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Dangerous Liaisons: Dyadic Power Transitions and the Risk of Militarized Disputes and Wars

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 June 2013

David Sobek  and
Jeremy Wells
David Sobek*
Affiliation:
Louisiana State University
Jeremy Wells*
Affiliation:
Louisiana State University
*
David Sobek, Department of Political Science, 240 Stubbs Hall, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, LA 70803-5433, [email protected]
Jeremy Wells, Department of Political Science, 240 Stubbs Hall, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, LA 70803-5433, [email protected]
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Abstract

Abstract. Power transition theory has been both theoretically and empirically developed in the context of a hierarchy (both global and regional). Yet the logic of the theory describes the interactions of a hegemon in relation to a rising challenger, which is essentially a dyadic interaction. As a result, we argue that power transition theory is a dyadic theory that can be examined across all dyads. We test power transition in a data set of all non-directed dyads from 1816 to 2001. Our results find robust evidence that dyadic power transitions increase the risk of militarized disputes. In addition, this result is not actually contingent on the dyad containing either powerful states or those with dissimilar preferences.

Résumé. La théorie de la transition du pouvoir a été à la fois théorique et empirique développée dans le cadre d'une hiérarchie (à la fois mondial et régional). Pourtant, la logique de la théorie décrit les interactions d'une puissance hégémonique par rapport à un challenger en hausse, qui est essentiellement une interaction dyadique. En conséquence, nous soutenons que la théorie de la transition du pouvoir est une théorie dyadique qui peut être examiné à travers toutes les dyades. Nous testons transition de puissance dans un ensemble de toutes les dyades non-directifs 1816–2001 données. Nos résultats trouvent des preuves solides que les transitions de pouvoir dyadique augmentent le risque de conflits militarisés. En outre, ce résultat n'est pas réellement subordonnée à la dyade contenant soit des Etats puissants ou ceux qui ont des préférences différentes.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique , Volume 46 , Issue 1 , March 2013 , pp. 69 - 92
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Political Science Association 2013 

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