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Regional Differentiation of Business Interest Associations: A Comparison of Canada and the United Kingdom*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 November 2009

William D. Coleman  and
Wyn P. Grant
William D. Coleman
Affiliation:
McMaster University
Wyn P. Grant
Affiliation:
University of Warwick
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Abstract

The cohesion of interest associations has been seen to depend, among other factors, on the character of the political regime. Federal regimes are said to have negative consequences for group cohesion because of their tendency to force extensive regional differentiation in associations. These conclusions are examined here and shown to be in need of elaboration. To explain differentiation in business associations, factors other than regime structure must be considered, specifically the structure of the sector being represented and the nature of the collective bargaining arrangements. When this is done, the wide variety of internal regional arrangements found in associations is better accounted for. Furthermore, some of these arrangements are shown to be more likely to weaken cohesion than others. The argument is based on a study of business associations in Canada and the United Kingdom that are active in three economic sectors—food processing, chemicals, and construction.

Résumé

On affirme d'habitude que la cohésion des associations ou groupes de pression dépend des caractéristiques du régime politique. Les régimes fédéraux affaiblissent la cohésion des groupes parce qu'ils imposent une différenciation régionale à l'intérieur des associations. À part les caractéristiques du régime politique, deux autres variables sont importantés pour expliquer la différenciation régionale des associations: la structure du secteur industriel que l'association représente et le régime des relations industrielles. En utilisant ensemble ces trois variables, on peut mieux expliquer la diversité des structures régionales des associations. De plus, quelques unes de ces structures sont plus susceptibles d'affaiblir la cohésion des associations que d'autres. Nous développons notre thèse en utilisant des données portant sur les associations patronales au Canada et au Royaume-Uni, associations qui fonctionnent dans trois secteurs économiques: l'industrie alimentaire, l'industrie chimique et la construction.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique , Volume 18 , Issue 1 , March 1985 , pp. 3 - 29
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Political Science Association (l'Association canadienne de science politique) and/et la Société québécoise de science politique 1985

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References

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16 Within each sector, not all the subsectors were studied. Using the International Standard Industrial Classification, three subsectors were chosen in food processing: 3,111, slaughtering, preparing and preserving of meat; 3,112, manufacturing of dairy products; and 3,113, canning and preserving of fruits and vegetables. Four were chosen in chemicals: 3,511, basic industrial chemicals; 3,512, fertilizers and pesticides; 3,513, plastics materials, synthetic resins, and man-made fibres; and 3,522, drugs and medicines. Only one subsector was chosen in machine tools; 3,824, woodworking and metal working machinery. In construction, the study was restricted to the civil engineering and general building sectors. The finishing trades were not included. In the Canadian case, virtually all the national associations in the sectors were interviewed and regional branches when the national association did not provide enough information on their activities. In Britain, because of the large number of associations involved, sampling had to be used.

17 In basic industrial chemicals, 65 per cent of value-added was produced in central Canada (Ontario and Quebec), in plastics and synthetic resins, 92.9 percent, and in drugs and medicine, 99 per cent. The figures are for 1980 and are taken from the Annual Census of Manufacturers conducted by Statistics Canada.

18 63.2 per cent of basic industrial chemicals are exported and 38.7 per cent of plastics materials and synthetic resins. Figures are for 1978 and derived from Jata supplied to the authors by Statistics Canada.

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24 For example, the Canadian Cattlemen's Association which represents cattle growers has two largely autonomous divisions, one for eastern Canada and one for western Canada with offices in Calgary.

25 This issue is discussed more extensively in Coleman, W. D., “The Political Organization of Business Interests in the Canadian Food Processing Industry,” Discussion Paper IIM/LMP 84-6 (Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin, 1984), 9–11.Google Scholar

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29 Ibid.

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