¹ The Operational Code of the Politburo (New York, 1951); A Study of Bolshevism (Glencoe, Ill., 1953). The “operational code” approach has been criticized for a failure to distinguish between official and operative ideologies. See Singer, J. David, “Man and World Politics: The Psycho-Cultural Interface,” Journal of Social Issues, XXIV (July 1968), 145.Google Scholar But one can also use the approach to assess whether (or to what extent) behaviour is consonant with expressed beliefs, rather than assuming a one-to-one relationship.

² “The ‘Operational Code’: A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making,” International Studies Quarterly, XIII (1969), 190–222. The ten questions which summarize George's version of the operational code are drawn from pages 201–16 of his essay.

³ Letter to author, Aug. 1961.

⁴ Included are Dulles’ writings during the three decades before he took office as Secretary of State and over four hundred press conferences, speeches, appearances before Congressional committees, and the like, during the years 1953–9.

⁵ Full citations may be found in footnotes 28, 32, 41, 45, 48, 49, 60, 67, 80, 93, 105, and 145 below.

⁶ Full citations may be found in footnotes 84 and 89 below.

⁷ Full citations may be found in footnotes 36, 96, and 104 below. There is at least one major gap here, however. I was unable to obtain a copy of Guhin's, Michael A. “The Political Philosophy of John Foster Dulles: An Examination of Its Foundations and Its Influence upon His Conduct of American Foreign Policy,” PH D dissertation, University of London, 1967Google Scholar, prior to finishing this paper.

⁸ Holsti, , “The Belief System and National Images: A Case Study,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, VI (1962), 244–52CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Holsti, , “Cognitive Dynamics and Images of the Enemy: Dulles and Russia,” in Finlay, David J., Fagen, Richard R., and Holsti, Ole R., Enemies in Politics (Chicago, 1967Google Scholar).

⁹ The most intensive and extensive summary of Dulles’, political philosophy can be found in his analysis of the causes of war, War, Peace and Change (New York, 1939Google Scholar). Some aspects of his thinking changed during the following decade, however; these are discussed below.

¹⁰ Ibid., 6.

¹¹ This general theme, with its undertones of Social Darwinism, was one of the most consistent and enduring of Dulles’ beliefs. See Dulles, , “Blessings of Liberty,” Vital Speeches Feb. 1, 1950, 231–6Google Scholar; and Dulles, , War or Peace (New York, 1950), 159.Google Scholar

¹² Dulles, War, Peace and Change, 10; Peaceful Change Within the Society of Nations (Princeton, 1936), 7.

¹³ War, Peace and Change, 27.

¹⁴ Dulles, , “Toward World Order,” in McConnell, Francis J., A Basis for the Peace to Come (Nashville, 1942), 32.Google Scholar

¹⁵ In 1937, for example, Dulles told a meeting of the Oxford Conference on Church, Community, and State that: “Before us today we have the spectacle of communism and fascism changing almost overnight the characteristics of entire peoples. Millions of individuals have been made into different, and on the whole, finer people. Elemental virtues are again treated as matters of concern. Immoralities and dishonestness, personal pride and prejudice are replaced by courage, self-sacrifice, and discipline. There is conscious subordination of self to the end that some great objective may be furthered.” Dulles, , “The Problem of Peace in a Dynamic World,” in Marquess, of Lothian, , ed., The Universal Church and the World of Nations (Chicago, 1938), 169.Google Scholar See also War, Peace and Change, 13.

¹⁶ “The Problem of Peace in a Dynamic World,” 150–1.

¹⁷ War, Peace and Change, 66–7.

¹⁸ Ibid., 35.

¹⁹ Ibid., 160.

²⁰ “An Interpretation of the Oxford Conference on ‘Church, Community and State,’” in Van Dusen, Henry P., The Spiritual Legacy of John Foster Dulles (Philadelphia, 1960), 17.Google Scholar

²¹ War, Peace and Change, ix-x.

²² Ibid., 22–3.

²³ The “false and inadequate solutions” are discussed in Ibid., 72–99.

²⁴ In 1925, for example, Dulles, said that in our “impulse to retain such wealth as we have” one could find the seeds of war. New York Times, Jan. 21, 1925.Google Scholar Aspects of economic determinism can also be found in War, Peace and Change, 121–3, 160.

²⁵ Ibid., 6–7, 12. See also Dulles, , “U.S. Military Action in Korea,” State Department Bulletin, July 17, 1950, p. 88Google Scholar; Dulles, , “Statement Before Committee I of the General Assembly,” ibid., Dec. 4, 1950, p. 909Google Scholar; Dulles, , “Statement at Caracas,” ibid., March 22, 1954, pp. 419–26.Google Scholar

²⁶ For further evidence on these points, see Holsti, “Cognitive Dynamics and Images of the Enemy,” 47–56.

²⁷ Dulles, , “News Conference, April 3, 1956,” State Department Bulletin, April 16, 1956, p. 642.Google Scholar See also Dulles, , “Policy for Security and Peace,” ibid., March 29, 1954, pp. 459–60Google Scholar; Dulles, , “Toward a Free Korea,” ibid., May 10, 1954, p. 706Google Scholar; Dulles, , “Report to President Eisenhower,” Ibid., Dec. 6, 1954, p. 850Google Scholar; and Dulles, , “Radio Interview in Canada,” Ibid., July 14, 1958, p. 61.Google Scholar Perhaps the clearest statement by Dulles on the relationship of ideology to action was in an open letter to Bertrand Russell, in Ibid., Feb. 24, 1958, pp. 290–3.

²⁸ Dulles, , “News Conference, Oct. 28, 1958,” Ibid., Nov. 17, 1958, p. 768.Google Scholar One of the many major points of difference between Dulles and the British government was that he felt “the British were too inclined to regard the Soviet government as another imperialistic Russian regime along traditional lines,” Drummond, Roscoe and Coblentz, Gastbn, Duel at the Brink (Garden City, NY, 1960), 163.Google Scholar

²⁹ For quantitative evidence on this point, see Holsti, “Cognitive Dynamics and Images of the Enemy,” 50.

³⁰ War or Peace, 8.

³¹ Ibid., 20.

³² Dulles, , “Reputation and Performance in World Affairs,” Vital Speeches, xv (1949), 446Google Scholar; Dulles, “World Brotherhood Through the State,” in Van Dusen, The Spiritual Legacy, 113; Dulles, , “U.S. and Russia Could Agree but for Communist Party's Crusade,” United States News and World Report, Jan. 21, 1949, p. 35Google Scholar; Dulles, , “The Challenge of Freedom,” State Department Bulletin, May 24, 1954, p. 780Google Scholar; Dulles, , “Television Interview in Great Britain,” Ibid., Nov. 10, 1958, pp. 734–5Google Scholar; and Berding, A. H., Dulles on Diplomacy (Princeton, NJ, 1965), 162.Google Scholar

³³ Dulles, “Oxford Conference,” in Van Dusen, The Spiritual Legacy, 21.

³⁴ Dulles, , “Remarks on the Japanese Peace Treaty,” State Department Bulletin, April 16, 1951, p. 618.Google Scholar

³⁵ Dulles, , “Challenge and Response in United States Policy,” State Department Bulletin, Oct. 7, 1957, p. 576.Google Scholar The same statement may be found in virtually all of Dulles’ theoretical discussions of international politics.

³⁶ Platig, Raymond E., “John Foster Dulles: A Study of His Political and Moral Thought prior to 1953 with Special Emphasis on International Relations,” PH D thesis, University of Chicago, 1957, pp. 302 ff.Google Scholar

³⁷ Dulles, “Oxford Conference,” in Van Dusen, The Spiritual Legacy, 192.

³⁸ Dulles, , “A Policy of Boldness,” Life, May 19, 1952, p. 154.Google Scholar

³⁹ Dulles, , “The General Assembly,” Foreign Affairs, XXIV (1945), 7.Google Scholar See also, Dulles, , “Peace is Precarious,” New York Times Magazine, Aug. 19, 1945, pp. 12Google Scholar ff; and New York Times, June 30, 1945.

⁴⁰ Dulles, , “The Christian Citizen in a Changing World,” in The World Council of Churches, The Church and International Disorder (New York, 1949), 82Google Scholar; and Congressional Record, 81 Cong., 1 sess., p. A5676.

⁴¹ Quoted in Robertson, Terence, Crisis – The Inside Story of the Suez Conspiracy (New York, 1965), 21.Google Scholar

⁴² Dulles, , “New Conference, Nov. 16, 1954,” State Department Bulletin, Nov. 29, 1954, p. 808.Google Scholar

⁴³ Dulles, , “Statement to the Senate, Jan. 14, 1959,” Ibid., Feb. 2, 1959, p. 152.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings, Jan. 28, 1959, p. 10.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ The Eisenhower Years: Affairs of State (New York, 1956), 59.

⁴⁶ Letter to author, Aug. 1961.

⁴⁷ Lisagor, Peter, “How Our Foreign Policy is Made,” New York Times Magazine, Sept. 28, 1958, p. 59.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ For further evidence of the “deep conflict in premises” between Eisenhower and Dulles, especially with respect to Soviet-American relations, see Brown, Seyom, The Faces of Power (New York, 1968), 86Google Scholar ff; Hughes, Emmet John, The Ordeal of Power (New York, 1963), esp. 104–16Google Scholar; and Larson, Arthur, Eisenhower: The President Nobody Knew (New York, 1968), 74, 80–81.Google Scholar The popular view that Dulles dominated American foreign policy during the Eisenhower years is questioned by at least one leading student of that period; Gerson, Louis L. has concluded that “Eisenhower played a more important role in foreign policy than Dulles.” Personal communication, July 1969.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ Churchill was bitterly angry at Dulles’ unwillingness to meet with the new post-Stalin Soviet leaders: “This fellow [Dulles] preaches like a Methodist Minister, and his bloody text is always the same: That nothing but evil can come out of meeting with Malenkov. Dulles is a terrible handicap. Ten years ago I could have dealt with him. Even as it is I have not been defeated by this bastard.” Quoted in Moran, Lord, Winston Churchill: The Struggle for Survival, 1940–65 (London, 1966), 508.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ Senate, Foreign Relations Committee, Hearings, Feb. 24, 1956, p. 19.Google Scholar

⁵¹ New York Times, Nov. 1, 1954.

⁵² Dulles, , “The Moral Initiative,” State Department Bulletin, Nov. 30, 1953, p. 744Google Scholar; Dulles, , “Statement Before Select Committee to Investigate the Seizure of the Baltic States,” Ibid., Dec. 14, 1953, p. 819Google Scholar; Dulles, , “Freedom – the Predominant Force,” Ibid., Feb. 2, 1959, p. 152Google Scholar; House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings, Jan. 28, 1959, p. 9Google Scholar; and Berding, Dulles on Diplomacy, 118.

⁵³ At his news conference of Oct. 28, 1958, Dulles revised his theory of Soviet “collapse” so that it in effect became synonymous with gradual evolution: “It is going to collapse through the fact that in the long run people are not going to allow themselves to be exploited, to be squeezed, merely to gain external conquests. The Government is going to have to adjust itself more to meet the demands of its own people.” Three months later he repudiated the theory of collapse: “Well, I am not sure that I ever said that they were riding for a fall. I said that I was confident that there would be an evolution within the Soviet Union away from the despotism, the tyranny, which has been characteristic of the early phases of communism…” Dulles, , “News Conference, Oct. 28, 1958,” State Department Bulletin, Nov. 17, 1958, p. 769Google Scholar; and, Dulles, , “News Conference, Jan. 27, 1959,” Ibid., Feb. 16, 1959, p. 223.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ For example in early 1956 he declared that “the result of the postwar decade has brought the Soviet Communists to a realization that they must bring their system closer to ours rather than the other way around, and that that process is going on at the present time … They have come to the conclusion that our method of doing things is better than theirs.” Senate, Foreign Relations Committee, Hearings, Feb. 24, 1956, pp. 56–7.Google Scholar

⁵⁵ Dulles, , “Our Foreign Policy in Asia,” State Department Bulletin, Feb. 28, 1956, p. 329.Google Scholar See also Dulles, , “Challenge and Response in United States Policy,” Ibid., Oct. 7, 1957, p. 571Google Scholar; and Dulles, , “Ending The Cold War,” Ibid., Feb. 16, 1959, p. 221.Google Scholar

⁵⁶ Dulles, , “Television Interview,” Ibid., Nov. 10, 1958, p. 734.Google Scholar

⁵⁷ Dulles, , “The Institutionalization of Peace,” Ibid., May 7, 1956, pp. 744–6.Google Scholar

⁵⁸ Dulles, , “Our Foreign Policy in Asia,” Ibid., Feb. 28, 1955, p. 329Google Scholar; Dulles, , “Principles and Policies in a Changing World,” Ibid., Dec. 8, 1958, p. 902Google Scholar; and Berding, Dulles on Diplomacy, 34.

⁵⁹ Senate, Foreign Relations Committee, Hearings, Feb. 24, 1956, p. 58Google Scholar; Dulles, , “News Conference, June 27, 1956,” State Department Bulletin, July 9, 1956, p. 50Google Scholar; Dulles, , “News Conference, July 16, 1957,” Ibid., Aug. 5, 1957, p. 229Google Scholar; Senate, Appropriations Committee, Hearings, Aug. 19, 1957, p. 610Google Scholar; Dulles, , “Statement at Opening of SEATO Council Meeting,” State Department Bulletin, March 31, 1958, p. 508Google Scholar; Dulles, , “The Strategy of Peace,” Ibid., May 19, 1958, p. 803Google Scholar; and Dulles, , “Address before National Press Club,” Ibid., Feb. 3, 1958, p. 160.Google Scholar

⁶⁰ Goldman, Eric F., The Crucial Decade – And After (New York, 1960), 250.Google Scholar

⁶¹ War or Peace, 174.

⁶² Dulles, , “The Task of World Peace,” Commercial and Financial Chronicle, Aug. 6, 1947, p. 749.Google Scholar

⁶³ See, for example, Berding, Dulles on Diplomacy, 7–8.

⁶⁴ Dulles, , “The Mutual Security Program – An Investment in Strength,” State Department Bulletin, May 23, 1955, p. 855.Google Scholar

⁶⁵ Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 2nd sess., 1952, XCVIII, part 2, p. 1801.

⁶⁶ Berding, Dulles on Diplomacy, 52–3. See also Gerson, Louis L., John Foster Dulles (New York, 1967), 306.Google Scholar

⁶⁷ Goold-Adams, Richard, John Foster Dulles: A Reappraisal (London, 1962), 94Google Scholar; Murphy, Robert, Diplomat Among Warriors (Garden City, NY, 1964), 377Google Scholar; Sulzberger, C. L., What's Wrong with U.S. Foreign Policy? (New York, 1959), 237Google Scholar; Roberts, C. M., “The Day We Didn't Go to War,” The Reporter, Sept. 11, 1954, pp. 11–12Google Scholar ff.; and Schick, Jack M., The Berlin Conflict, 1958–1962: American Foreign Policy Through Four Crises, forthcoming, chap. 2. The absence of planning in the latter two instances was described by Dulles’ successor, Christian Herter, in a seminar at Stanford University, Jan. 1962.Google Scholar

⁶⁸ Dulles, , “Look Here,” NBC Television, Sept. 15, 1957.Google Scholar See also Dulles, , “Our Policies toward Communism in China,” State Department Bulletin, July 15, 1957, pp. 93–4.Google Scholar

⁶⁹ Dulles, , “A Policy of Boldness,” Life, May 19, 1952, p. 152.Google Scholar This statement may be found in most of Dulles’ theoretical writings.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 154. See also Dulles, , “A Righteous Faith,” Life, Dec. 18, 1942, p. 50Google Scholar; New York Times, May 20, 1941.

⁷¹ This term is derived from Platig, “John Foster Dulles,” 153.

⁷² Dulles, , “The Importance of Initiative in International Affairs,” Vital Speeches, March 15, 1952, p. 334.Google Scholar See also Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 2nd sess., 1952, XCVIII, part 2, p. 1802.

⁷³ War or Peace, 75.

⁷⁴ Ibid., 240; Dulles, , “How My Faith Helped in a Decisive Hour,” Christian Century, March 19, 1952, pp. 36–7Google Scholar; Dulles, , “The Importance of Initiative in International Affairs,” Vital Speeches, XVIII (1952), 334.Google Scholar See also Gerson, John Foster Dulles, chap. 4.

⁷⁵ Dulles, , “The Goals of Our Foreign Policy,” State Department Bulletin, Dec. 13, 1954, p. 894.Google Scholar

⁷⁶ House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings, May 25, 1955, p. 20Google Scholar; Dulles, , “Address at Iowa State College,” State Department Bulletin, June 18, 1956, pp. 999–1000Google Scholar; and Dulles, , “New Conference, Oct. 2, 1956,” Ibid., Oct. 15, 1956, p. 580.Google Scholar

⁷⁷ Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, June 6, 1958, p. 795.Google Scholar See also Ibid., March 19, 1954, p. 5.

⁷⁸ See, for example, War or Peace, 99; Dulles, , “To Save Humanity from the Deep Abyss,” New York Times Magazine, July 30, 1950, p. 35Google Scholar; Dulles, , “Korean Problems,” State Department Bulletin, Sept. 14, 1953, p. 339Google Scholar; Dulles, , “Statement Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,” Ibid., Jan. 25, 1954, p. 133Google Scholar; Dulles, , “News Conference,” Ibid., Jan. 30, 1956, p. 155Google Scholar; and Shepley, James, “How Dulles Averted War,” Life, Jan. 16, 1956, pp. 70–80.Google Scholar

⁷⁹ Dulles, , “The Problem of Disarmament,” State Department Bulletin, March 12, 1956 p. 416.Google Scholar

⁸⁰ Full Circle (London, 1960), 71.

⁸¹ Dulles, , “Collaboration Must Be Practical,” Vital Speeches, Feb. 1, 1945, p. 248.Google Scholar

⁸² Dulles’, statement reported in the New York Times, July 9, 1957; andGoogle ScholarDulles, , “Our Policies Toward Communism in China,” State Department Bulletin, July 15, 1957, p. 94.Google Scholar

⁸³ Dulles, , “Statement at the San Francisco Conference,” Ibid., Sept. 17, 1951, p. 459.Google Scholar See also Dulles, , “The General Assembly,” Foreign Affairs, Oct. 1945, pp. 1–11Google Scholar; and Dulles, , “Ideals Are Not Enough,” International Conciliation, March 1945, pp. 134—5.Google Scholar

⁸⁴ A concise account of Dulles’ willingness to sacrifice the integrity of the State Department to placate the right wing of the Republican Party in Congress may be found in Morgenthau, Hans, “John Foster Dulles,” in Graebner, Norman A., ed., An Uncertain Tradition (New York, 1961), 297–300.Google Scholar See also Beal, John R., John Foster Dulles, 1888–1959 (New York, 1959), 139Google Scholar; New York Times, June 5, 1954; and Gerson, John Foster Dulles, 110–12.

⁸⁵ Platig, “John Foster Dulles,” 195.

⁸⁶ Miller, W. L., “Moral Force Behind Dulles’ Diplomacy,” Reporter, Aug. 9, 1956, p. 20.Google Scholar

⁸⁷ Dulles, , “Address Before American Society of International Law,” State Department Bulletin, May 8, 1950, p. 717Google Scholar; Dulles, , “A Policy of Boldness,” Life, May 19, 1952, p. 148.Google Scholar

⁸⁸ Dulles wrote this plank into the Republican platform. See also Dulles, , “Letter,” Commonweal, Oct. 3, 1952, p. 631Google Scholar; Dulles, , “Foreign Policy in the Presidential Campaign,” Foreign Policy Bulletin, Sept. 15, 1952, pp. 4Google Scholar ff; New York Times, Aug. 28, 1952; and Ibid., Sept. 4, 1952.

⁸⁹ For discussion of the lawyer's style and its effects on Dulles’ diplomacy, see Hughes, The Ordeal of Power, 205–6; Goold-Adams, John Foster Dulles, 223–4; Gordon Craig, “John Foster Dulles and American Statecraft,” in Craig, , War, Politics and Diplomacy (New York, 1966), 270Google Scholar; and Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, 384–5.

⁹⁰ Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, Jan. 15, 1953, pp. 15, 26.Google Scholar

⁹¹ Dulles, , “Recent Achievements of U.S. Foreign Policy,” State Department Bulletin, June 20, 1955, p. 993Google Scholar; and, Dulles, , “News Conference, Oct. 16, 1957,” Ibid., Nov. 4, 1957, p. 713.Google Scholar

⁹² Dulles, , “The Aftermath of the World War,” International Conciliation, April 1941, p. 267.Google Scholar

⁹³ Adams, Sherman, First-hand Report (New York, 1961), 89.Google Scholar A slightly different version of this quotation appears in Gerson, John Foster Dulles, 97.

⁹⁴ “The Problem of Peace in a Dynamic World,” 150–1.

⁹⁵ Observer, London, Nov. 11, 1956, quoted in Deadline Data on World Affairs, Dec. 9, 1960, p. 31.

⁹⁶ Compare, for example, Finer, Herman, Dulles Over Suez (Chicago, 1964Google Scholar), with Craig, “John Foster Dulles and American Statecraft.”

⁹⁷ Globe and Mail, Toronto, March 13, 1957; and Beal, John Foster Dulles, 258.

⁹⁸ Dulles favoured sending American troops to Lebanon although his brother Allen, head of the CIA, and other Eisenhower advisers, were opposed. Brown, The Faces of Power, 135.

⁹⁹ Quoted in Hughes, The Ordeal of Power, 119–20. See also Larson, 74.

¹⁰⁰ Hughes, The Ordeal of Power, 104–5, italics in the original. See also Larson, Eisenhower, 74–5.

¹⁰¹ Goold-Adams, John Foster Dulles, 127. See also Roy, Jules, The Battle of Dienbienphu (New York, 1965Google Scholar); and Tournoux, J-R., Secrets d'etat (Paris, 1960), 48Google Scholar ff. This offer is neither confirmed nor denied in any of the memoirs of the Eisenhower administration.

¹⁰² Quoted in Eden, Full Circle, 127. Taped interviews provided by associates of Dulles reveal that he was a leading advocate of the view that the West should keep a foothold in South Vietnam. New York Times, March 26, 1967.

¹⁰³ Brown, The Faces of Power, 84.

¹⁰⁴ Dulles, Rome-Taipei dossier, quoted in Cheng, P. P., “A Study of John Foster Dulles’ Diplomatic Strategy in the Far East,” PH D dissertation, Southern Illinois University, 1964, p. 451Google Scholar; and Gerson, John Foster Dulles, 211–13.

¹⁰⁵ For an elaboration of this point, see Dulles, Eleanor Lansing, John Foster Dulles: The Last Year (New York, 1963), 71Google Scholar; and Weinstein, Franklin B., “The Concept of Commitment,” Journal of Conflict of Resolution, XIII (1969), 52.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁶ Dulles told an associate that, “Of course, of all the things I have done, I think the most brilliant of all has been to save Quemoy and Matsu.” Hughes, The Ordeal of Power, 208, italics in the original.

¹⁰⁷ Dulles, , “Europe Must Federate or Perish,” Vital Speeches, Feb. 1, 1947, p. 235.Google Scholar See also Dulles, , “Thoughts on Soviet Foreign Policy and What to Do About It,” Life, June 3, 1946, pp. 112–18Google Scholar, and June 10, 1946, pp. 118–20; House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings, May 6, 1953, p. 182Google Scholar; and Dulles, , “News Conference, Oct. 16, 1957,” State Department Bulletin, Nov. 4, 1957, p. 710.Google Scholar Dulles did, however, entertain serious doubts about Nikita Khrushchev on this score. Berding, Dulles on Diplomacy, 52–3.

¹⁰⁸ War or Peace, 3.

¹⁰⁹ Dulles, , “An Estimate of Chinese Communist Intentions,” State Department Bulletin, April 4, 1955, p. 551Google Scholar; and Dulles, , “News Conference in Ottawa,” New York Times, March 19, 1955.Google Scholar

¹¹⁰ The Darwinian strain in Dulles’ thought contributed to the conviction that once an entity (including the communist empire) stops growing, it could not maintain the status quo, and therefore it must begin receding.

¹¹¹ House, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, June 13, 1956, p. 680Google Scholar; Dulles, , “News Conference, June 27, 1956,” State Department Bulletin, July 9, 1956, p. 48Google Scholar; Dulles, , “The Strategy of Peace,” Ibid., May 19, 1958, p. 803Google Scholar; Dulles, “Television Interview,” Ibid., Nov. 10, 1958, p. 735Google Scholar; and Berding, Dulles on Diplomacy, 32–3.

¹¹² Dulles’, Statement to Opening of Big Three sessions, New York Times, July 11, 1953Google Scholar; Dulles, , “News Conference, May 24, 1955,” State Department Bulletin, June 6, 1955, p. 914Google Scholar; Senate, Foreign Relations Committee, Hearings, Feb. 24, 1956 p. 19.Google ScholarDulles, , “The New Phase of the Struggle with International Communism,” State Department Bulletin, Dec. 19, 1955, p. 1003.Google Scholar See also Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, May 5, 1955, p. 15Google Scholar; Dulles, , “An Historic Week,” State Department Bulletin, May 30, 1955, p. 876Google Scholar; Dulles, , “Freedom's New Task,” Ibid., March 5, 1956, p. 363Google Scholar; and, Dulles, , “Developing the Atlantic Community,” Ibid., May 21, 1956, p. 834.Google Scholar For quantitative evidence on this point, see Holsti, “Cognitive Dynamics and Images of the Enemy, 56–9.

¹¹³ Hughes, The Ordeal of Power, 110.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., 137, italics in the original.

¹¹⁵ Adams, First-hand Report, 87. For a more detailed discussion of this point, see Davis, Saville R., “Recent Policy Making in the United States Government,” in Brennan, Donald G., Arms Control, Disarmament, and National Security (New York, 1961), 379–90.Google Scholar

¹¹⁶ For a detailed account of the pre-conference dialogue between Eisenhower, Dulles, Khrushchev, and Bulganin, see Davis, Paul C., “The New Diplomacy: The 1955 Geneva Summit Meeting,” in Hilsman, Roger and Good, Robert C., eds., Foreign Policy in the Sixties (Baltimore, 1966), 159–90.Google Scholar See also Berding, Dulles on Diplomacy, 20.

¹¹⁷ House of Representatives, Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, June 10, 1955, p. 10.Google Scholar See also War or Peace, 252.

¹¹⁸ See, for example, Goold-Adams, John Foster Dulles, 5–7.

¹¹⁹ Dulles, , “Developing NATO in Peace,” State Department Bulletin, April 30, 1956, p. 708Google Scholar; and Dulles, , “The Task of Waging Peace,” Ibid., Nov. 5, 1956, pp. 695–9.Google Scholar This point is also emphasized in Gerson, Louis L., “The Roots of Suez,” The Connecticut Alumnus Dec. 1967, p. 15.Google Scholar

¹²⁰ Dulles, , “Address Before National Press Club,” State Department Bulletin, Feb. 3, 1958, pp. 162–3Google Scholar; and, Berding, Dulles on Diplomacy, 23–4.

¹²¹ Dulles, , “News Conference, Oct. 16, 1957,” State Department Bulletin, Nov. 4, 1957, pp. 708–14Google Scholar; and, Dulles, , “Address before National Press Club,” Ibid., Feb. 3, 1958, p. 159.Google Scholar

¹²² Dulles, , “Morals and Power,” State Department Bulletin, June 29, 1953, p. 895.Google Scholar

¹²³ War or Peace, 16.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ Dulles, , “State Control Versus Self-Control,” Vital Speeches of the Day, XII (July 15, 1946), 595Google Scholar, quoted in Platig, “John Foster Dulles,” 101.

¹² War or Peace, 165–72; Dulles, , “Peace With Russia,” Christian Century, Aug. 25, 1948, p. 851Google Scholar; and Dulles, , “A Policy for Peace Insurance,” State Department Bulletin, May 29, 1950, p. 863.Google Scholar

¹²⁷ War or Peace, 239–41. See also Dulles, , “The Strategy of Victory,” State Department Bulletin, Jan. 13, 1958, p. 55.Google Scholar

¹²⁸ Taylor, Maxwell, The Uncertain Trumpet (New York, 1960), 65.Google Scholar

¹²⁹ Brown, The Faces of Power, 69–72, 120–1.

¹³⁰ “X” ( Kennan, George F.), “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” Foreign Affairs, July 1947, pp. 566–82.Google Scholar

¹³¹ Letter to the author, Aug. 1961.

¹³² War or Peace, 242. See also Dulles, , “The Challenge of Change, the Basic Philosophy, the Rationale, which Underlie U.S. Foreign Policy,” State Department Bulletin, June 23, 1958, pp. 1040–1.Google Scholar

¹³³ See Kennan, George F., American Diplomacy, 1900–1950 (Chicago, 1951Google Scholar), for a critique of the crusading style in American foreign policy. For Acheson, see David McLellan, “The Role of Political Style: A Study of Dean Acheson,” in Hilsman and Good, Foreign Policy in the Sixties, 229–56. This is not to say, however, that Acheson favoured a softer line against the Soviets than did Dulles. Indeed, during the Berlin “deadline crisis” quite the reverse was true. For an excellent discussion of this point, see Schick, The Berlin Conflict. Acheson's “hard line” is also evident in his recent memoir of the Cuban, missile crisis, “Dean Acheson's Version of Robert Kennedy's Version of the Cuban Missile Affair,” Esquire, Feb. 1969, pp. 76–7Google Scholar ff.

¹³⁴ Dulles, , “Confident of Our Future,” State Department Bulletin, Oct. 24, 1955, p. 640Google Scholar; and Dulles, , “Principles and Policies in an Changing World,” Ibid., Dec. 8, 1958, p. 902.Google Scholar

¹³⁵ Dulles, , “State Control versus Self-Control,” Vital Speeches, July 15, 1946, p. 594.Google Scholar

¹³⁶ Dulles, quoted in Goldman, The Crucial Decade, 250.

¹³⁷ George, “The ‘Operational Code,’” 200.

¹³⁸ See the references in n. 8 above.

¹³⁹ This appears true of beliefs 2, 6, 8, 13, 14, 16, 18, 19, 20, 24, 27, 31, 32, 35, 37, 39, 41. In some cases it is necessary to change the referent. Thus, the Soviet counterpart to belief 39 reads, “Power is the key to success in dealing with capitalist leaders.” There are also striking similarities (aside from the referent) in Dulles’ beliefs and those of many “New Left” groups; see, for example, beliefs 10, 14, 15, 16, 19, 26, 30, 32, 35, 39, 40, and 41.

¹⁴⁰ These questions are suggested by Rosenau's, James N. “Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy,” in Farrell, R. Barry, ed., Approaches to Comparative and International Politics (Evanston, Ill., 1966), 27–92.Google Scholar

¹⁴¹ John Foster Dulles: The Last Year, 179.

¹⁴² Barber, James D., “Classifying and Predicting Presidential Styles: Two ‘Weak’ Presidents,” Journal of Social Issues, XXIV (July 1968), 51–80.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁴³ Pp. 86–7. See also Dulles, , “The Road to Peace,” The Atlantic, CLVI (1935), 494.Google Scholar

¹⁴⁴ War or Peace (1950 ed.), 188–90.

¹⁴⁵ “Preface,” War or Peace (1957 ed.).

¹⁴⁶ Eisenhower, Dwight D., Waging Peace, 1956–1961 (Garden City, NY, 1965), 371–2.Google Scholar

¹⁴⁷ Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, 448. Some figures on the amount of time Dulles spent with Congressmen are presented in DeConde, Alexander, The American Secretary Of State (New York, 1963), 140.Google Scholar

¹⁴⁸ American Diplomacy, 1900–1950.

¹⁴⁹ In a debate on March 22, 1939, in which he was joined by Senator Burton K. Wheeler against James D. Warburg, who represented the “internationalist” position, Dulles, stated that, “Only hysteria entertains the idea that Germany, Italy, or Japan contemplates war upon us.” Quoted in the New York Times, Sept. 3, 1944.Google Scholar

¹⁵⁰ Gordon Craig concludes that the state of American public opinion required Dulles to adopt such language in his discussions of foreign policy. Craig, “John Foster Dulles and American Statecraft,” 271. The contrary and somewhat more convincing case is presented by Hans Morgenthau, who argues that Dulles, supported by President Eisenhower's immense popularity and prestige, was relatively free from constraints of public opinion. “John Foster Dulles,” 308.

¹⁵¹ One of the few systematic studies which sheds light on questions of this type concludes that role factors tend to outweigh personal ones. Rosenau, James N., “Private Preferences and Political Responsibilities: The Relative Potency of Individual and Role Variables in the Behavior of U.S. Senators,” in Singer, J. David, ed., Quantitative International Politics: Insights and Evidence (New York, 1968), 17–50.Google Scholar