1 See Desveaux, James A., Designing Bureaucracies: Institutional Capacity and Large-Scale Problem Solving (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994)Google Scholar; and Bruce Doern, G. and Toner, Glen, The Politics of Energy: The Development and Implementation of the NEP (Toronto: Methuen, 1985).Google Scholar

2 Toner, Glen, “Passionate Politics: Canada's Green Plan for Social Change?” Ecodecision 1 (1991), 31–35Google Scholar.

3 In 1974, the Department of the Environment became Environment Canada, as part of the Trudeau government's effort to incorporate more bilingual terminology into the federal lexicon. However, the old acronym “DOE” continues to be used.

4 Rayside, David A. and Lindquist, Evert A., “Canada: Community Activism, Federalism, and the New Politics of Disease,” in Kirp, David and Bayer, Ronald, eds., AIDS Policy in Eleven Industrialized Nations: Passion, Politics, and Policy (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1992)Google Scholar; “AIDS Activism and the State in Canada,” Studies in Political Economy 39 (1992), 37–77CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Lindquist, Evert A. and Rayside, David A., “Federal AIDS Policy for the 1990s: Is It Too Early for Mainstreaming?” in Abele, Frances, ed., How Ottawa Spends, 1992-93: The Politics of Competition (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1992)Google Scholar.

5 By the term successful, we are not referring to the content of the final design. Significant changes in policy direction are bound to be accompanied by clashes over what constitutes the appropriate policy stance. Nevertheless, we think our analysis is salient for two kinds of critics of such interventions. Critics who claim comprehensive policies were not bold enough should consider whether there was sufficient capacity to design a more ambitious programme. Critics who believe the policy went too far should look for future circumstances when such capacity has been created, and think about how to neutralize such capacity from inside and outside the government. For critiques of the content and implementation of the interventions discussed in this article, see Toner, Glen, “The Green Plan: From Great Expectations to Eco-Backtracking…to Revitalization?” in Phillips, Susan D., ed., How Ottawa Spends, 1994-95: Making Change (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1994), 229–260Google Scholar; Foster, Peter, The Sorcerer's Apprentices: Canada's Super Bureaucrats and the Energy Mess (Don Mills: Collins, 1982)Google Scholar; Carmichael, Edward A. and Stewart, James K., Lessons from the National Energy Program (Toronto: C. D. Howe Institute, 1983)Google Scholar; and Kinsman, Gary, “Managing AIDS Organizing: ‘Consultation,’ ‘Partnership,’ and the National AIDS Strategy,” in Carroll, William K., ed., Organizing Dissent: Contemporary Social Movements in Theory and Practice (Toronto: Garamond, 1992), 215–231Google Scholar.

6 See Rittel, H. W. J. and Webber, Melvin W., “Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning,“ Policy Sciences 4 (1973), 155–169CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

7 SeeSimon, Herbert A., “The Architecture of Complexity,” in Simon, Herbert A., ed., The Sciences of the Artificial (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1969), 84–118Google Scholar; and La Porte, Todd R., “Organized Social Complexity: Explication of a Concept,” in La Porte, Todd R., ed.. Organized Social Complexity: Challenge to Politics and Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1975), 3–39Google Scholar.

8 Schulman, Paul R., Large-Scale Policy Making (New York: Elsevier, 1980), 135Google Scholar.

9 Schulman, Paul R., “Nonincremental Policy Making: Notes Toward an Alternative Paradigm,” American Political Science Review 69 (1975), 1334–1370CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

10 According to Kingdon, problems move up the policy agenda as a result of shifting national mood, indicators of the extent of the problem, key events, resolution of other problems (thereby freeing up scarce resources) and, quite simply, chance. See Kingdon, John W., Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies (Boston: Little, Brown, 1984).Google Scholar

11 Many problems may be of sufficient magnitude to provoke public concern, but the distribution of their impact will shape public pressure and determine the scope of problem-solving activities. Their impact can be concentrated-affecting particular regions, certain economic sectors, or a few social groups more than others-or, it can be relatively dispersed, affecting most citizens more or less equally. Affected groups will have different capacities not only to identify and respond to problems but also to launch effective representations to authorities. The organizational capacity of affected groups will not only determine the kind of political pressure that policy makers can expect as they attempt to design interventions, but also the breadth of the intervention, since it must in some way satisfy the affected parties. See Olson, Mancur, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971)Google Scholar; and Moe, Terry M., The Organization of Interests: Incentives and the Internal Dynamics of Political Interest Groups (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980)Google Scholar.

12 There were several major environmental incidents from the mid-1980s onward which contributed to this explosion of interest in the mainstream of Canadian society. They included, for example, the chemical explosion in Bhopal, India, the chemical spill in the Rhine River, the garbage barge from New York that was not permitted to dock, the PCB fire in Quebec, the discovery of holes in the ozone layer of the atmosphere, the Chernobyl nuclear plant accident and increasing concern about disappearing rainforests and global warming.

13 SeeSchulman, “Nonincremental Policy Making.”

14 During 1988, the Conservative government was criticized constantly in the press, in part because both the prime minister and the minister of the environment had indicated concern about the environment but had taken little concrete action. Likewise with AIDS: there was extensive support for an AIDS strategy outside government, even editorial support from the Globe and Mail, a newspaper that more often than not was supportive of the government. In the case of energy policy, economic nationalists were successful in convincing the Canadian public that the high degree of foreign ownership in the oil and gas industry was a key factor shaping energy policy. Knowledge of this public perception motivated the Liberal party strategy for the 1980 election campaign and the Liberal government's design of the National Energy Program.

15 Incrementalists, such as Lindblom, label such activity “rational-synoptic-comprehensive decision-making” with the intent of discrediting such efforts. Like Etzioni, we acknowledge that nonincremental decisions or fundamental decisions are demanded and made, but we avoid equating nonincremental decisions with the notion of rational decision-making. While the term nonincremental decisionmaking has merit, it does not capture the essence of the decision-making challenge in a positive manner. See Lindblom, Charles E., “The Science of ‘Muddling Through,’” Public Administration Review 19 (1959), 79–89CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Etzioni, Amitai, “Mixed Scanning: A ‘Third’ Approach to Decision Making,” Public Administration Review 27 (1967), 385–392CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

16 On the problem of innovation in organization, see Wilson, J. Q., “Innovation in Organization: Notes Towards a Theory,” in Thompson, James D., ed., Approaches to Organizational Design (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1966), 195–218Google Scholar; Rowe, Lloyd A. and Boise, William B., “Organizational Innovation: Current Research and Evolving Concepts,” Public Administration Review 34 (1974), 284–293CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Downs, George W. Jr and Mohr, Lawrence B., “Conceptual Issues in the Study of Innovation," Administrative Science Quarterly 21 (1976), 700–714CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Wilson, James Q., “Innovation,” in Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It (New York: Basic Books, 1989), 218–232Google Scholar. This literature seems to worry more about whether organizations are generally more innovative rather than focusing, as we do, on what is required to design and approve a particular innovation. See Rowe and Boise, “Organizational Innovation,” on the climate and strategies for innovation.

17 Rowe and Boise, “Organizational Innovation,” 285.

18 Thompson, Victor A., “Bureaucracy and Innovation,” Administrative Science Quarterly 5 (1965), 1–20CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

19 Wilson, Bureaucracy, 221.

20 Throughout this study, “centre” refers to the prime minister and close political and bureaucratic advisors in the Prime Minister's Office (PMO), the Privy Council Office (PCO), the Department of Finance and the Treasury Board Secretariat. These departments and agencies are generally known as “central agencies” and their location and functions are distinct and separate from those of “line” departments. For an extensive treatment of central agencies in Canada, see Campbell, Colin and Szablowski, George J., The Super-Bureaucrats: Structure and Behaviour in Central Agencies (Toronto: Macmillan, 1979)Google Scholar; and Campbell, Colin, Governments under Stress: Political Executives and Key Bureaucrats in Washington, London, andOttawa (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983)Google Scholar.

21 See Wilson, “Innovation in Organization,” 196.

22 See Polsby, Nelson W., Political Innovation in America (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

23 Rowe and Boise, “Organizational Innovation,” 289. Mohr, “Conceptual Issues,” also recommended that analysts identify distinct types of innovation.

24 Edelman, Murray. The Symbolic Uses of Politics (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1964)Google Scholar.

25 As part of larger austerity measures, the 1991 budget extended the programme by one year, thus spreading expenditures over six years.

26 One of us has argued that the Green Plan should be viewed as a “first generation” environmental plan which will likely be followed by successively more detailed and stringent policies. In this view, in relation to the magnitude of the problem, the Green Plan is comparatively incremental in nature but nevertheless does represent a non-incremental policy response to a complex problem. See Toner, “Passionate Politics. ”

27 These partnerships, initiated by the federal government, would be in cooperation with provincial and territorial governments, industry, native and environmental groups and youth.

28 For AIDS, Health and Welfare Canada had to deal with the Medical Research Council, Corrections Canada, Canadian human rights commissions and the Department of Justice. For energy policy, EMR had to deal with the National Energy Board, the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs and the Department of Finance. For the Green Plan, DOE consulted with 40 federal government agencies. Perhaps even more important was the fact that much of the authority for dealing with all of these problems rested with provincial governments.

29 James Q. Wilson argues that most experts take up problem-solving tasks with a “prehistory” that reflects experience dealing with other, more limited and often decidedly different problems. See chapter 10 in Bureaucracy.

30 Schulman, Large-Scale Policy Making.

31 There is often considerable variation in culture, perspectives and autonomy not only across departments but also within departments.

32 See Mintzberg, Henry, The Structuring of Organizations (Toronto: Prentice-Hall, 1979), 431–467Google Scholar. Mintzberg also identified several other generic organizational structures (simple, professional bureaucracy, machine bureaucracy, divisionalized form), and outlined a variety of hybrid forms.

33 Ibid., 434,432.

34 Ibid., 434.

35 Ibid., 448.

36 Ibid., 437.

37 Ibid., 438.

38 Ibid., 457.

39 The very idea of administrative adhocracy is alarming to many who are concerned about checks and balances in bureaucracy, and norms of democratic accountability. For instance, in their article, “Adhocracy and Policy Development,” Francis Rourke and Paul Schulman point to two fundamental pathologies: the emergence of “rogue” organizations that set agendas and conduct policies outside normal channels, and therefore sidestep oversight procedures; and the fact that the “regular” departments and agencies may be allowed to atrophy as adhocracies encroach on their domains. The Rourke and Schulman article focuses on the pathologies associated with the expansion of the Executive Office of the President in the United States, and on special committees and commissions created by the Congress. While these are very legitimate concerns, our analysis deals primarily with Westminster-style bureaucratic systems whose structures are decidedly less politicized, and where the so-called permanent civil service is generally more flexible with respect to design changes and movement of personnel. Therefore, our concept of an administrative adhocracy is compatible with norms of democratic accountability, and serves to complement, rather than circumvent, the regular bureaucracy. See Rourke, Francis E. and Schulman, Paul R., “Adhocracy in Policy Development,” Social Science Journal 26 (1989), 131–142CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

40 We considered the idea of invoking the term “comprehensive design unit” instead, but decided that it would be preferable to build on a concept already in circulation.

41 See James A. Desveaux, “Farm Systems, Draft Choices, and Free Agents: Competing Styles of Leadership Recruitment and The Problem of Institutionalization,” paper delivered at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, 1989.

42 See Chandler, Alfred D., Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the History of the American Industrial Enterprise (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1962)Google Scholar; Child, John, “Organizational Structure, Environment and Performance: The Role of Strategic Choice,” Sociology 6 (1972), 1–22CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Desveaux, Designing Bureaucracies.

43 Schulman argues that public pressure can expand continuously and will outstrip the capacity of governments to produce an innovation because mobilizing expertise, security funds and assigning jurisdictions is a discontinuous process-it requires moving to a new threshold of activity. See “Public Policy vs Public Pressure,” in Schulman, Large-Scale Policy Making, 23-28. 44 See Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, 173-204.

44 See Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, 173–204.

45 Desveaux, Designing Bureaucracies, chap. 3.

46 Department of Energy, Mines and Resources, An Energy Policy For Canada: Phase I, 973.

47 For a detailed chronology, see Doern and Toner, The Politics of Energy, Appendix 1,495-505.

48 Department of Energy, Mines and Resources, An Energy Strategy for Canada: Policies for Reliance, 1976.

49 Simpson, Jeffrey, The Discipline of Power: The Conservative Interlude and the Liberal Restoration (updated ed.; Toronto: Macmillan, 1984)Google Scholar; and Bregha, François, Bob Blair's Pipeline: The Business and Politics of Northern Energy Development Projects (Toronto: Lorimer, 1979)Google Scholar.

50 Contrary to the arguments of observers like Peter Foster, officials within EPAS did not design the NEP in advance of the arrival of the Liberal government in October 1980. On this point, see Desveaux, Designing Bureaucracies: Doern and Toner, The Politics of Energy; and Foster, The Sorcerer's Apprentices.

51 The design of the EPAS adhocracy was also driven by EMR's previous negative encounters with the Alberta government on the Syncrude deal and Alberta's subsequent “manhandling” of then Prime Minister Joe Clark over energy policy.

52 One reason for the timidity of DOE was the lack of political will of the newly elected Conservative government. On the other hand, many policies adopted by governments, particularly during the Trudeau era, came in response to the entrepreneurial ideas of departments and key individuals.

53 M. P. Brown has noted that “Environment Canada stood…in the late 1970s as a department that had never quite jelled. It was as it had begun, a multiple dispersed unit with very few bonds between its separate parts, nationally or regionally Within the department and outside, there was a sense of floundering about after an evasive mission.” See Brown, M. P., “Environment Canada and the Pursuit of Administrative Decentralization,” Canadian Public Administration 29 (1986), 226CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

54 See Whittington, Michael S., “Department of Environment,” in Doern, G. Bruce, ed., Spending Tax Dollars: Federal Tax Expenditures. 1980-81 (Ottawa: School of Public Administration, Carleton University, 1980), 99Google Scholar.

55 Ibid., 105.

56 There were, of course, the usual complement of financial services, human relations and legal service and communications types as in any department. Three quarters of DOE staff are located outside the National Capital Region.

57 Doern, G. Bruce, “Johnny-Green-Latelies: The Mulroney Environmental Record,” in Abele, Frances, ed. How Ottawa Spends: The Politics of Competitiveness, 1992-93 (Ottawa: Carleton University Press. 1992), 359Google Scholar.

58 The Director General, Policy, position had been vacant for months. The policy development capacity consisted only of the ADM Policy who was the head of CPG, as well as a couple of lower-level officials. Moreover, relations between the ADM and the previous deputy minister had been strained.

59 These officials were intended, however, to be more than scrappy ambassadors for their services. They were expected to step out of their “service mentalities” and take a department-wide view of the environmental initiative.

60 The preparation of the Green Plan was haunted by the Conservative government's criticism of the Liberal's National Energy Program. Under the Mulroney government, the NEP was regarded as the model of how not to develop policy. Indeed, when it was revealed that several of the DOE team working on the Green Plan had been at EMR during the NEP era, there was considerable anxiety generated both within the government and industry. See Toner, Glen, “Stardust: The Tory Energy Program,” in Prince, Michael J., ed., How Ottawa Spends, 1986-87: Tracking the Tories (Toronto: Methuen, 1986), 119–149Google Scholar.

61 The information contained in this section is based on interviews conducted for the studies on Canadian AIDS politics, see note 4.

62 One responsibility of the NCA was to propose alternative organizational arrangements for handling AIDS.

63 For an alternative view of the success of this exercise, see Kinsman, “Managing AIDS Organizing.”

64 It is noteworthy that this was reported as being the first ever senior committee struck for policy purposes, lending additional support for our earlier observations that Health and Welfare Canada consisted of many islands of programmes and professional expertise.

65 Such pressure has been exerted on what many observers believe to be the most insular policy design process. See Lindquist, Evert A., “Citizens, Experts and Budgets: Evaluating Ottawa's Emerging Budget Process,” in Phillips, Susan D., ed., How Ottawa Spends, 1994-95: Making Change (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1994), 91–128Google Scholar.

66 For an excellent treatment of the role of policy entrepreneurs, see Meltsner, Arnold J., Policy Analysts in the Bureaucracy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976)Google Scholar; see also Desveaux, Designing Bureaucracies, chap. 1.