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Hayek, Liberalism and Social Knowledge*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 November 2009

Lawrence J. Connin
Lawrence J. Connin
Affiliation:
Penn State Altoona Campus
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Abstract

The Nobel prizewinner F. A. Hayek has spent his long career defending classical liberalism and the free market from those wishing to introduce planning and greater “rationality” into social life. As this study tries to show, Hayek's defence of market liberalism is predicated on his theory of social knowledge and how liberal principles and processes are best suited to cope with our limited ability to utilize this knowledge. He argues that we can cope best with our ignorance by resisting the temptations to set up centralized decision-making mechanisms and by accepting the discovery procedure of the market mechanism. Unlike other attempts to defend classical liberalism, Hayek offers a radically new knowledge-based foundation. If Marx's work could be labelled an economically-based sociology, Hayek's work could be labelled an epistemologically-based politics. But is his epistemological defence simply an ideological move to defend against attacks levelled at capitalism, or has he provided an indisputable foundation to justify the maintenance of liberal orders?

Résumé

F. A. Hayek, lauréat du prix Nobel, s'est consacré pendant sa longue carrière à défendre les thèses du libéralisme classique et de la libre entreprise contre ceux qui prônent la planification et une structuration sociale plus rationnelle. Nous nous proposons dans cette étude de montrer que la défense du libéralisme de marché par Hayek est basée sur sa théorie du savoir en société selon laquelle, étant donné nos capacités limitées à exploiter les connaissances existantes, il convient mieux d'y appliquer les principes et precédés libéraux. Selon son raisonnement, nous pouvons pallier à notre ignorance en ne cédant pas à la tentation d'établir des techniques générales de prise de décision et en acceptant le mode de découverte du processus spontané du marché. À l'encontre d'autres tentatives de défense du libéralisme classique, Hayek apporte un fondement tout à-fait nouveau basé sur la connaissance qu'il a de la société. Si l'oeuvre de Marx est une sociologie à base économique, celle de Hayek se présente comme une politique à base épistémologique. Se peut-il que sa défense épistémologique ne soit qu'une apologie idéologique pour contrecarrer les critiques du capitalisme? Ou y décèle-t-on un fondement incontestable pour justifier le maintien de l'ordre libéral?

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique , Volume 23 , Issue 2 , June 1990 , pp. 297 - 315
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Political Science Association (l'Association canadienne de science politique) and/et la Société québécoise de science politique 1990

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References

1 Laski, Harold J., The Rise of European Liberalism (London: Unwin Books, 1971), 17.Google Scholar

2 Ibid., 107.

3 See Hayek, F. A., “Kinds of Rationalism,” in Hayek, F. A., Studies in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), 82–95.Google Scholar

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6 Ibid.

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20 Ibid.

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23 Bartley, W. W., III, “Philosophy of Biology versus Philosophy of Physics,” in Radnitzky, Gerard and Bartley, W. W., III (eds.), Evolutionary Epistemology, Rationality, and the Sociology of Knowledge (Lasalle, Ill.: Open Court, 1987), 24.Google Scholar

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29 Ibid., 86.

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38 Hayek, “Kinds of Rationalism,” in Hayek, New Studies, 87.

39 Quoted in Ibid., 88.