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The Charter in the Supreme Court of Canada: The Importance of Which Judges Hear an Appeal*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 November 2009

Andrew D. Heard
Andrew D. Heard
Affiliation:
Dalhousie University
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Abstract

A traditional focus on the collective, institutional operation of the Supreme Court of Canada has obscured the practical impact on the Charter of Rights of the personal views held by the individual members of the Court. A study of all the Charter cases decided by the Supreme Court from 1983 to 1989 reveals a profound divergence of opinions within the Court. The differences are seen not only in each judge's overall support for Charter claims but also in the patterns of agreement between bilateral pairings of judges who have heard the same cases. The use of subsets of judges to sit on panels to hear Charter cases has meant that both the outcome of Charter cases and the content of our rights have depended to a large extent upon which judges happened to sit on the panels that heard the cases.

Résumé

Une tradition de recherche centrée sur le fonctionnement collectif et institutionnel de la Cour suprême du Canada a gardé dans l'ombre l'impact des opinions personnelles de chaque membre de la Cour sur la Charte de droits et libertés. Or, l'analyse de tous les jugements rendus sur la Charte par la Cour suprême entre 1983 et 1989 révèle de profondes divergences d'opinion entre les juges. Ces divergences sont manifestes tant du point de vue de l'attitude générale de chaque juge envers les revendications appuyées sur la Charte, que par rapport aux prises de position des juges ayant à statuer sur une même cause, Étant donné la pratique de la Cour de siéger en sous-groupe, tant la résolution des causes afférant à la Charte que la définition de nos droits ont été affectées dans une large mesure par l'identité des juges qui ont pris part à ces décisions.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique , Volume 24 , Issue 2 , June 1991 , pp. 289 - 307
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Political Science Association (l'Association canadienne de science politique) and/et la Société québécoise de science politique 1991

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References

1 See Baar, Carl and Baar, Ellen, “Diagnostic Adjudication in Appellate Courts: The Supreme Court of Canada and the Charter of Rights,” Osgoode Hall Law Journal 27 (1989), 1–25Google Scholar, and Petter, Andrew, “Immaculate Deception: The Charter's Hidden Agenda,” The Advocate 45 (1987), 857–866.

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17 Morton, Russell and Withey, “The Supreme Court's First 100 Charter of Rights Decisions.”

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19 R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30.

20 Re Public Service Employees Relations Act (Aha.), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313, and Public Service Alliance of Canada v. The Queen, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 424; and RWDSU v. Saskatchewan, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 460.

21 For this test see R.v. Oakes, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 103 at 135–40, and R. v. Edwards Books, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713, at 768.

22 Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (A.G.) et al., [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1322.

23 For example, United States of America v. Cotroni; United States of America v. El Zein, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 149.

24 Estey dissented in R. v. Wigglesworth, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 541, butsided with the rest of the panel in Burnham v. Metropolitan Toronto Police, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 572; Trumbley and Pugh v. Metropolitan Toronto Police, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 577; and Trimm v. Durham Regional Police, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 582.

25 [1983] 1 S.C.R. 43.

26 [1984] 1 S.C.R. 357.

27 For instance, R. v. Simmons, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 495 is not counted as a successful case. Even though the Court decided that the claimant's rights had been infringed by a customs search in a manner that could not be saved under s. 1, the evidence gained was not excluded under s.24(2).

28 Tate and Sittiwong, “Decision Making in the Canadian Supreme Court,” 902.

29 All the data referring to decisions and opinions include oral decisions delivered from the bench that have been reported in the Supreme Court Reports.

30 Singh et al. v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177.

31 R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30.

32 However, several of these were short oral decisions.

33 Chi square significance = 0.024.

34 Re Public Employee Relations Act (Alta.), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313; Public Service Alliance of Canada v. The Queen, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 424; and RWDSU v. Saskatchewan, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 460.

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