1 To date, most relevant research has been confined to the United States. See Prewitt, Kenneth, Eulau, Heinz and Zisk, Betty H., “Political Socialization and Political Roles,” Public Opinion Quarterly 30 (1966), 569–82CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Asher, Herbert B., “The Learning of Legislative Norms,” American Political Science Reivew 67 (1973), 499–513CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Bell, Charles G. and Price, Charles M., The First Term (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1975)Google Scholar. The studies by Asher, and Bell and Price are noteworthy for the use of panel designs to measure changes in legislators' role orientations during incumbency. In Canada, see Price, Richard G., Clarke, Harold D. and Krause, Robert, “The Socialization of Freshman Legislators: The Case of Canadian MPs,” in Pammett, J. H. and Whittington, M. S. (eds.), Foundations of Political Culture (Toronto: Macmillan, 1976)Google Scholar, chap. 11; Clarke, Harold D. and Price, Richard G., “A Note on the Pre-Nomination Role Socialization of Freshman Members of Parliament,” this Journal 10 (1977), 391–406Google Scholar; and Clarke, Harold D. and Price, Richard G., “The Role Socialization of Canadian Legislators: The Case of Provincial MLAs,” unpublished paper, Dept. of Political Science, University of Windsor, 1978Google Scholar.

On the significance of legislators' role orientations for understanding aspects of behaviour not constrained by party discipline (for example, constituency service) see Clarke, Harold D., Price, Richard G. and Krause, Robert, “Constituency Service Among Canadian Provincial Legislators: Basic Findings and a Test of Three Hypotheses,” this Journal 8 (1975), 520–42Google Scholar; and Clarke, Harold D., “Determinants of Provincial Constituency Service Behaviour: A Multivariate Analysis,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 3 (1978), 601–28CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

2 In the context of studying legislative behaviour, role socialization refers to the manner in which incumbents of legislative offices acquire the “values, skills, loyalties and cognitive maps” which, in their entirety, constitute legislators' images of their jobs. See Bell and Price, The First Term, 12–13, 29–35.

3 Clarke and Price, “Pre-Nomination Role Socialization,” 397.

4 Clarke, Price and Krause, “Constituency Service Among Canadian Provincial Legislators,” 530; Komberg, Allan and Mishler, William, Influence in Parliament: Canada (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1976), 309–10Google Scholar.

5 See, for example, Jackson, Robert J. and Atkinson, Michael, The Canadian Legislative System (Toronto: Macmillan, 1974)Google Scholar, chaps. 4, 5; Kornberg and Mishler, Influence in Parliament, chap. 10.

6 Schlesinger, Joseph A., Ambition and Politics (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966)Google Scholar, chap. 1. See also Mayhew, David P., Congress: The Electoral Connection (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), 11–77Google Scholar.

7 Much of the relevant literature is cited in Thompson, William N., “An Analysis of the Legislative Ambitions of State Constitutional Convention Delegates,” Western Political Quarterly 29 (1976), 427, n. 10CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

8 Legislative studies in Canada employing political ambition as an explanatory variable include Atkinson, Michael, “Policy Interests of Provincial Backbenchers and the Effects of Political Ambition,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 3 (1978), 626–46CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Clarke, “Determinants of Provincial Constituency Service Behaviour,” 608–10. Regarding political opportunity structures in Canada, see Surich, Joachim and Williams, Robert J., “Some Characteristics of Candidates in the 1972 Canadian Federal Election,” paper delivered at the annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association,Toronto, 1974Google Scholar; March, Roman, The Myth of Parliament (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1974)Google Scholar, chap. 2; Mishler, William, “Nominating Attractive Candidates for Parliament: Recruitment to the Canadian House of Commons,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 3 (1978), 581–600CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

9 On the cabinet selection process see Matheson, W. A., The Prime Minister and Cabinet (Toronto: Methuen, 1976)Google Scholar, chaps. 3, 5.

10 Strictly speaking, the question asked about job concepts in the pre-nomination period. Queries concerning role socialization during the election campaign reveal that the chief effects of the campaign were to reinforce the salience of constituency in job concepts and to give future MPs an indication of the heavy demands which would be placed on their times and resources should they be elected. Price, Clarke and Krause, “The Socialization of Freshman Legislators,” 221–25.

11 Schlesinger, Ambition and Politics, 10.

12 For example, in their study of the 28th Parliament Kornberg and Mishler found that 67.8 per cent of the MPs agreed with the statement: “I am certain that not doing these things [constituency service] will assure that you don't get elected.” (Emphasis in original.) A total of 78.7 per cent agreed that “Even statesmen have to be reelected and for that you have to look after your constituents.” Kornberg and Mishler, Influence in Parliament, 88. Similarly, in a nationwide study of provincial MLAs, Clarke, Price and Krause found that 90.1 per cent agreed with the statement that “The services a provincial legislator performs for his constituents are important in getting him reelected.” Clarke, Price and Krause, “Constituency Service Among Canadian Provincial Legislators,” 534.

13 For descriptions of these routines written by MPs themselves see Aiken, Gordon, The Backbencher (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1974)Google Scholar; Symes, R. Cyril, “A Day in the Life of a Member of Parliament,” The History and Social Science Teacher 11 (1976), 13–17Google Scholar; MacGuigan, Mark, “Parliamentary Reform: Impediments to an Enlarged Role for the Backbencher,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 3 (1978), 671–82CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

14 These figures are quite similar to those reported in a study of provincial MLAs. When asked about the extent of change in their job concepts after incumbency experience, 23.1 per cent stated “a great deal”; 54.3 per cent—“somewhat”; and 22.7 per cent—“virtually nothing.” Clarke and Price, “The Role Socialization of Canadian Legislators,” 12.

15 See, for example, Kornberg and Mishler, Influence in Parliament, 63–73.

16 Schlesinger, Ambition and Politics, 6.

17 Nor is the maintenance of party discipline. High levels of party discipline are exhibited by the vast majority of MPs. Relatedly, while ambition is probably a contributing factor in the maintenance of party discipline (“if you want to get along, go along”), other factors are involved. For example, Komberg has argued that pre-incumbency socialization regarding the norm of partisanship and the role of cohesive parties in a Westminster model parliamentary system is important. Komberg, Allan, Canadian Legislative Behavior (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1967), 134–35. See also MacGuigan, “Parliamentary Reform,” 679–80Google Scholar.

18 It may be assumed that MPs are aware of the importance of regional and ethnic representational criteria as factors influencing the selection of cabinet ministers. Recognizing these factors are beyond their control, progressively ambitious MPs have no alternative but to make use of available personal resources and opportunities provided by the existing political and institutional context when designing career advancement strategies.

19 Kornberg and Mishler, Influence in Parliament, chap. 9.

20 Such emphases in job concepts do not have unambiguous behavioural implications. MPs wishing to demonstrate their policy concerns or acumen will have to decide how best to do so. Becoming a committee chairman or a parliamentary secretary is one strategy, working in caucus is another. On the use of parliamentary secretaryships for this purpose, see Matheson, The Prime Minister and the Cabinet, 72–74. In any case, matters of style may also be important. Illustrative is the comment by a freshman regarding how different members attempt to make policy inputs in caucus: “You listen to the quiet ones, not the Members who are noisy. The noisy ones in the first six months have faded; the quiet ones have come on.”

21 To ascertain MPs' political ambitions the following questions were asked in both 1974 and 1978: “As an MP there are many ways your political career could develop. For example, some MPs wish to become a member of a particular committee, a parliamentary secretary, or perhaps, depending on political circumstances, a cabinet minister or member of the “shadow cabinet.” Realistically speaking, what are your short-term goals in this regard?” “Thinking of the more distant future, with due allowance for the uncertainties of political life, what are your longer-term goals in this regard?” Both the pre-incumbency and incumbency ambition variables are constructed by dividing the MPs into two categories: (a) those with major office goals, such as cabinet, shadow cabinet, “frontbench,” prime minister, party leader; (b) those with lesser or no office goals. In the multivariate analyses these two categories are scored 1 and 0 respectively.

22 The failure of more MPs to mention reelection as a short-term goal may be a result of the fact that a previous question had been posed concerning their desire to run again. All but two members indicated that they definitely would seek office in 1979, and several stated that they had already been re-nominated. Thus, the assumption of at least short-term static ambition would appear warranted in an overwhelming majority of cases.

23 Fletcher, Frederick J. and Goddard, Arthur M., “Government and Opposition: Structural Influences on Provincial Legislators,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 3 (1978), 647–70CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also Clarke, Harold D., Price, Richard G. and Krause, Robert, “Backbenchers,” in Bellamy, David J., Pammett, Jon H. and Rowat, Donald C. (eds.), The Provincial Political Systems (Toronto: Methuen, 1976), 228–32Google Scholar.

24 Matheson, The Prime Minister and the Cabinet, 71–74.

25 On the significance of pre-election party experience see Clarke and Price, “Pre-Nomination Role Socialization,” 398–403.

26 Level of formal education is a three category variable: (a) equal to or less than an undergraduate college or university degree; (b) undergraduate degree plus some graduate or professional training; (c) graduate or professional degree. For purposes of multivariate analysis these categories are scored 0, 1, and 2 respectively.

27 Consonant with this hypothesis is the finding that 50 per cent of the freshmen indicated that “materials learned in college or university” provided them with information about the job of being an MP. See Clarke, Price and Krause, “The Socialization of Freshman Legislators,” 220, table 2. The political socialization effects of post-secondary education on future MPs may be atypical. The general failure of colleges and universities to impart knowledge of the political system is argued in Symons, T. H. B., To Know Ourselves: The Report of the Commission on Canadian Studies (Ottawa: Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada, 1975), 65Google Scholar.

28 Cabinet ministers consistently have had higher socioeconomic statuses prior to entering Parliament than have other MPs. See Komberg and Mishler, Influence in Parliament, chap. 8, passim.

29 For a description of the pre-incumbency party activity index see Clarke and Price, “Pre-Nomination Role Socialization,” 406.

30 This is not to say that party activity invariably fuels political ambition. Presumably, however, those for whom such activity served to dampen ambition would not become candidates. In some instances election may serve to catalyze the latent ambitions of MPs who had allowed themselves to be nominated primarily as an act of service to their parties. On the relationship between party activity and attitudes toward public office, see Kornberg, Allan, Smith, Joel and Clarke, Harold D., Citizen Politicians—Canada (Durham, N. C.: Carolina Academic Press, 1979)Google Scholar, chap. 8. On party activity and recruitment as a candidate for Parliament see Mishler, “Nominating Attractive Candidates for Parliament,” passim.

31 See, for example, Porter, John, The Vertical Mosaic (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965), 398–403CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Kornberg and Mishler, Influence in Parliament, 262–67.

32 Blalock, Hubert, Causal Inferences in Nonexperimental Research (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1964), 27–60Google Scholar.

33 MPs who have been party activists may be receptive to or oriented toward different socializing agents and experiences. For example, prior party activity may have stimulated or heightened some MPs' interest in policy formulation. This interest may lead such MPs to interact with senior colleagues with similar interests and/or to search out arenas (such as caucus, committees) for the development and expression of policy concerns. Prior party experience might also provide MPs with political “savvy” about who shares their policy interests and/or how best to express these interests. As a result, orientations acquired prior to incumbency will be reinforced.

34 Kim, Jae-On and Kohout, Frank J., “Special Topics in General Linear Models,” in Nie, Norman et al., Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (Second edition; Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1975), 383–92Google Scholar.

35 It is noteworthy that the present data do not indicate the existence of a statistically significant interaction effect of progressive ambitions and being a parliamentary secretary on the number of different job features cited net of the main effects of ambition, position and other variables used in the model presented above. This finding, however, does not preclude the possibility that such an interaction effect exists regarding more subtle instrumental aspects of legislative role socialization not captured by the job image variable utilized in the present analysis. Also, existing data do not permit controls for variance in the types of tasks performed by parliamentary secretaries. As noted, task variance may be an important factor conditioning the role socialization impact of occupancy of particular positions. On the use of interaction terms in multiple regression analysis see Jae-On Kim and Frank J. Kohout, “Special Topics in General Linear Models,” 372–73.

36 Clarke and Price, “Pre-Nomination Role Socialization,” 403–05.