¹ “The finall Cause, End, or Designe of men, (who naturally love Liberty, and Dominion over others,) in the introduction of that restraint upon themselves, (in which we see them live in Commonwealths,) is the foresight of their own preservation, and of a more contented live thereby;…” The Leviathan, part II, chap, XVII (London, Everyman ed., 1949 (1914, 1651)).

² Unless, of course, unusually high degrees of denial or frustration of less crucial needs have been experienced. In this case it may be assumed that the sheer amount of frustration will have brought about qualitative changes in the nature of the frustration: additional needs, perhaps involving security and self-esteem, may become involved if the frustration of initially more peripheral needs is carried too far.

³ New York, 1964.

⁴ See especially Srole, Leoet al., Mental Health in the Metropolis (New York, 1962).Google Scholar A classic study in this area is by Hollingshead, August B. and Redlich, Fredrick C., Social Class and Mental Illness (New York, 1958).CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed

⁵ Mandelbaum, David, Current Anthropology, 6 (1965), 281–92.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁶ Cloward, Richard E. and Ochlin, Lloyd E., Delinquency and Opportunity: A Theory of Delinquent Gangs (New York, 1960), 1966 ed., 211.Google Scholar

⁷ Grinker, Roy R. and Spiegel, John P., Men under Stress (Philadelphia, 1945), 455.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁸ Current Concepts of Positive Mental Health (New York, 1958).

⁹ “A Theory of Human Motivation,” Psychological Review, 50 (1943), 370–96. A Gandhi or a Thich Tri Quang may deny himself food because “higher” needs have become more important; a person who has never had enough to eat could not activate or articulate his “higher” needs.

¹⁰ Human Nature in Politics (New York, 1963) chap. 1.

¹¹ Problems of crime, accidents, disease and death remain with us, of course. But most of us take our precautions as best we can as a matter of habit and occupy ourselves with other matters most of the time.

¹² The terms “freedoms” and “liberties” are used synonymously in this paper. It is redundant to speak of a priority for the least free individuals and of a priority for the most basic human needs or freedoms since by definition those are least free whose most basic needs are unmet or whose most basic liberties are denied. By definition, again, liberties are more basic the more crucial the needs to which they correspond.

¹³ See Sellin, Thorsten, The Death Penalty (Philadelphia, 1959).Google Scholar

¹⁴ I have discussed concepts and aspects of security at some length in my The Structure of Freedom (New York, 1965 (1958)), esp. 65–83 and 101–25.

¹⁵ Human Nature in Politics (New York, 1963), 9–11.

¹⁶ Britain and New Zealand in 1964 established procedures for compensating innocent victims of crime. California, on January 1, 1966, cautiously introduced a much more limited compensation system, which would require proof not only of damage but of financial need—including responsibility for dependent children. Cf. “Pay for Crime Victims: Uncharted Path,” Wall Street Journal, January 17, 1966.

¹⁷ Mr. Roy Wilkins, Executive Director of the NAACP, has issued a demand for federal legislation to compensate some victims of racial discrimination. See Crisis, June–July, 1966.

¹⁸ One of the signers of the document, Theobald, Robert, has elaborated on its argument in many articles and at least two books: Free Men and Free Markets (New York, 1965 (1963))Google Scholar and The Guaranteed Income: Next Step in Economic Evolution? (New York, 1966). “The Triple Revolution” is reprinted in Liberation, April 1964.

¹⁹ Myrdal, Gunnar in Beyond the Welfare State (New Haven, 1963 (1958))Google Scholar argues for planning not only for national welfare but world welfare, and warns that modern welfare states may otherwise continue to perpetuate misery and violence in other parts of the world. I agree, but have no space here to extend my argument to the international community.

²⁰ See Whyte, William F., Organization Man (New York, 1956).Google Scholar

²¹ There are also drawbacks—such as gullibility, or acceptance of distasteful government policies as legitimate on the false assumption that they have a freely formed and expressed majority opinion behind them.

²² It may be argued, also, that democracy in local communities is essential for building community loyalties and thus strengthening stable “climates of affection.”

²³ Cf. his Psychopathology and Politics (Chicago, 1930); World Politics and Personal Insecurity (New York, 1935); and Power and Personality (New York, 1948).

²⁴ Edelman, Murray, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (Urbana, 1964).Google Scholar

²⁵ Cf. my “Civil Disobedience: Prerequisite for Democracy in Mass Society,” in Spitz, David, ed., Political Theory and Social Change (New York, 1967), 163–83.Google Scholar

²⁶ The political ways of life in the French Fourth Republic according to this criterion must have been vastly preferred by most political behaviouralists, surely, when compared to de Gaulle's often inscrutable ways of leading the Fifth Republic!

²⁷ “Politics and Pseudopolitics,” American Political Science Review, 59 (1965), 39–57.

²⁸ “Introduction: Political Culture and Political Development,” in Pye, Lucian W. and Verba, Sidney, eds., Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton, 1965), 11–13.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²⁹ (Boston, 1966).

³⁰ Ibid., 45 and 33–48.

³¹ This is particularly noteworthy in view of the fact that Pye is one of the ablest among psychologically oriented political scientists. For example, see his Personality, Politics, and Nation Building (New Haven, 1962), or his “Personal Identity and Political Ideology,” in Marvick, Dwaine ed., Political Decision-Makers (Glencoe, 1961), 290–313.Google Scholar

³² See his Ethics and Language (New Haven, 1944).

³³ David Krech used to have on his office wall a sign reading “Perfink!” It was given to him by graduate students in appreciation of an important theme in his teaching: perception, feeling, and thinking are all aspects of the same process.

³⁴ Opinions and Personality (New York, 1964), 275.

³⁵ “The Motivational Bases of Attitude Change,” Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 49 (1954), 115–24.

³⁶ “The Functional Approach to the Study of Attitudes,” Public Opinion Quarterly, 24 (1960), 163–204.

³⁷ Opinions and Personality, v.

³⁸ The proportion of ego defensives is likely to be much lower among radical leftists than among radical rightists, because in the former case only the extremist stance and the militant methods, not the humanitarian aims, will appeal to authoritarian and anti-authoritarian personalities. For a discussion of anti-authoritarianism and types of rebel personalities, see my Structure of Freedom, 206–17.

³⁹ Opinions and Personality, 271.

⁴⁰ Concepts of basic psychological security and of psychological freedom are discussed in my book The Structure of Freedom, chap. 3.

⁴¹ This term is here used loosely; I would say that for the most socially anxious the whole society tends to be the reference group, in that approval is desired from almost everybody encountered. The term was introduced by Herbert H. Hyman, who uses it more concisely. See his “The Psychology of Status,” Archives of Psychology, no. 269 (1942'), and also his “Reflections on Reference Groups,” Public Opinion Quarterly, 24 (1960), 383–96.

⁴² And probably much more extensively, in this Spock-trained generation.

⁴³ Camus, Albert, The Rebel: An Essay on Man in Revolt (New York, 1956), 22Google Scholar (first published in French as L'homme revolté, Paris, 1951).

⁴⁴ How else can one read, for example, the “Epilogue” in Lipset's, Seymour MartinPolitical Man (New York, 1960).Google Scholar Lipset's statement reflects not a deviant view but the conventional position, it would seem, in the behavioural study of politics, to which Lipset has contributed extensively and creatively.

⁴⁵ As I think is done, for example, in Berelson, Bernard R., Lazarsfeld, Paul F., and McPhee, William N., Voting (Chicago, 1954)Google Scholar; and in Almond, Gabriel A. and Verba, Sidney, The Civic Culture (Princeton, 1964).Google Scholar See especially the last chapter in each book.

⁴⁶ Cf. his The Symbolic Uses of Policies.

⁴⁷ My thinking about university government is deeply influenced by Professor John R. Seeley. See, for example, his “Quo Warranto: The ‘Berkeley Issue’,” in Miller, Michael V. and Gilmore, Susan eds., Revolution at Berkeley (New York, 1965), 42–50Google Scholar; and his “The Berkeley Issue in Time and Place,” Our Generation, 5, no. 1 (May 1967), 24–30.