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Exploring Complex Judicial–Executive Interaction: Federal Government Concessions in Charter of Rights Cases

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 December 2010

Matthew A. Hennigar
Matthew A. Hennigar*
Affiliation:
Brock University
*
Matthew A. Hennigar, Department of Political Science, Brock University, 500 Glenridge Avenue, St. Catharines, ON L2S 3A1, [email protected]
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Abstract

Abstract. This article analyzes the federal government's concessions before the Supreme Court of Canada that its own laws are unconstitutional under the Charter of Rights, marking the first time that concessions have been analyzed empirically in Canada. Using data from 1984–2004, the author finds that full concessions of unconstitutionality are exceptionally rare but that partial concessions are not uncommon. There is weak support for the hypothesis that governments are more willing to concede laws passed by previous governments of a different party, but, on the whole, the federal government appears committed to defending its laws in court. The author explores the implications of this for the relationship between the judiciary and the executive, including judicial activism, Charter dialogue and government use of the courts to advance policy goals.

Résumé. Cet article analyse les concessions du gouvernement fédéral devant la Cour suprême du Canada que ses propres lois violent la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés. Il s'agit, en fait, de la première analyse empirique de ces concessions au Canada. S'appuyant sur des données des années 1984 à 2004, l'auteur constate que les concessions complètes d'inconstitutionnalité sont exceptionnellement rares, mais que les concessions partielles ne sont pas inhabituelles. On donne peu d'appui à l'hypothèse que les gouvernements sont plus disposés à concéder les lois passées par des gouvernements précédents représentant un autre parti, et, dans l'ensemble, le gouvernement fédéral semble être engagé à défendre ses lois devant les cours. L'auteur explore l'incidence de cette situation sur les relations entre le pouvoir judiciaire et le pouvoir exécutif, abordant, entre autres, la question de l'activisme judiciaire, du dialogue sur la Charte et de l'utilisation des tribunaux par le gouvernement pour promouvoir certaines politiques.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique , Volume 43 , Issue 4 , December 2010 , pp. 821 - 842
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Political Science Association 2010

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