¹ At times the connection is only suggested by passing directly from comments about the definition of the public interest to Bentham's recommendations on economic policy. See Hallowell, J. H., Main Currents in Modern Political Thought (New York, 1950), 214.Google Scholar Others are more explicit, while recognizing that Bentham was thinking about more than just economic processes. See Pitkin, Hanna F., The Concept of Representation (Los Angeles & Berkeley, 1967), 199.Google Scholar

² Examples are cited in Grundstein, Nathan D., “Bentham's Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation,” Journal of Public Law 2 (1953), 344–69Google Scholar at 352.

³ Perry, Ralph Barton, Puritanism and Democracy (New York, 1944), 500–2.Google Scholar

⁴ Writers who tax classical liberalism with this defect include the following: Maciver, R. M., The Web of Government (New York, 1947), 187Google Scholar; Neill, T. P., The Rise and Decline of Liberalism (Milwaukee, 1953), 59Google Scholar; Corbett, Sister T. A., People or Masses: A Comparative Study in Political Theory (Washington DC, 1950), 88Google Scholar; Jarlot, G., “Personne et humanité,” Archives de Philosophie XII, Cahier I (1936), 58Google Scholar; de Ruggerio, Guido, European Liberalism (Boston, 1959), 101–2Google Scholar; and, from a more secular perspective than most of the above, Hacker, Andrew, Political Theory; Philosophy, Ideology, Science (New York, 1961), 403.Google Scholar All of these deal either with Bentham or the formula of an aggregate of particular interests.

⁵ Bentham's place in the classical democratic tradition seems secure, even though interpretations differ widely. See Hartz, Louis, “Democracy: Myth and Reality” in Chambers, W. N. and Salisbury, R. H., eds., Democracy Today (New York, 1962), 27, 31Google Scholar; and Davis, Lane, “The Cost of Realism: Contemporary Restatements of Democracy” reprinted in McCoy, C. A. and Playford, J., eds., Apolitical Politics: A Critique of Behavioralism (New York, 1967), 186.Google Scholar

⁶ Some political scientists adopting this position are Pratt, R. Cranford, “The Benthamite Theory of Democracy,” Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, XXI (1955), 20–9CrossRefGoogle Scholar; de Grazia, Alfred, “The Nature and Prospects of Political Interest Groups,” in Ulmer, S. S., ed., Introductory Readings in Political Behavior (Chicago, 1961), 205Google Scholar; Miller, J. D. B., The Nature of Politics (London, 1962), 48Google ScholarPubMed; and Manning, D. J., The Mind of Jeremy Bentham (London, 1968), 78–9.Google Scholar

⁷ See Letwin, Shirley R., The Pursuit of Certainty (Cambridge, 1965), 146.Google Scholar

⁸ “Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation” in Works ed. Bowring, J. (London, 1843) I, p. 2.Google Scholar Hereafter cited as Works.

⁹ ‘Leading Principles of a Constitutional Code for any State,” Works, II, 269; “Constitutional Code,” Works, IX, 7.

¹⁰ “Principles of the Civil Code,” Works, I, 321.

¹¹ “Handbook of Political Fallacies,” Works, II, 416.

¹² “Manual of Political Economy,” Works, III, 40. See too “Principles of International Law,” II, 549.

¹³ “Constitutional Code,” 76.

¹⁴ “Manual of Political Economy,” 69.

¹⁵ Ibid., 40.

¹⁶ “Principles of International Law,” Works, II, 544.

¹⁷ Ibid., 539. This fear was shared by many people less radical than Bentham. Cf. Benjamin Constant, Oeuvres (Paris, 1957), 1082–4.

¹⁸ “Principles of International Law,” 551; “Constitutional Code,” 130, 137.

¹⁹ “Principles of the Civil Code,” 313.

²⁰ “Constitutional Code,” 127.

²¹ “Leading Principles of a Constitutional Code,” 271.

²² “Principles of International Law,” 545.

²³ For a brief treatment of the movement of vocabulary from common good to reason of state and from that to national interest, see Sturzo, Luigi, The International Community and the Right of War (London, 1929), 183–6.Google Scholar

²⁴ “Principles of International Law,” 559. See too the passage on “state secrets” quoted in Kent, C. B. R., The English Radicals: An Historical Sketch (London, 1899), 190.Google Scholar

²⁵ “Principles of International Law,” 539.

²⁶ “A General View of a Complete Code of Laws,” Works, III, 163. I am grateful to Professor John Plamenatz of All Souls College, Oxford, who first made me aware of this aspect of Bentham's thought.

²⁷ Ibid., 174.

²⁸ “Anarchical Fallacies,” Works, III, 506.

²⁹ Ibid., 520. A somewhat similar objection is contained in Bentham's earliest critique of Sir William Blackstone. See A Comment on the Commentaries, ed. Everett, C. W. (Oxford, 1928), 77.Google Scholar

³⁰ “Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation,” Works, I, 2.

³¹ But he was aware of an objective sense of the term, writing of “Interests, real or supposed” (“An Essay on Political Tactics,” Works, IX, 45). A recent commentator has objected that in making each man's subjective interest absolute, Bentham's system required unanimity or government would be placed in the difficult position of forcing people to act against their interests. See Flathman, R. E., The Public Interest: An Essay Concerning the Normative Discourse of Politics (New York, 1966), 22.Google Scholar Here it is only necessary to recall that Bentham did recognize some long-term interests of citizens that governments would care for without their being consciously affected. At the same time, Bentham often noted how “public opinion” would be formed through the assistance of opinion-leaders, many people not knowing how best to promote their legitimate interests (see “Plan of Parliamentary Reform,” Works, III, 445–50). Finally, the emphasis on unanimity is misplaced; for, as we shall see, Bentham promised all interests a hearing, not instant gratification.

³² “Securities against Misrule Adapted to a Mohammedan State,” Works, VIII, 559.

³³ Ibid., 559, 584–5.

³⁴ “Letters to Count Torreno,” Works, III, 524.

³⁵ “Leading Principles of a Constitutional Code,” 269.

³⁶ “Anarchical Fallacies,” 533; “Plan of Parliamentary Reform,” 440, 442.

³⁷ “Constitutional Code,” 63.

³⁸ “Principles of the Civil Code,” 307.

³⁹ “Leading Principles of a Constitutional Code,” 269–70.

⁴⁰ “Principles of the Civil Code, Appendix,” 358–9.

⁴¹ “Plan of Parliamentary Reform,” 470, 475.

⁴² “Principles of the Civil Code,” 321.

⁴³ Ibid., 320. The early liberals’ faith in the rules of the game as a genuine common interest has been ably criticized by H. J. Blackham in his Political Discipline in a Free Society (London, 1961), 92. One must admit though that a cogent argument may be made for universal provision of certain procedural liberties and this with no class overtones.

⁴⁴ “Plan of Parliamentary Reform,” 470.

⁴⁵ “Manual of Political Economy,” 98.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 99.

⁴⁷ Mercier de la Rivière, the Physiocrat, and Sir James Steuart were amongst the widely-read authors who popularized the expression.

⁴⁸ See R. A. Nisbet, Community and Power (New York, 1962), 176–80 and passim.

⁴⁹ “Plan of Parliamentary Reform,” 440–2; “Manual of Political Economy,” 99.

⁵⁰ As in the ominous-sounding insistence that “all particular interests put together will not prevail for the rejection of a measure beneficial in a superior degree to the whole” (“A Plan for Saving All Trouble and Expense in the Transfer of Stock…,” Works, III, 137). However, even here, he avoided a priori unanimity by taking the interests of a large group of stockholders as a better indication of the general good than those of a small number of powerful people. Neither group involved the whole public. We must also be aware of the tactical advantages to reformers, whatever their view of society, in claiming popular unanimity. This was certainly a large factor at the time of the Reform Bill. See Joseph Hamburger, James Mill and the Art of Revolution (New Haven, 1963), 73 et seq.

⁵¹ For the curious last example, see “Constitutional Code,” 53.

⁵² See “Rationale of Judicial Evidence,” Works, VI, 258. Numerous other texts record the same meaning.

⁵³ “Manual of Political Economy,” 97–8.

⁵⁴ An example of the sort of division of opinion which he hoped to end is Bentham's comment in an unpublished manuscript about morality “determined by class interests.” See M. P. Mack, Jeremy Bentham; An Odyssey of Ideas (London, 1962), 218. As the proponent of a new ethical system, Bentham naturally favoured replacing a chaos of standards with his own; but this is a far cry from proclaiming the illegitimacy of all interests but one.

⁵⁵ “Manual of Political Economy,” 98.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 99

⁵⁷ Ibid., 98.

⁵⁸ “A Protest against Law-Taxes,” Works, II, 581.

⁵⁹ Pratt, “Benthamite Theory of Democracy,” 22. Professor Pratt also admits here that Bentham did occasionally appreciate the necessary plurality of social interests, but the concession is weakened by Pratt's approval of Sir James Mackintosh for being much more cogent on that point. On consulting Mackintosh, we find reference only to the interests of rich versus poor and country versus town. Thus he sacrificed Bentham's recognition of the great variety of commercial interests, without coming any closer to a coherent account of class interests. For Mackintosh's review of Bentham, see Anon. “Universal Suffrage,” Edinburgh Review, XXXI (1818–19), 165–203.

⁶⁰ Jeremy Bentham's Economic Writings, ed. Stark, Werner (London, 1954), III, 215.Google Scholar

⁶¹ It can be argued that James Mill, and especially his followers, had this tendency. See Hamburger, Joseph, “James Mill on Universal Suffrage and the Middle Class,” Journal of Politics, 24, no. 1 (1962), 167–90CrossRefGoogle Scholar at 188–9.

⁶² On the supposed parallel with Rousseau see Crook, D. P., American Democracy in English Politics (Oxford, 1965), 19.Google Scholar Bentham soundly criticized the concept of a “general will” in its French application (see “Anarchical Fallacies,” 507). Elsewhere, he expressed concern lest a “pretended general will” be produced by coercion. In unfree nations “unanimity” might “glitter on the surface,” but would have little in common with genuine expression of public opinion (see “Essay on Political Tactics,” Works, II, 332).

⁶³ “Constitutional Code,” 7. This sort of statement has led some commentators to assume that Bentham was inconsistent in expecting normally self-interested people to become altruistic as citizens, sinking all personal concerns in the common good. See Pratt, “Benthamite Theory of Democracy,” 23, and Pitkin, Concept of Representation, 202. However, there is ample evidence that Bentham did not expect to cleanse electors of all private ambitions; he sought only to prevent their being bribed in the literal and characteristically pre-reform sense. See “Plan of Parliamentary Reform,” 485, where he explained that the great danger was “spuriousness of suffrage,” or a situation where voters were moved by greed or fear to promote the interests of others. Bentham's recognition of selfish interests, apart from one's share in the general interest, was quite compatible with his hope that “sinister interest” could be ruled out. For, deprived of immediate pecuniary profit, voters would have no certain course of action by which to gain at the expense of the public. The difficulty of anti-social calculation on the part of voters was a consideration familiar both to Bentham (“Handbook of Political Fallacies,” 453–4) and, curiously enough, to one of his critics: see Pitkin, Concept of Representation, 199, n. 37.

⁶⁴ “Constitutional Code,” 63.

⁶⁵ “Handbook of Political Fallacies,” 475.

⁶⁶ These “counterforces” operated both inside the legislature (see “Constitutional Code,” 53, 63) and in society at large, where he visualized small commercial “fraternities” banding together to combat the influence of larger interests. (See “Manual of Political Economy,” 99). Perhaps his most elaborate description of the “counter-balancing” nature of interests was in the 1816 manuscript of the unpublished “Political Deontology,” quoted by Werner Stark in The Fundamental Forms of Social Thought (London, 1962), 141.

⁶⁷ See “Handbook of Political Fallacies,” 446; “Plan of Parliamentary Reform,” 450.

⁶⁸ “Principles of the Civil Code,” 321.

⁶⁹ “Plan of Parliamentary Reform,” 452.