1 “Vulnerability” as used here is shorthand for “vulnerability dependence, ” which refers to a relationship in which one element is either supported by another element or reliant upon it for fulfillment of a need. For an explication of the term dependence (and also of the related terms independence, interdependence, autonomy, and dependency), see the excellent article by Baldwin, David A., “Interdependence and Power: A Conceptual Analysis, “ International Organization 34 (1980), 471–506.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Also see Jordan, Amos A. and Kilmarx, Robert A., Strategic Mineral Dependence: The Stockpile Dilemma, The Washington Papers, Vol. 70, no. 8 (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1979), 18–19.Google Scholar

2 Fagen, Richard R., “Mexican Petroleum and U.S. National Security, ” International Security 4 (1979), 39.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

3 Japan gets some 70 per cent of its imported oil from Persian Gulf producers.Comparative dependence for Western Europe is 57 per cent, and for the United States, 25 percent. Chubin, Shahram, “U.S. Security Interests in the Persian Gulf in the 1980s, ” Daedalus 247 (1980), 37.Google Scholar For the entire Middle East (including Libya), comparative OECD dependencies in 1978 were: Japan, 75 per cent of total imports; Western Europe, 75 per cent; and the United States, 40 per cent. Rockefeller Foundation, Working Paper on International Energy Supply: A Perspective from the Industrial World (London: Institute of Petroleum, 1978), 15.Google Scholar

4 For discussions of this issue, see Kemp, Geoffrey, “Military Force and Middle East Oil, ” in Deese, David A. and Nye, Joseph S.(eds.), Energy and Security, A Report of Harvardďs Energy and Security Research Project (Cambridge: Ballinger, 1981), 365–85Google Scholar; Atlantic Council of the United States, Special Working Group on the Middle East, Oil and Turmoil: Western Choices in the Middle East, Policy Papers: Security Series (Boulder: Westview Press, 1979), 33–35: Glakas, Thomas Peter, “Instability in the Gulf Region: A New Challenge for Western Security?” NATO Review 29 (1981), 20–23Google Scholar; and Bucknell III, Howard, Energy and National Defense (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1981), chap. 8.Google Scholar

5 Kelly, J. B., Arabia, the Gulf and the West (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1980), vii–viii.Google Scholar

6 Jordan, Amos A., “ Energy and National Security: Sizing Up the Risks, ” Washington Quarterly 3 (1980), 156CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

7 Ibid., 155.

8 Tucker, Robert W., “The Purposes of American Power,” Foreign Affairs 59 (1980/1981), 251CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For an earlier assessment of the use of force in the Gulf, see the same author's ““Oil: The Issue of American Intervention, ” Commentary 59 (1975), 21–31.Google Scholar

9 See, for this line of reasoning, Noreng, Øystein, Oil Politics in the 1980s: Patterns of international Cooperation, 1980s Project/Council on Foreign Relations (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978)Google Scholar, chap. 7; and the draft article written in October 1980 by Peter F. Cowhey and Leonard W. Ross, “The Search for Stability: The Case for an Oil Agreement. ” For an argument stressing both the need for “good diplomacy ”and the avoidance of force, see MajUlin, Robert R., “U.S. National Security and Middle Eastern Oil, ” Military Review 172 (1979), 39–49.Google Scholar

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11 By short-term is meant a period from the present to two years hence; medium-term, between two and ten years.

12 For a quantitative assessment of future supply probabilities, see Tom Neville et al., “The Energy Problem: Costs and Policy Options, ” Staff Working Paper(Washington: Department of Energy, Office of Gas and Integrated Analysis, March1980), cited in Deese and Nye, Energy and Security, 313.

13 Risk-assessment methodology is criticized in Bowring, Philip, “A Slap on the Risk”, Far Eastern Economic Review (7–13 August 1981), 50–51.Google Scholar

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15 I am indebted to Micallef, Joseph V. for drawing my attention to this quote in his “Political Risk Assessment,” Columbia Journal of World Business 16 (1981), 47.Google Scholar

16 For the argument that the Soviets intend to practise “economic cannibalism,” see Moss, Robert, “Reaching for Oil: The Soviets' Bold Mideast Strategy,” Saturday Review, April 4, 1980, 14–22Google Scholar; and Friedland, Edward, Seabury, Paul, and Wildavsky, Aaron, The Great Détente Disaster: Oil and the Decline of American Foreign Policy (New York: Basic Books, 1975), 50Google Scholar. The expression “economic cannibalism” stems from a 1948 speech by Harvard professor Charles C. Abbott, who applied it to an analysis of assumed Soviet intentions in postwar Western Europe. Eckes, Alfred E. Jr., The United States and the Global Struggle for Minerals (Austin: University of Texas, 1979), 149.Google Scholar

17 Quoted in Pranger, Robert J., “Six U.S. Perspectives on Soviet Foreign Policy Intentions, ” AEI reign Policy and Defense Review 1 (1979), 3.Google Scholar For the general problem of knowledge of Soviet goals and capabilities, see Barry, Donald D. and Barner-Barry, Carol, Contemporary Soviet Politics: An Introduction (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1978), chap. 15, “What Do We Really Know about Soviet Politics? ”Google Scholar

18 An excellent discussion of theories of revolution and their utility for predictive purposes is Cohan, A. S., Theories of Revolution (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1975).Google Scholar

19 Feldman, Elliott J., comp., Canada and Mexico: The Comparative and Joint Politics of Energy, Harvard Center for International Affairs: Policy Paper no. 3 (Cambridge: University Consortium for Research on North America, 1981), 48.Google Scholar

20 Rummel, R. J. and Heenan, David A., “How Multinationals Analyze Political Risk,” Harvard Business Review (1978), 67–76Google Scholar. This study was examining the prospects of Indonesian political instability, but its implications are intended to be relevant for the analysis of all sorts of political risk.

21 Robert Black, “Energy Tensions within the Western World: Systemic Problems in Face of Potential Oil ‘‘Scarcity, ’ ” a paper presented to the International Studies Association, Toronto, 1979, 16.

22 For an example, see U.S. Senate, Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, The Geopolitics of Oil (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980)Google Scholar.

23 Conant, Melvin A. “The Global Impact of Energy on U.S. Security Interests and Commitments,” in Margiotta, Franklin D. (ed.), Evolving Strategic Realities:Implications for U.S. Policymakers (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1980), 71.Google Scholar

24 Bonner, Raymond, “The Agony of El Salvador,” New York Times Magazine, February 22, 1981, 28.Google Scholar

25 “In sum, the Caribbean does represent an area of high security interest. With the exception of U.S. forces, the region is largely undefended and highly unstable politically.” Hayes, Margaret Daly, “Security to the South: U.S. Interests in Latin America,” International Security 5 (1980), 138.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

26 Martin, Everett G., “Unwieldy Wealth,” Wall Street Journal, February 3, 1981Google Scholar. At the time Martin was writing, Venezuela had an inflation rate of 23 per cent.

27 Quoted in the New York Times, March 8, 1981.

28 “Mexico's Indulgence,” a Washington Post editorial reprinted in the Manchester Guardian Weekly, February 8, 1981.Google Scholar

29 See, for this interpretation, Tugwell, Franklin, The Politics of Oil in Venezuela (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1975), 3.Google Scholar

30 For an examination of internal factors affecting Middle East stability, see Samore, Gary, “The Persian Gulf,” in Deese and Nye, Energy and Security, 49–110Google Scholar;Erb, Richard D. (ed.), “The Arab Oil-Producing States of the Gulf: Political and Economic Developments,” AEI Foreign Policy and Defense Review 2 (1980)Google Scholar; Hottinger, Arnold, “The Rich Arab States in Trouble,” New York Review of Books, May 15, 1980, 23–24Google Scholar; and Tinnin, David B., “The Saudis Awaken to their Vulnerability,” Fortune, March 10, 1980, 48–56.Google Scholar

31 “Alemania Interesada en más Petróleo Venezolano,” Government of Venezuela, Ministry of Energy and Mines, Carta Semanal, no. 43 (October 30, 1981), 25.Google Scholar

32 Mexico will supply 110 million barrels to the SPR by August 1986. Globe and Mail, October 22, 1981.

33 “U.S. Energy Outlook: An Initial Appraisal, 1971-1985” (Washington: National Petroleum Council, Committee on U.S. Energy Outlook, 1971), 1, 27Google Scholar. This same report predicted that by 1985 the United States would be importing nearly 2 million barrels of oil a day from Canada.

34 Safer, Arnold E., International Oil Policy (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1979), 16.Google Scholar For a synopsis of the major projections made over the past dozen years by governments, international organizations, private firms, and individual oil specialists, see Brodman, John R. and Hamilton, Richard E., A Comparison of Energy Projections to 1985, IEA Monograph no. 1 (Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and-Development, International Energy Agency. 1979).Google Scholar

35 Frank, Helmut J. and Schanz, John J. Jr, U.S.-Canadian Energy Trade: A Study of Changing Relationships (Boulder: Westview Press, 1978), 4.Google Scholar

36 National Energy Board, Energy Supply and Demand in Canada and Export Demand for Canadian Energy, 1966 to 1990, cited in Frank and Schanz, U.S.-Canadian Energy Trade, 62.

37 Foster, Peter, The Blue-Eyed Sheiks: The Canadian Oil Establishment (Toronto: Collins, 1979), 51.Google Scholar

38 Nelles, H. V., “Canadian Energy Policy, 1945-1980: A Federalist Perspective,” in Kenneth Carty, R. and Peter Ward, W. (eds.), Entering the Eighties: Canada in Crisis(Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1980), 105.Google Scholar

39 Noreng, Oil Politics in the 1980s, 23. For a discussion of the time constraints that limit the ability of consumers to substitute for imported oil, see Doran, Charles F., Myth, Oil, and Politics: Introduction to the Political Economy of Petroleum (New York: Free Press/Macmillan, 1977), 23.Google Scholar

40 A dissenting opinion on long-term potential is given in Willson, Bruce F., The Energy Squeeze: Canadian Policies for Survival, Canadian Institute for Economic Policy series (Toronto: James Lorimer, 1980), 9.Google Scholar

41 J. A. Armstrong, Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer, Imperial Oil, transcript of a speech on the future of the oil industry, presented to the Calgary Section, Petroleum Society of the Canadian Institute of Mining and Metallurgy, Calgary, January 15, 1981. (Hereafter cited as Armstrong Transcript.)

42 Government of Canada, Department of Energy, Mines and Resources, The National Energy Program: 1980 (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1980), 115.

43 The 1980 production figures are given in National Energy Board, 1980 Annual Report (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1981), 23. The Alberta share of conventional crude and equivalent production, some 1.3 MBO in 1980, is based on information from the Alberta Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, and is contained in the transcript of a speech delivered by the minister, Merv Leitch, to the Vancouver Board of Trade, January 14, 1981. (Hereafter cited as Leitch Transcript.) In terms of domestic consumption, conventional crude from all producing provinces accounted for 76 percent in 1980, with the balance being made up by the synfuels plants (7%) and net imports (17%). BP Canada, Annual Report 1980 (Toronto: Public Affairs Department, BP Canada, 1981), i.

44 Imperial Oil, “Modified Submission to the National Energy Board in the Matter of Supply of Oil, Natural Gas, and Other Forms of Energy in Relation to the Domestic Demand for All Forms of Energy, and the Supply/;Demand Balances for Hydrocarbons and Electricity and Showing Some of the Potential Effects of the National Energy Program on the Outlook for Oil Supply and Demand,” Vol. 1(September 1980, modified December 1980), 45 (Hereafter cited as Imperial NEB Submission.)

45 Estimates of oil-sands reserves vary widely but all observers find them to be considerable. In 1973, the Alberta Energy Resources Conservation Board estimated that the Athabasca deposit alone contained “potential surface mineable reserves” of 74 billion barrels of crude bitumen, and “potential in situ reserves” of 686 billionbarrels (cited in Larry Pratt, The Tar Sands: Syncrude and the Politics of Oil [Edmonton: Hurtig, 1976], 191). More recently, Imperial Oil has estimated that total Albertan oil sands reserves are more than 950 billion barrels, “only a fraction of it…recoverable using today's technology” (Imperial Oil, Annual Report 1980 [Toronto:Imperial Oil, 1981], 12). The Alberta portion alone of the Lloydminster heavy oilfields (not to be confused with the tar- and oil-sands deposits elsewhere in the province) has been estimated by the Geological Survey of Canada to contain recoverable reserves of some two billion barrels (Globe and Mail, March 25, 1981).Estimates for Hibernia and nearby fields on the Atlantic Grand Banks range up to 10billion barrels, as much as on Alaska's North Slope (New York Times, March 15,1981). Some 5 to 8 billion barrels are expected to be discovered by Dome Petroleum in the Beaufort/Mackenzie Delta area; and Panarctic Oil believes that there are at least 300 million barrels in the High Arctic (Globe and Mail, February 3, 1981; March 18, 1981).

46 Helliwell, John F., “Energy in Canada,” Current History 79 (1980), 126.Google Scholar

47 Imperial NEB Submission, 37–38. According to latest Canadian Petroleum Association figures, Canadian conventional oil reserves stood at 5.9 billion barrels at the end of 1980 (Financial Times of Canada, April 13, 1981).

48 Leitch Transcript.

49 NEP, 93.

50 Canada's Oil and Gas Reserves (Toronto: Shell Canada, Public Affairs Department, 1979), 7.Google Scholar

51 James F. Keeley, “Constraints on Canadian International Economic Policy” (Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University, 1980), 335-36; McDougall, John N., “Canada and the World Petroleum Market,” in Hillmer, Norman and Stevenson, Garth (eds.), A Foremost Nation: Canadian Foreign Policy and a Changing World (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977), III;Google ScholarRichards, John and Pratt, Larry, Prairie Capitalism: Power and Influence in the New West (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1979), 223.Google Scholar

52 For 1980 figure, Department of Energy, Mines and Resources statistics. (Here after cited as EMR Statistics.) For 1979 figure, G. Yorke-Slader, Secretary, National Energy Board, to author, March 3, 1981.

53 The IEA emergency allocation measures for oil consider “oil supplies available to the group” to consist in all crude oil available to IEA members, all products imported from outside the IEA, and all finished products and refinery feedstocks produced in association with natural gas and crude oil available to the IEA. International Energy Agency, “Agreement on an International Energy Program,” chap. 3, art. 7, sec. 7.

54 EMR Statistics.

55 In an address to a special symposium on “Canada and Mexico: The Comparative and Joint Politics of Energy,” Harvard University, April 9, 1981.

56 EMR Statistics.

57 “Traditionally markets for this petroleum product have been supply driven because heavy fuel oil is a normal by-product of the conventional refinery process.” Shell Canada, “Supplement to Submission to the National Energy Board in the Matter of an Inquiry into the Supply of Oil, Natural Gas, and Other Forms of Energy in Relation to the Domestic Demand for All Forms of Energy, and the Supply/Demand Balances for Hydrocarbons and Electricity” (January 1981), 29. (Hereafter cited as Shell NEB Submission.)

58 “Canada to Participate in International Oil Emergency Test,” memorandum from the Office of the Minister, Department of Energy, Mines and Resources, September 22, 1980.

59 EMR Statistics.

60 Ibid. The total oil swapped in 1979 was 133,000 barrels a day. NEB, Annual Report 1979, 73.

61 Statistics Canada, Imports: Merchandise Trade, 1980 (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1981), 71.

62 Imperial NEB Submission, 4.

63 See, for example, Gordon, Robert J. and Pelkmans, Jacques, Challenges to Interdependent Economies: The Industrial West in the Coming Decade, 1980s Project/Council on Foreign Relations (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 80.Google Scholar On the other hand, it is possible to overstate Canada's reliance on imports. For example, F. W. Gorbet claims that “roughly half [sic] of Canadian oil consumption is sourced from abroad and potentially subject to interruption” (“Energy Self-Sufficiency: A Realistic and Desirable Goal?” Canadian Public Policy 6 [1980], 473Google Scholar).

64 Fagen, “Mexican Petroleum and U.S. National Security,” 40. Imports of 3.4 MBD represented 26 per cent of U.S. oil consumption in 1970. In 1977, US imports peaked at 8.7 MBD, or 47 per cent of total consumption. Since then, US imports of crude and products have registered declines.

65 NEP, 54.

66 For a comparative analysis of OECD energy consumption, see Dunkerley, Joy, Trends in Energy Use in Industrial Societies: An Overview, Research Paper R-19(Washington: Resources for the Future, 1980)Google Scholar. Also see Slagorsky, Z. Charles, Energy Use in Canada in Comparison with Other Countries (Calgary: Canadian Energy Research Institute, 1979)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

67 Interview, Department of Energy, Mines and Resources, November 20, 1980.

68 Texaco Canada, “Submission to the National Energy Board in the Matter of an Inquiry into the Supply of Oil, Natural Gas, and Other Forms of Energy in Relation to the Domestic Demand for All Forms of Energy, and the Supply/Demand Balances for Hydrocarbons and Electricity” (September 1980, amended March 1981), exhibit no. 7. To the extent that Canada can upgrade its refinery capacity and process at home the heavy crude oil that is currently being exported, the distinction between“gross” and “net” imports of crude loses relevance. At present, two major refinery projects are being mooted. If both (one a heavy fuel-oil upgrader in Montreal, the other a heavy crude-oil upgrader in Saksatchewan) get built, they would have a combined throughput of about 100,000 barrels a day (Globe and Mail, October 1, 1981; Ibid., October 17, 1981).

69 Imperial NEB Submission, 6; Shell NEB Submission, 27, 38.

70 Canadian Bar Association, 62nd Annual Meeting, Montreal, August 25, 1980.

71 Leitch Transcript.

72 McNicholas, John, “The Prospects for Canadian Self-Sufficiency in Oil Over the Next Decade,” Canadian Public Policy 6 (1980), 454–62.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

73 “Enhanced,” or “tertiary,” recovery refers to the use of third-generation methods to extract additional quantities of oil from working reservoirs. Methods of extraction include steam injection, fire “flooding,” and carbon-dioxide injection (NEP, 28).

74 Globe and Mail, March 19, 1981. The percentage decline in Canadian oil consumption was less than the corresponding decline of 7.5 per cent registered by the 21 IEA members in 1980 (New York Times, February 7, 1981).

75 Statistics Canada, Imports: Merchandise Trade, 1980, 71. In comparison, the United States gets only 25 per cent of its imported oil from the Persian Gulf.

76 In 1980 Saudi Arabia supplied 1.5 MBD to the United States, or some 9 per cent of that country's consumption of 17 MBD (New York Times, March 24, 1981).

77 See the paper by Knelman, F. H. in Nemetz, Peter (ed.), Energy Crisis: Policy Response (Toronto: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1981).Google Scholar

78 Singer, S. Fred, “Crisis—For OPEC,” New York Times, March 31, 1981.Google Scholar

79 Walker, Michael (ed.), Oil in the Seventies: Essays on Energy Policy (Vancouver:Fraser Institute, 1977), xviii.Google Scholar

80 Stobaugh, Robert and Yergin, Daniel, “Energy: An Emergency Telescoped,” Foreign Affairs: America and the World 1979 (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1980), 563.Google Scholar

81 Levy, Walter J., “Oil and the Decline of the West,” Foreign Affairs 58 (1980), 1015CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

82 Nye, “Energy Nightmares,” 140.

83 The “export quotient” is based on data through the first ten months of 1980. Carta Semanal, no. 23 (October 31, 1980), 1Google Scholar.

84 Canada's principal sources of imported oil during the quarter century after the Second World War were the United States and Venezuela. By the 1950s, the latter had com e to dominate the Canadian import market, and as late as 1970 was supplying nearly two-thirds of the country's imported oil (Foster, Blue-Eyed Sheiks, 27-28;McDougall, “Canada and the World Petroleum Market,” 86).

85 Oil Supply—Prospects and Policy, Current Policy, no. 202 (Washington: Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, 1980), 3Google Scholar.

86 Martinez, Anîbal R., Energy Policies of the World: Venezuela (Newark, Del.: University of Delaware, Center for the Study of Marine Policy, 1975), 21–22Google Scholar.

87 Governing Document on the Venezuelan Energy Policy (Caracas: Ministry of Energy and Mines, February 1979), 17–27;Google Scholar Interview, Venezuelan Embassy, Ottawa, November 19, 1980; Foros VI Plan Desarrollo de la Nación, 1981-1985: Sector Petrolero y Petroquîmico (Caracas: Ministry of Energy and Mines, October 1980), cuadro no. 2; MEM mimeo on the 6th national plan, 7; Carta Semanal, no. 43(October 30, 1981), 3Google Scholar.

88 Governing Document, 35.

89 Information obtained from the Canadian Embassy in Caracas and the Venzuelan Embassy in Ottawa. In 1978, 11,000 barrels a day of heavy oil were included in total crude imports from Venezuela of 185,000 b/d; in 1980, the respective figures were30,000 and 150,000.

90 Humberto Calderón Berti, Hacia una Politico Petrolera Integral, Colección la Alquitrana, no. 7 (Caracas: Ministry of Energy and Mines, 1979)Google Scholar, 12.

91 Romulo Betancourt, Venezuela's Oil, trans, by Donald Peck (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1978), 240Google Scholar.

92 For an expression of popular opposition to price increases, see Alfonso Garcîia Gutiérrez, “No Debe Aumentarse Precio de la Gasolina,” El Universal (Caracas), February 17, 1981.

93 Statistics Canada, Imports: Merchandise Trade, 1980, 71Google Scholar.

94 From more than 400,000 barrels a day in 1973, Canadian imports of Venezuelan crude shrank to fewer than 200,000 in 1979.

95 Based on interviews with MEM officials, Caracas, February 18, 1981.

96 Estimates of “potential” reserves in the Orinoco Heavy Oil Belt (formerly known by the misnomer, Orinoco Tar Belt) vary widely, but as one US government source states, “everyone agrees that the potential is immense.” Figures of the oil in place range from a low of about one trillion barrels to a high of seven trillion. But recovery problems are held to be as immense as the Belt's potential (U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Outlook on Venezuela's Petroleum-Policy, 96th Cong., 2dsess. [Washington:United States Government Printing Office, February 1980]Google Scholar, 67; Gutiéerrez, Francisco J.La Faja Petrofîfera del Orinoco, Colección la Alquitrana, no. 4 [Caracas: Ministry of Energy and Mines, 1976]Google Scholar).

97 Sevinc Carlson, “Mexico's Oil: Trends and Prospects to 1985,” in Jordan, Amos A., Hayden, Bryan, and Michael, Moodie (eds.), Facing the International Energy Problem. 1980-2000 (New York: Praeger, 1979), 91Google Scholar.

98 By 1973 Mexico was importing 60,000 barrels a days of crude oil. It was able to phase out all such imports by September 1974, and since then has been a net exporter. Bermúdez, Antonio J., La Polîitico Petrolera Mexicana (Mexico City: Editorial Joaquîn Mortiz, 1976), 62–63Google Scholar.

99 Cited in Williams, Edward J., The Rebirth of the Mexican Petroleum Industry: Developmental Directions and Policy Implications (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1979), 2Google Scholar.

100 Fagen, “Mexican Petroleum and U.S. National Security,” 46.

101 Programa de Energîa: Metas a 1990 y Proyecciones al Año 2000 (Resumen yConclusiones) (Mexico City: Secretariat of Patrimony and Industrial Development, November 1980), 47–58Google Scholar. Mexico calculates reserves in terms of hydrocarbons (meaning crude oil and equivalent plus natural gas): of the total, crude and equivalent constitutes approximately 75 per cent.

102 Atchley, John K., “Mexican Oil: An Overview” (Mexico City: American Embassy, December 1980), 12Google Scholar.

103 David, Ronfeldt, Richard Hehring, and Arturo Gándara, Mexico's Petroleum and U.S. Policy: Implications for the 1980s, Executive Summary for the U.S. Department of Energy (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, June 1980), 3Google Scholar.

104 Informatión Cientîfica y Tecnólogica (Mexico City: National Council of Science and Technology, February 1, 1981), 40Google Scholar.

105 See Ronfeldt et al., Mexico's Petroleum and U.S. Policy, 5; and Mancke, Richard B., Mexican Oil and Natural Gas: Political, Strategic, and Economic Implications (New York: Praeger, 1979), 113–20Google Scholar.

106 For left-nationalist perspectives, see John, Saxe-Fernández, Petróleo y Estrategîa:México y Estados Unidos en el Contexto de la Politico Global (Mexico City: Siglo Veintiuno, 1980), 112Google Scholar; and Jorge, Basurto, El Conflicto Internacional en torno al Petróleo de México (2d ed.; Mexico City: Siglo Veintiuno, 1980), 13Google Scholar. Also see Meyer, Michael C., “Roots and Realities of Mexican Attitudes toward the United States: ABackground Paper,” in Erb, Richard D. and Ross, Stanley R. (eds.), United States Relations with Mexico: Context and Content (Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1981), 29–38Google Scholar.

107 Programa de Energîia, 19. In 1980 about 70 per cent of the country's exchange was earned through the export of oil and gas.

108 Juan Antonio, Zúñiga, “Iran y México: Historias que Pare ʼn Converger,” Proceso, November 17, 1980, 18–19Google Scholar.

109 Programa de Energîa, 18-19, 30. The 1981 export totals are projections found in James Nelson Goodsell, “New Natural-Gas Discoveries Double Mexican Estimates,” Christian Science Monitor, March 17, 1981Google Scholar.

110 Based on interviews with officials of the Canadian Embassy, Mexico City, February20, 1981Google Scholar.

111 Programa de Energîa, epigraph.

112 “Where the Big Econometric Models Go Wrong,” Business Week, March 30, 1981, 70Google Scholar.

113 Romeo Flores, Caballero, El Petróleo: Una Alternativa para el Desarrollo de México, Technical Paper Series, no. 19 (Austin: University of Texas: Institute of Latin American Studies, 1978), 1–2Google Scholar. For an analysis of recent difficulties experienced by Mexican energy planners, see Williams, Edward J., “Mexican Hydrocarbon Export Policy: Ambition and Reality,” in Lawrence, Robert M. and Heisler, Martin O. (eds.), International Energy Policy (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1980), 65–79Google Scholar.

114 See, for this view, Pablo González Casanova, “The Economic Development ofMexico,” Scientific American, September 1980, 204. For a good summary of the short comings of the Echeverrîa administration, see Fagen, Richard R., “The Realities of U.S.-Mexican Relations,” Foreign Affairs 55 (1977), 692–95CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

115 Speech delivered at a conference on “Mexico in the 1980s,” sponsored by theCanadian Association—Latin America and Caribbean (CALA), Vancouver, March 12, 1981.

116 New York Times, January 12, 1981Google Scholar.

117 Interviews, Ottawa, November 20, 1980Google Scholar.

118 “Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United Mexican States on Industrial and Energy Cooperation,” Department of External Affairs mimeo, May 27, 1980Google Scholar.

119 For a critical assessment of the Mexican oil deal, see the report prepared by the Alberta Petroleum Marketing Commission, “Mexican Crude: Who Needs It? Who Wants It?” (October 1980). Also see David, Murray, “Trading for Latin AmericanOil,” International Perspectives (November/December 1980), 28–30Google Scholar.

120 Globe and Mail, November 3, 1981Google Scholar.

121 Information supplied by Canadian Embassy, Mexico City.

122 Information supplied by Venezuelan Ministry of Energy and Mines, Caracas.

123 Interview, Ottawa, November 18, 1980Google Scholar.

124 Ibid.; speech to the Canadian Bar Association, Montreal, August 25, 1980.

125 Ibid.

126 “Part of this favourable reputation of Canadians is simply due to the fact that they are not Americans. In the words of one of President López Portillo's predecessors,‘Pobre Mexico, tan lejos de Dios, tan cerca de los Estados Unidos’” (J. W. C. Tomlinson and M. Thompson, “A Study of Canadian Joint Ventures in Mexico”[Vancouver: University of British Columbia, Faculty of Commerce and Business Administration, 1977], 50). Also see Ogelsby, J. C. M., Gringos from the Far North: Essays in the History of Canadian-Latin American Relations, 1866-1968 (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1976), 66Google Scholar.

127 Winfield, David J., Minister Counsellor, Canadian Embassy, Mexico City, in a speech at the CALA conference, Vancouver, March 12, 1981Google Scholar.

128 CALA Reports 4 (April 1981), 1Google Scholar.

129 Interview, Mexican Embassy, Ottawa, November 19, 1980Google Scholar.