¹ This article is concerned with the phenomenon of regional integration in Western Europe and North America rather than with political integration as a separate, distinct aspect. It does not argue that NAFTA is a form of political integration leading to political unification. Rather than viewing the European and North American experiences as unique because one contains an underlying commitment to political union and the other does not, this article sees them as variations on the theme of regional integration with differing levels of institutionalization.

² For an elaboration of a framework which uses such categories see the work of Cox, Robert W., “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory,” in Keohane, Robert O., ed., Neorealism and Its Critics New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 204–254Google Scholar, and Production, Power and World Order New York: Columbia University Press, 1987)Google Scholar.

³ The low/high politics distinction is prominent in traditional international relations literature. High politics was thought to involve the primary concern of states—the issue of war and peace, while other issues fell into the category of low politics.

⁴ For example, Huelshoff, Michael G., “Domestic Politics and Dynamic Issue Linkage: A Reformulation of Integration Theory,” International Studies Quarterly 38 (1994), 255–279CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Cronett, Linda and Caporaso, James A., “And Still It Moves! State Interests and Social Forces in the European Community,” in Rosenau, James N. and Czempiel, Ernst-Otto, eds., Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 219–289CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Keohane, Robert and Hoffmann, Stanley, “Institutional Change in Europe in the 1980s,” in The New European Community Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 1–39Google Scholar.

⁵ An intellectually coherent, but practically more difficult alternative strategy has been federalism, while other theorists have concentrated on the formation of community that does not undermine the traditional state (pluralists). See Pentland, Charles, International Theory and European Integration London: Faber and Faber, 1971)Google Scholar, chaps. 2 and 5.

⁶ Mitrany, David, A Working Peace System Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1966)Google Scholar.

⁷ The European Coal and Steel Community was formed by France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg in 1951. Its primary purpose was to create a common market for coal and steel. For details see Diebold, William, The Schuman Plan New York: Praeger, 1959)Google Scholar. Euratom was created at the same time as the European Economic Community and was designed to integrate the nuclear sector. Its operation has been frustrated by state desires to maintain autonomy in this delicate field.

⁸ These examples are taken from George, Stephen, Politics and Policy in the European Community (2nd ed.; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 21–23Google Scholar.

⁹ Haas, Ernst B., The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces, 1950–1957 Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958)Google Scholar; and Lindberg, Leon N., The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963)Google Scholar.

¹⁰ The Commission is the European Community's bureaucracy.

¹¹ Pentland, International Theory, 131.

¹² This was the question posed at the beginning of a collection of essays considering the responses of key member states of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development to the turbulence of the 1970s (Katzenstein, Peter J., ed., Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States [Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978], 3)Google Scholar.

¹³ Haas, Ernst B., The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975)Google Scholar.

¹⁴ See Keohane, Robert O. and Nye, Joseph S., “International Interdependence and Integration,” in Greenstein, Fred and Polsby, Nelson, eds., International PoliticsHandbook of Political Science, Vol. 8 Menlo Park: Addison-Wesley, 1975), 363–414Google Scholar; and Keohane, Robert O., Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition Boston: Little Brown, 1977)Google Scholar.

¹⁵ An influential collection of articles exploring regime theory was published in 1983 (Krasner, Stephen D., ed., International Regimes [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983]Google Scholar).

¹⁶ Tranholm-Mikkelsen, Jeppe, “Neo-functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete? A Reappraisal in the Light of the New Dynamism of the EC,” Millennium. 20 (1991), 1–22CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Mutimer, David, “1992 and the Political Integration of Europe: Neofunctionalism Reconsidered,” Journal of European Integration 13 (1989), 75–101CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁷ Keohane and Hoffmann acknowledge the limited applicability of spillover fromeconomic to political domains (”Institutional Change in Europe,” 18–22).

¹⁸ George, Politics and Policy in the European Community, 16.

¹⁹ Hoffmann, Stanley, “Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe,” Daedalus 95 (1966), 862–915Google Scholar.

²⁰ Keohane and Hoffmann, “Institutional Change in Europe,” 17.

²¹ Moravcisk, Andrew, “Negotiating the Single European Act: National Interests and Conventional Statecraft in the European Community,” International Organization 45 (1991), 66Google Scholar.

²² Hoffman, Stanley, “Goodbye to a United Europe?” New York Review of Books, May 27, 1993, 27–31Google Scholar.

²³ Cronett and Caporaso, “And Still It Moves!” 219–89.

²⁴ A review of the study of international political economy in British universities contrasts the inclusive nature of a global political economy approach with more traditional approaches in O'Brien, Robert, “International Political Economy and International Relations: Apprentice or Teacher?” in Linklater, Andrew and Macmillan, John, eds., Boundaries in Question: New Directions in International Relations London: Pinter, 1995), 89–106Google Scholar.

²⁵ Cocks, Peter, “Towards a Marxist Theory of European Integration,” International Organization 34 (1980), 1–40CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²⁶ Sandholtz, Wayne and Zysman, John outline the role of European companies in the 1992 process in “1992: Recasting the European Bargain,” World Politics 42 (1989–1990), 95–128CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Also see Bastiaan van Apeldoorn and Otto Holman, “Transnational Class Strategy and the Relaunching of European Integration: The Role of the European Round Table of Industrialists,” paper presented at the International Studies Association Conference, Washington, March 29, 1994.

²⁷ Gill, Stephen, “The Emerging World Order and European Change: The Political Economy of European Union,” in Miliband, Ralph and Panitch, Leo, eds., The Socialist Register 1992: New World Order? London: Merlin, 1992), 157–196Google Scholar.

²⁸ Tomlin, Brian W., “The Stages of Prenegotiation: The Decision to Negotiate North American Free Trade,” International Journal 44 (1989), 254–259CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²⁹ For a review of disputes in the areas of the National Energy Policy, softwood lumber and culture in the early 1980s, see Leyton-Brown, David, Weathering theStorm: Canadian-U.S. Relations, 1980–1983 Toronto: Canadian American Committee, 1985)Google Scholar.

³⁰ Crispo, John, ed., Free Trade: The Real Story Toronto: Gage, 1988), 16Google Scholar.

³¹ This strategy is examined below under “powerful epistemic community.”

³² Grey, Rodney de C., United States Trade Policy Legislation: A Canadian View Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1982), 8Google Scholar.

³³ Horlick, Gary N. and Oliver, Geoffrey D., “Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Law Provisions of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988,” Journal of World Trade Law 23 (1989), 5Google Scholar.

³⁴ Bello, Judith Hippler and Holmer, Alan F. refer to the role of multinational businesses in turning back a number of provisions of the 1984 Trade Act in “The Trade and Tariff Act of 1984: The Road to Enactment,” The Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws Washington: American Bar Association, 1987), 49–82Google Scholar.

³⁵ Destler, I. M., American Trade Politics: System under Stress Washington: Institute for International Economics, 1986), 125Google Scholar.

³⁶ For a detailed liberal economic Canadian critique see Rugman, Alan M. and Anderson, Andrew D. M., Administered Protection in America London: Croom Helm, 1987), 42Google Scholar.

³⁷ It is estimated that the Canadian steel industry spent over one million dollars in trade cases in 1983–1984, while the Canadian softwood lumber industry spent $11 million in legal and consulting fees in its unsuccessful fight in 1986–1987 (Rugman, Alan M., “U.S. Protectionism and Canadian Trade Policy,” Journal of World Trade Law 20 [1986], 373Google Scholar; and Percy, Michael B. and Yoder, Christian, The Softwood Lumber Dispute and Canada-U.S. Trade in Natural Resources [Halifax: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1987], 138Google Scholar).

³⁸ When American steel producers decided to limit European competition in 1982, they filed over 150 unfair trade petitions! In adopting similar tactics against newly industrializing countries in 1984, American steel officials admitted the aim was to make the burden of fighting legal cases so great that foreign producers would be happy to enter into negotiated trading practices (Destler, American Trade Politics, 130).

³⁹ The Question of Secure U.S. Market Access in the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement Toronto: Ontario Government, 1988)Google Scholar.

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⁴¹ Smith, Guy C., “The United States-Mexico Framework Agreement: Implications for Bilateral Trade,” Law and Policy in International Business 20 (1989), 655–681Google Scholar.

⁴² Rubio, Luis F., Rodriguez, Christina D. and Blum, Roberto V., “The Making of Mexico's Trade Policy and the Uruguay Round,” in Nau, Henry, ed., Domestic Trade Politics and the Uruguay Round New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), 186Google Scholar.

⁴³ See Gabriel, Ana Maria Perez, “Mexican Legislation Affecting the Maquiladora Industry,” in Fatemi, Khosrow, ed., The Maquiladora Industry New York: Praeger, 1990), 207–216Google Scholar.

⁴⁴ Scheinman, Marc N., “Report on the Present Status of Maquiladoras,” in Fatemi, , ed., The Maquiladora Industry, 22Google Scholar.

⁴⁵ Weintraub, Sidney, Transforming the Mexican Economy Washington: National Planning Association, 1990), 10Google Scholar; and Fatemi, “Introduction,” in The Maquiladora Industry, 4.

⁴⁶ Camil, Jorge, “Mexico's 1989 Foreign Investment Regulation: The Cornerstone of a New Economic Model,” Houston Journal of International Law 12 (1989), 1–22Google Scholar.

⁴⁷ For an overview of the radical change in Mexican policy see Dornbusch, Rudiger, “Mexico's Economy at the Crossroads,” Journal of International Affairs 43 (1990), 273–290Google Scholar, and Castañeda, Jorge G., “Salinas' International Relations Gamble,” Journal of International Affairs 43 (1990), 407–422Google Scholar.

⁴⁸ Newsweek, October 16,1989.

⁴⁹ Haas, Peter, “Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination,” International Organization 47 (1992), 3Google Scholar.

⁵⁰ Report of the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1985), see Vols. 1Google Scholar (especially 324) and 2 (especially 381). The view that the Commission's report drew its conclusions excessively from liberal economists and business presentations, casting other views aside, led to the publishing of Drache, Daniel and Cameron, Duncan, eds., The Other Macdonald Report Toronto: Lorimer, 1985)Google Scholar.

⁵¹ The characterization of Canada as a spoilt and lazy country is provided by a former chief of staff to Prime Minister Brian Mulroney in McQuaig, Linda, The Quick and the Dead Toronto: Viking, 1991), 108Google Scholar.

⁵² Hart, Michael M., “The Future on the Table: The Continuing Negotiating Agenda under the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement,” in Dearden, Richard G., Hart, Michael M. and Steger, Debra P., eds., Living with Free Trade Ottawa: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1989), 73Google Scholar (emphasis in the original). This view is also expressed by critics of the trade deal (see Warnock, John W., Free Trade and the New Right Agenda [Vancouver:New Star Books, 1988]Google Scholar).

⁵³ The decision of the Canadian Manufacturers Association to reverse its traditional stance and back a trade deal was also important as it allowed business to present a relatively united front on the issue. An overview of the BCNI's political impact on government policy can be found in Langille, David, “The Business Council on National Issues and the Canadian State,” Studies in Political Economy 24 (1987), 41–85CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁵⁴ The shift towards a free trade strategy and the coalescing of the business agenda and Conservative government's policies is explored in McQuaig, The Quick andthe Dead.

⁵⁵ Rubio, Rodriguez and Blum, “The Making of Mexico's Trade Policy,” 169–71.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 169–90.

⁵⁷ “Mexican Trade Negotiators Form an Elite Team,” The Financial Post Canada), May 03, 1991Google Scholar.

⁵⁸ Biersteker, Thomas J., “The Triumph of Neoclassical Economics in the Developing World: Policy Convergence and Bases of Governance in the International Economic Order,” in Rosenau, and Czempiel, , eds., Governance without Government, 102–131Google Scholar.

⁵⁹ A view of the election campaign is provided by three party strategists in Caplan, Gerald, Kirby, Michael and Segal, Hugh, Election: The Issues, the Strategies, the Aftermath Toronto: Prentice-Hall, 1989)Google Scholar.

⁶⁰ “Four Giants Disclose Pro-Free-Trade Donations,” Toronto Star, April 11, 1989Google Scholar. Companies acknowledging large contributions include Canadian trans-nationals Alcan, Noranda, Brascan, Maclean Hunter, the Royal Bank, Ford of Canada, Shell Canada, Texaco Canada and Gulf Canada Resources.

⁶¹ “Poor Back Opposition, Rich Support PCs,” The Globe and Mail Toronto), November 24, 1988Google Scholar.

⁶² See “Clinton Forms New Coalition to Win NAFTA's Approval,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly, November 20, 1993, 3181–3185Google Scholar.

⁶³ Weintraub, Transforming the Mexican Economy, 13.

⁶⁴ For an effective critique of the Mexican regime see Reding, Andrew, “Mexico: The Crumbling of the Perfect Dictatorship,” World Policy Journal 8 (1991), 255–286Google Scholar.

⁶⁵ Hellman, Judith Adler, “Mexican Perceptions of Free Trade: Support and Opposition to NAFTA,” in Grinspun, Ricardo and Cameron, Maxwell A., eds., The Political Economy of North American Free Trade New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), 193–204CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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⁶⁷ For details on the condition of Mexican labour see Botz, Dan la, Mask of Democracy Boston: South End Press, 1992)Google Scholar.

⁶⁸ For a preliminary assessment see Robinson, Ian, “The NAFTA Side Agreement on Labour Standards,” North American Trade as if Democracy Mattered Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, 1993), 37–46Google Scholar; and Levinson, Jerome I., The Labor Side Accord to the North American Free Trade Agreement Washington: Economic Policy Institute, 1993)Google Scholar.

⁶⁹ Charles Pentland speculated on the domestic implications for Canada of increased Canada-United States integration in “North American Integration and the Canadian Political System,” in Stairs, Denis and Winham, Gilbert R., eds., The Politics of Canada's Economic Relationship with the United States Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985), 95–125Google Scholar. While of interest to the present study, Pentland was engaged in answering a different question by focusing on the implication of established theory for Canada rather than considering the implications of North American events for international relations theories.

⁷⁰ Cecchini, Paolo, Catinat, Michael and Jacquemin, Alexis, The European Challenge 1992 Aldershot: Wildwood House, 1988)Google Scholar.

⁷¹ See, for example, Hollings, Ernest F., “Reform Mexico First,” Foreign Policy 93 (1993–1994), 91–103CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Hufbauer, Gary Clyde and Schott, Jeffrey J., “Prescription for Growth,” Foreign Policy 93 (1993–1994), 104–114CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁷² Toronto Star, April 10, 1994.

⁷³ Waltz, Kenneth, Theory of International Politics Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979)Google Scholar.

⁷⁴ For a general discussion of the possibility of overlapping interests in the state-firm relationship, see Dunning, John H., “Governments and Multinational Enterprises: From Confrontation to Co-operation?” Millennium 20 (1991), 225–244CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Strategies for the state in this environment can be found in Reich, Robert, The Work of Nations New York: Vintage Books, 1992)Google Scholar; Stopford, John and Strange, Susan, Rival States, Rival Firms Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Porter, Michael, The Competitive Advantage of Nations New York: Free Press, 1990)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁷⁵ See Gill, Stephen, ed., Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁷⁶ Cox, “Social Forces,” 207.

⁷⁷ Moravcisk employs intergovernmentalism in “Negotiating the Single European Act,” Mutimer turns to neofunctionalism in “1992 and the Political Integration of Europe: Neofunctionalism Reconsidered,” while Huelshoff tries to model state and domestic levels using the Social Charter as a case study in “Domestic Politics and Dynamic Issue Linkage.”

⁷⁸ This criticism is similar to that levelled at positivist international relations theory by Neufeld, Mark in “Interpretation and the ‘Science’ of International Relations,” Review of International Studies 19 (1993), 39–62CrossRefGoogle Scholar.