¹ (Chicago, 1965), 4. A comparable effort using 1965 Canadian federal election data is Van Loon, Rick, “Political Participation in Canada,” this Journal, 3 (1970), 376–99.Google Scholar

² Like so many other areas of electoral behaviour research, these attempts were given a large stimulus by the work of V.O. Key. See his posthumously published, The Responsible Electorate, Cambridge, Mass. 1966. See also Shapiro, Michael J., “Rational Political Man: A Synthesis of Economic and Social-Psychological Perspectives,” American Political Science Review, 63 (1969), 1106–19.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³ Goldberg, Arthur S., “Social Determinism and Rationality as Bases of Party Identification,” American Political Science Review, 63 (1969), 5–25.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁴ Repass, David E., “Issue Salience and Party Choice,” American Political Science Review, 65 (1971), 389–400.CrossRefGoogle Scholar See also Natchez, Peter B. and Bupp, Irvin C., “Candidates, Issues and Votes,” Public Policy, 1 (1968), 409–37Google Scholar; Pierce, John C., “Party Identification and the Changing Role of Ideology in American Politics,” Midwest Journal of Political Science, 14 (1970), 25–42CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Field, John O. and Anderson, Ronald E., “Ideology in the Public's Conceptualization of the 1964 Election,” Public Opinion Quarterly, 33 (1969), 380–98CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Weisberg, Herbert F. and Rusk, Jerrold G., “Dimensions of Candidate Evaluation,” American Political Science Review, 64 (1970), 1167–85CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Symposium, “Issue Voting,” American Political Science Review, 66 (1972), 415–70.Google Scholar

⁵ For a useful summary of some of the older literature, see Eckstein, Harry, “Introduction. The Impact of Electoral Systems on Representative Government,” in Comparative Politics: A Reader, ed. Eckstein, Harry and Apter, David E. (New York, 1963), 247–53.Google Scholar For the most complete empirical analysis, see Rae, Douglas W., The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws (2nd ed.New Haven, 1971).Google Scholar For the (recently revived) debate in Canada, see Cairns, Alan C., “The Electoral System and the Party System in Canada, 1921–1965,” this Journal, 1 (1968), 55–80Google Scholar; Lovink, J.A.A., “On Analysing the Impact of the Electoral System on the Party System in Canada,” this Journal, 3 (1970), 497–516Google Scholar; and Cairns, , “A Reply to J.A. Lovink, ‘On Analysing the Impact of the Electoral System on the Party System in Canada’,” this Journal, 3 (1970), 517–21.Google Scholar

⁶ Social Choices and Individual Values (New York, 1951).

⁷ Only some of the key features of the voluminous literature spawned by Arrow's work will be noted here. For an old but useful survey of much of the remainder, see Riker, William H., “Voting and the Summation of Preferences,” American Political Science Review, 55 (1961), 900–11.Google Scholar

⁸ A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago, 1956).

⁹ Committees and Elections (Cambridge, 1958). Black had, in fact, anticipated the Arrow theorem and published his solution prior to 1951. Tullock, Gordon, Toward the Mathematics of Politics (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1967)Google Scholar, chap. 3, showed that Black's solution of single peakedness can be generalized to multiple dimensions.

¹⁰ An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York, 1957). Downs, in fact, modified a solution for ideological differentiation between parties first suggested by Harold Hotelling in 1929 and applied it to the Arrow Problem. [See Hotelling, Harold, “Stability in Competition,” Economic Journal, 39 (1929), 4–57.CrossRefGoogle Scholar] Downs was, however, one of the first theorists to suggest that Arrow's theorem could be solved once conditions of perfect certainty were modified. Since the publication of Downs’ work, there has been a rapid increase in the literature on multi-dimensional models of spatial competition. Some of the more important works in this literature are reviewed and extended in Davis, Otto A., et al., “An Expository Development of a Mathematical Model of the Electoral Process,” American Political Science Review, 64 (1970), 426–48.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹¹ Buchanan, James M. and Tullock, Gordon, The Calculus of Consent (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1962).CrossRefGoogle Scholar Subsequent modifications of the theory in this book will be found in Ostrom, Elinor, “Some Postulated Effects of Learning on Constitutional Behavior,” Public Choice, 5 (1968), 87–104CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Keisling, Herbert J., “Potential Costs of Alternative Decision-Making Rules,” Public Choice, 4 (1968), 49–58CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Mark Sproule-Jones, “Toward a Dynamic Analysis of Collective Action,” Western Political Quarterly (forthcoming).

¹² Tiebout, Charles M., “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures,” Journal of Political Economy, 64 (1956), 416–24CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Oates, Wallace E., “The Effects of Property Taxes and Local Public Spending on Property Values: An Empirical Study of Tax Capitalization and the Tiebout Hypothesis,” Journal of Political Economy, 77 (1969), 957–71CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Ellickson, Brian, “Jurisdictional Fragmentation and Residential Choice,” American Economic Review, 61 (1971), 334–39Google Scholar; Hirschman, Albert O., Exit, Voice and Loyalty (Cambridge, Mass., 1970)Google Scholar; Orbell, John M. and Uno, Toru, “A Theory of Neighborhood Problem Solving: Political Action vs Residential Mobility,” American Political Science Review, 66 (1972), 471–89.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹³ Downs, An Economic Theory; Garvey, Gerald, “The Theory of Party Equilibrium,” American Political Science Review, 60 (1966), 27–38CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Stone, Clarence M., “Local Referendums: An Alternative to the Alienated Voter Model,” Public Opinion Quarterly, 29 (1965), 213–22.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁴ Olson, Mancur Jr., The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge, Mass., 1965)Google Scholar; Wagner, Richard, “Pressure Groups and Political Entrepreneurs,” Papers on Non-Market Decision Making, 1 (1966), 161–70Google Scholar; Breton, Albert, “A Theory of the Demand for Public Goods,” Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, 32 (1966), 455–67CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Barnes, Samuel H., “Party Democracy and the Logic of Collective Action,” in Approaches to the Study of Party Organization, ed. Crotty, William J. (Boston, 1968), 105–38Google Scholar; Manzer, Ronald, “Selective Inducements and the Development of Pressure Groups: The Case of Canadian Teachers’ Associations,” this Journal, 2 (1969), 103–17Google Scholar; Salisbury, Robert H., “An Exchange Theory of Interest Groups,” Midwest Journal of Political Science, 13 (1969), 1–32CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Burgess, Philip M. and Robinson, James A., “Alliances and the Theory of Collective Action: A Simulation of Coalition Processes,” Midwest Journal of Political Science, 13 (1969), 194–218CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Shapiro, David L., “Pressure Groups and Public Investment Decisions,” Public Choice, 10 (1971), 103–8CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Clarkson, Stephen, “Barriers to Entry of Parties in Toronto's Civic Politics,” this Journal, 4 (1971), 206–34Google Scholar; Scott, Andrew M., Competition in American Politics (New York, 1970)Google Scholar, chaps. 2 and 3.

¹⁵ Ireland, Thomas, “The Rationale Of Revolt,” Papers on Non-Market Decision Making, 3 (1967), 49–66Google Scholar; Lipsky, Michael, “Protest as a Political Resource,” American Political Science Review, 62 (1968), 1144–58CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Luttwak, Edward, Coup d'Etat: A Practical Handbook (London, 1968)Google Scholar; Albert, and Breton, Raymond, “An Economic Theory of Social Movements,” American Economic Review, 59 (1969), 198–205Google Scholar; Scott, Anthony, “Investing and Protesting,” Journal of Political Economy, 77 (1969), 916–20CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Lipsky, Michael, “Community Organization as a Political Resource,” paper delivered at the 69th Annual Meeting of American Political Science Association, Los Angeles, 8–12 Sept., 1970Google Scholar; Parenti, Michael, “Power and Pluralism,” Journal of Politics, 32 (1970), 501–32CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Tullock, Gordon, “The Paradox of Revolution,” Public Choice, 11 (1971), 89–99CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Cicchetti, Charles J. et al., “On the Economics of Mass Demonstrations,” American Economic Review, 61 (1971), 719–24.Google Scholar

¹⁶ This point has been made in Sproule-Jones, Mark, “Strategic Tensions in the Scale of Political Analysis,” British Journal of Political Science, 2 (1972), 173–91.CrossRefGoogle Scholar There are a few exceptions in the literature to this general comment, such as, Warren, Robert O., “Federal-Local Development Planning: Scale Effects in Representation and Policy Making,” Public Administration Review, 30 (1970), 584–95CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Kafoglis, Madelyn L., “Participatory Democracy in the Community Action Program,” Public Choice, 5 (1968), 73–85CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and “Equality of Opportunity in Decision Making: Its Scope in Economic, Social and Political Processes,” American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 29 (1970), 1–16; Weschler, Louis F. and Warren, Robert O., “Consumption Costs and Production Costs in the Provision of Antipoverty Goods,” paper delivered at the 69th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Los Angeles, 8–12 Sept. 1970Google Scholar; Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty; Orbell and Uno, “Neighborhood Problem Solving.”

¹⁷ In a theoretical work being pursued concurrently with most of our empirical research, Norman Frolich and his colleagues extended some of Downs’ logic to the economic analysis of organized groups made by Mancur Olson. As a result, they derived a theory of political leadership that is based upon concepts that are similar to our own concept of “public benefits” explained below. This theory is now published as Political Leadership and Collective Goods (Princeton, 1971).

¹⁸ Rather peculiarly, the economic studies of referenda voting also have relied on aggregate data. See, for example, Wilson, James Q. and Banfield, Edward C., “Public Regardingness as a Value Premise in Voting Behaviour,” American Political Science Review, 58 (1964), 876–87CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Birdsall, William C., “A Study of the Demand for Public Goods,” in Essays in Fiscal Federalism, ed. Musgrave, Richard C. (Brookings, 1965), 235–94Google Scholar; Sproule-Jones, Mark and Van Klaveren, Adrie, “Local Referenda and Size of Muncipality in British Columbia,” B.C. Studies, 8 (1970), 47–50.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Nie, Norman H. et al., “Social Structure and Political Participation: Developmental Relationships,” American Political Science Review, 63 (1969), 361–78, 808–32.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²⁰ See Lasswell, Harold D. and Kaplan, Abraham, Power and Society (New Haven, 1950), 55–62, 67–73, 74–97Google Scholar for an extensive treatment of the role of resource values in political life. Resources are also treated at length in the writings of R.A. Dahl.

²¹ Downs, An Economic Theory, and most economists use the term “expected utility” because of this factor.

²² Public goods differ in the degree to which their benefits are packageable. A sterile debate on the applicability of the logic of public good analysis to goods varying in their degree of packageability immediately followed Samuelson's original explication of the theory in 1954. See Samuelson, Paul A., “The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 36 (1954), 387–90CrossRefGoogle Scholar, “Diagramatic Exposition of a Theory of Public Expenditure,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 37 (1955), 350–6, and “Aspects of Public Expenditure Theories,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 40 (1958), 332–8; Margolis, Julius, “A Comment on the Pure Theory of Public Expenditure,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 37 (1955), 347–9CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Colm, Gerhard, “Comments on Samuelson's Theory of Public Finance,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 37 (1956), 408–12.Google Scholar

²³ In small groups where the proportion of benefits to costs for any member is likely to be large there will be a greater probability of making decisive contributions by changing the level of one's political activity. See Olson, Logic of Collective Action.

²⁴ See, especially, Warren, “Federal-Local Development Planning”; and Weschler and Warren, “Consumption Costs.”

²⁵ For technical proof of these statements, see Tullock, Gordon, “Social Cost and Government Action,” American Economic Review, 59 (1969), 189–97Google Scholar; Private Wants, Public Means (New York, 1970), chap. 1; Buchanan, James M., “Notes for an Economic Theory of Socialism,” Public Choice, 8 (1970), 29–44CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Bish, Robert L., The Public Economy of Metropolitan Areas (Chicago, 1971)Google Scholar, chap. 3.

²⁶ See Breton, “Demand for Public Goods.”

²⁷ As an indicator of reliability, 25.70 per cent of the sample turned out to vote in 1969 compared to 23.27 per cent of the entire Saanich electorate.

²⁸ See Webb, Eugene G. et al., Unobtrusive Measures (Chicago, 1966)Google Scholar, for a discussion of the value of multiple indicators in social research.

²⁹ Woodward, Julian L. and Roper, Elmo, “Political Activity of American Citizens,” American Political Science Review, 44 (1950), 872–85.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³⁰ See Campbell, Angus et al., The Voter Decides (New York, 1954), 187–9.Google Scholar

³¹ Ibid., 194–9.

³² These political knowledge scales were derived and made applicable to the Canadian and local contexts after a review of the scales reported in Robinson, John P. et al., Measures of Political Attitudes (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1968)Google Scholar, chap. 10.

³³ The attentiveness scales were, again, derived and modified from information reported in ibid., 450.

³⁴ Interestingly, this conclusion is also used in some of the more traditional political sociology analyses of participation. See, for example, the references to “stable communication networks” and the “existence of networks of access to… political leaders” in Alford, Robert R. and Lee, Eugene C., “Voting Turnout in American Cities,” American Political Science Review, 62 (1968), 806.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³⁵ “Canadian Society,” Sociological Perspectives (3rd ed., Toronto, 1968), 748–53.

³⁶ “Social Structure and Political Participation.”

³⁷ Future research on the models should probably, as a consequence, attempt to tap activity in solely community based organizations, activity which may have been obscured in our survey items. Such community oriented organizations appear to be increasing in number, size, and apparent effectiveness in many urban areas of Canada. See, especially, Draper, John A. et al., Citizen Participation: Canada. A Book of Readings (Toronto, 1971).Google Scholar

³⁸ “Social Structure and Political Participation,” 818.

³⁹ Blalock, Hubert M. Jr, Causal Inferences in Nonexperimental Research (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1964).Google Scholar

⁴⁰ Blalock, Hubert M. Jr, Theory Construction, (New York, 1969)Google Scholar; Milbrath, Political Participation.

⁴¹ For full details of this procedure, see Kenneth D. Hart, “Social Structure and Political Participation: A Critical Response,” Institute for Behavioural Research, York University (forthcoming).

⁴² Both views on the appropriate development of a scientific enterprise are set out in Popper, Karl R., “Three Views Concerning Human Knowledge,” Contemporary British Philosophy (London, 1956), 350–88.Google Scholar We would not, of course, take issue with the statement that higher level generalizations in a deductive theory are inherently more difficult to verify than lower level ones.