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Rescuing the New Natural Law Theory: From Absolute Values to a Theory of Autonomy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 July 2012

Joshua D. Goldstein
Joshua D. Goldstein*
Affiliation:
University of Calgary
*
Joshua D. Goldstein, Department of Political Science, University of Calgary, 2500 University Dr. NW, Calgary AB, T2N 1N4, [email protected]
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Abstract

Abstract. The new natural theory developed by Germain Grisez, John Finnis, Robert George and other new natural lawyers is presented by both its friends and its liberal critics as more concerned with absolute values than theorizing human freedom. This concern is seemingly borne out by the new natural lawyers' narrow and exclusionary sexual ethic. However, this article suggests that the new natural law theory might be rescued from both these groups and shown to contain a robust and attractive account of freedom. Through a reconstruction of the new natural law theory's unique mode of arriving at moral action, this article suggests the new natural law theory integrates three distinct dimensions of autonomy which are often kept separate: a Kantian moral autonomy, a Rawlsian personal autonomy and a Hegelian ethical autonomy. The result is a new natural law theory—and a sexual ethic—more liberating than either the friends or critics of the new natural law theory would seem to allow.

Résumé. La nouvelle théorie de la loi naturelle, développée par Germain Grisez, John Finnis, Robert George et plusieurs autres défenseurs de la nouvelle loi naturelle, est présentée par ses défenseurs et critiques libéraux comme étant plus concernée par les valeurs absolues que par la théorisation de la liberté humaine. Cette préoccupation semble être née de la conception étroite et exclusive que font les théoriciens de la nouvelle loi naturelle de l'éthique sexuelle. Par contre, cet article suggère que la nouvelle théorie de la loi naturelle peut être secourue de ces deux groupes et démontre que la nouvelle loi naturelle contient une description robuste et intéressante du concept de liberté. À travers une reconstruction du mode d'arrivée à l'action morale unique à la nouvelle théorie de la loi naturelle, cet article suggère que la nouvelle théorie de la loi naturelle intègre trois dimensions distinctes de l'autonomie qui sont souvent gardées séparer: l'autonomie morale kantienne, l'autonomie personnelle rawlsienne et l'autonomie éthique hégélienne. Le résultat est une nouvelle théorie de la loi naturelle, et une éthique sexuelle, plus libérée que ce que les défenseurs et critiques de la nouvelle théorie de la loi naturelle semblent permettre.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique , Volume 45 , Issue 2 , June 2012 , pp. 451 - 472
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Political Science Association 2012

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