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The Charter's Influence on Legislation: Political Strategizing about Risk

Presidential Address to the Canadian Political Science Association, Regina, Saskatchewan, May 31, 2018

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 November 2018

Janet L. Hiebert
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Abstract

Commentators and critics often invoke the metaphor “Charter proofing” to emphasize how much the Charter and judicial review have influenced legislation. This metaphor implies that proposed legislation is evaluated carefully for its consistency with Charter rulings as a condition of passage because decision makers believe legislation should respect judicial interpretations of constitutional norms and/or because they engage in risk-averse behaviour out of self-interest to minimize the likelihood that legislation could subsequently be challenged and declared unconstitutional. However, it is not clear that the federal government is as worried about having legislation declared invalid as many assume. If this is so, federal government responses to the Charter raise an interesting puzzle. The government has both the resources and the institutional capacity to anticipate judicial concerns and integrate judicial norms into legislation to minimize the likelihood of having legislation declared unconstitutional. So why does it not act in a more risk-averse manner at the outset, in order to protect legislation from the possibility of judicial invalidation? This address offers a five-part explanation to this puzzle that emphasizes the significance of political strategizing about risk.

Résumé

Les commentateurs et les critiques invoquent souvent la métaphore de la « vérification de conformité » pour souligner à quel point la Charte et le contrôle judiciaire ont influencé la législation. Cette métaphore implique que la conformité de la législation proposée avec les décisions de la Charte est évaluée avec soin comme condition d'adoption, parce que les décideurs croient que la législation devrait respecter les interprétations judiciaires des normes constitutionnelles et/ou adopter des comportements à risque par intérêt personnel afin de minimiser la probabilité que la législation puisse être contestée et déclarée inconstitutionnelle par la suite. Cependant, il n'est pas clair si le gouvernement fédéral soit à ce point préoccupé de voir une loi déclarée invalide comme beaucoup le supposent. Si tel est le cas, les réponses du gouvernement fédéral à la Charte soulèvent un casse-tête intéressant. Le gouvernement dispose à la fois des ressources et de la capacité institutionnelle nécessaires pour anticiper les préoccupations judiciaires et intégrer les normes judiciaires dans la législation afin de réduire au minimum la probabilité que la législation soit déclarée inconstitutionnelle. Alors pourquoi n'agit-il pas d'emblée avec une plus grande aversion au risque afin de protéger la législation contre la possibilité d'invalidation judiciaire ? Ce discours offre une explication en cinq parties de ce casse-tête qui met l'accent sur l'importance de l'élaboration de stratégies politiques en matière de risque.

Type
Research Article/Étude originale
Information
Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique , Volume 51 , Issue 4 , December 2018 , pp. 727 - 747
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Political Science Association (l'Association canadienne de science politique) and/et la Société québécoise de science politique 2018 

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Footnotes

I want to thank Kiera Ladner for helping and supporting me in making my opening welcome statement when delivering this Address in Regina in Cree. I also want to thank my colleague Kyle Hanniman for his challenging suggestions about how I interpret and characterize political strategizing.

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