1 Smiley, Donald V. “Territorialism and Canadian Political Institutions,” Canadian Public Policy 3 (1977), 449–57;CrossRefGoogle ScholarSimeon, Richard, “Regionalism and Canadian Political Institutions,” in Meekison, J. Peter (ed.), Canadian Federalism (3rd ed.; Toronto: Methuen, 1977), 292–304;Google ScholarGibbins, RogerRegionalism: Territorial Politics in Canada and the United States (Toronto: Butterworths, 1982), 78.Google Scholar

2 Smiley, “Territorialism,” 453; Jackson, Robert and Atkinson, MichaelThe Canadian Legislative System (2nd ed.; Toronto: Macmillan, 1980).Google Scholar

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9 Pross, A. Paul “Pressure Groups: Adaptive Instruments of Political Communication,”Google Scholar in Pross, A. Paul (ed.), Pressure Group Behaviour in Canadian Politics (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1975), 1–26.Google Scholar David Kwavnick argues that one of the major objectives of interest groups is to eliminate or discredit competing groups which claim to speak on behalf of their constituency (“Pressure Group Demands and the Struggle for Organizational Status: The Case of Organized Labour in Canada,” this JOURNAL 3 [1970], 56–72).Google Scholar

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11 Ibid., 326.

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15 Gibbins, Regionalism, 137: “The interests of any one region can be promoted only to the extent that the party is not hurt electorally in other regions, although the degree of constraint here is proportionate to the population size of the affected regions.”.

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22 Macnaughton, Bruce, “Canadian Parliamentarians and Interest Group Effectiveness,” in Gaboury, Jean-Pierre and Hurley, James Ross (eds.), The Canadian House of Commons Observed (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1979), 349.Google ScholarPross, A. Paul (“Parliamentary Influence and the Diffusion of Power,” this JOURNAL 18 [1985], 261)Google Scholar concurs that groups' recognition of “the legitimating capacity of Parliament” and its “ability to focus public debate, now makes interaction with parliament highly desirable in the eyes of many groups and a necessity in the eyes of others.”

23 Thompson, and Stanbury, , The Political Economy of Interest Groups, 37.Google Scholar

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25 Ibid., 683; Jackson, and Atkinson, , The Canadian Legislative System, 94Google Scholar; Rush, Michael, “Committees in the Canadian House of Commons,” in Lees, John D. and Shaw, Malcolm (eds.), Committees in Legislatures (Durham: Duke University Press, 1979), 226.Google Scholar

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27 Ibid., 683.

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33 Rush, , “Committees in the Canadian House of Commons,” 222.Google Scholar

34 Smith, David E., The Regional Decline of a National Party (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981), chap. 6.Google Scholar

35 The CCA existed as early as 1932 (when it was called the Council of Canadian Beef Producers), but grew in the 1970s as a result of a check-off system whereby it received a fixed sum of money from each cattle sale.

36 This description of the various groups' beliefs draws upon a weekly reading of The Western Producer; Wilson, Barry, Beyond the Harvest (Saskatoon: Western Producer Prairie Books, 1981), 245Google Scholar; Mitchell, Don, The Politics of Food (Toronto: James Lorimer, 1975), 18 and chap. 5Google Scholar; and the Canadian Cattlemen's Association, Policy Directions for the Canadian Beef Producer (1977).

37 Their lobby in 1970–1971 to secure exemption from the Farm Products Marketing Agencies Act, was highly successful. See Skogstad, Grace, “The Farm Products Marketing Agencies Act,” Canadian Public Policy 6 (1980), 89–100.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

38 Historically, the farm community has never given unified support to one national farm organization, but the discord in the agricultural community grew particularly apparent in the post-1960 period as specialization and capitalization of production reinforced economic and commodity cleavages.

39 An urban-rural riding is one with an approximately equal number of rural and urban polls.

40 Cairns, Alan C., “The Electoral System and the Party System in Canada, 1921–1965,” this JOURNAL 1 (1968), 55–80.Google Scholar

41 Hockin, , “Adversary Politics,” 324.Google Scholar

42 John B. Stewart explains why opposition committee members may be more knowledgeable than government members: “First, since ministers no longer are appointed as members of the standing committee, while most members of the shadow cabinet are,... second, unless the ministerial majority in the House is very great—about 165 to 97—by the time the ministers, the deputy speakers, and the assistant deputy speaker, as well as the parliamentary secretaries... and the chairmen of the committees have been subtracted, the opposition will enjoy also the advantage of having a relatively large number of members available to fill its places on the committees” (The Canadian House of Commons, 169).

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44 Ibid.

45 This and subsequent information about members' descriptions of their links to agricultural groups and the importance of agricultural concerns to them was obtained by interviews and questionnaires in February-March, 1983.

46 Rush, , “Committees in the Canadian House of Commons,” 234.Google Scholar

47 Nordlinger, , “Representation,” 116.Google Scholar

48 The full title is “An Act to Regulate the Importation into Canada of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Meat and to Amend the Export and Import Permits Act.”

49 Conservative MP Charles Mayer: “I know the present bill is basically the same as we would have brought forward had we remained the government” (Minutes, Standing Committee on Agriculture, November 5, 1981, 45:19).

50 Ibid., June 17, 1982, 38:8–9, and November 5, 1981, 45:9 when Eugene Whelan acknowledged that the formula change was the same as the CCA had proposed.

51 To illustrate, PC member Bert Hargrave invited the CCA to delineate the dangers of interfering with the North American continental flow of live beef, while the NDP members queried whether the Meat Import Act was only a stop-gap measure that fell short of the appropriate remedy to ensure beef producers an adequate return—a national meat marketing agency (Minutes, Standing Committee on Agriculture, June 16, 1981; June 23, 1981).

52 Ibid., June 16, 1981, 40:22–24. On November 5. 1981, Conservative member Mayer argued that there was “no more democratic body” than the CCA (45:20).

53 Ibid., June 16, 1981,45:17.

54 Ibid., June 10, 1982. 81:28–29 (Eugene Whelan).

55 The full title is “An Act to Establish a Corporation called Canagrex to Promote. Facilitate and Engage in the Export of Agricultural and Food Products from Canada.”

56 Whelan, Eugene (Minutes, Standing Committee on Agriculture, June 10, 1982, 81:24)Google Scholar lists the groups for and against the bill. See also the editorial, “Foes of Canagrex,” Globe and Mail (Toronto), January 26, 1983, 6.Google Scholar

57 Minutes, Standing Committee on Agriculture, July 8, 1982, 87:31.

58 Ibid., June 29, 1982, 83:34.

59 In its June 1, 1982, presentation, the Consumers Association of Canada talked about “excessive government intervention” and claimed Canagrex “contravenes a competitive market place” (76:5). See also Wilson, Barry, “Canagrex Still a Hot Potato,” The Western Producer, November 25, 1982, 1.Google Scholar

60 See Pinard, Yvon's justification of S.O. 75(c) during Question Period, December 14, 1982 (House of Commons, Debates, 21565–66).Google Scholar

61 McLoughlin, Paul, “Canagrex Finds Some Support,” The Western Producer, January 13, 1983, 5Google Scholar, quoting Whelan's use of the word “substantial.” The NDP did not succeed in making co-operative credit societies, along with authorized banks, as eligible to maintain Canagrex accounts (Minutes, Standing Committee on Agriculture, July 15. 89:6). The Conservatives succeeded in procuring an amendment to Clause 13 that would prevent a conflict of interest on the part of directors of Canagrex. Two other amendments were also in response to Conservative suggestions. The annual report of Canagrex would be referred to the agriculture committee (Clause 40) and the minister of agriculture and Canagrex's board of directors would have more authority to preaudit Canagrex's three-year corporate plan (Clause 31). Another amendment met the NDP request that the auditor general's annual audit of Canagrex be extended to include “a comprehensive audit of the affairs of the Corporation” when he deemed it necessary (Clause 29). See also Wilson, Barry, “Canagrex: Once More to the Well.” The Western Producer. July 15, 1982, 26.Google Scholar

62 Minutes, Standing Committee on Agriculture, July 7, 1982, 86:24 and 86:23 (Liberal MPs Claude Tessier and Marcel Dionne, respectively).

63 See especially Liberal MP M. Dubois, ibid., April 29, 1982, 63:23.

64 Gordon Taylor, ibid., June 29, 1982, 84:44–45. As late as January 1983, two CFA affiliates, the Manitoba Farm Bureau and Alberta Unifarm, broke with the CFA to oppose Canagrex. See Wilson, Barry, “Canagrex touchy CFA issue,” The Western Producer, February 3, 1983.Google Scholar

65 Minutes, Standing Committee on Agriculture, May 18, 1982, 60:51.

66 The NDP pointed to the fact that membership in the CCA is not necessarily vol untary in either Alberta or British Columbia. Alberta cattlemen belong “because they pay a check-off and BC cattlemen because membership is required in order for eligibility in BC's commodity stabilization scheme (Gary Jones, President of the Canadian Cattlemen's Association, ibid., 69:51).

67 Ibid., May 20, 1982, 70:43 (Conservative MP, Stan Korchinski).

68 A story in the Globe and Mail (January 26, 1983, 6) spoke of massive producer opposition to Canagrex. This erroneous impression washrpart created by the political nature of the selection of witnesses invited to appear: the result was that the number of groups opposing Canagrex rivalled and perhaps.exceeded the number supporting it. In actual fact, the number of producers supporting Canagrex probably exceeded those opposing it.

69 Minutes, Standing Committee on Agriculture, June 23, 1982, 83:10–11.

70 Ibid., July 8, 1982, 87:41 (Conservative MP Art Malone).

71 Ibid., April 29, 1982, 63:10–12. Conservative MP Doug Neil questioned the Canadian Pork Council along similar lines on May 18, 1982, 69:12.

72 Ibid., June 23, 1982, 83:14 and June 29, 1982, 84:82, respectively.

73 House of Commons, Debates, December 11, 1981, 13972–73.

74 Appearing before the transport committee, Minister of Transport Jean-Luc Pepin told Conservative Bert Hargrave that those working on payments to producers would “have to find a solution, an option, that would be acceptable to the pools and would be acceptable also to the Quebec farm organizations” (Minnies, Standing Committee on Transport, June 29, 1983, 104:34).

75 During the three days of hearings in Regina, 72 groups presented briefs. During the two-day hearing in Edmonton (August 2–3), the transport committee heard from the government of Alberta, 21 groups and 8 individuals; in Vancouver (August 12), from the deputy minister of transport and 18 predominantly business and transportation groups; in Winnipeg (August 4–5), from the government of Manitoba, 31 individuals, and 24 groups. Several other organizations, including Canadian National Railways and Canadian Pacific Limited, appeared before the committee in Ottawa. The October 31 issue of the Standing Committee on Transport Proceedings contains the written submissions of 54 individuals and the November 3 issue contains 24 submissions of provincial government departments and organizations.

76 See, for example, Minnies, Standing Committee on Transport, August 10, 1983, 115:102.

77 Ibid., August 10, 1983, 115:98.

78 House of Commons, Debates, June 21, 1983, 2638.

79 Franks, C. E. S., “The Dilemma of the Standing Committee of the Canadian House of Commons,” this JOURNAL 4 (1971), 471.Google Scholar An alternative perspective, 14 years after Franks's prediction, is that of Pross, A. Paul (“Parliamentary Influence and the Diffusion of Power,” 263)Google Scholar, which suggests that groups' focus on parliament has enhanced the latter”s role in the policy process. The findings reported here are consistent with Pross's claim.

80 Mallory, J. R., The Structure of Canadian Government (rev. ed.;Toronto: Macmillan, 1984), 302.Google Scholar

81 The president of the Alberta Cattle Commission, Stan Berg, described the process of Crow change as “one of the most futile and inept examples of responsible democracy in the history of Canada.” Said Berg: “... having spent years of discussions and research on the whole reform issue, having involved hundreds of people and organizations and caused them to spend thousands of hours and millions of dollars, many of them by individual farmers, the government has created a railway subsidy program that could in large part have been worked out in a half-day meeting with the Minister of Transport and senior railway officials” (Minutes, Standing Committee on Transport, August 2, 1983, 108:71 and 108:72, respectively).

82 Dawson, Helen Jones, “National Pressure Groups and the Federal Government,” in Pross, (ed.). Pressure Group Behaviour, 34.Google Scholar