¹ For statements on parliamentary functions, see Mallory, J.R., The Structure of Government (Toronto, 1971), 242–4Google Scholar; and Dawson, R. MacGregor, The Government of Canada, revised by Ward, Norman (5th ed., Toronto, 1970), 304–7.Google Scholar

² The 1957 pipeline debate and the 1963 flag debate would be examples.

³ See Kornberg, Allan, Canadian Legislative Behavior (New York, 1967Google Scholar), and Hoffman, David and Ward, Norman, Bilingualism and Biculturalism in the Canadian House of Commons (Ottawa, 1970Google Scholar).

⁴ Hoffman, David, “Liaison Officers and Ombudsmen: Canadian M.P.'S and Their Relations with the Federal Bureaucracy and Executive,” in Hockin, Thomas A., ed., Apex of Power (Scarborough, Ont., 1971), 150.Google Scholar

⁵ The Making of Canadian Foreign Policy (Scarborough, 1969), 144.

⁶ For Canadian examples, see Dawson and Ward, The Government of Canada, 306–7 and 365–74; Blair, Ronald, “What Happens to Parliament?” in Lloyd, Trevor and McLeod, Jack, eds., Agenda 1970: Proposals for a Creative Politics (Toronto, 1968), 219Google Scholar; and Eayrs, James, The Art of the Possible (Toronto, 1961), 3–4.Google Scholar For a British example, see Birch, A.H., Representative and Responsible Government (Toronto, 1964), 150.Google Scholar American observers of legislative-executive relations have been somewhat more precise and distinguished between control, supervision, and oversight, and in some cases have suggested that control is more applicable to the presidential system and oversight to the parliamentary system; but this assessment is only partially correct. See Harris, Joseph P., Congressional Control of Administration (Washington, 1964), 5 and 9Google Scholar, and Jewell, Malcolm E. and Patterson, Samuel C., The Legislative Process in the United States (New York, 1966), 484.Google Scholar

⁷ Crick, Bernard, The Reform of Parliament (New York, 1965), 173.Google Scholar

⁸ Ibid., 79 (emphasis in original).

⁹ Dawson and Ward (p. 306) discuss surveillance under the rubric of “general supervision,” and Van Loon, Richard J. and Whittington, Michael S., The Canadian Political System (Scarborough, 1971), 458Google Scholar, refer to the “general audit function.” For a discussion of “refinement” as the major function of Parliament, see Van Loon and Whittington, 447–90.

¹⁰ “Liaison Officers and Ombudsmen,” 153.

¹¹ “What Happens to Parliament?” 234.

¹² A definite exception is Ward, Norman, The Public Purse: A Study in Canadian Democracy (Toronto, 1962Google Scholar), and the literature on delegated legislation. See Kersell, John E., Parliamentary Supervision of Delegated Legislation (London, 1960Google Scholar) and Musolf, Lloyd D., Public Corporations and Accountability: The Canadian Experience (Cambridge, Mass., 1959CrossRefGoogle Scholar).

¹³ See Eayrs, The Art of the Possible, 3–4 and 103–4, and Birch, Representative and Responsible Government, 152.

¹⁴ The normal Canadian practice has been to discuss either the opportunities for surveillance or the difficulties which are encountered. For an example of the former approach, see Dawson and Ward, The Government of Canada, chap. 19; and for an example of the latter, see Hoffman, “Liaison Officers and Ombudsmen,” 153–62. For a statement on criteria in the American system, see Harris, Congressional Control of Administration, 11–14.

¹⁵ From February through to the end of March 1967 there were fifty-five meetings of the Standing Committee on National Defence; thirty-nine parliamentarians sat on the committee. During the spring of 1968 the parliamentarians were approached in an attempt to obtain their attitudes towards reorganization of the armed forces and the political process by means of a pre-tested, structured, interview schedule. From this group thirty-four interviews (20 Liberals, 12 Conservatives, and 2 New Democrats), averaging one and a half hours, were conducted for a completion rate of 87 per cent. The author acknowledges the problems raised by after-the-fact survey research, yet the advantages of obtaining data in the area of perceptions outweigh the disadvantages.

¹⁶ See Matthews, Donald R., U.S. Senators and Their World (Durham, NC, 1960Google Scholar).

¹⁷ See Hockin, Thomas A., “The Advance of Standing Committees in Canada's House of Commons,” Canadian Public Administration, XII, no 2 (Summer 1970), 185–202.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁸ These data can be found in House of Commons, Standing Committee on National Defence, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence (Ottawa, 1963–1966Google Scholar). In 1963–4 the committee was a Special Committee.

¹⁹ The classic study in Canada is Porter, John, The Vertical Mosaic: An Analysis of Social Class and Power in Canada (Toronto, 1965CrossRefGoogle Scholar). Also see Kornberg, Canadian Legislative Behavior, and Kornberg, , “The Social Basis of Leadership in a Canadian House of Commons,” Australian Journal of Politics and History, XI (1965), 324–34.Google Scholar

²⁰ Normandin, P.G., ed., The Canadian Parliamentary Guide, 1968 (Ottawa, 1968Google Scholar), annual.

²¹ In the 27th Parliament there were thirty-one standing, special, and joint parliamentary committees, with a total of 688 seats for members of the House of Commons. If the twenty-six cabinet ministers are not taken into account this meant that each parliamentarian averaged 2.9 committee assignments.

²² Despite the conventional wisdom it should not be assumed that the major variable will be the “government-opposition” dichotomy. See the conclusions of this paper.

²³ See R.B. Byers, “Executive Leadership and Influence: Parliamentary Perceptions of Canadian Defence Policy,” in Hockin, Apex of Power, 176.

²⁴ Quoted by Spicer, Keith, “Why Didn't Canada's Defence Watchdog Bark?” Globe and Mail, Toronto, Aug. 4, 1966.Google Scholar

²⁵ Farrell, The Making of Canadian Foreign Policy, 147.

²⁶ Griffiths, Franklyn, “Opening Up the Policy Process,” in Clarkson, Stephen, ed., An Independent Foreign Policy for Canada? (Toronto, 1968), 110–18.Google Scholar

²⁷ See Birch, Representative and Responsible Government; Crick, The Reform of Parliament; Blair, “What Happens to Parliament?”; Hoffman, “Liaison Officers and Ombudsmen”; and Franks, C.E.S., “The Dilemma of the Standing Committees of the Canadian House of Commons,” this JOURNAL, IV, no. 4 (Dec. 1971), 461–76.Google Scholar

²⁸ Representative and Responsible Government, 151.

²⁹ The Art of the Possible, 103.

³⁰ Can. H. of C. Debates, 1963, 455–8.

³¹ “Interest Groups and the Canadian Parliament: Activities, Interaction, Legitimacy, and Influence,” this JOURNAL, IV, no 4 (Dec. 1971), 447, n. 7.

³² Byers, “Reorganization of the Canadian Armed Forces: Parliamentary, Military and Interest Group Perceptions,” mimeo.

³³ The Art of the Possible, 112.

³⁴ The Making of Canadian Foreign Policy, 129.

³⁵ Public Opinion and Canadian Identity (Berkeley, Calif., 1967), 218–21.

³⁶ For example, see Deutsch, Karl W.et al., France, Germany and the Western Alliance (New York, 1967Google Scholar), and Brecher, Michael, India and World Politics (New York, 1968Google Scholar).

³⁷ “What Happens to Parliament?” 238.

³⁸ Congressional Control of Administration, 6.

³⁹ There are some signs that the Trudeau administration is more willing than previous administrations to consider outside opinion. At the same time, non-governmental interest in foreign and defence policy appears to be increasing. See Stairs, Denis, “Publics and Policy-Makers: The Domestic Environment of the Foreign Policy Community,” International Journal, XXVI, no 1 (Winter 1970–1971), 221–48.CrossRefGoogle Scholar