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The Necrologists of International Relations*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 November 2009

K. J. Holsti
K. J. Holsti
Affiliation:
University of British Columbia
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Abstract

Two contemporary streams of thought in international relations offer significant theoretical challenges to the field and to the way it has been organized since the time of Rousseau. New power cycle theories propose that the etiology of war resides in different growth rates among the major powers. Hegemonic wars are a recurrent consequence of the states system. The literature suggests that the patterns of the past are likely to be repeated in future; hence, the only solution to the problem of war is the transcendence of the states system. The second body of literature proposes that growing interdependence is bringing profound structural changes that are already leading to the demise of the nation state and to the transformation of the states system. The essay critically examines these theories and outlines reasons why both are empirically and logically deficient. These bodies of literature also illustrate how even among rigorous quantitative analysts, normative concerns animate research. Finally, the author suggests why the search for a theory or model of international politics is doomed to failure, and why a healthy field will be characterized by intellectual pluralism.

Résumé

Les relations internationales, dont les grandes lignes ont ete démarquées depuis l'époque de Rousseau, sont aujourd'hui l'objet de deux écoles de pensée aux théories controversées. Selon les nouvelles théories du cycle de pouvoir, la guerre est causée par le différent rhythme de croissance qui existe entre les grandes puissances. Les guerres de nature hègémonique sont des conséquences du système d'États. Cette école affirme que les cycles des évènements se répéteront et, par conséquent, que la seule solution est d'aller au-delà du système d'États. La deuxième école propose que l'interdépendance grandissante entre des nations est en train de créer de grands changements structuraux qui annoncent déjà la fin de l'État-nation et la transformation du système d'États. Cet article examine d'un oeil critique ces théories et esquisse les raisons pour lesquelles chacune possède des lacunes empiriques et logiques. Ces deux écoles illustrent également que même chez les plus rigoureux des analystes quantitatifs, la recherche ne parvient pas à se dissocier déun certain nombre de valeurs implicites. Léarticle se termine par un plaidoyer en faveur du pluralisme intellectuel de la recherche.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique , Volume 18 , Issue 4 , December 1985 , pp. 675 - 695
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Political Science Association (l'Association canadienne de science politique) and/et la Société québécoise de science politique 1985

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References

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