands,” paper presented at the Conference on Parliament, Policy and Regime Support, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina, 1982.Google Scholar See also, Allison, Graham T., Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little Brown, 1971).Google Scholar Allison's first model of decision-making is itself supportive of the first hypothesis. This is because in a crisis it deals with the government as a single congealed purposeful actor. Standard operating procedures do not apply.

8 This is fully examined elsewhere. See Doern, and Toner, . The Politics of Energy, chap. 9Google Scholar; and Economic Council of Canada, Connections: An Energy Strategy for the Future (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1985). chap. 3.Google Scholar

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11 In a broader sense energy interest groups do not consist solely of groups composed of those companies which explore for, produce, and distribute oil and gas. Consumer groups also exist, through we examine them only tangentially. Consumers were also represented by key governments in the two periods and thus will be related to the analysis, but our focus is clearly on the above four industry interest groups rather than on this broader category of energy interest groups.

12 Canadian Petroleum Association, Annual Report, 1984. On the CPA and IPAC, see also, House, J. D., The Last of the Free Enterprisers: The Oilmen of Calgary (Toronto: Macmillan, 1980).Google Scholar

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33 Independent Petroleum Association of Canada, IP AC Energy Policy Discussion Paper; Gordon, Woods, “The Petroleum Sector, Energy Policy and the Economy,” Report to the Independent Petroleum Association of Canada, January 1985.Google Scholar

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