Hostname: page-component-7479d7b7d-68ccn Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-08T15:34:09.515Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Policy Communities and Policy Divergence in Canada: Agro-Environmental Policy Development in Quebec and Ontario*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 November 2009

Éric Montpetit  and
William D. Coleman
Éric Montpetit
Affiliation:
École nationale d'administration publique
William D. Coleman
Affiliation:
McMaster University
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Despite what would appear to be pressures for policy convergence in Canada due to growing continental integration and market competitiveness, agro-environmental policies in the provinces of Quebec and Ontario have become increasingly divergent over the past decade. Quebec's policies are comprehensive, coercive in approach and intrusive in the production process; those in Ontario, while comprehensive, rely more on industry self-regulation and shy away from intruding significantly into farming practices. Three institutional factors help explain this policy divergence. First, Quebec's main environmental act enabled the Ministry of the Environment to participate in the agro-environmental policy community's “subgovernment,” while the Ministry of the Environment in Ontario remained in the “attentive public.” Second, the agricultural policy network in Ontario took on many attributes of closed bipartite corporatism during the 1990s, thereby enhancing the power potential of Ontario's farmers. Third, path dependence related to policy feedback predisposed Ontario to self-regulatory approaches, but favoured strong statist policies in Quebec. The combination of these institutional differences creates distinct negotiation settings in the two provinces. Consequently, in Ontario, policy discussions tend to focus on wealth generation to the exclusion of distributive justice, while in contrast, Quebec's institutions focus more on distributive issues, perhaps at the expense of aggregate value creation.

Résumé

Bien que l'intégration nord-américaine et l'ouverture des marchés publics aient renforcé les pressions en faveur de la convergence des politiques publiques des provinces canadiennes, les politiques agro-environnementales du Québec et de l'Ontario sont devenues de plus en plus dissemblables au cours de la dernière décennie. Les politiques du Québec sont globales, coercitives et interventionnistes, exigeant que des changements radicaux soient apportées aux méthodes de production. Les politiques de l'Ontario, quoique globales, s'appuient davantage sur l'autoréglementation de l'industrie, évitant l'imposition de changements importants aux pratiques agricoles. Trois facteurs institutionnels expliquent ces orientations divergentes. Premièrement, la principale législation environnementale du Québec permet au ministre de l'Environnement de participer aux instances infra-gouvernementales qui éiaborent la politique agroenvironnementale, alors qu'en Ontario, le ministre de l'Environnement demeure à l' écoute de la communauté. Deuxièmement, durant les années quatre-vingt-dix, la politique agricole, en Ontario, a donné naissance à une structure de pouvoir corporatiste bipartite qui a accru l'influence des fermiers de cette province. Troisiémement, si les réactions du milieu agricole ont incité le gouvernement à adopter une approche non contraignante en Ontario, au Québec, elles ont plutôt encouragé les autorités à persister sur la voie de l'interventionnisme étatique. Ces différences institutionnelles ont engendré des contextes distincts de négotiation de la politique agro-environnementale dans les deux provinces. Alors qu'en Ontario, celle-ci est centrée sur 1'augmentation des revenus plutôt que sur leur distribution équitable, au Quebec c'est l'approche inverse qui prévaut.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique , Volume 32 , Issue 4 , December 1999 , pp. 691 - 714
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Political Science Association 1999

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 For elaboration on this policy paradigm, see Coleman, William D., “From Protected Development to Market Liberalism: Paradigm Change in Agriculture,” Journal of European Public Policy 5 (1998), 632–;651.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

2 Skogstad, Grace and Kopas, Paul, “Environmental Policy in a Federal System: Ottawa and the Provinces,” in Boardman, Robert, ed., Canadian Environmental Policy: Ecosystems, Politics, and Process (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1992), 51Google Scholar. See also Troughton, M. J., “Agriculture and Rural Resources,” in Mitchell, Bruce, ed., Resource and Environmental Management in Canada (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1995), 174–177.Google Scholar

3 Coleman, William D., Skogstad, Grace and Atkinson, Michael, “Paradigm Shifts and Policy Networks: Cumulative Change in Agriculture,” Journal of Public Policy 16 (1996), 273–301.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

4 Soroos, Marvin S., “From Stockholm to Rio and Beyond: The Evolution of Global Environmental Governance,” in Vig, Norman J. and Kraft, Michael E., eds., Environmental Policy in the 1990s (3rd ed.; Washington: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1997), 291–293Google Scholar. See also Toner, Glen and Conway, Tom, “Environmental Policy,” in Doern, G. Bruce, Pal, Leslie A. and Tomlin, Brian W., eds., Border Crossings: The Internationalization of Canadian Public Policy (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1996), 110.Google Scholar

5 Agriculture Canada, Growing Together (Ottawa: Agriculture Canada, 1989), 1–2.Google Scholar

6 Coleman, William D. and Skogstad, Grace, “Neo-Liberalism, Policy Networks, and Policy Change: Agricultural Policy Reform in Australia and Canada,” Australian Journal of Political Science 30 (1995), 242–263.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

7 Skogstad, Grace, “Agricultural Policy,” in Doern, et al. , eds., Border Crossings, 145–166.Google Scholar

8 OECD, Sustainable Agriculture: Concepts, Issues and Policies in OECD Countries (Paris: OECD; 1995), 27.Google Scholar

9 Skogstad, Grace, “The Farm Policy Community and Public Policy in Ontario and Quebec,” in Coleman, William D. and Skogstad, Grace, eds., Policy Communities and Public Policy in Canada: A Structural Approach (Mississauga: Copp Clark Pitman, 1990), 59–90.Google Scholar

10 Bipartite corporatism (sometimes referred to as sectoral corporatism) refers to policy networks where a single producer interest participates consistently in policy formulation, and perhaps policy implementation, with relevant state actors. See Coleman, William D. and Skogstad, Grace, “Policy Communities and Policy Networks: A Structural Approach,” in Coleman, and , Skogstad, eds., Policy Communities, 28–29.Google Scholar

11 The subgovernment includes those actors in the policy community directly involved in the making of policy while the attentive public includes those interested in the given policies, but not directly involved in policy making (ibid., 25–26).

12 We follow Paul Pierson here in using policy feedback to refer to the politics that result from policies. Policy structures create resources and incentives for the formation and activity of social groups. Policies also affect processes of “social learning” among actors (Dismantling the Welfare State? Reagan, Thatcher, and the Politics of Retrenchment [New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994], 39ff).Google Scholar

13 Fritz Scharpf suggests a dualistic standard for evaluating the influence of modes of interaction on policy outcomes: a utilitarian welfare criterion and an equity or distributive justice criterion (Games Real Actors Play: Actor-Centered Institutionalism in Policy Research [Boulder: Westview, 1997], 15, 90–93).Google Scholar

14 The figures on agricultural production in this paragraph are all obtained from Tables 1 and 5 in Statistics Canada, Historical Overview of Canadian Agriculture, Catalogue 93–358-XPB (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 1997).Google Scholar

15 Réglement sur la prévention de la pollution des eaux par les établissements de production animale.

16 One of the purposes behind revising the Loi sur la protection du territoire agricole was to create more harmony between the protection of agricultural land and the objectives of municipal planning as defined by the Loi sur l'aménagement et l'urbanisme. On this problem see Cimon, Jean, Zonage agricole et développement urbain (Montreal: Méridien, 1990).Google Scholar

17 In the Act “normal farm practice” is defined as “a practice that is conducted in a manner consistent with proper and accepted customs and standards as established and followed by similar agricultural operations under similar circumstances and includes the use of innovative technology used with advanced management practices” (Farm Practice Protection Act, Article 1).

18 Under the Ontario Building Code, municipalities have to deliver building permits for any structure larger than 10 square metres, including manure storage facilities. When the structure is a farm building, the municipalities often require a project assessment by an agricultural engineer. OMAFRA's regional offices can provide this service. In certain cases, the regional conservation authorities have an advisory role for the issuing of municipal building permits. It should be noted that municipalities in Quebec have a similar responsibility in delivering building permits for agricultural projects, yet only once the project has been certified by the MEF.

19 AgCare, Update 9 (1999), 2. If all “lifestyle farms” are included, and these too are potential sources of pollution, the total number of farms in Ontario is over 70,000.

20 Ontario, , Responsive Environmental Protection: A Consultation Paper (Toronto: Government of Ontario, 1996).Google Scholar

21 Scharpf, Games, chap. 6.

22 Ibid., 126–30.

23 Ibid., 130–32.

24 Ibid., 71. See also Coleman and Skogstad “Policy Communities,” 25'26.

25 Kenis, Patrick and Schneider, Volker, “Policy Networks and Policy Analysis: Scrutinizing a New Analytical Toolbox,” in Marin, Bernd and Mayntz, Renate, eds., Policy Networks: Empirical Evidence and Theoretical Considerations (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 1991), 25–59Google Scholar; and Hassenteufel, Patrick, “Do Policy Networks Matter? Lifting descriptif et analyse de l' état en action,” in LeGalés, Patrick and Thatcher, Mark, eds., Les Réseaux de politique publique: Débat autour des policy networks (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1995), 91–108.Google Scholar

26 Kesteman, Jean-Pierre, with Boisclair, Guy and Kirouac, Jean-Marc, Histoire du syndicalisme agricole au Quebec: UCC-UPA, 1924–1984 (Montreal: Boréal Express, 1984), 286é287.Google Scholar

27 It should be noted that the ministére des Affaires municipales (MAM) and municipalities have also developed a capacity for policy participation as a result of the contradiction between the Loi sur la protection du territoire agricole and the Loi sur l'aménagement et l'urbanisme. During the process of revising the Loi sur la protection du territoire agricole and the regulation on livestock operations, the MAM exercised pressures for thorough environmental rules similar to those proposed by the MEF.

28 See Coleman and Skogstad, “Policy Communities,” 26–29.

29 Kesteman et al., Histoire du syndicalisme, 270–72.

30 Ibid., 274.

31 Skogstad, “Farm Policy Community,” 73–75.

32 Interview, April 3, 1997.

33 Skogstad, “Farm Policy Community,” 69.

34 More often than not environmental groups have very limited resources. In Ontario a large share of these resources has been devoted to building expertise in nuclear energy, toxic substances, air pollution and industrial pollution—the problems about which environmental groups are most often consulted by the OMEE. Thus when an OMEE official in Ontario was asked whether environmental groups address agricultural pollution, he replied: “Not that I am aware of. Among the briefings and letters to ministers that I have seen in the past year, environmental groups are absent” (Interview, February 12, 1997). This statement is consistent with our own responses from Greenpeace, Pollution Probe and the Canadian Institute for Environmental Law. See also Winfield, Mark, “The Ultimate Horizontal Issue: The Environmental Policy Experiences of Alberta and Ontario, 1971–1993,” this Journal 27 (1994), 129–152.Google Scholar

35 Skogstad, “Farm Policy Community,” 69.

36 Ibid., 78.

37 Interview, March 13, 1997.

38 Interview, March 13, 1997.

39 Ontario Farm Environmental Coalition. Our Farm Environmental Agenda (Toronto: OFEC, 1992).Google Scholar

40 Scharpf elaborates on the different capacities for collective action of coalitions and associations in Games, 54–56.

41 Farmers are permitted to request a refund from the organization to which they choose to pay dues. They have to make the request within 90 days starting with the deadline to pay the annual dues. Otherwise, all Ontario farmers are required by law to belong to one of the accredited general farm organizations. To date, the refund rate has been low.

42 This point is developed in Coleman, William D., “Banking, Interest Intermediation and Political Power: A Framework for Comparative Analysis” European Journal of Political Research 26 (1994), 31–58.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

43 Pierson, Dismantling, 42.

44 Standing Committee on Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, Soil at Risk (Ottawa: Senate of Canada, 1984).Google Scholar

45 Skogstad, “Farm Policy Community,” 67.

46 Latouche, Daniel, Le bazar: des anciens Canadiens aux nouveaux Québécois (Montreal: Boreal, 1990), 149.Google Scholar

47 Coleman, William D., “Le nationalisme, les intermédiaires et l'intégration politique canadienne,” Politique el Sociétés 28 (1995), 37–51.Google Scholar

48 Our translation of Noel, Alain, “Le chômage en héritage,” in Gaagon, Alain-G., ed., Québec: État et Société (Montreal: Quebec/Amérique, 1994), 430.Google Scholar

49 Scharpf, Games, chap. 6.

50 Interview, April 4, 1997.

51 Scharpf, Games, 128.

52 In 1988, it will be recalled, the Liberal government would not proceed with recommended policy changes from MEF because UPA and MAPAQ were opposed.

53 This negotiating situation comes closer to what Scharpf terms “problem-solving” (Games, 130–32).

54 Interview, February 12, 1997.

55 Interview, November 18, 1992.

56 Interview, November 13, 1992.

57 Interview, February 28, 1997.

58 Garrett, Geoffrey and Lange, Peter, “Internationalization, Institutions and Political Change,” in Keohane, Robert and Milner, Helen, eds., Internationalization and Domestic Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 48–75.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

59 This finding is consistent with Garrett and Lange, Hypothesis, 4 (ibid., 53).

60 Garrett and Lange argue that responsiveness to changing preferences of producers due to internationalization will be inversely proportional to the number of veto points in the given system (ibid., 53).

61 See the discussion in Scharpf, Games, 89–93.

62 Lehmbruch, Gerhard, “Concertation and the Structure of Corporatist Networks,” in Goldthorpe, John, ed., Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 62.Google Scholar

63 Garrett, Geoffrey, Partisan Politics in the Global Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 129–130CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Scharpf, Games, 132–34.

64 Ibid., 133, 137–38.

65 Interview, April 3, 1997.