1 Barker, Rodney, “The Absence of the State in Explanations of British Politics,” paper presented at the Political Studies Association Conference, 1977Google Scholar; Macpherson, C. B., “Do We Need a Theory of the State?” Archives Europeennes de Sociologie 18 (1977), 223–61CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Dyson, Kenneth, The State Tradition in Western Europe (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1980), chaps. 1, 7Google Scholar; and compare Cairns, Alan C., “The Governments and Societies of Canadian Federalism,” this JOURNAL 10 (1977), esp. 717ff.Google Scholar

2 The Report of the Task Force on Canadian Unity, A Future Together (1979)Google Scholar, similarly identifies problem areas in the Canadian political system; see also Laundy, Philip, “Report of the Task Force on Canadian Unity,” The Parliamentarian 60 (1979), 133–40.Google Scholar

3 Models may be merely descriptive (of a working system) or functionally more sophisticated, capable of manipulation for experimental purposes, didactic, heuristic or predictive. A developed model is dynamic not static. Models select, simplify and abstract from the complexity of the system modelled in order to emphasize the particular relevance of some features of that system. The process of abstraction involves conceptualization and the demonstration of logical relationships and internal coherence. (And a model may reveal or postulate previously unperceived relationships.) See Gross, L. (ed.), Symposium on Sociological Theory (New York: Harper, 1959)Google Scholar, Introduction, and Brodbeck, May, “Models, Meanings and Theories”; Rudner, R. S., The Philosophy of Social Science (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1966)Google Scholar; and Stone, Richard, Mathematics in the Social Sciences and Other Essays (London: Chapman and Hall, 1966).Google Scholar

4 For example, Sharpe, L. J. (ed.), Decentralist Trends in Western Democracies (London: Sage, 1979).Google Scholar

5 Compare King, Anthony, Why is Britain Becoming Harder to Govern? (London: BBC, 1976)Google Scholar; Johnson, Nevil, In Search of the Constitution (Oxford: Pergamon, 1977)Google Scholar; Cook, C. and Ramsden, J., Trends in British Politics since 1945 (London: Macmillan, 1978)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, see especially papers by Philip, A. B. and Peele, Gillian; Kavanagh, Dennis, “New Bottles for New Wines: Changing Assumptions about British Politics,” Parliamentary Affairs 31 (1978), 6–21Google Scholar; Rose, Richard, “Ungovernability: Is there Fire Behind the Smoke?,” Political Studies 22 (1979), 351–70.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

6 A pragmatic and incremental process of constitutional change as a consequence of pluralism has frequently been held to describe Canadian politics. “Thus, constitutional arrangements reflect deals… that the contending political forces are willing and able to accept at a given time. In this process, original positions are modified and bartered in the heat of negotiation” (John E. Trent, “Reform of the Canadian Federal System: A Note,” Political Science Review 17 [1978], 68). Likewise, Alan C. Cairns envisages a possible future for Canada which is “a long, twilight struggle of coping, compromising, revising and adapting” (“The Other Crisis of Canadian Federalism,” Canadian Public Administration 22 [1979], 194).Google Scholar

7 For example, Mitchell, J. D. B., “The Sovereignty of Parliament and Community Law: the Stumbling Block that isn't There,” International Affairs 55 (1979), 33–46.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

8 Compare Rose, Richard, Politics in England Today (London: Faber, 1980), chaps. 2 and 4.Google Scholar

9 It is interesting that, comparing the British and Canadian literature, there is a clearer recognition in Canada of the problem of relating political cognitions and processes—simply because the Canadians have been unable to assume the cultural homogeneity which has apparently characterized British politics—and also a greater willingness to cede that the constitution itself might determine attitudes to institutions and processes. For example, Laundy, Philip, “A New Direction for Canada,” The Parliamentarian 59(1978), 211–15Google Scholar, and Carr, W. K. and Belanger, J. A., “The Uneasy Union,” Conflict 1 (1979), 161–70.Google Scholar

10 So, in examining the range of proposals for federal constitutional reform in Canada, concepts such as “decentralized,” “centralized,” “pact” and “association” are regarded as problematical and, “a new concept for Canadian federalism will have to motivate any structural modifications because the concepts mentioned… are too ‘exclusive’ to embrace the current political, cultural and economic realities. Thus modifications to the Canadian constitution would have to be conceived not in terms of either a pact between French and English or an association of provinces but both. And, going back to the very roots of the federal principle, any new institutions would have to continue to be conceived of as providing both a sufficiently strong central government and decentralised autonomy. Finally, these new structures would need to deal with the somewhat new but seemingly permanent factor of interdependence” (Trent, “Reform of the Canadian Federal System,” 68). We argue that such an exercise must be prior to attempts to reformulate a theory of federalism to fit Canadian problems as proposed, for example, in A Future Together. See also Mallory, J. R., “Canadian Federalism in Transition,” Political Quarterly 48 (1979), 149–63.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

11 Johnson, In Search of the Constitution, 84.

12 While the Crown performs much the same symbolic function in Canada as in England, the 1867 British North America Act is the basis of authority. There is then a fundamental difficulty in suggesting repatriation of the Canadian constitution under that Act while simultaneously attempting to retain the form of authority; a recent discussion well illustrates the problem of considering the legal aspects of Canadian constitutional reform without a full understanding of the political implications: O'Connell, D. P., “Canada, Australia, Constitutional Reform and the Crown,” The Parliamentarian 60 (1979), 5–13.Google Scholar

13 Mackintosh, J. P., The Government and Politics of Britain (3rd ed. rev.; London: Hutchinson, 1974), esp. chap. 2.Google Scholar

14 Bagehot, Walter, The English Constitution, with an Introduction by Crossman, R. H. S. (Glasgow: Fontana, 1965), 151.Google Scholar

15 Ibid., 219.

16 Compare Griffiths, J. G., The Politics of the Judiciary (Glasgow: Fontana, 1978).Google Scholar

17 Devlin, Lord, “The Common Law, Public Policy and the Executive,” Current Legal Problems 9(1956), 11.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

18 “Where… the right to individual freedom is part of the constitution because it is inherent in the ordinary law of the land, the right is one which can hardly be destroyed without a thorough revolution in the institutions and manners of the country” (Dicey, A. V., Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution [10th ed.; London: Macmillan, 1959], 201).Google Scholar This has been the standard argument in England against the codification of rights and in favour of relying on judge-made law based on common law principles for the defence of liberties. See also Dicey's, Lectures on the Relation of Law and Opinion in England (London: Macmillan, 1905), esp. chap. 5.Google Scholar

19 Scarman, Lord, English Law: The New Dimension (London: Stevens, 1974).Google Scholar Compare with an earlier case made by the constitutional authority H. W. R. Wade: refuting the argument for the development of a system of administrative law in Britain similar to that of France, Wade pointed out that the British courts are already sufficiently equipped to do all that the French Conseild'Etat can do so long as the British judiciary is alerted to the full potentialities of the English law(Wade, H. W. R., “Crossroads in Administrative Law,” Current Legal Problems 21 [1968], 79).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

20 Joseph, Keith, “Freedom under the Law,” quoted in Zander, Michael, A Bill of Rights? (Chichester: Barry Rose, 1975), 15.Google Scholar

21 Hailsham, Lord, Elective Dictatorship (London: BBC, 1976).Google Scholar

22 Phillips, O. Hood, Reform of the Constitution (London: Chatto and Windus, 1970), 144.Google Scholar

23 Similarly in modern Canada, the federation has been seen as a counterforce for progress and freedom against the conservatism and parochialism of local or ethnic minorities. See, for example, Trudeau, P. E., Federalism and the French Canadians (Toronto: Macmillan, 1968).Google Scholar In relation to Britain and France see Langrod, P., “Local Government and Democracy,” Public Administration 31 (1953), 25–34CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Moulin, Leo, “Local Self-government as a Basis for Democracy: A Further Comment,” Public Administration 32 (1954), 433–37CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Panter-Brick, K., “Local Self-government as a Basis for Democracy; a Rejoinder,” Public Administration 32 (1954), 438–40.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

24 Austin, John, “Centralisation,” Edinburgh Review 85 (1847), 231–32.Google Scholar

25 The centralizers' case is well put in Senior, N., “Poor Law Reform,” Edinburgh Review 74 (1841), 1–44.Google Scholar The best known proponent of the anti-centralization case is Joshua Toulmin Smith. See, for example, his Local Self-government and Centralisation (London: 1851).Google Scholar The debate is discussed in Lubenow, W. C., The Politics of Government Growth (Newton Abbott: David and Charles, 1971).Google Scholar

26 Compare Wilson, Woodrow, “The Study of Administration,” Political Science Quarterly 1 (1887), 197–222.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

27 In Britain there has been—until recently—an overly rigid distinction between politics and administration and a consequent neglect of the administrators’ input into the decision-making and implementation process: see Dunsire, A., The Executive Process, Vol. 1 (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1978). The view that an out-of-date understanding of the Canadian constitution has hidden the real nature of the governmental process is argued in Caims, “The Governments and Societies of Canadian Federalism” and “The Other Crisis of Canadian Federalism.”Google Scholar

28 Eleventh Report from the Expenditure Committee of the House of Commons (London: H.M.S.O., 1977), para. 95.Google Scholar

29 Report of the Royal Commission on the Constitution (Chairman, Lord Kilbrandon), Cmnd. 5460 (November 1973)Google Scholar; Devolution within the United Kingdom: Some Alternatives for Discussion (H.M.S.O., June 1974); Paper, White, Our Changing Democracy; Devolution to Scotland and Wales, Cmnd. 6348, (H.M.S.O., November 1975).Google Scholar

30 Report of the Royal Commission on the Constitution, Vol. 1, p. 122.

31 Lambton, John, 1st Earl of Durham, Report on the Affairs of British North America, 1839.Google Scholar The Report was very clear that the granting of representative institutions to the colonies also implied responsible government: that is, that the executive branch (the Crown or its local surrogate) must be politically controlled by the opinion of the representative assembly. This view was defended in England against the charge of unbridled democracy by, for example, Wakefield, E. G., A View of the Art of Colonization (London: 1849; reprinted, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1914)Google Scholar and by Buller, C., Responsible Government for the Colonies (London: 1840; reprinted, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1916).Google Scholar However, the unlimited sovereignty of the Crown was asserted by Henry (Third Earl) Grey, , The Colonial Policy of Lord John Russell's Administration (London: 1853)Google Scholar and Parliamentary Government (London: 1858)Google Scholar and by Lewis, G. C., An Essay on the Government of Dependencies (London: John Murray, 1841).Google Scholar The political justification of this assertion was that the Crown was an impartial arbiter between rival factions in the colony, and also (compare with note 26 above) that the London government represented more progressive opinion than that of the colonists. In this latter argument, relations between colony and mothercountry are treated analogously to those between central government and municipality, that is, explicitly, as merely a case of political decentralization.

32 Where the political problems of drafting or amending a constitution are at issue, the development of principles is equally important. The elements which make up a constitution or model will not be merely a list of political processes and institutions, but primarily the values, rules and principles which underpin the practice: the given a priori understanding of politics applied to a particular polity. What is necessary is a two-fold exercise: to identify and elucidate the elements that would go to make up an acceptable model and to combine them in such a way (with the appropriate links) that there is a model. So having assembled the parts by reference to all the available sources, with the addition of new parts where necessary—a procedure, perhaps, of checking current practice become convention—it would also be necessary to tie the whole together to ensure the coherence and logical unity that would characterise a model proper.

33 Compare, “Where the magnitude represented by the word ‘sovereign’ has been identified as ‘limitless’ or ‘total’ power not only is there an end to any rational consideration of the character of this power… but the way has been opened to the muddled denial of sovereign authority to any office whose prescription and permission may be responsive to the ‘pressures’ of those obligated Invoked to specify a postulate of the office or procedure of rule in a state (the quality of its authority), inadvertent thinkers have used the word ‘sovereignty’ to represent a feature of the procedure and have embarked upon a nonsensical enquiry designed to locate it among the components of the procedure, as if the authority of a procedure could be identified with some distinguishable part of it” (Oakeshott, Michael, “The Vocabulary of a Modern European State,” Political.Studies. 23 [1975], 323Google Scholar; compare d'Entreves, A. P., The Notion of the State: an Introduction to Political Theory [Oxford: Clarendon, 1967]Google Scholar, Introduction and Part 3; and Stankiewicz, W. J., Aspects of Political Theory; Classical Concepts in an Age of Relativism, [London: Collier Macmillan, 1976], Part 3).Google Scholar

34 Thus a noticeable aspect of much present Canadian commentary on constitutional issues is the emphasis on such values as “unity,” “legitimacy” and “community” and the need to elucidate them in the Canadian context before the present crisis can be adequately resolved.

35 The logical coherence of a model is associated with the notion of balance: this fits with Aristotelian constitutionalism, “checks and balances,” Machiavelli's “dynamic blending of elements that are needed in different proportions at different times” and Rose's nice metaphor, “Because politics resembles ballet more than it does a still-life painting any description must emphasise movement and the relationship among the parts of the ensemble” (Politics in England Today, 16).

36 The view that there is no coherent theory of local self-government in England, merely a vague ethical commitment to an ill-defined notion, is developed in McKenzie, W. J. M., Theories of Local Government (London: The London School of Economics, 1961).Google Scholar

37 Compare Friedrich, C. J., Constitutional Government and Democracy (London: Ginn, 1950) chap. 1.Google Scholar

38 By a “sovereignty of values” we mean the politically coercive influence of that set of values which we argue will necessarily underpin political theory and practice relating to a state. The particular set will vary according to the political culture of a given political system. Compare footnote 22 above; see also footnote 33 above, and Rees, W. J., “The Theory of Sovereignty Re-Stated,” Laslett, P. (ed.), Philosophy, Politics and Society (Oxford: Blackwell, 1956).Google Scholar