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Duverger, Epstein and the Problem of the Mass Party: The Case of the Parti Québécois

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 November 2009

Harold M. Angell
Harold M. Angell
Affiliation:
Concordia University
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Abstract

With a theoretical framework based on Duverger and Epstein we examine the mass party and compare it to the cadre party. The Parti Québécois fits its criteria. In 1977 it imposed its fund-raising methodology on other Quebec parties by barring donations from moral persons. Only Quebec electors may now donate anything. Only the Quebec Liberal party has adapted. The hypothesis is that a loss in popularity leads to a loss of membership and a financial crisis. This may lead to a crise de conscience and a split in membership, leading to disintegration and defeat. Such a crisis shook the PQ from 1981 to 1985 and the defeat of December 2, 1985, was an inevitable consequence.

Résumé

Sous l'angle de la théorie de Duverger et Epstein concernant les notions de parti de masse et de parti cadre, le Parti québécois est ici considéré comme étant un parti réunissant les critères du party de masse. Dans cette perspective, en 1977 il impose aux autres partis son mode de financement notamment en interdisant tout don de « personnes morales »; autrement dit, seuls les électeurs québécois peuvent y contribuer ou faire un don. (Le Parti libéral du Québec a d'ailleurs adhéré à ce régime.) L'étude tend à démontrer qu'une perte de popularité entraîne une perte du nombre de membres et par conséquent une crise financière. Ce phénomène peut aussi conduire à une crise de conscience, voire une scission parmis les membres menant à la désintégration et à la défaite. Une telle crise a ébranlé le Parti québécois entre 1981 et 1985 et explique en partie la défaite du 2 décembre 1985.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique , Volume 20 , Issue 2 , June 1987 , pp. 363 - 378
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Political Science Association (l'Association canadienne de science politique) and/et la Société québécoise de science politique 1987

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References

1 The edition used here is the 3rd English edition, Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State (London: Methuen, 1964), trans, by Barbara and Robert North, esp. 60-71.Google Scholar

2 Published as “The Structure and Function of the Finances of the Ralliement des Créditistes,” in Studies in Canadian Party Finance (Committee on Election Expenses; Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1966), 405-57.

3 Ibid., 408-09.

4 Duverger, Political Parties, 63.

5 Ibid., 27.

6 For further argument on this point see Angell, H. M., “Le financement des partis politiques provinciaux du Québec,” in Lemieux, V. (ed.), Personnel et partis politiques au Québec (Montreal: Boréal Express, 1982), 80.Google Scholar

7 Duverger, Political Parties, 63.

8 Ibid.

9 Ibid.

10 Ibid.

11 The Gazette, April 26, 1983.

12 For a cogent argument on these lines for Canada, see Paltiel, K. Z., Political Party Financing in Canada (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1970), 161.Google Scholar

13 Duverger, Political Parties, 64.

14 Ibid.

15 Ibid.

16 Chief Electoral Officer of Canada, Report Respecting Election Expenses 1984, Ottawa, July 15, 1985, 1.Google Scholar

17 Directeur-général des élections du Québec, Rapports Financiers pour 1984, Sainte-Foy, Québec, mai 1985, 63–72 and 184.Google Scholar

18 Election Expenses 1984, 2.

19 A good description of the activity of such a party in Canada is provided by Gray, Charlotte, “A Liberal Education,” in Saturday Night, March 1986, 14.Google Scholar She writes: “In January 1983 Liberal party president Iona Campagnolo struck a committee to discuss reform proposals. Its interim discussion paper, a year later, suggested that long years in office had made it ‘progressively easier for the party to slip into the role of simply an election machine, cranked up every four years, but largely dormant and ineffective in inter-election periods.’ There was hostility between the parliamentary wing and the rank and file.”

20 Duverger, Political Parties, 64.

21 Election Expenses 1984, 3.

22 Duverger, Political Parties, 65.

23 Ibid., 66.

24 Ibid., 110.

25 Epstein, L. D., Political Parties in Western Democracies (New York: Praeger, 1967), 246–47.Google Scholar

26 Directeur général du financement des partis politiques, Rapports de dépenses électorales, élections generates du 13 avril, 1981, Montreal, aÉut 1981, 14.

27 The Gazette, March 14, 1980.

28 R.S.Q..C.F–2.

29 On Quebec's “new class” concept see for example, Guindon, H., “Social Unrest, Social Class and Quebec's Bureaucratic Revolution,” Queen's Quarterly 71 (1964), 150–62.Google Scholar

30 No delegate convention was held, but all the members on the register as of August 15, 1985, would have the right to vote in a kind of general election of all PQ members.

31 September 30, 1985.

32 In the 1981 election 3.6 million valid votes were cast of a total of 4.4 million voters on the lists—a turnout of 82.5 per cent.

33 Duverger, Political Parties, 63.

34 Le Devoir, October 15, 1985.

35 The Gazette, October 28, 1985.

36 The Gazette, February 21, 1986, and The Globe and Mail, February 22, 1986.

37 “La caisse est É sec,” Le Devoir, October 2, 1985.

38 The Gazette, January 14, 1986.