¹ Since the ownership of capital, not land, is the crucial factor in an industrial society, I shall not discuss Mill's views on land. It is important to note, however, that his approach was radical in form. Instead of beginning his analysis with the liberal assumption that an individual has the right to what he has produced, Mill always argued that in the case of the ownership of land the welfare of the majority (including their right not to be subject to irresponsible power) must be the criterion. It is precisely this kind of important test, as we shall see, that he did not apply to the ownership of capital.

² Principles of Political Economy, Robson, J. M., ed., in Collected Works of John Stuart Mill (Toronto, 1965), II, 215Google Scholar, See also 227.

³ “The Right of Property in Land,” Dissertations and Discussions (London, 1875), IV, 288.

⁴ Principles of Political Economy, II, 208.

⁵ Ibid., III, 934.

⁶ Ibid., 811.

⁷ Ibid. See also Elliott, H. S. R., ed., The Letters of John Stuart Mill (London, 1910), I, 248.Google Scholar

⁸ “Vindication of the French Revolution of February 1848,” Dissertations and Discussions (London, 1859), II, 395. There is an important difference, of course, between exertion and productivity. One man through little effort but with more skill may produce more than another who has less ability but works harder. At times Mill indicated an awareness of the difference, but normally his position was that greater rewards should go to those whose greater exertion results in greater productivity, i.e., he normally considered them together. When this is done the practical effect is for productivity per se to become the criterion because it is quantifiable.

⁹ Principles of Political Economy, II, 215–17.

¹⁰ Ibid., 215.

¹¹ Ibid., 216.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid., 217.

¹⁴ I have made such a criticism in the fifth chapter of my doctoral thesis, “The Good Society of John Stuart Mill” (Toronto, 1966). One of the main criticisms is perhaps worth indicating. The abstinence argument used to justify an economic return on capital is not persuasive. In a financial relation between two or more an economic return for abstinence is just, i.e., non-exploitative, only when all the parties are in an equal position to abstain. This is not the case in capitalism where one class owns the means of production and the rest in order to survive must work for them. Mill himself pointed out the coercion involved in capitalist wage-relations. See “The Claims of Labour,” Dissertations and Discussions (1859), II, 206. Capitalism does not provide the conditions in which all have equal access to the means of assuring self-development; Mill stipulated that a good society should do so. See Utilitarianism in Utilitarianism, Liberty, Representative Government (London, 1954), 58–9.

¹⁵ Principles of Political Economy, II, 225n.

¹⁶ See V. W. Bladen's Introduction in the Principles of Political Economy. I give additional reasons for reaching this conclusion in “The Good Society of John Stuart Mill,” chap. V.

¹⁷ The Spirit of the Age, von Hayek, F. A., ed. (Chicago, 1942), 60.Google Scholar

¹⁸ “Civilization,” Dissertations and Discussions (1859) I, 164.

¹⁹ Ibid., 170.

²⁰ Ibid., 173.

²¹ “Armand Carrel,” ibid., I, 234.

²² “Endowments,” Dissertations and Discussions (1875), IV, 22–23.

²³ Considerations on Representative Government in Utilitarianism, Liberty, Representative Government, 116.

²⁴ “Tocqueville on Democracy in America, II” Dissertations and Discussions (1859), II, 67.

²⁵ Ibid., 73.

²⁶ “The Claims of Labour,” 189–90.

²⁷ Ibid., 190. Mill also added that without accompanying ideas favourable circumstances might lead to nothing.

²⁸ Mineka, F. E., ed., The Earlier Letters of John Stuart Mill, in Collected Works of John Stuart Mill (Toronto, 1963), XIII, 641.Google Scholar In A System of Logic, Mill attributed more influence to the causal role of ideas in history than I have suggested here. However, even there he emphasized the importance of their historical context and stressed their long-run influence.

²⁹ Spirit of the Age, 92.

³⁰ Autobiography (New York, 1957), 10. Italics added.

³¹ “Tocqueville on Democracy in America, II,” 15. Italics added.

³² “The Claims of Labour,” 192–3. In the Principles of Political Economy, III, 760, Mill claimed that all privileged and powerful classes have used their power in the interest of their own selfishness. They never consciously ruled in the interests of the poor “who were, in their estimation, degraded, by being under the necessity of working for their benefit.”

³³ Representative Government, 248.

³⁴ Ibid., 249.

³⁵ Ibid., 251.

³⁶ Ibid., 254–5.

³⁷ Ibid., 310.

³⁸ A System of Logic (London, 7th ed., 1868), II, 482.

³⁹ Ibid., 481.

⁴⁰ “Tocqueville on Democracy in America, I,” in Himmelfarb, Gertrude, ed., Essays on Politics and Culture (New York, 1963), 175.Google Scholar

⁴¹ Principles of Political Economy, III, 762.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Ibid., 763.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 767.

⁴⁵ “Tocqueville on Democracy in America, II,” 45.

⁴⁶ “The Claims of Labour,” 188–9.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 205.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 207.

⁴⁹ “Thornton on Labour and Its Claims,” Dissertations and Discussions (1875), IV, 80.

⁵⁰ On Liberty in Utilitarianism, Liberty, Representative Government, 7.

⁵¹ Representative Government, 254.

⁵² “Thornton on Labour and Its Claims,” 80.

⁵³ Representative Government, 255.

⁵⁴ Utilitarianism, 28.

⁵⁵ “Nature,” in Nature and the Utility of Religion (New York, 1958), 32. See also An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy (London, 4th ed., 1872), 585.

⁵⁶ “Civilization,” 203.

⁵⁷ Auguste Comte and Positivism (London, 1908), 83.

⁵⁸ Autobiography, 148–9.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 149.

⁶⁰ The Subjection of Women in On Liberty, Representative Government, The Subjection of Women (London, 1954), 451. In A System of Logic, II, 443, Mill remarked that some characteristics of man could not be explained in terms of social conditioning alone; some instincts were involved. However, he went on to assert that such instincts could be “modified to any extent, or entirely conquered” by the environment.

⁶¹ Earlier Letters, XII, 31–2.

⁶² “Civilization,” 177.

⁶³ Ibid., 178.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 183.

⁶⁵ “A Prophecy,” Dissertations and Discussions. (London, 1859), I, 285.

⁶⁶ Autobiography, 110.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 149–50.

⁶⁸ Socialism (Chicago, 1849), 34.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 35.

⁷⁰ Earlier Letters, XII, 40, 47–8. See also Utilitarianism, 10, for Mill's observation that it is because of the “occupations to which their position in life has devoted them” that most people do not prefer higher values than they do. They do not do so because quite literally they are no longer able to.

⁷¹ Earlier Letters, XII, 48.

⁷² “Tocqueville on Democracy in America, I,” 186.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Representative Government, 202–18.

⁷⁵ “Civilization,” 167.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 168.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Ibid., 188.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Ibid., 189.

⁸¹ “The Claims of Labour,” 200.

⁸² Ibid., 204.

⁸³ Ibid., 210.

⁸⁴ Ibid., 216–17.

⁸⁵ To show how central the notion of co-operation is to Mill's idea of the good life in a modern society would go well beyond the limits of this paper. I have attempted to do this in “The Good Society of John Stuart Mill.” See: “Civilization,” 166–71, 189; The Principles of Political Economy, II, 768–94, 943; “The Claims of Labour,” 210–14; Earlier Letters, XIII, 739; August Comte, 149; and Autobiography, 148–9.

⁸⁶ “The Claims of Labour,” 210–11. See also Principles of Political Economy, III, 768.

⁸⁷ See Macpherson, C. B., The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism (Oxford, 1962), 53–9.Google Scholar See also his “The Maximization of Democracy,” in Laslett, P. and Runciman, W., eds., Philosophy, Politics, and Society, Third Series (Oxford, 1967)Google Scholar; and The Real World of Democracy (Toronto, 1965), chaps. V and VI.

⁸⁸ One of the central purposes of this paper has been to show that Mill clearly saw the causal connection between capitalist economic institutions and these four moral deficiencies of capitalist societies. Although Mill believed that some improvement in these areas could be made within a capitalist framework, as we have shown above, the conclusion to be drawn from his sociology, which he himself saw, is that such improvement could not be substantial. I have asserted that twentieth-century capitalist democracies, in spite of improvements, have retained the moral inadequacies seen by Mill in the nineteenth century. That they have, and have done so for Millian reasons, can be demonstrated. This would, however, require another paper. At this point I simply suggest that it is the case.

⁸⁹ Generally speaking the choice is between the “revisionist” approach begun by Joseph Schumpeter and subsequently accepted by many American political scientists, and that of such theorists as C. Bay, T. B. Bottomore, E. Fromm, and C. B. Macpherson. There is some evidence to suggest that there is growing critical awareness by some American political scientists of the moral limitations of the first approach. See Walker, J. L., “A Critique of the Elitist Theory of Democracy,” American Political Science Review, LX (June 1966)Google Scholar; and Bachrach, P., “Corporate Authority and Democratic Theory,” a paper presented at the 1966 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, and The Theory of Democratic Elitism (Boston, 1967).Google Scholar A common limitation of even the critics, however, is their failure to see that classical democratic norms should be applied to economic as well as “political” institutions. The contemporary significance of Professor Bachrach's work lies in his arguing persuasively that if two of the values of democracy viz., accountability by those who hold power in society to the majority and meaningful participation in decision-making, are to be realized, then “political” must also include economic institutions. To socialists the argument is not unfamiliar.