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Selling the Goods and Services Tax: Government Advertising and Public Discourse in Canada
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 November 2009
Abstract
This note examines the Canadian federal government's attempts to use communication programmes to influence public opinion toward the Goods and Services Tax (GST). Using internal government documents and polling data, the authors describe the scope and objectives of the GST campaign, and assess its effectiveness in shaping public opinion. They then describe some of the weaknesses in popular discourse about the propriety of communication programmes of this kind.
Résumé
Cette note examine l'utilisation des programmes de communication par le gouvemement fédéral du Canada afin d'influencer l'opinion publique à l'égard de la taxe sur les produits et les services (TPS). Les auteurs se servent des documents internes du gouvemement et des sondages d'opinion pour décrire la limite et les objectifs de la campagne TPS, afin d'évaluer son efficacité. Pour conclure, ils examinent certaines faiblesses du discours public au sujet de la TPS et la légitimité de tels programmes.
- Type
- Note
- Information
- Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique , Volume 28 , Issue 2 , June 1995 , pp. 311 - 330
- Copyright
- Copyright © Canadian Political Science Association (l'Association canadienne de science politique) and/et la Société québécoise de science politique 1995
References
1 There are few works which describe the expansion of communication activities by Canadian governments and consider whether it should be regarded as problematic. Earlier Canadian works have tended to emphasize the value of “mass suasion” or “exhortation” as a more economical and less coercive alternative to other policy instruments. See, for example, Doern, G. Bruce and Phidd, Richard W., Canadian Public Policy: Ideas, Structure, Process (Toronto: Methuen, 1983), 112, 124Google Scholar. Few, however, have closely examined how Canadian governments have applied this policy instrument in practice. William Stanbury and Jane Fulton briefly note criticisms of communications campaigns organized by the federal Canadian Unity Information Office (CUIO) in 1977-1982, but do not examine those concerns in tawa Spends, 1984 (Toronto: Methuen, 1984), 288, 305-06. A more detailed examination of the CUIO's activities may be found in Rose, Jonathan, “Government Advertising in a Crisis: The Quebec Referendum Precedent,” Canadian Journal of Communication 18 (1993), 173–196CrossRefGoogle Scholar. A noteworthy recent contribution to the small international literature on this subject is O'Shaughnessy, Nicholas, The Phenomenon of Political Marketing (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
2 Response to Access to Information Act request, July 5, 1990. The Department of Secretary of State also contributed another $300,000 to Finance's advertising campaign through its Weekly Newspaper Advertising Programme, designed to provide community, ethnic and Aboriginal newspapers with a “basic schedule of government information ads.”
3 Response to Access to Information Act request, April 12,1991.
4 Revenue Canada (Customs and Excise), “Proposed Goods and Services Tax Communications Plan” (November 10, 1989), 2.
5 Response to Access To Information Act request, May 1991.
6 GST Consumer Information Office News Release, September 12, 1990; and Response to Access To Information Act request, November 19,1990.
7 See: “The Top 100,” Marketing 95 (1990), 2.
8 Report on Election Expenses, 1988 (Ottawa: Chief Electoral Officer of Canada, 1989)Google Scholar, s.2, l;s.3,339.
9 Hiebert, Janet, “Interest Groups and Federal Elections,” in Seidle, F. Leslie, ed., Interest Groups and Elections in Canada (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1991), 20.Google Scholar
10 See, for example, the statements of Minister of Justice Doug Lewis, Debates (September 25, 1989), 3819, 3821; of President of the Treasury Board Gilles Loiselle, Debates (May 10, 1990), 11262; and of Minister of Finance Michael Wilson, Debates (June 6, 1990), 12336; (October 9, 1990), 13927; and (October 24, 1990), 14619.
11 ”Justification for GST Advertising Campaign,” memorandum from Barbara Uteck, GST Communications Working Group, Department of Finance, to C. Guitté”, Supply and Services Canada, August 9,1989.
12 D. R. Harley Consultants, “Proposal forthe Evaluation of Goods and Services Tax Information for Small Business,” report to GST Communications Working Group, Department of Finance (February 26,1990), 1.
13 Memorandum from P. Fairchild, Temple Wright Associates, to B. Uteck, GST Communications Working Group, Department of Finance, June 8,1989.
14 Publitel Communications, “Department of Finance GST Advertising Phase III,” report to the GST Communications Working Group, Department of Finance (Draft of March 20,1990), 2.
15 Publitel Communications, “Fall 1990—The Government's Economic Agenda—A Communications Strategy,” report to the GST Communications Working Group, Department of Finance (June 27,1990), 1-3.
16 Decima Research, “Preliminary Results of June 1990 Omnibus Survey,” Report to the Department of Finance (June 21,1990), question 41.
17 Angus Reid Group, “Television Ads for the Proposed Goods and Services Tax: Executive Summary,” memorandum submitted to the Department of finance (October 1990), 1.
18 Angus Reid Group, “Surveys on the Senate,” Waves 1-5 (October-November 1990).
19 Publitel, “Advertising Phase III” (March 20, 1990), 2.
20 Decima Research, “Report to the Department of Finance, Study #3805-12” (September 1989), 22-23.
21 Decima Research, “Report to the Department of Finance, Study #3805-13” (November 1989), 25. A later focus group study of proposed radio advertisements seemed to show that “notions such as international competitiveness, investment and business cost structures will simply fly way over the heads of listeners” (memorandum from Barbara Uteck to Peter Daniel, April 5,1990).
22 The government also made two changes in policy in response to Decima's findings. In an effort to ameliorate worries about the GST's impact on poor families and the cost of living, the government dropped the proposed tax rate from 9 to 7 per cent in December 1989. However, the January 1990 Decima poll showed that this did little to influence public opinion: the proportion of persons having a negative impression of the GST remained almost unchanged. The same poll showed that spending cuts that had been announced by the government in December to demonstrate its frugality “went almost unnoticed by Canadians” (see Decima, “Study #3805-13,” questions 65 and 67; and memorandum from Decima Research to Department of Finance, “GST January Analysis” [June 7, 1990], 6, 8, 12).
23 Publitel, “Advertising Phase III” (March 20, 1990), 5-7; and Publitel Communications, “Department of Finance GST Advertising Phase III” (Draft of April 10, 1990), 5-7.
24 Debates (May 15,1990), 11446.
25 Publitel, “Advertising Phase III” (April 10,1990), 2-4.
26 Decima Research, “June Omni Results,” Department of Finance, Study #3980-13 (June 1990), 10.
27 See Publitel, “Advertising Phase III” (March 20,1990), 19-26; and Publitel Communications, scripts of advertisements as recorded, May 2,1990.
28 D. R. Harley Consultants, “Research Report on the GST Consumer Information Office Focus Groups,” Report to the GST Consumer Information Office (August 24,1990), 4.
29 Ibid., 7.
30 Memorandum from Peter Fassbiner, Palmer Jarvis Advertising, to Kevin Schack-ell, Revenue Canada (Customs and Excise), “Fall Campaign,” May 29,1990.
31 See McGuire, William, “The Myth of Mass Media Impact,” in Comstock, George, ed., Public Communication and Behavior (Orlando: Academic Press, 1986).Google Scholar
32 Angus Reid Group, “Survey on the Senate, Wave Number 4: Top Line Data” (October 1990), question 15.
33 The Globe and Mail, October 29, 1990, A6.
34 Decima Research attempted to measure retailer and consumer resistance to the tax in two surveys of retailers completed for the Department of Finance in September and November 1990. One third of retailers in both surveys thought it likely that store owners generally would refuse to collect the tax, and half thought it likely that consumers would try to refuse to pay the GST. In the September survey, 19 per cent of retailers said they personally would either refuse to charge GST, or collect the tax but refuse to send it to the government. This dropped to 14 per cent by November (Decima Research, “Top Line Data: Retailers Preparedness Surveys,” reports to the Department of Finance [September and November 1990]).
35 Customs and Excise, “Tax Communications Plan” (November 10,1989), I.
36 See questions 23, 64, 65, 67, 68 in Decima, “Study #3805-12”; and the results from the same questions in Decima's omnibus surveys throughout 1990.
37 Reid Group, “Wave Number 4: Top Line Data,” question 19. Forty per cent of respondents told Decima Research that they found the department's April tabloid somewhat or totally unbelievable (”Preliminary Results of the June Omnibus Survey,” question 34).
38 Angus Reid Group, “Proposed Goods and Services Tax Advertisement Testing: Summary Report of Focus Group Findings” (October 1990), 2-4.
39 Starch Research Services, “Readership Survey on the GST Tabloid,” report to the Department of Finance (June 1990), 7; and Decima, “Preliminary Results of the June 1990 Omnibus Survey,” question 32.
40 ”Ottawa's $1.1 Million Bid to Sell GST Backfires,” The Globe and Mail, March 5,1991, Al.
41 A Decima poll showed that the government's announcement of its decision to drop the GST rate from 9 to 7 per cent had precisely this effect on public opinion about the tax. Individuals who were already disposed unfavourably became more hostile to the GST, while those who were neutral or favourably disposed said the change made them feel better about the tax (Decima Research, “Slide Presentation for the January 1990 Poll” [January 1990]).
42 See Kingdon, John W., Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies (Boston: Little Brown, 1984), 3.Google Scholar
43 Decima, “Study #3805-13,” questions 2-4. Decima appears to have dropped this question from later surveys, and we are therefore unable to determine whether opinion about these priorities changed significantly in 1990.
44 Ibid., questions 29,60. Question 29 was also included in Decima surveys throughout 1990.
45 See Majone, Giandomenico, Evidence, Argument and Persuasion in the Policy Process (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989)Google Scholar. A recent application of Majone's approach to the study of public policy may be found in Andrew Stark, “‘Political-Discourse’ Analysis and the Debate over Canada's Lobbying Legislation,” this JOURNAL 25 (1992), 513-34.
46 Qualter, Terence H., Opinion Control in the Democracies (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985), 123–24.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
47 See statement by John Manley, Debates (October 10,1990), 13980.
48 See statement by Don Bondria, Debates (October 19,1990), 14445.
49 Opposition MPs did attempt to obtain a ruling that one of the Department of Finance's early advertisement constituted a contempt of Parliament. The Speaker rejected the complaint, but his argument for doing so had serious deficiencies. The Speaker indicated that he would not be so generous to the government in future cases (see Debates [October 10,1989], 4457-61).
50 See statements by Diane Marleau, Debates (May 10, 1990), 11261; Doug Young (October 9, 1990), 13297; and Don Boudria (October 19,1990), 1445.
51 In August 1990 the Canadian Advertising Council, a voluntary association, ruled that some Department of Finance radio advertisements had broken the Council's code regarding false and misleading advertising (letter from Susan Burke, Canadian Advertising Council, to Don Boudria, MP, August 2,1990).
52 The advertisements made unqualified assertions about the tax's fairness and its effect on the cost of living and economic growth. The conclusions reached by the department's staff were significantly more cautious. See, for example, Bob Hamilton and C. Kuo, “The Goods and Services Tax: A General Equilibrium Analysis,” Department of Finance, Tax Policy and Legislation Branch, Working Paper 89-3 (1989).
53 La Cie de Films, “Final Preproduction Meeting for the Shooting of Four Television Commercials,” Report to the Department of Finance (September 17, 1990).
54 Reid Group, “Summary Report of Focus Group Findings,” 9-10.
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