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Party, State and Political Competition in Canada: The Cartel Model Reconsidered*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 November 2009

Lisa Young
Lisa Young
Affiliation:
University of Calgary
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Abstract

This article argues that the cartel party thesis is not supported by empirical evidence in the Canadian case. Even though Canadian parties at the federal level colluded to provide themselves with funding and to hinder the entry of new parties into the system, they were not transformed into cartel patties. Canadian parties have not become primarily reliant on state resources, and the specific formulas for delivery of public funding do not remove or greatly diminish parties' incentives to solicit support from the public. Parties' ties to civil society consequently remain intact. There is little evidence for the consequent diminution of party competition or increased interpenetration of state and society posited by the cartel thesis. The article argues that the cartel model is largely inapplicable to anglo-american political systems because it fails to take into account the effect of specific forms of state funding.

Résumé

Cet article soutient que la thèse des partis de cartel n'est pas corroborée empiriquement par le cas canadien. Bien que les partis politiques canadiens au niveau fédéral aient fait collusion pour se procurer du financement et pour nuire à l'entrée de nouveaux partis, ils ne se sont pas transformés en partis de cartel. Les partis canadiens ne sont pas devenus dépendants des ressources de l'État et les formules d'attribution du financement étatique n'éliminent ni ne diminuent significativement les motivations à la sollicitation de contributions du public. Les liens entre les partis et la société civile demeurent donc intacts. Peu de faits indiquent qu'il y ait eu une diminution de la compétition entre les partis ainsi qu'une croissance de l'interpénétration de l'État et de la société civile, deux phénomènes prévus par la thèse des partis de cartel. Cet article propose que le modèle des partis de cartel ne s'applique pratiquement pas aux systèmes politiques anglo-américains parce qu'il ne tient pas compte de l'impact des particularité des formulas d'attribution du financement étatique.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique , Volume 31 , Issue 2 , June 1998 , pp. 339 - 358
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Political Science Association (l'Association canadienne de science politique) and/et la Société québécoise de science politique 1998

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References

1 Katz, Richard S. and Mair, Peter, “Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party,” Party Politics 1 (1995), 5CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

2 Examples of this include Jenson, Jane, “Innovation and Equity: The Impact of Public Funding,” in Seidle, F. Leslie, ed., Comparative Issues in Party and Election Finance, Research Study for the Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1991), 113Google Scholar; and Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing, Reforming Electoral Democracy, Vol. 1 (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1991), 209–230Google Scholar.

3 See, for example, Constantinou, Peter P., “Public Funding of Political Parties, Candidates and Elections in Canada,” in Seidle, F. Leslie, ed., Issues in Party and Election Finance in Canada, Research Study for the Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1991), 236Google Scholar.

4 In fact, some observers argue the reverse—that public funding enhances the capacity of parties to act as agents of political intermediation. See, for example, Jenson, “Innovation and Equity.”

5 See, for example, Ware, Alan, Political Parties and Party Systems (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 114–116Google Scholar.

6 For a critique of the cartel theory, see Koole, Ruud, “Cadre, Catch-Ail or Cartel? A Comment on the Notion of the Cartel Party,” Party Politics 2 (1996), 507–523CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

7 Katz and Mair, “Changing Models,” 19.

8 Michaud, Pascale and Laferrière, Pierre, “Economic Analysis of the Funding of Political Parties in Canada,” in Seidle, , ed., Issues in Party and Election Finance in Canada, 378Google Scholar. New Zealand was not included in the study. Australia's public subsidies account for only a slightly lower proportion of total election funding, while public subsidies in both the United Kingdom and the United States are substantially less than in Australia or Canada. If the market value of free air time were included in the calculation, however, the proportion of public funding in the UK would be similar to that of Canada and Australia, and the US would remain the outlier, with a far smaller proportion of public funding.

9 Maclvor, Heather, “Do Canadian Parties Form a Cartel?” this Journal 29 (1996), 317–334Google Scholar.

10 Ibid., 333.

11 Katz and Mair, “Changing Models,” 23–24.

12 It would, however, be incorrect to attribute the stable three-party system over this period solely to electoral laws. As Alan Cairns and others have demonstrated, Canada's single-member plurality electoral system acts as a significant barrier to the entry of new parties. In historical context, we find that the period 1970–1993 was by no means the only era of stability within the Canadian party system. See Cairns, Alan C., “The Electoral System and the Party System in Canada, 1921– 1965,” this Journal 1 (1968), 55–80Google Scholar.

13 See Jenson, “Innovation and Equity.”

14 Katz and Mair, “Changing Models,” 15.

15 Ibid., 16.

16 While it must be acknowledged that the Barbeau Committee and, 25 years later, the Royal Commission of Electoral Reform and Party Financing comprised partisan appointees, it can nonetheless be argued that both achieved a degree of independence. Certainly, the parties in parliament were not quick to embrace the regulatory regimes recommended by either body.

17 Robin Sears, cited in Stanbury, W. T., Money in Politics: Financing Federal Parties and Candidates in Canada, Research Study for the Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1991), 30–31Google Scholar.

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19 Paltiel, Khayyam Z., “Campaign Financing in Canada and Its Reform,” in Penniman, Howard, ed., Canada at the Polls: The General Election of 1974 (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1975), 195Google Scholar.

20 See Stanbury, Money in Politics, 35; and Jenson, “Innovation and Equity,” 120–24. During the period between 1960 and 1974, six federal elections were held, four of which resulted in minority governments.

21 Jenson, “Innovation and Equity,” 124.

22 Ibid., 123.

23 See Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing, Reforming Electoral Democracy, 305–07.

24 Jenson, “Innovation and Equity,” 130.

25 Cited in Stanbury, Money in Politics, 43.

26 See Ibid., 41–52.

27 Seidle, F. Leslie, “The Election Expenses Act: The House of Commons and the Parties,” in Courtney, John, ed., The Canadian House of Commons: Essays in Honour of Norman Ward (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 1985), 131Google Scholar.

28 Calculated from Report of the Chief Electoral Officer Respecting Election Expenses (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1988)Google Scholar.

29 Stanbury, Money in Politics, 452. The Liberals have spent between 85 per cent and 99 per cent of their limit, and the Conservatives have spent between 89 per cent and 100 per cent of their limit.

30 Ibid., 385–86.

31 Ibid., 50–51.

32 Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing, Reforming Electoral Democracy, 296–302.

33 Ibid., 368–72. In the 1990s parties used a variety of formulas to tax back portions of candidate reimbursements.

34 Increasingly, however, the parties have adopted internal receipting procedures that allow them to benefit from the tax credit for these contests.

35 Seidle, “Canadian Political Finance Regulation,” 19–20.

36 The 1974 legislation involved a somewhat different formula for reimbursements, tying party reimbursements to the cost of television advertising and candidate reimbursements to postage costs.

37 Recent legislation changed the threshold for reimbursement, tying it instead to the proportion of the vote won. This will prevent situations such as one which arose in 1993, where the Natural Law Party, which won only a minuscule portion of the popular vote, received a substantial reimbursement because its election expenditures were high.

38 Seidle, “Canadian Political Finance Regulation,” 8.

39 Stanbury, Money in Politics, 361–62

40 Michaud and Laferrière, “Economic Analysis,” 372.

41 Stanbury, Money in Politics, 225. There is some dispute over this because of findings that only 45 per cent to 65 per cent of all those eligible to claim the tax credit actually do so.

42 Ibid., 276–80, 546–47.

43 Because Revenue Canada does not disaggregate the value of the political contribution tax credit by party, it was necessary to use the value of the tax credit to all registered parties for this calculation. Therefore, the figures in Table 2 slightly overestimate the three parties' reliance on public funding.

44 Michaud and Laferrière, “Economic Analysis,” 376.

45 Katz and Mair, “Changing Models,” 19.

46 Ibid., 16–17.

47 Ware, Political Parties and Party Systems, 107–08.

48 Calculated from data in Feigert, Frank, Canada Votes 1935–1988 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1989), 22Google Scholar. Figures from 1993 were not included in the calculation because the 1993 election involved the break-up of the cartel. Had 1993 figures been included, however, the difference between the contemporary period and the pre-cartel era would have been even smaller.

49 Katz and Mair, “Changing Models,” 19–20.

50 Whitaker, fReginald, The Government Party: Organizing and Financing the Liberalb Party of Canada, 1930–1958 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977)Google Scholar.

51 Elkins, David J., “Parties as National Institutions: A Comparative Study,” in Bakvis, Herman, ed., Representation, Integration and Political Parties in Canada, Research Study for the Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1991), 29Google Scholar.

52 See Elkins, “Parties as National Institutions”; and Whitaker, The Governing Party.

53 Both the American and German courts have been active in this regard.

54 Nassmacher, Karl-Heinz, “Structure and Impact of Public Subsidies to Political Parties in Europe,” in Alexander, Herbert E., ed., Comparative Political Finance in the 1980s (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 237Google Scholar.