1 For a review of deterrence literature, see Jervis, Robert, “Deterrence Theory Revisited,” World Politics 31 (1979), 289–324CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Jervis, Robert, Lebow, Richard N. and Stein, Janice G., Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985)Google Scholar; Levy, Jack, “When Do Deterrent Threats Work,” British Journal of Political Science 18 (1988), 485–512CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Harvey, Frank and James, Patrick, “Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Record of Aggregate Testing and an Alternative Research Agenda,” Conflict Management and Peace Science 12 (1992), 17–45;CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Pages, Erik R., “The Evolution of Deterrence Theory: A Review of the Literature,” International Studies 16 (1991), 60–65.Google Scholar

2 Huth, Paul and Russett, Bruce, “What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from 1900-1980,” World Politics 36 (1984), 496–526CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Huth, Paul and Russett, Bruce, “Deterrence Failure and Crisis Escalation,” International Studies Quarterly 32 (1988), 29–45CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Huth, Paul and Russett, Bruce, “Testing Deterrence Theory: Rigour Makes a Difference,” World Politics 42 (1990), 466–501CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Lebow, Richard Ned and Stein, Janice Gross, “Beyond Deterrence,” Journal of Social Issues 43 (1987), 5–71CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Lebow, Richard Ned and Stein, Janice Gross, “Rational Deterrence Theory: I Think, Therefore I Deter,” World Politics 41 (1989), 208–224CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, “When Does Deterrence Succeed and How Do We Know?” paper presented to the 1989 meeting of the International Studies Association; and Lebow, Richard Ned and Stein, Janice Gross, “Deterrence: The Elusive Dependent Variable,” World Politics 42 (1990), 336–369.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

3 Harvey, and James, , “Nuclear Deterrence Theory,” 31–33.Google Scholar

4 A decision (by the attacker) not to threaten publicly, caused by the defender's anticipated reaction, should count as a case of successful deterrence: “Unfortunately, given the practical need to focus on observed interactions, that process would not be identified by any standard means of collecting data. While the problem of ‘non-events’ cannot be rectified by an approach that focuses on explicit threats, the bias against a verdict in favour of deterrence should be kept in mind” (ibid., 33). The converse of this argument also is true; a threatening state can fail to achieve its goals for reasons independent of deterrent threats, with the latter incorrectly receiving the credit (see James, Patrick, Crisis and War [Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1988], 78–115).Google Scholar See also Lebow, Richard Ned and Stein, Janice, “Beyond Deterrence,” Journal of Social Issues 43 (1987), 5–71;CrossRefGoogle ScholarRiekhoff, Harald Von, “Methodological and Historical Problems in Determining Deterrence Success,” Journal of Social Issues 43 (1987), 79–84;CrossRefGoogle ScholarTetlock, Philip, “Testing Deterrence Theory: Some Conceptual and Methodological Issues,” Journal of Social Issues 43 (1987), 85–91CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Levy, Jack, “When Do Deterrent Threats Work,” British Journal of Political Science 18 (1988) 485–512CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Huth and Russett, “Testing Deterrence Theory.”.

5 Harvey, and James, , “Nuclear Deterrence Theory,” 32.Google Scholar If the initial retaliatory threat by state A (defender) triggers a crisis for state B (initiator), then state B may come to view itself as the legitimate defender of the status quo, provoking a counterretaliatory threat against state A.

6 Morgan, Patrick, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1977), 28.Google Scholar

7 Levy, “When Do Deterrent Threats Work”; and Harvey and James, “Nuclear Deterrence Theory.”.

8 Huth, and Russett, , “Testing Deterrence Theory,” 475.Google Scholar

9 Ibid., 473.

10 Ibid., 473 (emphasis added). Craig, Gordon and George, Alexander, Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 139Google Scholar, provide a practical example of this complexity in their study of the 1973 Yom Kippur war. Despite diplomatic efforts, “the United States was unable to guarantee Israel's security from a variety of Arab threats ranging from economic blockade to terrorists attacks to full scale offensives by conventional forces The deterring powers found themselves forced to re-evaluate their commitments as the dissatisfied powers altered their strategies in accordance with perceived weaknesses in these commitments” (emphasis added).

11 Huth, and Russett, , “Testing Deterrence,” 473.Google Scholar

12 Harvey, and James, , “Nuclear Deterrence Theory,” 33.Google Scholar

13 Cimbala, Stephen, Nuclear Strategizing: Deterrence and Reality (New York: Praeger, 1988), 137.Google Scholar

14 Harvey and James, “Nuclear Deterrence Theory.”

15 Orme, John, “Deterrence Failures: A Second Look,” International Security 11 (1987), 96–124Google Scholar; and Lebow, Richard Ned, Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crises (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981).Google Scholar

16 Lebow, and Stein, , “When Does Deterrence Succeed,” 55.Google Scholar

17 Orme, , “Deterrence Failures,” 98.Google Scholar

18 Safran, Nadav, Israel: The Embattled Ally (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981)Google Scholar; Orme, , “Deterrence Failures,” 96–124Google Scholar; and Craig and George, Force and Statecraft.

19 Safran, , Israel: The Embattled Ally, 198.Google Scholar

20 Orme, , “Deterrence Failure,” 120Google Scholar. Nasser was reported to have predicted the likelihood of an Israeli attack at 80-100 per cent. However, the estimate was made just prior to Israel's retaliation, when the probability of invasion was high. This says nothing of Israel's failure, earlier in the crisis, to deter Nasser by convincing him that an attack would be imminent if Egypt began mobilizing its troops, which it did. In fact, given the Israeli prime minister's public statements rejecting any military retaliation, Israel's weak response to Nasser's decision to block the straits of Tiran, and the pressure Israel was experiencing from the US to avoid a war, Nasser could not help but question Israel's resolve and, by implication, the credibility of Israel's retaliatory threat. The intention here is not to defend one or the other position, or to encourage endless debate over interpretation of the historical record, but t o establish that these debates continue.

21 Craig, and George, , Force and Statecraft, 188–192.Google Scholar

22 For a thorough description of the relevant political, religious and military factions that played a role in the Lebanese civil war, see Khalidi, Walid, Conflict and Violence in Lebanon: Confrontation in the Middle East, Harvard Studies in International Affairs No. 38 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979)Google Scholar; and Deeb, Marius, The Lebanese Civil War (New York: Praeger, 1980).Google Scholar

23 Evron, Yair, War and Intervention in Lebanon: The Israeli-Syrian Deterrence Dialogue (London: Croom Helm, 1987), 34.Google Scholar

24 For a detailed account of events surrounding the decision to set up the military cabinet, see Rabinovich, Itmar, The Warfor Lebanon: 1970-1983 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984).Google Scholar

25 Rasler, Karen, “A Comparative Analysis of Monadic and Dyadic Perspectives on the 1976 Lebanese Crisis,” International Studies Quarterly 28 (1984), 427–446CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Dawisha, Adeed, “Syrian Intervention in Lebanon, 1975-1976,” Jerusalem Journal of International Relations 3 (1978), 245–263.Google Scholar

26 The evidence cited by Dawisha in support of an increasing perception of threat by Syrian decision makers was based on interviews with Abdulla al-Khani (Syrian deputy foreign minister), Adib al-Dawoodi (the president's adviser on foreign affairs) and Ahmad Iskander (Syrian minister of information) between January 7 and 13, 1978 (ibid., 246-47). Several statements by President Asad on December 2, 1975 were also used to support his assertions: “Arab unity as far as we are concerned takes priority over any other aim. It is an aim for which we are struggling continuously. The fact that we have not achieved much in this field so far does not mean that we feel pessimistic or have despaired. The issue, as far as we are concerned, is a permanent aim which requires continuous effort on our part.” For a thorough account of the speech, see British Broadcasting Corporation, Summary of World Broadcasting, Part IV: The Middle East, 5074/A79 (1975).Google Scholar

27 Rabinovich, The War for Lebanon; and Khalidi, Conflict and Violence in Lebanon.

28 Rabinovich, , The Warfor Lebanon, 123–124.Google Scholar

29 Asad's comments on July 20,1976 provided a clear indication that he expected Israel to intervene, not only because of their security interests in Lebanon, but because it was in Israel's larger political interest in the Middle East to intervene. Asad acknowledged that “A decisive military action (by Kamal Junblatt)…would open doors to every foreign intervention, particularly Israel's intervention. Let us all visualize the magnitude of the tragedy which might ensue if Israel were to intervene and save some Arabs (Christians) from other Arabs (Muslims) The partitioning of Lebanon is an old Zionist aim” (Ma'oz, Moshe, Asad: The Sphinx of Damascus [London: Wiedenfeld and Nicolson, 1988], 128).Google Scholar

30 Deeb, The Lebanese Civil War. As the fighting in Beirut continued, Syria proposed a political compromise in the form of a new nonmilitary cabinet headed by Rashid Karami. Given the growing opposition to Franjiya's original decision, the president was forced to accept Karami, a traditional rival, as the new prime minister. On June 30, 1975, Karami formed a government of communal balance in which he also held the defence portfolio.

31 Realizing that they were at a disadvantage militarily, the Christian Maronites were generally supportive of the Syrian reforms, whereas the Muslim-PLO coalition were convinced that the proposals would not produce an equitable distribution of political power in Lebanon.

32 Freedman, Robert, “The Soviet Union and the Civil War in Lebanon, 1975-1976,” Jerusalem Journal of International Relations 3 (1987), 60–93.Google Scholar

33 Meo, Leilla, “Syria and the Conflict in Lebanon,” in Mougharabi, Fouad and Aruri, Na-seer, eds., Lebanon: Crisis and Challenge in the Arab World, Special Report No. 1 (Detroit: Association of Arab-American University Graduates, 1977), 29.Google Scholar

34 Lawson, Fred, “Syria's Intervention in Lebanese Civil War,” International Organization 38 (1984), 451.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

35 Dawisha, , “Syrian Intervention in Lebanon,” 251.Google Scholar

36 Freedman, , “The Soviet Union and the Civil War,” 67–69Google Scholar; and Lawson, , “Syria's Intervention in Lebanese Civil War,” 451–477.Google Scholar

37 Ibid., 451.

38 Ibid.

39 Lebow, and Stein, , “Rational Deterrence Theory,” 53–55.Google Scholar

40 “As long as the quarrels in Lebanon are confined to the Lebanese community, I don't think that Israel can or should do anything. But her defense interests along the northern border may be touched if (Syria) intervenes. In such a case, Israel should preserve her moral right and her military might to protect her security interests in the border zone (Allon 1976).” Quoted in Evron, , War and Intervention in Lebanon, 36–37.Google Scholar

41 Ibid.

42 Ibid., 37.

43 Prospects for political gains were enhanced by Syria's diplomatic skills before the intervention. By the time Syrian troops invaded Lebanon, Syria had managed to rally wide public support even among traditional Muslim leaders. Internationally, France and the US supported the intervention as long as the Syrian troops were used to protect Christian Maronites. The loss of Egypt from its sphere of influence compelled Soviet leaders to guard against losing Syria as well (ironically, Asad believed that intervention would bolster his independence from the Soviet Union and improve Syrian-US relations). Opposition to the intervention was quite weak. Although Iraq moved forces to its eastern border, the military threat to Syria was insignificant. As for Egypt, the signing of the Sinai II agreement compromised its authority over other Arab states and the PLO in Lebanon, so most of its activities were diplomatic in nature.

44 Syria was experiencing several strategic, foreign and domestic pressures prior to the invasion that might explain why Israel's best deterrent efforts were challenged. Specifically, the invasion was essential to prevent partition, establishment of a radical regime in Lebanon that might pull Syria into an unwanted war with Israel, and intervention and occupation by Israel of southern Lebanon. In addition, the timing was perfect. Before 1974, the distribution of capabilities in the Middle East was bipolar in nature, with Egypt being the dominant Arab power. Following the Yom Kippur war, however, important changes took place in both the bases and distribution of power in the region. As capabilities of other Arab countries began to rise, Syria acquired both the incentive and capabilities to carry out a more assertive foreign policy. Syrian leaders were also experiencing a number of domestic pressures at the time. Important economic changes were taking place in Syria during the mid-1970s that shifted Syria's industrial capacity towards the oil industry (Lawson, “Syria's Intervention in Lebanese Civil War”). This shift was detrimental to regions in the northern part of the country, the centre of Syria's cotton industry. As unemployment in these areas increased, so did opposition to the Ba'th regime. Moreover, food shortages and a 30 per cent inflation rate made capital increasingly scarce within the Syrian economy. Because the regime was unable to pump enough money into northern regions to appease the growing opposition, Syria's armed forces were required to suppress the violence, provoking further opposition which culminated in a wave of strikes, bombings and assassinations. A military move into Lebanon, intended to impose a solution to the fighting there, became increasingly attractive to the Syrian regime. Such an operation could provide Syria's rulers with significant additional resources that they could use to their own domestic political advantage (ibid., 474). The most important of these resources were the capital held by Lebanese financial institutions, consumer products imported from Lebanon and the facilities at the port of Beirut.

45 Evron, , War and Intervention in Lebanon, 47.Google Scholar

46 Jervis, Robert, “Deterrence Theory Revisited,” World Politics 31 (1979), 289–324.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

47 Lebow, and Stein, , “When Does Deterrence Succeed,” 63.Google Scholar

48 The overwhelming consensus is that, throughout the crisis, Syrian and Israeli decision making was both cautious and calculated. Each move was discussed thoroughly and efforts were made to clarify intentions to ensure that the crisis did not escalate out of control. Syria's diplomatic skills were effectively utilized to reassure both Israel and the US that their interests would not be jeopardized. This was no easy task; strategies of reassurance are rarely successful in a protracted conflict because conciliatory moves tend to be viewed with great suspicion. Notwithstanding Syria's diplomatic skills, however, Syrian leaders were mistaken in their judgment that the problems in Lebanon could be solved by a resort to force. Although a more massive intervention (three months later) achieved both a cease-fire and a political compromise at the Riyhad conference (October 1976), neither lasted very long.

49 Kugler, Jacek, “Terror without Deterrence,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 28 (1984), 470.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

50 Harvey, and James, , “Nuclear Deterrence Theory,” 38.Google Scholar

51 A complete explanation of coding rules for each variable can be found in Brecher, Michael and Wilkenfeld, Jonathan et al., Crises in the Twentieth Century, Vol. 1. Handbook of International Crises, and Vol. 2: Handbook of Foreign Policy Crises (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1988).Google Scholar

52 Initial identification of cases included in the International Crisis Behaviour Project relied upon the New York Times Index and Keesing's Contemporary Archives. Area experts and existing compilations of “related phenomenon” were consulted i n the process of compiling the final list of 28 crises. With respect to operational decision on specific variables, intercoder reliability was .85.

53 Brecher, Michael and James, Patrick, Crisis and Change in World Politics (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986).Google Scholar

54 For example, “Oil and uranium-producing regions acquired greater salience since the 1950s; coal-producing regions became less significant. Key waterways and choke points such as the Suez Canal have retained their (geostrategic) relevance over the decades. A combination of assets enhances geostrategic salience. For instance, the strait of Hormuz provides access and egress from a region that, in the 1970's, produced 40% of the world's oil supply, with vast reserves to increase its geostrategic salience” (ibid., 36).

55 The authors cite the 1956 Suez crisis as an example: “The United Kingdom and France were major powers in Global terms, and Egypt was at most a middle power. The former countries were economically advanced; the latter had a very poor developing economy. The adversaries differed in political regime—Western democracy versus military authoritarian—and in culture—language, belief system and so on. These differences were accentuated because the United Kingdom and France were struggling to preserve existing international system rules regarding rights embodied in interstate agreements over the Suez Canal whereas Egypt was asserting national rights as a basis of a higher rule” (ibid., 38). The decision to implement a military solution to the crisis was a product of these cleavages. In fact, the political regime and culture of Israel and Egypt created cleavages that remain central to many of the continuing problems of the region.

56 Ibid., 137.

57 Brecher, , Wilkenfeld, et al., Handbook of Foreign Policy Crises, 2.Google Scholar

58 James, , Crisis and War, 20.Google Scholar

59 “Intensity” refers to the level of violence and hostility employed as a crisis management technique. “Centrality,” on the other hand, refers to the importance the decision makers attach to their use of violence (Brecher, Wilkenfeld et al., Handbook of Foreign Policy Crises).

60 The tau b statistic measures the percentage reduction in error when predicting categories of the dependent variable. A tau b of 25 means that the independent variable produces a 25 per cent reduction in error. It also should be noted that, with a population rather than a sample of cases, significance levels appear in an advisory role.

61 Of the nine crises in which very high threats occurred, 78 per cent (7) exhibited minimal levels of violence.

62 James, Patrick and Harvey, Frank, “The Most Dangerous Game: Superpower Rivalry in International Crises, 1948-1985,” Journal of Politics 54 (1992), 25–51.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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64 Included in P2 is the assertion that nuclear powers should achieve draws when directly confronted with other nuclear powers. To test this, only cases of mutual deterrence were examined. Of these 11 crises, only 4 (36%) provided evidence to support that aspect of the proposition (that is, the dispute ended in compromise or stalemate). In other words, a majority (64%) of the cases with both superpowers “directly” involved as crisis actors ended in a defeat/victory scenario.

65 Wilkenfeld, Jonathan and Brecher, Michael, “Superpower Crisis Management Behaviour,” in Kegley, C. W. and McGowan, P. J., eds., Challenges to America (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1979), 185–212.Google Scholar

66 These results support Onea's contention that rational choice will frequently prevail in crises: “The centralization of authority, decline in partisan politics, and greater acceptance of the leader's responsibility that typically occur during crises create an opportunity for leadership and innovation.” The concentration of authority also suggests that fewer independent interests require accommodation. Furthermore, senior officials are usually generalists, with less inclination to bargain in order to protect bureaucratic interests (Oneal, John R., “The Rationality of Decision-Making during International Crises,” Polity 20 [1988], 598–622).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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68 Waltz, “The Stability of a Bipolar World.”